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PROTECTED VILLAGES AND COMMUNAL VILLAGES
IN THE HOANG ANH PROVINCE OF TET (1968-1982)

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**PROTECTED VILLAGES AND COMMUNAL VILLAGES IN
THE MOZAMBICAN PROVINCE OF TETE (1968-1982)**

A History of State Resettlement Policies; Development and War

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ABSTRACT

Mozambique's Province of Tete offers, over the last century, a good example of the negative impact of state policies on local community development. Being a region historically deprived of significant investment, Tete became, since the early days of colonialism, an area where state and local community's economy were in direct confrontation, without the mediation of state and private plantations or other undertakings. In this context, state policies sought to achieve two main goals: on the one hand the establishment of mechanisms of political and administrative control over these communities; on the other to extract local produce and producers without transforming significantly the framework in which such communities assured the production and reproduction of their lives.

The analysis of this impact undertaken below is based on the concept of rural settlement patterns, in which the village represents a central role. The two processes discussed correspond to two major state attempts to alter these patterns by extinguishing community villages and resettling the rural population in villages of a new kind. Though run by two distinct states, the colonial and the independent, it is argued that both processes followed a somewhat similar path: both ignored or took little account of local perspectives; both attempted, through villagisation, to achieve local political and administrative control; both failed to base this profound change on the transformation of slash and burn agriculture which had characterised community economy until then. While the colonial state did not even attempt such transformation, the independent one did not achieve it.

The result was that an already fragile rural economy was deprived of vital factors such as, internally, land or customary organisation of production, and externally, access to the international market which played a fundamental role in it since early this century. Consequently, the chronic state of war experienced by the region has to be viewed in close connection with the imbalance provoked by such experiences which, far from creating development conditions, pushed the local rural economy back to dangerous levels of subsistence.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

referred to institutions and expressions used in the colonial [c] and post-independence [i] documentation and/or mentioned in the text

AA	Administrative Authorities [c]
AAC	Association of Former Nationalist Fighters (after <i>Associação dos Antigos Combatentes</i>) [i]
AAdm	Administrative Authorities [c]
AB	Aerodrome Base [c]
AC	Communal Village (after <i>Aldeia Comunal</i>) [i]
AdCirc	District Commissioner (after <i>Administrador de Circunscrição</i>) [c]
AdConc	District Commissioner (after <i>Administrador de Concelho</i>) [c]
AdPa	Local Administrator (after <i>Administrador de Posto</i>) [c]
Agricom	National Company for Agricultural Commercialisation [i]
AHM	Mozambique Historical Archives [ci]
<i>Ald</i>	Protected villages (after <i>Aldeamentos</i>) [c]
APE	Local Health Agent (after <i>Agente Polivalente Elementar</i>) [i]
APsic	Psychological Action (after <i>Ação Psicológica</i>) [c]
BA	Airport Base (after <i>Base Aérea</i>) [c]
BArt	Artillery Battalion (after <i>Batalhão de Artilharia</i>) [c]
BCaç	Hunters Battalion (after <i>Batalhão de Caçadores</i>) [c]
BCav	Cavalry Battalion (after <i>Batalhão de Cavalaria</i>) [c]
BCom	Commando Battalion (after <i>Batalhão de Comandos</i>) [c]
BDI	Bulletin for Divulging Intelligence (after <i>Boletim de Divulgação de Informação</i>) [c]
BI	Information Bulletin (after <i>Boletim de Informação</i>) [c]
BO	Official Bulletin (after <i>Boletim Oficial</i>) [c]
BR	Official Bulletin (after <i>Boletim da República</i>) [i]
Cadeco	Centre for Supporting Cooperative Development (after <i>Centro de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo</i>) [i]
CArt	Artillery Company (after <i>Companhia de Artilharia</i>) [c]
CCaç	Hunters Company (after <i>Companhia de Caçadores</i>) [c]
CCav	Cavalry Company (after <i>Companhia de Cavalaria</i>) [c]
CCom	Commando Company (after <i>Companhia de Comandos</i>) [c]
CCM	Mozambique's Army Chief Command (after <i>Comando Chefe de Moçambique</i>) [c]
CEP	Tete's Coordinating Body for the <i>Aldeamentos</i> (after <i>Comissão de Estudos e Planeamento</i>) [c]
CFM	Mozambique Railways (after <i>Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique</i>) [ci]
CIO	Southern Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Office
CIPCNAC	Inter-provincial commission for relief operations (after <i>Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais</i>) [i]
CNAC	National Commission for Communal Villages (after <i>Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunais</i>) [i]
COCAP	Commission for coordinating psychological action (after <i>Comissão de Coordenação da Ação Psicológica</i>) [c]
CODCB	Operational command for the defence of Cahora-Bassa (after <i>Comando Operacional de Defesa de Cahora-Bassa</i>) [c]
COFI	Operational command of mobile forces (after <i>Comando Operacional das Forças de Intervenção</i>) [c]
Com	Commando troops (after <i>Comandos</i>) [c]

Com	Communiqué [c]
ComSec F	Sector F Command (after <i>Comando Sectorial F</i>) [c]
CONCP	Coordination body of the nationalist movements of the Portuguese colonies
Coremo	Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (after <i>Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique</i>)
CPAC	Provincial commission for communal villages (after <i>Comissão Provincial das Aldeias Comunais</i>) [i]
CRED	Regional centre for experiment and development (after <i>Centro Regional de Experimentação e Desenvolvimento</i>) [i]
CTC	Central Territory Command (after <i>Comando Territorial Centro</i>) [c]
DF	Frelimo's Female Detachment (after <i>Destacamento Feminino</i>)
DGS	Portuguese Security Police (after <i>Direcção Geral de Segurança</i>) [c]
DINECA	National Directorate for Rural Commercialisation (after <i>Direcção Nacional de Comercialização Agrária</i>) [i]
Dinoproc	National Directorate of Collective Production (after <i>Direcção Nacional da Produção Colectiva</i>) [i]
DNH	National Directorate for Housing (after <i>Direcção Nacional de Habitação</i>) [i]
DPA	Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (after <i>Direcção Provincial de Agricultura</i>) [i]
FCX	Caldas Xavier Files at the AHM (after <i>Fundo de Caldas Xavier</i>) [c]
FGT	Tete Government Files at the AHM (after <i>Fundo do Governo de Tete</i>) [c]
FM	Moatize Files at the AHM (after <i>Fundo de Moatize</i>) [c]
FMA	Macanga Files at the AHM (after <i>Fundo da Macanga</i>) [c]
FPLM	Frelimo Military Forces (after <i>Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique</i>)
Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front (after <i>Frente de Libertação de Moçambique</i>)
GAP	Office of Psychological Action (after <i>Gabinete de Acção Psicológica</i>) [c]
GDT	Tete Governor or Government (after <i>Governador or Governo do Distrito de Tete</i>) [c]
GE	Portuguese military "special groups" (after <i>Grupos Especiais</i>) [c]
GEP	Portuguese military "special groups of parachutists" (after <i>Grupos Especiais de Paraquedistas</i>) [c]
GF	Frontier Guards (after <i>Guarda Fronteira</i>) [c]
GG	Mozambique's General Governor or Government (after <i>Governador or Governo Geral</i>) [c]
GIFOP	Office for information and formation of public opinion (after <i>Gabinete de Informação e Formação da Opinião Pública</i>) [c]
GODCA	Office for Cooperative Organisation and Development (after <i>Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas Agrárias</i>) [i]
GPZ	Office of the Zambesi Plan (after <i>Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze</i>) [c]
IDT	Tete Intendant (after <i>Intendente do Distrito de Tete</i>) [c]
IIAM	Mozambique's Institute for Agronomic Research (after <i>Instituto de Investigação Agronómica de Moçambique</i>) [c]
IN	Enemy (after <i>inimigo</i>) [c]
Info	Information [ci]
INIA	National Institute for Agronomic Research (after <i>Instituto Nacional de Investigação Agronómica</i>) [i]
ISANI	Files on Inspection of Administrative Services and Native Affairs at the AHM (after <i>Inspecção dos Serviços Administrativos e Negócios Indígenas</i>) [c]
ISum	Intelligence Summary [c]
MA	Ministry of Agriculture [i]
Manu	Makonde National Union (Mozambique)
Mecanagro	National company of agricultural machinery [i]
Mens	Message (after <i>Mensagem</i>) [ci]

MNR	Mozambique National Resistance
MOPH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing (after <i>Ministério das Obras Públicas e Habitação</i>) [i]
MR	Cabled message (after <i>Mensagem-Rádio</i>) [c]
NESAM	Association of African secondary students of Mozambique (after <i>Núcleo dos Estudantes Secundários Africanos de Moçambique</i>)
NF	Our forces (after <i>nossas forças</i>) [c]
NT	Our troops (after <i>nossas tropas</i>) [c]
OPsic	Psychological Operation (after <i>Operação Psicológica</i>) [c]
Pel	Platoon (after <i>Pelotão</i>) [c]
Perintrep	Periodical Information Report [c]
Pide	Portuguese security police (after <i>Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado</i>) [c]
PRE	Economic Rehabilitation Programme (after <i>Programa de Reabilitação Económica</i>) [i]
PP	Research request (after <i>Pedido de Pesquisa</i>) [c]
PSP	Police Corps (after <i>Polícia de Segurança Pública</i>) [c]
QG	Headquarters (after <i>Quartel General</i>) [c]
Renamo	Mozambique National Resistance (after <i>Resistência Nacional Moçambicana</i>) [i]
RI	Information report (after <i>Relatório de Informação</i>) [c]
RInfo	Information report (after <i>Relatório de Informação</i>) [c]
Ripeco	Information report [c]
RMM	Military Area of Mozambique (after <i>Região Militar de Moçambique</i>) [c]
RN	News report (after <i>Relatório de Notícia</i>) [c]
RS	Situation report (after <i>Relatório da Situação</i>) [c]
SAP	Services of psychological action (after <i>Serviços de Acção Psicológica</i>) [c]
SCCI	Services for intelligence centralisation and coordination (after <i>Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações</i>) [c]
SDAP	District services for psychological action (after <i>Serviços Distritais de Acção Psicológica</i>) [c]
SE	"Special Section" at the AHM (after <i>Secção Especial</i>) [ci]
SIC	Civil intelligence services (after <i>Serviços de Informações Cíveis</i>) [c]
SIM	Military intelligence services (after <i>Serviços de Informações Militares</i>) [c]
Sitrep	Situation Report [c]
s/d	undated (after <i>sem data</i>)
s/n	unnumbered
Supintrep	Supplementary Intelligence Report [c]
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
Udenamo	National democratic union of Mozambique (after <i>União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique</i>)
UDI	Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence
Unami	National Union for Independent Mozambique (after <i>União Nacional de Moçambique Independente</i>)
Unar	African national union of <i>Rumbézia</i> , the territory between rivers Rovuma and Zambezi (after <i>União Nacional Africana da Rumbézia</i>)
Unemo	National union of the students of Mozambique (after <i>União Nacional dos Estudantes de Moçambique</i>) [c]
ZOT	Tete operational area (after <i>Zona Operacional de Tete</i>) [c]

GLOSSARY

Aldeamento - Colonial protected village during the nationalist war.

Aringa - Fortified village.

Banja - Strict family; more widely, public meeting.

Bar - Portuguese settlement for gold mining.

Bele - Literally, breast; group whose distinct identity is the descent from the same woman.

Butaka - *Prazo* slave regiment regiment formed by *insakas*; *achikunda* village.

Cabanga - Alcoholic beverage.

Caderneta - Colonial identity card for Africans.

Calosera - Land between furrows.

Camblinha - Family refuge.

Canarim - Man of a Goanese descent.

Candongga - Black market.

Canhangulo - Rudimentary fire arm.

Cantina - Rural shop.

Capitania - Captainship.

Chigawo - Local segment of the matrilineage; neighbourhood; quarter.

Chigunda - Cultivated plot of a young couple.

Chikunda - Slave soldier of the *prazo* army.

Chirimambeta - Cultivated plot of a young maiden woman.

Cinamwali - Chewa ceremony for female initiation rituals.

Cingwirizano - "Work for work" mutual assistance.

Citengwa - Patrilocal marriage.

Colono - Formerly African farmer, the sense used in the text.

Dimba - Irrigated agriculture.

Fumo - Chief (same as *mfumu*).

Inhacuana - Chief.

Insaka - *Achikunda* group (10 to 12 soldiers).

Kulina - To cultivate, to work the land.

Landim - Originally, Nguni people; more widely, Africans.

Luane - House and surroundings; property.

Machamba - Cultivated plot, garden.

Machila - Hammock used to carry Europeans.

Machileiro - *Machila* carrier.

Mambo - Chief; paramount chief.

Mbumba - Sorority group; all sisters of the same family; matrilineage.

Mezimba - Large village (see *Muzinda*).

Mfumu - Chief.

Milando - Conflict.
Mowa - Home brewed beer.
Mphala - Rain fed agriculture; literally, second wife.
Mphanje - Newly cultivated plot ("first year" *machamba*).
Mtumbila - Land between furrows.
Mudzi - Village.
Mukazambo - *Achikunda* leader.
Munda - Garden, cultivated plot.
Munda ya ciweta - The chief's *machamba*, where every villager had to work some days per year.
Mussoco - Head tax.
Muzinda - Village, chief's village.
Muzungo - People with power and influence (originally, Europeans).
Mwene - Chief.
Mwini Dziko - Paramount chief.
Mwini Mudzi - Village headman.
Mukazambo - Leader of a *prazo* slave army.
Mussambadzi - Chief-trader of the *prazo*.

Ndomba - "Work for beverage" mutual assistance.
Nkamwini - Husband.
Nkhoswe - Lineage guardian, generally the woman's elder brother or uncle.
Nyau - Male secret society of masked dancers (acting particularly in male initiation ceremonies).

Pfuko - Totem of the matrilineal clan.
Pheresero - "Work for produce" mutual assistance, also referred to as *ganho-ganho*.
Poço - Daily food ration for African workers.
Pombe - Home brewed beer.
Pondo - Local corruption of the English word 'Pound'.
Prazeiro - *Prazo*-holder.
Prazo - Land conceded by the Portuguese king to a settler on the Zambezi valley.

Régulo - Local African authority invested by the colonial state.
Regedoria - Territory assigned to the *régulo* (also *regulado*).

Shirene - Local corruption of the English word 'Shilling'.
Sipai - African member of the colonial or *prazo* police.

Tsachikunda - The leader of the *insaka*.

Ulere - Free transport system for migrant labourers.

INTRODUCTION

a) The Subject and Structure of the Study

Presently, the Mozambican Province of Tete is emerging from an extended ten-year war which brought to the region, as a consequence, generalised chaos, particularly the death of a great numbers of its peasants, the displacement of the overwhelming majority and, broadly, intolerable living conditions for those who remained in the area. Looking back at the recent history of the region one finds as perhaps its most outstanding characteristic the constant movement of people. In the short period of the last fourteen years at least four major resettlement processes have occurred, not to count previous ones provoked by the process of colonial installation or present movement in the aftermath of the war. From 1968, scattered homesteads were violently aggregated in strategic villages which survived for six years, enveloped by a war context. Independence brought a rapid movement of dispersion followed, shortly after, by re-clustering of people in settlements of a new kind. These, in their turn, only lasted for a couple of years, hit by the recent war which disintegrated the pattern in the entire Province. Now, that the population is heading back to their areas, a new resettlement process will certainly take place, which in our view confers relevance to the study of such phenomena.

A first look reveals state policies, on the one hand, and war and natural disasters, on the other, as major causes behind this shifting. Therefore, the historical contexts which enveloped these policies and wars, as well as what they aimed at, seem to underlie the key questions to be posed. What also emerges is a people deprived of resources, both social and economic, to cope with the transformations involved in such processes, thus being prevented from acting as central protagonists. The understanding of this situation requires an analysis of the historical process which created the Tete peasantry and shaped their relationship with the state.

The selection of the present day Province of Tete demands some initial remarks, since the argument could be put forward that such a vast area can hardly be considered as a unity of study. It encloses radical socio-cultural differences among its peoples, particularly the ones separated by the Zambezi river (the matrilineal Maravi related peoples, in the north, and the

patrilineal Shona-Tawara in the south), or even important socio-economic differences, as for instance the ones between the Angónia population, who experienced some level of economic integration under the colonial rule, as opposed to the people from western Marávia or Zumbo, who apparently were kept in a highly marginal context. However, we will try to argue in the following chapters that affinities prevailed over differences. Firstly, because economic, social and cultural integration was a process so old as to precede the Portuguese arrival in the region, in the 16th century, as testified by the fact that riverine peoples were already developing mixed cultures based on commercial and cultural interchange. Secondly, because the territorial limits of Tete underwent few alterations throughout the last century, consisting in the inclusion or exclusion of some border areas, exchanged with the neighbouring territories of Manica and Sofala. Thirdly, because the characteristics of the territory, deprived of road communication and far from outlets to the international markets (unlike, for instance, Zambézia), as well as of capital to develop eventual farming or mining undertakings, reserved for Tete a particular place in the political economy of the region, based to a great extent on labour migration. Last but not least, because the territory and its people were administered by an "autonomous" provincial entity, intermittently from the days of colonial administration and definitely from 1952. It will be argued below that this factor conferred on the territory particular characteristics *vis-à-vis* other provinces of Mozambique.

It is the purpose of the present thesis to discuss the evolution of rural settlement patterns in the Mozambican Province of Tete, with particular focus on two major resettlement schemes fostered by the state, which came to be known as *Aldeamentos* and *Aldeias Comunitárias*. Although enveloped by radically different historical contexts, both processes can be broadly characterised as an attempt by the state, moved by objectives defined by itself, to alter completely the way the rural people occupy the territory - the existing rural settlement pattern.

As it is considered here, a rural settlement pattern is a broad common set of characteristics referring to one particular region, defining in a coherent manner how and why the people of this region occupy their territory. This is determined by the action of several factors, namely the way material production and reproduction of its conditions are organised in the rural area, in a context of concrete social relations. Such factors are not *given* but rather *constructed*, and in this sense a rural settlement pattern results from a sort of "sedimentation" of the historical process experienced by the communities involved.

The first and most tangible way in which a rural settlement pattern is presented is "physical", as a set of villages enclosed in a particular territory, even if these villages are reduced to their smallest proportions, as in the case of Tete rural households. In fact, the family only partially permits the understanding of the *rationality* of social functioning in this context. Besides being hard to define, it fails to explain aspects such as kinship ties, mutual aid systems or structures of political power, which perform a vital role in the organisation of local material life. The agricultural production unit, which is an abstract concept, always has a concrete form, in this case the village, which is therefore the point of departure of the analysis to be undertaken. The village (and the set of villages existing in one territory) permits the understanding of such agricultural units not only in themselves but also in connection with each other.

Moreover, as we will try to show below, the village seems to have been always at the core of the process of socio-economic transformation initiated early in the colonial period. The village was preserved while it fitted the colonial interests, firstly because surpluses could be extracted from it as it was set (it was a matter of improving the already existing channels), and later as a guarantor of labour survival, supplementing peasant economy and permitting rapid increases of absolute surplus extraction. In a second stage, when the limits of production increase, within the context of production organisation provided by the village, were reached, attempts were made to *transform* the village, generally into a larger human settlement where production could be re-organised within a more suitable framework which was to benefit from technological improvements and to guarantee more efficient labour control.

It is this period, initiated when state *direct* interference on the village started being attempted, which the present thesis aims at discussing. Generally, such transformations were preceded by the design of models of new villages to be installed, or models for rural settlement pattern. A model for rural settlement pattern, therefore, is considered here as a plan or a series of plans conceived by a state to be implemented in one territory, aiming at creating a new rural settlement pattern there. Under this perspective, the study of such a process ought to include: a) the rural settlement pattern which suffered the impact resulting from the introduction of the conceived models; b) the state, its objectives and structures when conceiving and directing the implementation of the programme; c) the programme in itself; and d) the results which ultimately came out, in terms of impact on local communities and of transformation of the previous rural settlement pattern.

The present thesis is structured in three parts. Part I entails a long but, in our view, necessary discussion of the colonial impact on the existing settlement pattern in Tete, in order to better comprehend the political economy of the region and particularly the nature of the communities who were to endure the two resettlement schemes. Parts II and III will deal directly with these resettlement schemes.

Consequently, Chapter 1 of our study discusses the *meaning* of pre-colonial Tete, particularly its integration in a wider socio-economic context and the factors shaping it physically. This discussion will be focussed on the case of the Chewa people (one of the most significant in northern Tete), given the lack of space to extend the discussion to other peoples who only briefly will be referred to. The study of the Chewa rural settlement pattern is, therefore, a necessary step in order to fully understand not only the *rationality* of its operation but also the impact of the colonial period, later on. As to the former aspect, in discussing the Chewa settlement pattern¹ we will attempt to show that though being apparently self-sufficient in terms of material production, its villages had close kinship connections with each other, as *parts* of a wider territorial unit ruled by the *Mwini Dziko*, the level from which the pattern can be fully understood. On the other hand, it will seek to examine the extent to which the social relations of production (including the family ties) closely worked to prevent the village from *growing* beyond a certain level, from which problems would appear which could not be resolved by the prevailing level of productive forces. One of the most important criteria defining this barrier was access to land in a poorly differentiated society in terms of productive activities, which could also be referred to as maintenance of the unity between the family residential and productive spaces, or at least of a *tolerable* distance between the two. It is probable that the new and smaller villages, with lands for everyone, tended to foster community harmony. On the contrary, the older and larger villages, with more inhabitants, more *tired* soils whose fertility could not be restored on the basis of the available technology, and consequently more limited access to lands, tended to develop social differentiation ruled by kinship ties, and conflict in general, which paved the way to population splits. It will be argued that this dynamic of permanent segmentation, associated to a great and critically needed accuracy in locating the most fertile lands, determined a pattern of scattered settlement composed of small shifting villages.

¹For a detailed discussion of the Chewa societies, see Langworthy 1969, Matos 1965, Rita-Ferreira 1966 and Segurado 1989.

But such a pattern is not likely to have existed without contacts with other territorial units, and even with other state systems.² Chapter 2 will therefore discuss the context of trade between the hinterland and the coast, with particular incidence from the 18th century, namely the struggle for the trade routes. Also included in this analysis are the first forms of colonial settlement, the *prazos* which, due in part to specific characteristics of the colonial power, developed semi-autonomously from the Portuguese colonial government. It will be questioned what parallel the major political shift provoked by their arrival had with changes in the socio-economic sphere and, broadly, in the settlement pattern. Apparently, such *prazo* forms operated in the region undermining the village economy from within but without transforming it fundamentally. The *prazeiros*, sometimes through measures to acquire local legitimacy but mostly through violent means which included the action of their private armies, replaced the African chiefs in their areas of influence but kept the same channels for exploiting local communities. Fed by the latter, the former could thus develop trade, particularly of ivory and slaves, to the extreme of capturing and exporting its own population when alternative sources were depleted. As a result of the expansion of this slave trade, the first half of the 19th century witnessed generalised chaos on the Zambezi valley through violent wars to which contributed the arrival of migrant waves of southern Ngoni. The settlement pattern, therefore, suffered convulsive transformations dictated by war. The villages of chiefs and *prazeiros* were transformed into strongholds to resist the attacks of enemies while many communities attempted to survive through wandering settlement. Agricultural production dropped and famine broke forth in a context aggravated by severe droughts.³

The following two chapters will discuss the period of formal colonial rule. Chapter 3 deals with the first quarter of our century, during which important processes took place concerning both the colonial settlement in general and the definition of the *place* of Tete in the colonial arena. Important colonial structures were established for administering the territory and bringing the peasantry into the space of the colonial state, the latter having the

²For the discussion of village as a category and of the relationship between African village and state, see Coquery-Vidrovitch 1981, 1985.

³See this particular focus in Newitt 1988.

role of integrating the former in the international market.⁴ As elsewhere in Africa, this was done mainly through the establishment of obligatory taxes. This process had particular characteristics in so far as Tete is concerned. Enclosed in the further hinterland, deprived of outlets to the international market as much as of capital for promoting agricultural and mining development, Tete was shaped as an immense labour reserve. Its peasants left the villages for seasonal and periodical work, particularly in Southern Rhodesia but also in South Africa and Zambézia, enduring a process of rapid semi-proletarianisation. This process was furthered by Salazar's *New State*, from the 1930s, which represented a shift toward a colonial policy mainly based on the attempt to make the colonies pay for the rapid accumulation of the metropolitan territory. This policy, accompanied by the attempt to maintain the colony as labour supplier, created in Tete a contradiction between the definition of its profile as a labour reserve and some attempts, albeit modest, to develop colonial agriculture in its lands. As will be argued, this resulted in the refinement of colonial pressure which profoundly transformed the community village.

Politically, the implementation of administrative authorities down to the local level, through the *regedorias*, was completed during this period, transforming former African authorities into actual agents of the state basically in charge of labour recruitment and tax collection. But the *regedorias* also meant a *false* preservation of the community territory, concerning its economic role. The establishment of smaller *regedorias*, in parallel with demographic increases, must have been related to the first signs of land shortage. However, this was a slow process, mitigated by the absence of a significant settler or plantation agriculture (if some eastern parts are excluded), which would imply competition for land between the *foreign* and the peasant sectors. Meanwhile, labour migration meant increased absence of men in the villages, and thus reduction of fallow periods and consequent soil impoverishment. On the other hand, a rural trade network, even if minuscule, was combined with the establishment of frontier markets in the neighbouring territories, and with the new habits brought by migrant labourers, *monetising* the village economy and encouraging

⁴Discussion around the definition of the concept of "peasant" in Klein 1980. "Most discussions of peasants are in agreement on the following variables: (1) Peasants are agriculturalists who control the land they work either as tenants or smallholders. Landless labourers are not peasants. (2) They are organised largely in household units which meet most of their subsistence needs. (3) They are ruled by other classes, who extract a surplus either directly (rent) or through control of state power (taxes). Peasants do not sell their labour the way workers do; they must provide a part of their production to those who control the coercive machinery of the state (...). (4) Peasant culture is distinct from, but related to, the larger culture of the dominated group" (p. 11). For the "pushing back" of the discussion on the peasantry to the pre-colonial context, see Ranger 1978:102-104.

production increases. As trade is not necessarily based on surpluses (on the assumption of produce available for market after community needs are assured), the increase in peasant output to the market occurred often at the expense of an impoverished diet and the weakening of the village economy in general. Though Tete was, in this period, a relatively important agricultural exporter, famines became recurrent in the villages.

Part II of the thesis will deal with the major resettlement scheme implemented by the colonial state in connection with the advent of the nationalist war for independence:⁵ the *aldeamentos*. Chapter 5 will examine this villagisation⁶ process as a fundamental element of colonial counter-insurgency in Mozambique, following what is considered as an international strategic tradition of counter-insurgency. The following chapters will deal more closely with the case of Tete: Chapter 6 will discuss state and villagisation; Chapter 7 will relate the programme with the unfolding of the war; and Chapter 8 will assess the impact of this process on local communities.

In spite of its short duration of six years (mid-1968 to mid-1974), the scheme of *aldeamentos* was certainly the most far reaching resettlement programme endured by the Province of Tete. Villagisation had been discussed since the 1940s, and even implemented in restricted areas with the purpose of increasing peasant production, as had been the case with cotton concentrations elsewhere in the colony. However no such attempts seem to have taken place in Tete, due to reasons indicated above. Broadly speaking, Tete peasant communities suffered, therefore, this kind of experience for the first time, one which had a profoundly negative impact, which will be analysed along three main lines: the first includes the problems raised by nucleation in itself, particularly the shortage of lands which appeared for the first time, at least in an acute manner; the second concerns the abrupt decline in the numbers of migrant labourers to Southern Rhodesia due to the war and consequent restrictions raised by the authorities of both countries, which had the effect of a *re-peasantisation* and of depriving the community economy of the supplementary role performed by migrant earnings; last but not least, the war wiped out the fragile trade network established in the area, with the

⁵For the study of the counter-insurgent forces in the war of independence see, particularly, Beckett 1985 and Henriksen 1983.

⁶Neologisms such as *villagisation* and *nucleation* have been used in the existing literature on these issues (see, for instance, Cohen & Isaksson 1987, Shao 1986, Thiele 1986). We consider here villagisation as concerning the whole resettlement process, and nucleation, more particularly, as the formation of population gatherings.

profound effect which can be surmised in a local economy already heavily dependent upon the market for some time. As a result, this process can hardly be discussed in the traditional frame of relations between colonial state policies and the African peasantry since, more than merely causing a reverse of the village economy towards subsistence patterns, it almost blocked the functioning of African rural communities, who became dependent upon the state, in many cases even for daily meals. It is a phenomenon which can only be understood in terms of an *interregnum*. Certainly, behind the mask of their propaganda, colonial authorities knew that such a situation could only be held for a short period, in which the military would try to win the war.

Wars, irrespectively of their nature, are phenomena which have been present throughout the history of Tete, particularly during the recent period under focus. Although they were different conflicts with different natures and origins, the fact is that they continued almost uninterruptedly in the region for almost two centuries, except for a short interregnum of little more than forty years, between the 1920s and the 1960s. Such recurrence makes it legitimate, in our view, to look for an articulation between conflict and rural settlement patterns, to study the extent to which war causes settlement transformation and vice versa. On the one hand, there is strong evidence of wars influencing the settlement pattern in the widespread emergence of *aringas*, strongholds replacing the villages of *prazo* landlords and African chiefs, from the 1800s, and particularly in the process of the *aldeamentos*. On the other, the case of settlement patterns contributing to the outbreak of wars is an hypothesis to take into account, particularly in the discussion of the recent and fierce war which hit the region.

The struggle for independence earned massive popular support from local communities in Tete, as in all the northern areas, for reasons not only political and ideological, broadly related with the liberation from colonial oppression, but more concretely because Frelimo had managed to develop popular solutions to the hardships faced during the struggle. Even if implying great efforts on the part of the peasants, the solutions were found in accordance with their view: the liberated areas controlled by the guerrilla forces had been basically organised in a dispersed manner (in fact it could not have been otherwise since large settlements would be easily detected by the colonial army), where even a basic trading system had been operating.

Usually, the population in the area is classified, in the period immediately after independence and according to their origins, into people from the *aldeamentos*, people from the liberated areas and refugees in the neighbouring countries now returning. While the people from the two latter categories generally tended to head to their home areas, where they resumed their lives by settling themselves in a dispersed manner, most of the population from the *aldeamentos* tended to do just the same, leaving the places where they had endured forced nucleation. The classification above, in not quantifying the three mentioned population sectors, hides the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Tete population (around 70% according to the estimates discussed in Chapter 6) came from the *aldeamentos*. The freeing of people from the *aldeamentos* was, not surprisingly, a central popular expectation in the aftermath of independence. This is why, in our view, the effort of Frelimo to keep the people in the *aldeamentos* in this period, trying to avoid great movements of population while its strategy for the rural areas was being defined, must have introduced a first element of ambiguity in the relationship between the movement and the peasantry, all the more because the *aldeamentos* had been always referred to, in Frelimo propaganda, as concentration camps.

But further arguments have to be sought for answering what seems to be the key question here: considering the genuine commitment of Frelimo and the new Government to transforming Mozambique's rural society and economy, putting an end to exploitation of man by man and imprinting a development dynamic based on economic growth, people's well being and transition to socialism, how was it that the development of rural society came to be almost completely blocked? The answers advanced so far seem to be placed somewhere between two extreme positions. The first argues that except for minor internal problems Mozambique's countryside was witnessing great developmental transformations until it was blocked by an external aggression through a proxy guerrilla movement. The second claims, on the contrary, that Frelimo rural policies, neglecting the peasants, were the ones to blame for the profound rural crisis: after independence a bureaucratic elite was emerging within Frelimo and the new Government, one which broke with the initial popular goals. As a result, Frelimo's popularity amongst the peasants sharply decreased and this was allegedly the reason for the outbreak of an *internal war*.

The last part of our thesis will discuss the *aldeias comunais* as the second major resettlement scheme in the area under study. Chapter 9 will deal with the programme at the

national level and in so far as the state strategy for development was concerned.⁷ It will argue that in spite of efforts to foster the programme, this was hampered by two major obstacles: one was the prevailing dualist perspective of a "modern" agricultural sector controlled by the state, in charge of a central role in promoting economic development, which relegated the peasantry, represented by the cooperative and family sectors, to a marginal place in the process;⁸ the second was the highly centralised planning perspective, formalised at the Third Frelimo Congress, which increasingly ignored peasant participation and imposed increasingly unrealistic targets to be achieved.

Chapter 10 will discuss the impact of the programme in Tete. It will argue that despite the radical difference in the nature of the popular post-independence state, from the colonial one, some of the negative consequences engendered by nucleation of people were continued and even aggravated. Difficult access to land continued to be felt not only for the reasons already operative in the former *aldeamentos* but also because of higher average numbers of inhabitants per nucleation and the fact that, as most of the *aldeias comunais* remained in the places of the former *aldeamentos*, the lands were already greatly exhausted.⁹ But our central argument will focus on another factor affecting the economy of the villages: The Government bias in favour of collective forms of production - particularly cooperatives - on which to base village economy was added to nucleation as a factor behind the hardships felt by the family sector. Not that such a bias was moved by anti-peasant policies, being, on the contrary, based on the concept of altering the relations of production as a means to foster productive forces and development (transition to socialism) in general. In this context, and at least until the Fourth Frelimo Congress,¹⁰ in 1983, the most that the household sector could get from the Government was being *tolerated*. On the other hand, the implementation of a standard formula for collective organisation, not departing from household mutual aid systems, for example, but rather conceived centrally, created the coexistence of two independent forms of production essentially competing with each other, at the village level. Moreover, cooperatives in a nucleated environment demanded a level of organisation and

⁷For the discussion of the African post-independence state see, for instance, Doornbos 1990.

⁸Wuyts 1989:53-67, in this respect.

⁹Detailed discussion of the impact of villagisation in household agriculture in Casal 1987, 1988.

¹⁰On the Fourth Congress as a turning point, re-evaluating the role of household agriculture, Saul 1985:112-113, Wuyts 1989:67-69.

technology beyond the reach of the community, one which the state proved being incapable of instilling. Meanwhile, the acceleration of the process on the basis of administrative criteria, particularly the *stimuli* from the central planning apparatus which took little account of local conditions, deferred strategic adjustments.¹¹ Since outputs of the cooperative sector remained little more than symbolic, the result was that far from being an alternative to household production in a context of community development, cooperatives brought further hardships, ultimately transforming the villages into a direct threat against the family economy, weakening food and economic security in general.

Of course it could be suggested that since the Tete programme of *aldeias comunais* had reached the relatively low level of 13 percent of the population at its most developed stage, in 1982, the reasoning above does not draw a representative picture of Tete peasantry. In this respect, we will argue that the strategy of the new regime, particularly after the Third Frelimo Congress, of centralising on a hardly effective state the role of provider of agricultural inputs and market services, acted contrarily to what was expected by the authorities and affected negatively both the household and cooperative sectors of the rural communities, whether living in *aldeias comunais* or in former *aldeamentos* and in dispersed settlement.¹²

In parallel, in 1982 Tete experienced a major drought and the first attacks of what would be a ravaging ten year-war conducted by Renamo, a proxy guerrilla movement supported by South Africa. A direct connection between the emergence of Renamo and manifestations of local protest would therefore seem probable, and in fact some authors aligned themselves with this interpretation. However, events in Tete demand, in our view, much more complex explanations, which will be discussed here only in so far as the first stage of the war is concerned (its development beyond 1982 will only partially be taken into account). First of all, because of the origins and nature of Renamo, clearly traced in late colonial attempts to influence the process and in the development of a regional strategy of

¹¹See, in this respect, Saul 1985:125.

¹²Wuyts 1989:63: "(...) the Mozambican peasantry was heavily dependent on wage income from migrant labour, and the post-independence situation quickly changed from one of labour shortage to one of rural unemployment. This eroded the basis of peasant agriculture and required an organized response which the state failed to make. State planning imitated colonial planning in so far as it started from the assumption that the peasantry was self-reliant enough to survive on local resources alone. Failure to analyse the patterns of labour utilization in the rural economy ensured the inability to comprehend that the peasantry depended on its integration within the monetary economy for survival."

South Africa towards destabilising the country, one which has prevailed until the present day. Renamo penetration into Tete, from the outside, can be dated and geographically located. Secondly, because popular protest against the transformation of socio-economic conditions in the countryside was still at an early stage, mechanisms still existed to respond to it at least in part, and consequently it could not explain the sudden escalation of the attacks, their simultaneous and generalised occurrence. Whatever the evolution of social protest may have been in different conditions, the fact is that when the war broke out such protest was still occurring *inside* the system and not challenging Frelimo's rule. Last but not least, Renamo's stand in the field did not reveal from the outset the slightest attempt to win the people to its cause. Destruction of economic and social targets remained practically as its only mission, which led local communities, in our view, to seek solutions outside a bi-polarised frame, surviving in refuges in the conflict areas, seeking protection in the environs of major towns or fleeing to neighbouring countries. The period covered by the present dissertation has as its limit the year of 1982, when Renamo's war destroyed almost half of the communal villages existing in Tete, giving way to an inexorable decline of the villagisation programme.

Finally, Chapter 11 will draw some conclusions on the impact of villagisation on local peasant communities. It will argue that despite the difference between the policies guiding the implementation of the *aldeamentos* and the *aldeias comunais*, the eventual results were much alike. Factors hampering local community development during the *aldeamento* process and related to slash and burn agriculture remained as major obstacles after independence. Most importantly, some of them still stand, in the present post-war *scenario*, as obstacles to be coped with by any resettlement attempt if local social stability and sustainable development are to be achieved.

b) The Sources

Our research benefited from both very adverse and very favourable conditions. The former were related with the war situation¹³ which prevailed in Tete (as well as in the rest of the country) over the research period. Field work was thus seriously hampered by security

¹³Recently, the region experienced pronounced changes, particularly as a consequence of the Rome Peace Agreement signed between Frelimo and Renamo, in October 1992. However, though hostilities came rapidly to a halt, the re-establishment of a climate of peace is much slower and an environment of great expectation prevails to present day, combined with occasional incidents.

conditions and almost entirely limited to the environs of the cities of Tete and Moatize, even if these were areas where an important part of Tete's *aldeamentos* and *aldeias comunais* were established. In order to overcome this obstacle, a programme of interviews was designed which, in addition to the account of occasional *common people* testimonies, was focused much more on *target persons* than on *target communities*.¹⁴ Certainly, the corresponding *bias* on archival sources rendered the search for local peasant views (as opposed, for instance, to state views) a much harder task to undertake.

However, on the other hand, we also benefited from very favourable conditions which included access (frequently at first hand) to important files both of the *Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique* (AHM) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), in Maputo, as well as of the colonial *Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze* (GPZ), housed by the Tete Directorate of Agriculture, in Tete. Amongst other advantages, the *hard data* presented permitted a permanent *quantitative approach* which was sometimes vital to the construction of our reading of the process. The AHM files facilitated the study of the *aldeamentos*, a process which due in part to the lack of sources received little attention in the past, not only from researchers¹⁵ but also from the new authorities after independence. This aspect, very important, is behind the fact that many adverse conditions created by the *aldeamentos* continued to prevail in the *aldeias comunais*.

Understandably, *archival coverage* of the post-independence period presents more problems for two main reasons. Firstly, events are much more recent and consequently the records are much more sensitive, in part because a war was ongoing. Secondly, the process of independence sharply decreased the *technical* capacity of the state, particularly in so far as production of documents is concerned. Notwithstanding this, access to files of central state departments such as *Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunais* (CNAC) and *Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas* (GODCA) was vital to the construction of our view of the important resettlement process after independence. Archival sources are organised in our Bibliography in main files corresponding to issuing entities and including numbers of boxes consulted.

¹⁴See interviews cited in the Bibliography. The corresponding tape-recordings and transcriptions were deposited in the *Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique*.

¹⁵Amongst the few, Jundanian 1974 and Henriksen 1983. For the Portuguese *aldeamentos* in Angola, Bender 1972.

Finally, also included in the bibliography are published and unpublished sources which influenced the development of our research. Some were of particular relevance. Langworthy 1969 remains perhaps as the most in-depth analysis of pre-colonial Chewa society, while Newitt 1973 provides a careful approach to the early colonial period on the Zambezi valley. Klein 1980 and Ranger 1978 give excellent accounts of the state of discussions on the peasantry, while Coquery-Vidrovitch 1981 and 1985 opens up convincing perspectives on the understanding of the African village. Doornbos 1990 provides a brief but sharp account of the debate on the African independent state, and Brito 1991 discusses the political and administrative perspective of the Mozambican one party state on the rural areas. Wuyts 1989 provides an accurate analysis of Mozambique's political economy in the first years of independence. Some doctoral theses focused on the *aldeias comunais*: Araújo 1988 and Almeida Serra 1991 have attempted general approaches to the programme, the former under a *geographical* perspective and the latter integrating it in a wider study of the political economy of post-independence Mozambique, while Roesch 1986 discussed a case study. Casal 1987 systematically analyses the impact of post-independence villagisation on rural household economy. Literature on the recent war which hit the country, though already abundant, is still at an early stage in part because of poor field research. Vines 1991 attempted the first *history* of Renamo. Martin & Johnson 1986 opened the discussion of the war as part of a wider South African strategy for the region while Geffray 1991 brought the discussion of the war into Mozambique's rural context. However, the unexplored ground is still vast. Particularly important seem the local *histories* of the war and the views and strategies of the rural population to cope with it. Some aspects have been advanced by O'Laughlin 1992b and Wilson 1992.

PART I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
COLONIAL RULE IN TETE

Chapter 1:

TETE PRE-COLONIAL RURAL SETTLEMENT

a) Introduction to Tete Population

The northwestern Mozambican province of Tete was historically occupied by three major groups of peoples, as a result of the expansion of adjacent African pre-colonial "empires" and also because of geographical factors, namely the ones dictated by the Zambezi river, which runs through the entire Tete territory from west to east. The vast area north of the Zambezi, with the exception of two Nguni pockets in the present day districts of Angónia and Macanga (which will be dealt with in Chapter 2), is occupied by matrilineal peoples of the so-called Maravi confederation, first referred to as such by ancient Portuguese explorers because of their supposedly common historical, cultural, linguistic and religious background.

The Maravi were generally considered as formed by three main peoples, namely Nyanja, Chewa and Nsenga.¹ Of the first one, only the Manganja (N'ganga) segment was settled in Mozambique, in the present day southeastern District of Mutarara.² As to the Chewa, who will deserve further attention in this Chapter, as a majority people, their two main segments were the Chipeta (historically submitted to the Ngoni after the latter invaded Angónia in the 19th century), and the Zimba, settled in the districts of Macanga and Marávia. Finally, the Nsenga, the third Maravi people, were settled in the present day western districts of Marávia and Zumbo.

The area south of the Zambezi was occupied by patrilineal groups with a common Shona origin centred in present day Zimbabwe and for centuries deeply influenced by the

¹Rita-Ferreira 1958:61-67.

²The two remaining segments, Nyassa and Nyanja proper, living in Malawi.

Zimbabwe culture and the Mwenemutapa. The Shona, who are widely installed in central Mozambique down to the Save river, are represented in southern Tete by two peoples, the Tawara, in the present day districts of Changara, Cahora-Bassa and Mágoè, and the Zezuro, in western Mágoè.³


Between the two main groups of people above, and following the line established by the Zambezi river separating them, several peoples were established. Their specific cultures were the result of the influence of both northern matrilineal and southern patrilineal peoples, as well as of the fact of the Zambezi being a corridor along which all sorts of contacts took place, as a privileged route for trade or military invasion. Along its margins were settled several peoples comprising, in Tete, Chikunda, scattered through the Aruangua, Zambezi and Shire valleys and having developed a warrior culture as a result of their historical role as a praetorian guard of the first colonizers; Nyungwe, sharing many characteristics with the former and located around the city of Tete; Sena, settled in low numbers in the present day district of Mutarara; Dema and Tande in southwestern Tete around Zumbo; Gova, in the Chicoa area; and Pimbe, on the left margin of the Zambezi between rivers Capoché and Mucanha.⁴

Of course such a territorial distribution is very simplified, having tended to be blurred in the course of time because of both natural neighbouring cultural contacts and the "levelling" role played by colonialism. The Zambezi valley cultures, presenting every possible blend between matrilineal and patrilineal cultures represent a good example of the powerful influence of such contacts. However, even if such differences are not to be ignored, it is possible to ascertain a common economic base for all these peoples in the slash and burn agriculture having the hoe as its main working instrument. This was historically organised in differentiated manners, and was supplemented by hunting and wild plant and fruit collection. In the following sections we will seek to define a pre-colonial pattern of rural settlement through the closer study of one of these peoples, the Chewa, arguing that this pattern was determined by cultural, economic and historical factors.

³Rita-Ferreira 1958:41-59, included the Tawara in the group of Peoples from the Lower Zambesi. Other Shona peoples settled in Mozambique are the Barwe, Manyika, Teve, Ndau (Shanga, Gova, Danda and Tombodji segments).

⁴Other peoples of the Zambesi complex included Chuabo, Podzo and Tonga. See Rita-Ferreira 1958:51-59.

MAP 1.1: TETE PEOPLES



b) The Chewa: Early History and Settlement

The peoples living in the northern territory of the present day Province of Tete, as well as in southern Zambia and almost all the territory of Malawi, have a common Maravi origin or were in some way affected by contact with the Maravi. The main protagonist of the process which led to their territorial arrangement in Tete was the Chewa State system of the Undi, flourishing between the 16th and 19th centuries.

The Maravi are said to have immigrated into the area from the Luba country, in northern Katanga, between 1200 and 1500, the date nearer to 1500 being more likely⁵. Some diluted traditions say that they came from further up, from Nigeria or even Sudan or Egypt⁶ but this must have to do with the origin of the whole Bantu peoples as the collective memory guards it. A 19th century source⁷ mentioned local testimonies recounting that their ancestors came from the Kazembe kingdom through the Great Aruangua, conquering all the tribes they came across, until they arrived into Lake Nyassa (Malawi) shores. Whether they came as a whole nation or, more plausibly, as a small group of chiefly invaders,⁸ the fact is that they appear to have imposed themselves on local Bantu-speaking agriculturalists and pygmy peoples, the *akafula*. On the shores of Lake Nyassa, near the mouth of Bua river, they allegedly founded a great kingdom ruled by Kalonga, which would be the nucleus of the Maravi peoples. Choma, remembered as the place where Kalonga settled, is also mentioned as the place of birth of the two main clans, the Phiri as the clan of the chiefs, the invaders, and the Banda as the clan of the rainmakers, connected with the local people. Carl Wiese, a German explorer of Tete in the late 1800s, wrote that "this surname Pire [Phiri] is probably not primitive either, because the Maravi tend to adopt the names of their mothers; thus we can assume that during their fusion with the conquered races they took it from one of them".⁹

⁵Langworthy 1973:IX.

⁶Matos 1965:81, quoting Assahel Jonassane Mazula (*História dos Nianjas*, 1962) and her own oral interviews.

⁷Wiese 1892:503-504.

⁸Newitt 1973:28.

⁹Wiese 1892:504. Responsibility for the translation of extracts of literature in Portuguese or French, whenever they are cited, remains with the author. Segurado 1989:69 also declines the widely accepted argument of the identification of Phiri and Banda with invaders and locals: "According to oral tradition, the

The causes and means of their imposition on these areas are also various. The military powers of Kalonga, the leader of the Phiri immigration, are not to be excluded as a reason, since he was probably capable of launching relatively large operations, but Maravi domination seems to have been due also to some superior skills such as the improved metallurgical techniques they brought, and the control of the leading cults and chief trade routes.¹⁰ Their own name, *Maravi*, would mean "People of the Flames" because of their particular ability in iron foundry in relatively improved melting furnaces.

According to some readings,¹¹ the Kalonga had his paramount position threatened about the 16th century, by another Maravi *mambo*, Lundo. The fact seems to have been that Lundo, based at the Shire valley, was in a much better position than Kalonga (who had remained in his settlement southwest of Lake Nyassa) to benefit from and control the Muslim ivory routes. The attempt of Lundo to dominate the ivory trade, thus defying the monopoly of Kalonga, may have been behind these struggles for supremacy. Consequently, the highly centralised system of Kalonga began suffering important segmentation.

At the beginning of the 17th century occurred a major split with the departure of Undi, who was either a real protagonist or a sort of title-name existing at the court of Kalonga. In his pertinacious study, Langworthy enumerates several explanations for the departure of the Undi.¹² While some versions recount that he was sent by Kalonga to rule over the people who had been left behind during the original migration, others say that Undi might have left because of population pressure and environmental problems such as the exhaustion of soils. According to the official version of the house of Undi, after the death of Kalonga Undi was passed over in the succession dispute by a young nephew of the king. Being both men of prestige and with a large following, quarrels started between Undi and the new Kalonga. Finally, Undi left, taking with him the bulk of the elders and all of the female Phiri relatives of Kalonga's family,¹³ thus creating future problems of succession in the

Banda/Phiri dichotomy is a model imported by royalty itself". To Banda was also associated the control of the ritual dance for male initiation, *nyau*, which has also a role in female initiation (*cinamwali*) and in the integration of the spirit of the defuncti in the ancestors' world (*bona*).

¹⁰Newitt 1973:28-29; Langworthy 1973:9.

¹¹See Alpers 1975:47-9.

¹²Langworthy 1969:159-61.

¹³Langworthy 1969:162.

household of Kalonga.

In his travels, Undi stopped at Chipeta, where he allegedly established some chiefs, and at Mano, near the confluence of the Vubue and Luia rivers, where he established his own nuclear kingdom. These two areas have been considered as the oldest of Undi's kingdom since he ruled there directly over the local territorial chiefs, with no tributary kings between the two levels. Much later, in 1889, Wiese met Undi in his village, located to the west of Mano, "at one day of march from the confluence of the Kapoche and Uatize [Luatize] rivers".¹⁴ From Mano Undi expanded in several directions, building a large number of tributary kingdoms under his power. Langworthy goes on saying that behind this expansion process three central reasons could be found: economic incentives, mainly related with the ivory trade with the Portuguese, who were taking the place of the Arabs in the Zambezi valley; natural segmentation of royal lineages resulting in conflict within the ruling elite - an analogous process to the one which had led to the departure of Undi himself from the court of Kalonga; and the skilful leadership of the succeeding Undis.¹⁵ It would be in order to alleviate the tension in his household that Undi would send some defiant relatives to rule over newly conquered territories.

In the attempt to seize hold of important trade positions, Undi expanded towards the Shire valley and to the Zambezi, near some Portuguese settlements. As Lundo was declining, Undi established Biwi as his tributary king. In the movement towards the Zambezi, Undi was looking for a more suitable position to have direct trade contacts with the Portuguese.¹⁶ A little later he expanded resolutely to the west, absorbing the vast areas at the northwest of the present day Tete Province to the Aruangoa, in a process described by Wiese:

"Previous factions had split up before crossing the Aruangoa [the Lwangua and not the river elsewhere referred to as Great Aruangua, which is the present Aruangua, in the far west of Tete] avoiding the river and travelling down along its right margin until they arrived at the environs of the Zambezi, and wiping out also all the tribes they found, they built the great dynasty of Chiuié [Chewa] (...). Sons of Chiuié later crossed the Aruangoa and conquered a great part of Senga, Ucunda and Uiza areas".¹⁷

¹⁴Wiese 1892:556.

¹⁵Langworthy 1969:215.

¹⁶Langworthy 1969:211; 216.

¹⁷Wiese 1892:503-504.

Here, again, there might have been some connection of the expansion towards the Aruangua with the establishment of the Portuguese fairs of Feira and Zumbo. Throughout the Nsenga area some tributary kings were established under the authority of the Undi, as well as several territorial chiefs. However, some of the latter were not appointed directly by the Undi but by the tributary kings instead, or were integrated by their own initiative in the Undi's system.¹⁸ From this flexible process resulted a deep fusion of Chewa and Nsenga cultures.

Finally, the Undi's northern areas, south of Zambia, seem to have been integrated after this process, about the middle of the 17th century. There, Mkanda was included in the system as tributary king. However, this situation of a simultaneously centralised and segmentary power was not going to last long. If it was its segmentary structure and the external trade which had led to its growth, the further development of the very same factors would cause its decline. Some of these internal and external developments, considered by Newitt¹⁹ as being both symptom and cause for the brake up of the Maravi state system, will be considered next.

c) Social and Political Organisation: The Chewa Village

The question of the centralisation/segmentation of the Undi system requires further attention. The so-called "external" causes of his disintegration, more or less completed during the first half of the 19th century, were due mainly to the erosion caused by contact with the Portuguese and some African peoples attracted by trade, such as the Yao and Biza, as well as to Ngoni invasions, and to the increase of the slave trade, and will be discussed below. As to the "internal" causes, they seem to have a lot to do with the Chewa social rules, production systems and political organisation.

The institution of the clan, which might have been central to social organisation previously, when the Chewa people were less numerous, had lost its predominance in favour of the matrilineage, so that a more varying intermarriage could be possible, since within the

¹⁸Langworthy 1969:222.

¹⁹Newitt 1973:29.

clan its members were considered as brothers and sisters, thus being forbidden to marry among themselves. The clan had then remained as defining the common origin, whilst the matrilineage and its segments increasingly gained importance as the basic social element. While men and women bore the same totem (*pfuko*) or symbol of the common ancestor, only women could transmit the *pfuko* to their descendants.²⁰

The nucleus of the Chewa kinship structure was the *bele*, meaning a group whose distinct identity was the descent from a woman, being composed by that same woman, her unmarried sons, plus her daughters and the sons of the married ones. This group can be considered as the segment of a matrilineage. The *bele* descends from a senior segment and contains, in its young girls, the future junior segments. All the related segments are part of a matrilineage. A *bele* plus the husband of the "original" woman and the husbands of her daughters form what could be called the Chewa family unit.²¹

The marriage was matrilocal, meaning that the husband would come from other villages (sometimes form a different neighbourhood within the same village) to settle in the place of his wife (and reciprocally, that the men of the village would leave to marry elsewhere).²² As a foreigner and a mere procreator, the husband or *nkamwini* had a low status in the village, subordinated to the family of the wife. In case he was polygamous, which was very common, he would follow the rules of each wife's family, depending on the place where he was living at the moment. The major decisions in the *banja* (the strict family, including the husband, his wife and their children) were to be made on the outside, by the *nkhoswe*, the guardian of the matrilineage. The *nkhoswe* was an uncle or brother of the wife, usually the elder, chosen to protect her and her children while they were not grown up. Being himself a man, this means that generally the *nkhoswe* could, on his turn, marry and live away from the village. So, important decisions concerning the families of the village would come from the outside, from other villages, when the *nkhoswe* would be called to advise on decisions. Reciprocally again, the obligations of the husband towards his own matrilineage

²⁰Medeiros (ed.) 1988b.

²¹Langworthy 1969:8.

²²Patrilocal marriage, or *citengwa*, was also possible, though reserved for lineage chiefs and *kankhoswe* (or lineage guardians). According to Segurado 1989:59, patrilocal marriages occur even today amongst the Chewa in Mozambique, provided that an agreement was reached between the chiefs of the two parties and that explicit agreement was conceded by the head of the woman's lineage. Of course this has also to do with deep external influence over the years.

were stronger than the ones towards his own wife and children. Although being away from his village of origin, he would never lose sight of the affairs of his own matrilineage, particularly of his sisters, whose *nkhoswe* might be himself.²³

The role of the segments of matrilineage in organising the totality of social relations could be felt from the bottom-level of the Chewa society - the village, a space where social and political structures were coupled. The size of a Chewa village was variable, depending on factors such as the physical setting and its carrying capacity, mainly concerning water availability, land fitness, abundance of game, and others such as the capacity of its headman to gather followers around him. Ranging from a couple of dozen huts to around 400,²⁴ the village might have a core of only one segment of matrilineage or be large enough as to include several segments of different matrilineage, having as headmen, or *mwini mudzi*, the leader of the segment of the matrilineage which founded it (all segments had as headmen the brother of the founding woman or his son).²⁵ Thus, in terms of kin organisation of the inhabitants, the village was composed by the segment of the matrilineage which founded it, plus junior segments of the same matrilineage as well as segments of other matrilineages, and finally by the men who had joined it through marriage. Usually, the incorporation of segments of matrilineage other than the founding one was due to factors such as maladies and famine at the former home villages of the newcomers, or to good conditions offered by the village in terms of natural resources or political environment. The kinship organisation, always present, influenced all social and political life and ruled even the spatial setting. According to Langworthy, the Chewa village would appear as a confused and disorganised complex of huts, granaries, small cooking huts, pigeon and chicken coops, and pens for small stock, the only collective space being the one cleared for the village meeting, near the house of the headman, by the middle of the village.²⁶ But behind this casual appearance, with no limits or fences, the village was divided in *achigawo*, a sort of quarters or neighbourhoods determined by kinship and apparently composed of families of the same segment of a matrilineage.

²³Rita-Ferreira 1966:120.

²⁴Langworthy 1969:19.

²⁵Segurado 1989:60-61: "Amongst the Mozambican Chewa a traditional village would gather at least two lineages. Each one had its own chief, the village chief being the chief of the founding lineage".

²⁶Langworthy 1969:18.

The complex social structure was also the basis for the organisation of production. It determined the existence of several types of gardens around the village. According to Matos,²⁷ after the marriage the young couple would depend, for a while, entirely on the *machamba* of the parents of the woman. The couple had no autonomy at all and even the produce for man's consumption would come from the *machamba* or the kitchen of his mother-in-law. In some cases, they were allowed to open a small *chigunda* near the main *machamba* of the family, where they could grow some private products. However, before marriage, the young girl, besides helping the parents in their *machamba*, could also have a small plot, a *chirimambeta* or "maiden *machamba*", from where she could collect products for her own use or to receive her friends with. If this *chirimambeta* had proved to be good enough, the young couple could transform it in their family *machamba*, thus avoiding the work of opening a new one. Segurado described the position of the young couple as follows:

"[The land] distribution is not processed through a request to the headman but through the integration of the couple in the kinship scheme: the *nkhoswe* of the residential site would seek for the couple's first plot when the parents of the wife consider that the young husband is already capable of working by himself. Until then the couple had depended on the wife's parents for a while (...). When the young husband has revealed working skills through having worked for the mother-in-law, the couple's *kankhoswe* can negotiate their access to an "easy" land, i.e. a *machamba* which has been abandoned a short time before. Though production in that *machamba* will be poor, since if it was abandoned it was because it was not producing enough any more, its produce will enable the couple to organise the first *mowa wa kankhoswe*, i.e. the 'godfather's beer', made of maize produced by the couple and coming out from their own granary. This ceremony is very important since it proves the couple is now autonomous and from now can claim the access to a plot to be cleared, i.e. a normal *machamba*. (...) The choice [of the new plot] will be communicated to the lineage headman and to the village chief more or less formally. Such choice can not give way to conflicts and the young husband knows that he cannot choose the best lands if the number of candidates is high. He has not yet demonstrated he is capable of cultivating the hectare (average *machamba* area) by himself, or more accurately that he can clear one hectare in the two-month period preceding the seeding season. What generally happens is that he will not be able to clear what he was proposing himself but just half or three quarters of a hectare".²⁸

The Chewa peoples were considered as great agriculturalists among the peoples of the Zambezi valley, although they practised the classical itinerant agriculture not very differently from the other peoples in the region.²⁹ Both actual Marávia and Macanga territories, the

²⁷Matos 1965:93-97.

²⁸Segurado 1991: Personal Communication.

²⁹According to Ganitto, "The Marave busy themselves for the most part with agriculture, from which they gain their livelihood. Weavers, smiths, and basket makers, and those that practise other trades, do so mostly for amusement rather than as a way of life". Another interesting passage referring to the Tumbuka, a Chewa people, illustrates the importance of agriculture in everyday's life: "A curious thing happens here. The Tumbuka usually go to work between seven and eight in the morning, and whether to avoid the enemy's

homelands of the Chewa, were very rich zones of xerophilous forests. There were two main types of agriculture, one of them being rain fed and the other irrigated by natural processes, referred to by the Manganja people respectively as *mphala* and *dimba*.³⁰ The location of the more common rain fed *machamba* was chosen according to indications given by natural vegetation: being luxuriant was a sign that the land would be suitable for good agriculture. The first year crop would be planted over the ashes of burnt natural trees, thereby securing the fertility of the *mphanje* (the first year *machamba*). For the following years the fertility of the *machamba* would depend almost solely upon the ashes of burnt grass mixed with roots which had resisted the fire. Gradually, the *machamba* would get poorer during the following two or three years. After that period of time (which in case of exceptionally fertile or irrigated areas could be expanded to ten years or more), the family would have to move to new virgin lands. The "tired *machamba*" would not be abandoned then, in case there were planted fruit trees, and it seems that some practices aimed at delaying the process of soil exhaustion as the one in which the owner would keep on adding small new plots to his *machamba* on the sides, leaving the old ones in fallow. The more common crops were maize, pearl millet, sorghum, yams, beans, ground-nuts and bananas, with cassava usually encircling the plot. Inside, the crop was planted in prepared land between furrows, the *caloseras* or *mtumbilas*, and it seems that the only rotation method was to plant in the next season the crop of the *calosera* directly in the furrows and vice-versa.

The picture of an agricultural production firmly entrenched within the framework of the *banja*, the strict family, as described above, could induce a wrong idea of lack of cooperation between family members and neighbours. On the contrary, there were several forms of mutual assistance in all spheres of economic and social life. Eliseu and Medeiros referred to them in a detailed manner.³¹ Three main forms of mutual assistance could be enroled, as well as all sorts of variants between them: *cingwirizano*, or "work for work"

surprises, or to busy themselves in cultivation, all the people of the village go to the fields without exception of age or sex; and they leave the village deserted with the huts wide open. Nevertheless it is still quite safe because as soon as a stranger, black or not, appears, the dogs, hens, goats, pigeons and so on scamper off with a tremendous hubbub, at which the villagers know that some foreigner is about, and they go and take a careful look. This does not happen in just a few villages. It happens in them all". Gamitto 1960: 68, 148.

³⁰Alpers 1975:23-4.

³¹Eliseu and Medeiros 1991:176-181. In fact, the focus of the authors was on the Nyungwe communities located more or less around the city of Tete. However, the strong influence exerted by the neighbouring Chewa culture over these communities in all spheres of social and material life, legitimate in our view an identification of these aspects.

assistance; *ndomba*, or "work for beverage" assistance; and *pheresero* (more commonly *ganho-ganho*), or "work for produce" assistance. The first one occurred in order to perform certain works (particularly in agriculture) the family alone was not capable of undertaking in the length of time required, such as weeding the plot. An agreement was then made between the families in need, according to which all of them would participate in assisting each of them. The *cingwirizano* was therefore an agreement becoming possible when all the participating families had comparable needs in terms of labour, one which was considered as concluded when all the participants had been assisted. As to the "work for beverage" assistance, it occurred when a family needed labour for weeding their fields, clear a new *machamba* or harvesting, to transport harvests or building materials, or even to build a new house or granary. The family would then brew large quantities of beer (less frequently other beverages) to be distributed in equal parts amongst the participants in the work. Finally, the "produce for work" system occurred when the participation was compensated through food.

The village was a place in which there coexisted different segments of different matrilineages, often from different clans, as was already mentioned. Even if the internal dynamics of kinship ruled most of social life, the village, as place where different matrilineages confronted each other, was also the basic unit of political life beyond the strict limits of kinship. The headman of the segment which founded the village, besides his segment, headed also the village in a political sense. He was the *mwini mudzi* or *mfumu*, the leader. Of course, in a small village both kin and political questions tended to be more closely connected. A good head of lineage segment was a good head of village, since the segment, together with the men who had joined it through marriage, formed the village. But a larger village would demand from the *mfumu* the more political task of regulating the questions between segments of different matrilineage, in order to alleviate the social tension, which was his primary role. Besides, his wise action included the protection of the inhabitants from famine and plagues, from wars, and would be exercised also through his privileged access to the religious world. In this sense, a good *mfumu* would then be one who managed to gather a great number of followers in order to form a large village. But the individual role of the *mfumu* was also somehow restricted by the strong customary rules - which more than anyone else he was supposed to preserve - and by the superior authority of the *mwini dziko*, the territorial chief who delegated to the *mfumu* some important prerogatives such as the one of distributing the land.

But if the political role of a good *mfumu* could be simply defined through his influence in enhancing the centripetal forces to form a solid village, it was sometimes beyond his capacity to counter the centrifugal forces of the kin structure, which determined continuous change. We referred earlier the role of the *kankhoswe* as guardians of the *mbumba* (the "sorority group" formed by his sisters), who, living generally outside the village (in the villages of their wives) had though an important role in the conduct of the village matters through their influence on the attitudes and decisions of the *banjas* whose females enjoyed their remote protection. This is why "beyond the apparent organisation of the visible population nuclei, there [was] among them an underground network of interrelations and dependencies which [were] potential sources for conflicts"³² or solidarities. As hidden ties, these kinship networks interlinked the villages at the family level, fading the boundaries of the villages of the same territory. On the other hand, as argued by Segurado³³, the *mbumba* was in permanent conflict with the lineage for wedding control. A successful *nkhoswe* was one with a strategy for remaining in his village, assuring close control of his sisters and thus paving the way for heading his segment (or even the village) himself.

The village, thus, was not either defined in space (in the sense it did not correspond to a closed social group) or stable in time. The continuous fragmentation of the matrilineage in junior segments appeared as a process of countering the problems due to its excessive growth, which thwarted the control over it by their guardians and affected the familial harmony. This process took often the form of younger leaders of the matrilineage defying the elders and going away, in conflict or not, to start new segments in new settlements.³⁴ Thus, although being a well defined and "closed" space "physically" and politically speaking, the village suffered major and continuous factors that countered its closeness and stability. The apparently well defined and closed social structure of the village hiding its close kin ties with other villages, together with the growth of the village in terms of its population causing struggles for power that led to the departure of groups to form new villages, were thus factors which acted against the village being a permanent and stable settlement. Besides, the above was perhaps a "kinship adjustment" to the limits imposed by shifting agriculture which certainly played a vital role in this trend against stabilisation (the exhausted soils obliging

³²Matos 1965:89.

³³Segurado 1991: Personal Communication.

³⁴Langworthy 1969:12; Rita-Ferreira 1966:121-122.

people to move away in search of better lands, the impossibility of large human agglomerations), a trend which could not be countered by the relatively modest techniques of crop rotation aiming at extending the period of soil fitness. In broad terms, the role of the *machamba* in securing the people to the land was very relative, since an old *machamba* was by definition a poor and exhausted one, with no particular value to transmit by heritage processes, if the fruit trees were excluded.³⁵

The complex role of the *mfumu* in assuring social and political rule inside his village has already been referred to. He filled a sort of "gap" between the kinship world and the administrative and political world, deeply involved in both and having to harmonise them. If the *mfumu* can be considered as placed on the top of his matrilineage, on the other hand, he was on the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy, receiving from the territorial chief some prerogatives but having to canalise to him tributes and questions he could not settle.

d) The Chewa Territorial Organisation

As it was argued, the villages did not work on their own, either in terms of space, being interlinked with other villages through kinship ties, or in terms of time, tending to grow and split up in junior villages. A group of villages worked then as a network of simultaneously autonomous and interdependent elements. That network, which could grow or diminish in the course of time depending on various factors, existed inside a territorial unit with very well defined boundaries and being clearly distinct from neighbouring territories, headed by the *mwini dziko*. Some authors consider this territorial unit (the "space of the tribe", according to Rita-Ferreira) and its political organisation as having had a long and firmly entrenched history among the Maravi.³⁶

The territory was occupied by the historical community who owned it, the only one who had the right to live there, to cultivate the land and explore the waters, to cut the trees, to hunt and to collect. While for members of the community this was a pre-defined or natural right, for foreigners to settle in they first had to obtain authorisation from the territorial chief.

³⁵ Trees, for instance, were not considered as appendixes of land, as it is commonly acknowledged, but instead land was an appendix beneath the planted trees. See Matos 1965:102.

³⁶See, for instance, Alpers 1975:28-9.

While for Rita-Ferreira the territory belonged to the community and the *mwini dziko*, rather than an owner, was a sort of guardian of the land, securing the use of collective property according to the historic and social rule, Langworthy says that the chief was considered as owning the land.³⁷ In any case, the political legitimacy of the territorial chief appeared to be more complex than that of the *mfumu*. While for the latter it derived from the fact of heading the main segment of a matrilineage in a village (which made him head of the village), the former was not related to his people principally on the basis of kinship, but through the recognition both of the *mambo* above him and of the people of the territory (which could show non-acceptance simply by moving away and asking for protection from a neighbouring chief). We could consider then that the *mwini mudzi* was the guardian of basic social and political relations, while the *mwini dziko* was the "anchor" of the group to the territory. Although the *mwini dziko* might be the head of a preeminent matrilineage in the territory, he could also ascend to the post through being indicated by the *mambo* or paramount leader, which made his position a very political one.³⁸

The role of the *mwini dziko* was much wider than the one of just distributing the land to the village headmen. He was also responsible for the safety of his community and accumulated a range of legislative, executive, judicial, military and religious functions. Being assessed by people such as the *kankhoswe*, he called up the people to fight against external aggression; he solved serious internal conflicts which the village headmen could not cope with; he organised rain-calling ceremonies, appealing to the spirits to ensure productive harvests; he provided food to villages with failing harvests. To do all this he had to be a powerful man, and his power besides deriving from his legitimacy came from the tributes he collected. The true core of the political relationship between these two levels - village and territory - appears to be, then, the services provided against the tribute collected. The tribute paid by the villages included several items as ivory, tobacco, bear, animal skins, iron implements or foodstuffs from the *munda ya ciweta*, a specific *machamba* near the village where every villager was to work some days in the year, its products reverting to the *mwini dziko*³⁹ or to the village headman⁴⁰ or maybe to both in specific proportions. Langworthy

³⁷Rita-Ferreira 1966:55-9; Langworthy 1969:36.

³⁸Langworthy 1969:36.

³⁹Rita-Ferreira 1966:57.

⁴⁰Matos 1965:96.

insists on the fact that this tribute should not be considered as a rent to a landlord who absolutely controlled the land, in the European feudal sense, but instead as a recognition of the services of the chief in providing the land, and more important, in performing ritual duties to ensure the productivity of the land.⁴¹ More than that, the chief was supposed to cover the food shortages in the villages during periods of famine with products of his own stock, and would distribute the items obtained from the external trade, which he controlled entirely. Theoretically then, besides including a degree of peasant exploitation, this relationship appears as a sort of compromise between the territorial chief and his people - political life being organised in such a way that it could not work unless there was harmonious cooperation between the chief and his people. The village of the territorial chief, although with the same characteristics of the other villages, was larger and included both more kin and non-related adherents hoping for favour or eventual political and economic gain.⁴² The place was obviously more frequently visited by traders and explorers whose status as guests was supported by the chief with the products collected as tribute. It was also in the village of the chief that most of the people who enforced the rule in the territory lived.


Over a set of territorial chiefs ruled the Undi, himself a *mwini dziko* or *mambo* but with the complete autonomy of a true king. As a *mambo*, Undi ruled his nuclear kingdom at Mano, at the beginning. But with the expansion of his state system, he subordinated other *amambo*, integrating them in his system as tributary kings and ruling over them as paramount. Langworthy lists as main tributary kings of the Undi, at about 1700, Chifuka, Kalindawalo, Chofombo, Cachombo, Chimuara, Biwi, Kangulu and Mkanda.⁴³

Most of the powers of Undi, the paramount *mambo*, were identical to those of a territorial chief, but being exerted in a larger scale, either the ones derived from the property of the land or the religious ones. In this sense, Undi appointed a tributary king as the tributary king appointed his own territorial chiefs. But, of course, this bias in the difference of degree should be taken relatively, since Undi was the ultimate source of power in the system, namely the religious power, and in case of external aggression all the tributary kings would, in principle, rise to defend him. One of the few contemporary descriptions of the Undi's political organisation was left by Gamitto's "Mwata Kazembe":

⁴¹Langworthy 1969:36-7.

⁴²Langworthy 1973:IX-XVIII.

⁴³Langworthy 1969:map 4.



Source: Langworthy 1969.

"The chief of the nation has the title of Unde; his orders are executed without question or delay in all the dominions in which he is obeyed; but no important matter is decided without being heard by a council composed of elders, or of those in whom he has equal trust. On rare occasions this council meets in secret session; it gathers usually under a great tree in the Muzinda (the name of the village in which the Mambo or Fumo resides), against whose trunk Unde sits back with the council about him; round the council are seated the people who want to listen to the case. The spectators who do not belong to the council often speak and are heard as if they belonged to it. When the subject has been talked over, Unde declares that he agrees with the council's deliberations, or amends them, as he thinks fit. (...) The whole Marave country is divided into territories or provinces governed by Mambos, and these are subdivided into districts whose chiefs are the Fumos. Both are hereditary and succession takes place in the same way as for Unde".⁴⁴

e) Conclusion: The Chewa Settlement Pattern

We have argued that the Chewa social and political system was based, to a great extent, in its kinship structure. This structure was formed by matrilineage formations which were not stable at all, in so far as both time and space were concerned. In fact, and using Langworthy's words,

"there [was] continual rivalry among brothers and between uncles and nephews for control over and leadership of larger or smaller segments of lineage. This rivalry sooner or later [led] to the fission of a larger segment to produce smaller segments. These smaller segments [would] in turn eventually split after population growth [took] place and a new group of rivals for leadership [arose]".⁴⁵

We have also argued that agricultural production, being the main way of living of the Chewa people, was developed under kinship rules, and that its shifting nature, resulting from the exhaustion of soils in spite of some incipient rotation techniques, was closely related and furthered the fragmentation process of the matrilineage. The relatively low population density levels in the past could suggest the availability of land. However, one has to take also into account the fertility of such land and, most importantly, the land really available in the village surroundings. A large territorial unit with low numbers of population would not necessarily avoid problems due to lack of land, since a large village would probably experience those problems - the soils around the village would become exhausted, forcing its inhabitants to pass through progressively longer distances in order to reach their *machambas*. Land

⁴⁴Gamitto 1960:68-69.

⁴⁵Langworthy 1973:IX-XVII.

availability strongly contributed, therefore, to this fragmentation process.⁴⁶

Consequently, a more or less explicit competition would grow in the village during the life-time of the chief, within the group or between groups. Frequently, the disputes took violent forms, and most of the times resulted in the losing claimant having to leave with his followers, a segment or a smaller section of a segment, to start a new village. Sometimes, in order to avoid violent break outs, the chief would send an ambitious brother or nephew to form a new village, together with his followers. Clearly, then, if this splitting process had some elements of rebellion in it, it can be seen also as a "built-in method of averting conflict over social and political leadership within a restricted area"⁴⁷ and of maintaining environmental balance. On the other hand, the absence of complete disruption, the extent to which the new village would keep ties of subordination with the ancient one was an important factor in the establishment of political hierarchy.

This also applies in part to the relationship between the *mwini dziko* and the *mfumu*. Some authors refer to the *mfumu* as "invested" in its functions by the *mwini dziko*, as a simple subordinate chief. For Rita-Ferreira, the submission and loyalty of the *mfumu* towards the *mwini dziko* would fade away with the progressive disappearance of the protagonists of the initial agreement and his districts would tend to become independent units, with the eventual agreement of the *mwini dziko*.⁴⁸ However, this subtle relationship can be also seen from a different angle: a powerful *mwini dziko* would be one with a large following. In this sense, political hierarchy would grow not just in the top-bottom direction, but also to the extent that the newly formed villages, founded with or without the agreement of the *mwini dziko*, would keep the kinship and political ties of subordination. Political hierarchy would thus grow in

⁴⁶Large clusters were not common on the basis of shifting agriculture, and where they occurred they were certainly moved by "external" reasons (not ascribable to the system's internal functioning). Liesegang studied the effects of large population settlements on the surrounding environment in present day Niassa Province during the 19th century, due to war conflicts. At a time when weaponry was not very much differentiated the high number of warriors could be a decisive factor for military success, and for this reason and also for assuring protection, the population gathered in large numbers in villages located on hill slopes. Some of these villages, such as Metonia and Unango, reached nearly 10,000 inhabitants. Incapable of assuring a sustainable resource utilization, these clusters could only have had a short life. Despite the improvement of certain techniques such as the establishment of small irrigation canals and the practice of furrowing and others, the lack of wood for fuel and soil exhaustion determined their rapid disintegration and, as soon as the military threat was reduced, these communities spread out in smaller groups, leaving behind large areas of eroded wasteland. See Liesegang 1984.

⁴⁷Langworthy 1973:IX-XVII.

⁴⁸Rita-Ferreira 1966:58.

the bottom-top direction. Above this level of the territorial units was the one established from the political relationship between the *mambos*, where the Undi, himself a *mwini dziko*, ruled once as paramount.

This "three levelled" organisation - village *amfumu*, territorial chiefs and paramount king - is thus somehow theoretical and suffered major vicissitudes over the times. On the other hand, it must not be considered just as a classical "vertical" structure or a stabilised top-bottom system, but rather depending also on close cooperation and including factors of perpetual change. Once again, it is Langworthy who says that

"from time to time there was change in the hierarchy as tributary kings gained independence or new tributary kings were created. There was mobility up and down depending on a number of variable circumstances operating at all levels of the hierarchy. Someone could start as a chief, gaining power by conquest and normal population growth to the point of becoming a small-scale king, then being conquered by another king and becoming a tributary king, and maybe through adverse circumstances reverting to a chief..."⁴⁹

The village was the nuclear place where kinship and administrative worlds were coupled. Not only because it contained several segments of a lineage, and even, in some cases, different lineages who had to live together under certain rules, but also because the village was part of a territorial unit. The village is considered here as a nucleus and not as the total space of this encounter because, as we have also seen, the kinship structure went beyond its area even at the basic family level, through marriage matrilocal residence. The space containing both kinship and administrative worlds would be, then, the territorial unit of the clan, a set of matrilineage units marrying between themselves, as regards kinship, or a set of villages and the territorial space around them, if administration is concerned. The territorial unit of the *mwini dziko*, as a "closed container" of a set of villages, was thus the Chewa settlement pattern, the most stable structure of an unstable system.

⁴⁹Langworthy 1973:XVII.

Chapter 2:

PORTUGUESE IMPACT ON THE UPPER ZAMBEZI TO THE LATE 19th CENTURY

We attempted above to present a summary description of how, theoretically, the Chewa society functioned, ignoring deliberately external influences in order to capture the "internal" factors, not only its fragmentation and instability but also its harmony and self-sustenance. Of course this has to be taken carefully, since such a society free from external influence is not likely to have existed, and their major political boundaries were built on trade with the exterior. Besides, the Chewa people of the Zambezi valley suffered much more deeply than their counterparts in southern Zambia the influence of patrilineal societies from the south bank of the Zambezi, immersed as they were in a very complex set of social and political blends of peoples with various origins, that for several historic reasons were established in this region.

We will look now to the role of the foreign impact in affecting that northern Zambezi society, starting from the period between the 1700s and the early 1800s. The main aspects to consider here concern trade, not only as a means of putting different societies into contact but also leading to territorial interpenetration and to producing factors leading to new settlement patterns.

a) The Context of Trade

The Chewa people were not considered as important traders in spite of having developed trade contacts with other peoples since their arrival into the northern Zambezi area. From these times those referred to as having had commercial relations with the area were some small Swahili communities based at Sena and Tete since about the 12th century, and the Portuguese, with whom the Chewa conducted a minor ivory trade during the 17th century.¹ Instead of travelling like other peoples, the Chewa received traders within their own country or had trade routes crossing it, thus taking part in the vast trade complex of the Zambezi valley, which integrated as protagonists some African peoples like the Yao, usually trading for their

¹Serra 1986:15, 26.

own account but also acting sometimes as intermediaries for the Swahili, or the Biza, making the bridge between Kazembe - the westernmost pole of this trade - and the Zambezi valley. Also present were the Portuguese, together with an institution to which they gave birth but of which they soon lost control - the Zambezi *prazos*.

The Portuguese were established on the coast of Mozambique since the beginning of the 16th century, with a main settlement at Sofala, from where they had made contacts to receive gold from the hinterland. But as this process had become more and more difficult due to Swahili boycotts on the access routes, trying to divert them northwards, to outlets controlled by them, and also due to the hostility of some Shona dynasties which had understood the Portuguese presence as a threat to their own autonomy, the Portuguese had increasingly penetrated into the hinterland, trying to seize hold of the gold sources. Thus, they had established trading posts at Tete and Sena (around 1530), and Quelimane (a decade later). For the next two centuries the Zambezi valley would be their main penetration route. Designated by the Portuguese as *Rios de Sena*, the area was divided into *capitanias* (captainships) and subdivided into districts. The *capitão-mor* of Sena ruled over the *capitães* of Quelimane, Tete and Sofala.² As the southern Zambezi State of Mwenemutapa was a privileged source of gold to the Portuguese, they had another *capitão-mor* attached there, as well as several *capitães*.

Up to the end of the 17th century, the main commercial disputes came to be around the gold from the Mwenemutapa area south of the Zambezi, but during the following century some major changes occurred, namely moving the ground of those disputes upwards, to the Zambezi valley, not any more just as a penetration route, and the shift from gold to ivory as the main indigenous product to be looked for by the Portuguese. The rebellion of Changamira in 1693, expelling the Portuguese from his area, as well as the over-extraction of gold, leading to increasing difficulties in obtaining it, must have been some of the reasons behind this change. The Portuguese had had previous contacts with those northern areas as they had some *bares*³ installed relatively deep inside the region, but the fact is that the northern Zambezi territories were not a "golden" region, at least in the sense that the Mwenemutapa area had been further south. So, the Portuguese, with their "obsession" for the Mwenemutapa

²Serra 1986:20-22.

³Settlements for gold mining.

gold and having more or less neutralised the Arab trade routes, deeply affected the political economy of the area,⁴ generating a series of political conflicts among African chiefs - whose power had been built and maintained greatly on a foreign trade basis - for supremacy over the trade routes still existing.

At the end of the 18th century the Chewa territory was placed in the way of several routes linking what was perhaps the most important commercial link of the northern Zambezi valley, having on the one side, at its eastern extremity, the Yao and the coastal Swahili communities, and on the other, at the western interior, the Lunda State of the Kazembe, a legendary ivory supplier. The connection between Yao and Kazembe was done mainly through the Biza people, who shared with the Yao the reputation of being the greatest traders of this region. The Biza were peoples who allegedly had come from beyond the Aruangua river during the second half of the 18th century, pushed by the Kazembe, who had rendered them tributary. Carl Wiese wrote in 1889 that

"the Uiza [Biza] is a race with pleasant semblance both in what concerns men and women. With rare exceptions, they do not show face marks or bored lips. The Uiza are also part of the peoples who emigrated from Bangweolo and they still keep the tradition because when their mambos die they do not bury them in the left bank of the Aruangua. They carry their corpses to the other bank instead, after these are reduced to bones, burying them behind the Muchinga mountains. While they still are not reduced to bones, the corpses remain exposed, laying on platforms inside the huts. It is a race of warriors, but they are also good traders who used before to go trading in caravans. (...) The language of the Uizas is very different from other languages of Zambezia and a speaker of the Tete language cannot understand it, and they speak as if they were singing. However, the mambo, the superiors and a lot of people know very well and speak the Tete language (...). They all can speak the cháua or jáua [Yao] language in order to be able to communicate with the Arabs and other Nyassa inhabitants".⁵

The Biza purchased ivory at Kazembe with goods which came to them from the Yao, and both "indisputably dominated the carrying trade of the interior of East Central Africa".⁶ As to the Yao, they were located in the easternmost of this trading route, and delivered the ivory purchased from the Biza either to the Portuguese or to the northern coastal Swahili communities. In addition, they made also important commercial contacts directly with the Undi area, on the path of this route, looking not only for ivory but also for a commodity soon achieving central importance: slaves. It was in this context of dispute over the control of the trade routes in the 18th century that the Yao-Biza connection was working, diverting the

⁴See Alpers 1975:47.

⁵Wiese 1892:570.

⁶Alpers 1975:180.

coastal terminals of the hinterland trade to the far north of Mozambique, or at least obliging the Portuguese to share the control over that trade with Yao and Swahili. This situation was due not only to the Swahili-Yao trade initiative but also to the lack of capacity of the Portuguese trade structures to operate in the Upper Zambezi. As Newitt puts it,

"the old machinery of the royal monopoly and the cumbersome and costly system by which their trade was organized were pricing the Portuguese out of the market. They were undersold by French and Dutch interpoles and increasingly the Yao travelled northwards to find outlets for their ivory in the region north of Cape Delgado, which was nominally subject to the Sultan of Muscat and Oman".⁷

Besides, this "cumbersome" and bureaucratic structure was translated, in the hinterland, into the setting of re-export tariffs to the subordinate ports, which caused the Biza, for instance, to occasionally deliver their ivory directly in Quelimane. But the Portuguese suspected that the trade was being diverted to outlets further north, since the quantities of ivory arriving from Kazembe to Quelimane were decreasing fast, and in spite of Kazembe being probably "anxious to diminish his exclusive reliance on the Yao for his ivory exports and cloth and bead imports".⁸

As they had done two hundred years before, when they went after the source of gold to eliminate the Swahili alternatives, the Portuguese tried to reach the Biza-Kazembe system directly, in an attempt to short-circuit the Yao trade. Several expeditions were organised probably with this in mind, namely those conducted by Lacerda e Almeida/Francisco João Pinto in 1798-1799, and by António Gamitto in 1831. Apart from this, informal contacts already existing between the Biza and some Portuguese colonists might have paved the way for these attempts. Carl Wiese corroborates these contacts writing that around the 1830s-40s they used to travel "regularly to Tete. They interrupted this practice because one of their large caravans was assaulted and almost wrecked by people from Macanga".⁹ The Portuguese managed to acquire and establish a trading post at Aruangua, although it did not seem to produce important results since it suffered frequent assaults and the trade channelled through it was very limited. For some years the Portuguese had to carry on developing further attempts to reach Kazambe.¹⁰


⁷Newitt 1973:218.

⁸Alpers 1975:179.

⁹Wiese 1892:570.

¹⁰Alpers 1975:245.

MAP 2.1: TRADE IN THE ZAMBEZI VALLEY (1800s)



b) The *Prazo* System

The growth of trade and the intention of contacting directly the sources of ivory took the Portuguese more and more into the hinterland north and south of the Zambezi. Contact with the local African political units must have brought a series of conflicts since the foreigners occupied lands and were trying to make the terms of trade increasingly more favourable to themselves, even if they received lands in exchange for military favours, and if the African elites needed the goods that were brought to them for supporting their ruling position.

On the other hand, one must take into account the weakness of the Portuguese presence at the hinterland - their low numbers as well as the rudimentary nature of their administrative and military apparatus. Bearing this factor in mind it is not difficult to understand why much of that trade came to be "informally" promoted by individual colonists such as elephant hunters, traders, army deserters and other characters, produced in the centrifugal movement of an uncoordinated colonial presence. This reality, together with the authorities' efforts to settle colonists in the new territories of the *Rios de Sena*, determined the pattern of the early occupation of the Zambezi valley commonly acknowledged as the *Prazo* system.

Prazo is a Portuguese word meaning a period of time. It designated the estates "conceded" or occupied by these individual settlers, from the 17th century on, as a result of Portuguese conquest or of the initiative of the settlers themselves. The occupied lands came to be designated this way in the Portuguese legislation because the settlers were supposed to possess them during a period of time of three generations. In order to have legitimate access to one *Prazo* the settler had to fulfil specific conditions and duties, such as to marry a Portuguese woman, to collect the head-tax and to administer the area, to pay an annual rent to the government and to provide military support to the authorities.¹¹

The origin of this land-leasing system, somewhat obscure, was a matter of some controversy and debate in the old colonial historiography. For Pedro Alvares, the Portuguese *prazos* had had an Arab origin explained by the fact that when the Portuguese arrived at Mozambique they had found the coast already organised in sultanates in which its authorities ruled the local populations through the *fumos* and *mwenes*. These subordinated chiefs collected

¹¹Newitt & Garlake 1967: 134, n.7.

a sort of head-tax which was in part channelled upwards. According to Alvares, the Portuguese had then transformed the sultanates into *capitanias*, keeping these intermediary authorities at their posts and maintaining the collection of the head-tax, the *mussoco*.¹² In order to improve the system and to enhance their sovereignty, the Portuguese had allegedly appointed emphyteutas between the *capitães-mores* and the local *fumos* and *mwenes*. These emphyteutas could only transmit their rights of exploring the land and of collecting the *mussoco* to their daughters, and only if the latter married Portuguese men of European origin. Ernesto de Vilhena, denying the Arab origin, considered that when a people invades another that, in turn, offers resistance, there are always some individuals that play a relevant role (in serving the invaders). In this particular case these individuals would be the *fumos*. For others, as Almeida d'Eça, the *prazos* would have been brought from Portugal, which he tried to prove by the fact that similar systems had been practised by the Portuguese and the Spanish in South America. Finally, Alexandre Lobato finds the origin of the *prazos* in the old Portuguese feudal system of the *sesmarias*, in which the Portuguese kings assigned plots of uncultivated land to settlers. According to him, the system was adopted in Zambezia with the purpose of colonising the interior. Slowly, the Portuguese settlers went on trading, becoming rich and powerful, placing the local authorities under their rule. The system would have been improved with a system of land leasing borrowed from India, from where Mozambique was governed until 1752, consisting basically in the land being given to girls who married Portuguese men of European origin.¹³

Excluding the possibly more sophisticated version of Lobato, what all these arguments suggest is that if the Portuguese did not bring with them the organisational structures for the *prazos*, at least they adapted and subordinated the local ones to suit their purposes - they put forward an interpretation in which the Portuguese controlled the whole process of penetration from the start. This is hardly acceptable, particularly if we consider the fragility of the Portuguese presence in the hinterland and the "informality" which accompanied the whole settlement process. Moreover, in the developments of the 17th and 18th centuries further arguments can be found against such a picture of dependence of the *prazos* upon the authorities. Many people involved in the settlements of the interior belonged to or came to constitute families whose ramifications penetrated the Portuguese administration. This means

¹²Álvares 1916:139-40.

¹³Lobato 1962:97-116; Pinhal 1971:80-4.

that there were not two separated blocks, or that there was not a clear line defining the interests of the Portuguese administration from the ones of the *Prazo*-holders, since frequently these were the ones who represented the authorities, holding honorific ranks of the Portuguese army such as the title of *capitão-mor*. This situation, as well as the subordination of some authorities to the superior power of the surrounding landlords, led to conflicts between the local authorities and the central ones, the former boycotting, delaying or deliberately "misunderstanding" the determinations issued by the latter.

Of course it was only after a while that some *prazo*-holders became able to openly challenge the Portuguese authority. What seems important to stress here is the ambiguity that must have characterised the "first days" of the *prazos*, when they were building their material base of existence on the back of the African societies, using the support of the authorities when it was possible (and supporting them in turn) or defying them when the occasion arrived. The relationship between Portuguese authorities and *prazos* was clearly marked by tardy attempts of the legislation to catch up with reality, to deal with consecutive *faits accomplis*. But if, on the one hand, the incapacity of the local Portuguese authorities to deal with these new landlords resulted in an ambiguous relationship which permitted the growth of the latter, on the other the relationship *prazo*-African society further illuminates their coming into being.

It is not difficult to imagine Tete, for instance from where those "unofficial" elements penetrated the hinterland with some activity in mind in order to get rich. An elephant hunter would be accompanied, let us say, by ten African hunters and forty carriers transporting goods to offer or exchange with local *mwini mudzi* and *mwini dziko* along the way, both hunters and carriers having been recruited in the small villages surrounding the city of Tete. After several days of journey under difficult conditions, the guides, people used to travel in the area, would advise the explorer to stop at a place known as having good elephant herds. The explorer, maybe an Indian from Goa with a Portuguese name, would follow the advice, ordering the party to camp near a small village, after asking for the consent of its *mwini mudzi*. The Goanese would offer some gifts not only to thank the local host but also to send to the *mwini dziko* who, if he was not far away, would require their presence in his village for the courtesy ceremonials. With the local authorities' consent, the expedition would settle there for several months, hunting around and not forgetting to send to the *mwini dziko* - through the *mwini mudzi* - the ground tusk of each dead elephant. While being there, the

expedition would run out of food, using the cloth and bead they had brought to buy maize that the small village would fortunately have in stock in small granaries. Besides the possibility of doing some trade, the small village would find an extra advantage in hosting the foreigners for such a long time, since they were hunting elephants that had been causing a great damage to the millet and maize *machambas* around the village. Maybe the villagers would also hunt on their own account, although only occasionally since the village did not possess such powerful weapons as the ones brought by the Goanese hunter. They would have to dig deep pits or to attack the elephant from tree-perches by plunging a heavy spear in between the shoulder blades, or even to sever the elephant's tendon with wide-edged axes.¹⁴ The objective, besides the meat for feeding the village, would be to get extra cloth through selling the ivory to the expedition, except of course the ground tusks which they would keep, for sending to the *mwini dziko*. After five months or so the hunter would feel satisfied with the ivory collected or would be having problems with some members of the expedition, anxious to return to their homelands. He would then travel back to Tete, promising to return in the following year. He would do so, the whole process being resumed. By this time he would be fairly familiarised with the place, with still plenty of elephants around, and of food in the granaries to feed the hunters. Growing ties were then linking the Goanese to the local village. Some signs indicated to him that the *mwini dziko* was not so dreadful after all, his village being relatively distant from the site. Meanwhile, the *mwini mudzi* would be getting greedy, not sending to his territorial chief all the ground tusks any more, trying to exchange them with the Goanese instead. The foreigner would then feel he would not need to spend so much cloth in the exchange, neither would he need to be so polite towards the village authorities. His attitudes would get more and more abrupt and he would ultimately seize hold of the village, his hunters transformed in a sort of body guard of his. This would not mean necessarily a break with the *mwini mudzi* since he would be opened to some compromise for not losing entirely his position. As regards the *mwini dziko*, there would be war or maybe he would offer the Goanese a daughter in marriage instead, preferring to have such a powerful hunter as an ally. Trying to safeguard at least the appearance of his power or intending to have the guns of the hunter on his side to fight some neighbour, he might even offer the land where the small village was located to his new son-in-law. From then on, the hunter would be probably spending much more time in the area, looking after activities which were now not only hunting but also political. His men would take the ivory to Tete for trading or the trade would be done on the site, with Yao merchants. Some years later the sons of the

¹⁴Local hunting methods described in Alpers 1975:27-8, 69.

Goanese, having African mothers and living a more than half African life, would be more keen on the local values than on the ones their father adopted while living with the Portuguese.¹⁵ The only contacts they would have with the Portuguese would be in hosting and at times guiding an occasional expedition, but they would not hesitate on which side to stand and fight if the interests of the expedition and their own, as individual settlers, appeared as contradictory.

This short hypothetical description aims at showing how an individual colonist could settle in the territory of an African state and start what, on the long run, would become a *Prazo*. Many other ways were certainly possible, depending on the African societies where they settled and their different origins - from the mere deserter, running away from the Portuguese authorities to offer his services to an African chief, to the mentioned Goanese hunter or a gold-pro prospector eventually backed by capital from someone else, at the start. This question places, then, the two important aspects of the relationship between the *prazos* with the Portuguese authorities, on the one side, and with the African societies, on the other.

The fact is that it would be impossible for the settler to start from nothing, not just because the territory where he arrived belonged already to some community but mainly because it would be virtually impossible for him to survive permanently without the support of such a community. As we could generalise from the history of the Goanese hunter above, in which he and his men ended up being fed by the village, it was the surplus produced by the community which allowed the settlement of the foreigners. But it was a surplus produced under specific organisational circumstances, i.e. through kinship channels and appropriated by the village headman and the territorial chief. The new reality appeared, then, from a compromise between the settler and the local political powers. These new settlers, integrated or trying to be integrated in the mercantile circuit (through mining, hunting or simply trading), could not afford to destroy the political and economic pre-existing systems, since they had not brought alternatives or means to implement them. What they did instead was to integrate themselves, to place themselves as high as they could in the existing structure, through violent means or other, such as political alliances and marriages, which served the purpose of legitimating themselves and enhancing their position and power. Of course, this implied the progressive "adaptation" and transformation of the existing "status quo", but not,

¹⁵On this shifting from European to local cultures by the *prazo*-holders see the important Isaacman & Isaacman 1975.

at least from the very beginning, its radical substitution by new organisational forms. Inside the prazo, according to Newitt,

"The fumo was a traditional authority and his selection and appointment depended on many factors. It is clear, however, that the prazo-holders claimed the right to depose a fumo and select his successor and that their approval had to be obtained before any fumo could exercise his authority. But the fumo had to be acceptable to his people and therefore chosen according to traditional rules. He also had to be acceptable to the spirits - which meant in practice the spirit-mediums. The most important, and undoubtedly the most arduous of the duties of the fumo was to collect and hand over the annual tribute which the colonos paid to the prazo-holders".¹⁶

The bias then appeared to be to subordinate and transform rather than to destroy. Thus the progressive creation of political and economic agents such as the *achuanga*, or supervisors working on behalf of the *prazo*-holder on tax collection, or the *achikunda*, soldier-slaves who supported his power. On the part of the *prazo*-holder, and since his authority was based not only on his power but also on his legitimacy, the tendency was to involve himself more and more in the local structure through local marriages.

Amongst the major protagonists of the transformation in the areas occupied by the *prazos* were the afore mentioned *achikunda*. They had their origin in the people recruited by the *prazo*-holder to support his trading and hunting activities (as was the case in the hypothetical example of the Goanese hunter referred to above) or in recruitment to secure the position of the *prazeiro* by enhancing his power. The fact of the extreme ethnic diversity of the *achikunda*, which included not only Maravi peoples but also others, such as Sena, Tonga, Yao, Bisa, Nsenga, supports the idea that what led to them being a distinct social and cultural group was the common role played inside the *prazos*.¹⁷ Amongst the large variety of functions performed by the *achikunda* were the ones of protecting the *prazeiro* against foreign aggression, keeping order within the *prazo* - crushing eventual revolts of *colonos*, preventing them from escaping to neighbouring territories or assuring the collection of the head-tax (*mussoco*), and trading or hunting on the account of their master. Because they were strangers to the fabric of the local social relations and because it was advantageous for the *prazeiro* that they were kept apart, the *achikunda* lived in their own villages, strategically deployed throughout the estate¹⁸ and according to a new specific organisation, clearly defined and

¹⁶Newitt 1973:171, 178-181.

¹⁷Isaacman 1972a, which is our main source concerning the *achikunda*.

¹⁸Isaacman 1972a:455.

relatively rigid. They had a major chief, the *mukazambo*, selected on the basis of his loyalty towards the prazo-holder, and also of his popularity amongst the *achikunda*. They were organised in *butakas*, the basic unit which formed the *achikunda* village. The *butaka* was subdivided in *insakas*, squads of ten to twelve male *achikunda* with their families, conducted by an appointed *tsachikunda*.

Together with the *achikunda*, other organs made their appearance to put this new state to work. The *chuanga* was a sort of slave official existing in the villages of *colonos*, in some *prazos* transmitting the prazeiro orders to the head of the village and supervising the collection of the head-tax and the forced sale of the village agricultural produce.¹⁹ The *mussambadzi* was a sort of chief-trader that, on the account of the prazo-holder and under the protection of *achikunda* squads, directed the *prazo* trade expeditions operating on the Zambezi Valley.

Evidently, this structure was built up progressively, following the *prazeiro's* needs, his capabilities and also his fortunes, in a political, military and economic context considered by Isaacman as extremely volatile. This was also a structure that assumed several forms and variations. But undeniably, the territory suffered, at its basic village level, the transformation of some of its main structures and the introduction of new ones in order to promote an important role in the trade context produced by colonial penetration in the Zambezi Valley.

The logic of the territorial unit which we tried to disclose in theoretical terms for the Chewa earlier, was deeply disturbed by the introduction of *achikunda* village units - the *butakas*. These *butakas*, as we have seen, were formed on the basis of male integration into a structure, men who brought their families to the new settlements. Isaacman wrote that "the implications of the shift to a patrilocal residence pattern for matrilineal peoples were substantial. An entirely new nexus of kinship relationships developed to satisfy the function which the matrilineage had previously served".²⁰ Besides, the relationships between these new units and the local villages were mostly inimical, characterised by *achikunda* raids to enforce the masters' rule. Inside the local villages the transformation was also major, the

¹⁹Isaacman 1972a:455.

²⁰Isaacman 1972a:453.

mfumu standing between his people and the *prazo*-holder²¹ and the agricultural tributes imposed on the people getting progressively heavier in order to support the growing apparatus of the *prazo*. On the other hand, the role played by the *achikunda* as a military force, ensuring also the surplus extraction of local production, hunting and trading for their master, reveals the very nature of the *prazo* as an hybrid institution standing between the Portuguese and the local African societies, acting as a new major protagonist of the trade system and creating a new pattern in the Zambezi valley.

c) Factors of Crisis and Change in the Zambezi Valley in the Early 1800s

Around the beginning of the 19th century some major factors were combining to change the economy of the Zambezi Valley in a profound manner. About the previous pattern, we have seen that it operated over the unequal exchange of local products, such as ivory and gold, for European and Asiatic fabrics, beads, guns and alcoholic beverages. Its main protagonists were not only the feeble Portuguese trading posts and fairs, the decaying African States of the environs and some external African and Swahili traders, but also the hybrid institution referred to as the *prazo* system, which managed to achieve some autonomy from Portuguese rule and to operate at the basic level of the African states, further affecting their decaying process. Amongst the most important factors of change, we can mention the increase of slave trade to major proportions, the appearance of the Ngoni in the Zambezi Valley, and the radical transformation of the *prazo* system with the emergence of a new form of political unit. Newitt²² suggested that the heavy drought that hit Southern Africa during the 1820s, particularly this region, also had major importance as a factor for change.

Around the second half of the 18th century, ivory, on the basis of which a whole commercial system had functioned in the Zambezi Valley, began declining to a secondary role in favour of another product soon achieving overwhelming importance: slaves. Certainly, the region had been trading in human beings for a long time, but it had been a minor trade, only occasionally being integrated in the international circuits, namely Arabian ones, and having a specific and relatively moderate impact within the region.

²¹Newitt 1973:180.

²²Newitt 1988.

Before the mid-18th century slavery had had a special nature in the Zambezi Valley, as a form of clientship.²³ Differently from the European feudal system, from its hierarchical society, this particular form of slavery grew with the necessity of the disrupted communities, in the context of great disturbance caused by the decay of the African states and the transformation operated by the *prazos* within the region: to escape famine, plagues and violence, and look for someone powerful enough who could be served in exchange for protection. Newitt lists several types of slaves, according to the origin of enslavement, showing how members of uprooted communities jumped from one political unit to another, either running away from some sort of threat or punishment, or simply seeking protection and food. Inside the *prazo*, these people came to augment the crowd of domestic slaves that used to do all sorts of services required by the *prazo*-holder, or were merely integrated as *colonos*.

However, in the second half of the 18th century the region faced a growing international demand for slaves, due to the development of coffee, sugar cane and cotton plantations in Mauritius and Reunion, the French islands of the Indian Ocean. Besides, by the end of the century the plantations of the Americas were again in the market for slaves, as they had been more than a hundred years before, when they had been fed mainly by slaves from the African coast of the Atlantic. For several reasons, the African coast of the Indian Ocean, particularly northern Mozambique, was transformed into a major slave supplier.²⁴ The international demand, together with some "favourable" conditions in the region, gave way to a process in which the export of slaves would increase to catastrophic proportions, clearly illustrated by the fact that the slaves exported through the port of Quelimane, which in the 1800s were already reaching such high numbers as 28,800, jumped to 51,900 in the 1820s.²⁵ Alpers showed also how this shifting towards the slave trade was sudden, writing that in 1806 ivory and gold represented 57 percent, foodstuffs 26 percent, and slave trade only 17 percent of the exports through Quelimane, while in 1821 gold and ivory were only 7 percent, foodstuffs had "sharply declined", and slaves had expanded to 85 per cent.²⁶ The shift of trade from its previous forms to the exporting of slaves did not mean a structural change but

²³Newitt 1973: , refers to clientship saying that it "arises in an unsettled society when men seek the protection of the rich and powerful in return for service. It is a way of creating an artificial 'family' unit when blood kinship has proved itself an inadequate form of protection and support in times of difficulty".

²⁴See Serra 1986:27.

²⁵Newitt 1988:15.

²⁶Alpers 1975:216-7.

the prevalence of the merchant system, in which international demand for specific local products dictated the economic activity within the region. It has thus been considered as a new cycle of that system,²⁷ in which slaves replaced other goods as the main traded item. However, the impact of this new trade within the region was obviously more profound not just because of the generalisation of this activity but also, above all, since the question was no longer the mere depletion of natural resources but also of men and women as the main labour force in any society, and particularly in these ones, with a low level of productive forces.

The connection of the increase in slave trade with the growth of famine and the general decline of the colony, particularly the *Rios de Sena*, was already being mentioned by contemporary Governor-General Xavier Botelho, who wrote, among other things, that "... the inhabitants turn to this trade [in slaves] from working in their fields (...) so that the lands remain uncultivated and, as a further consequence, elephant and hippo hunting for the sake of ivory is in decline". The same Botelho, as well as Captain Owen, the commander of British naval reconnaissance units, mentioned in 1825 that the port of Quelimane, which used to be a traditional food exporter, was importing grain from places such as Zanzibar, Muscat and others, as a result of the slave trade.²⁸

Without denying those connections completely, Newitt²⁹ proposes a radical new reading of the general events, in which internal African factors - and not just international trade demands - would play a greater role. His idea is to reassess the role played by the drought which hit the region in the 1820s in causing that major crisis. This particular drought cycle began being felt in the region from around 1823, the famine "beginning to bite" in early 1826, "deepening and spreading" throughout 1828 and "continuing relentlessly" into 1830 and 1831.³⁰ It brought with it plagues of locusts and epidemics, and resulted in the collapse of agriculture and in the famine bringing mining and trading to a standstill. Different sectors of the Zambezi valley society had different response patterns to cope with this deep crisis. With regard to the African states both north and south of the Zambezi, the results must have been

²⁷Serra (Coord.) *et al.* 1988:104-106.

²⁸Vail & White 1980:27; 25-8.

²⁹Newitt 1988.

³⁰Newitt 1988:20-1.

particularly disruptive. In fact, the two main bases of their political system - agriculture and foreign trade - were drastically reduced. The important states of the south were greatly weakened and "the chieftaincy of Mwenemutapa largely disintegrated, though the chiefly title remained, and the Changamire state was destroyed". In late 1829, people from Mwenemutapa were entering Tete, looking for food.³¹ The northern areas of Tete, somehow less affected by hunger, could not avoid, even so, the major political reshaping which was to come with the emergence of the state of Macanga, to which we will return later.

Another general factor of destabilisation - regarding the African states as well as the other sectors - was the emergence of the Ngoni, deepening the military threat and further disturbing the fragile balance within the region. The Ngoni came to this debilitated region through migration waves. In 1830 they had passed through Manica, and in the following year they were threatening Tete, Sena and all the right bank of the Zambezi. The African states of the region could not cope with the Ngoni military strength. The most affected ones, in the path of the Ngoni and inside the territory of what would be the Ngoni's Gaza state, between the Sabi and the Zambezi rivers, were both the Barue and the Mwenemutapa, and soon the people from the southern villages were fleeing across the Zambezi into the northern areas. While the Ngoni westernmost branch, the Ndebele of Mzilikadzi, headed to the area of present day Zimbabwe, threatening the Portuguese fairs at Manica and Zumbo, Zwangendaba's and Nqaba's Ngoni, pushed by internal clashes and by the arrival of successive migrations, crossed the Zambezi and headed northwards, from where they would return later to settle in the north and northeast of the Maravi territory in Tete. Meanwhile, by 1840 the storm caused by their presence had more or less passed, according to Newitt, who considered that during this period "the chieftaincies of the Portuguese borders had probably suffered more than the Portuguese themselves".³²

The pattern of response of the Portuguese "formal" sector (in the sense that the *prazos* would be their "informal" sector) is somewhat more complex to describe. It has to do with the transition from traditional trading activity to slave trading, and with the way they managed to cope with those natural and political events, mainly the decline of agriculture and the threat to their administrative presence. By the beginning of the 19th century the Portuguese

³¹Newitt 1988:26; 21.

³²Newitt 1973:223.

settlements, mainly the ones at the coast, were supported by the agricultural production of the *prazos*. The increase in their supply combined with the Portuguese liberal revolution, which pulled down the trade barriers allowing the convergence of foodstuffs from foreign settlements of the region, produced the falling in agricultural prices, which in turn affected *prazo* production after 1821. Always according to Newitt, "the combination of free trade and falling production struck deeply at the local economy and many of the *prazos* were no longer cultivated".³³ It was by this time that the drought hit the region, further increasing the lack of foodstuffs.

In the further hinterland, the effects of the crisis on trade were felt in all its several components. The routes were more and more hard to traverse, the rivers getting dry, disrupted communities not providing carriers, and uncontrolled groups of waylayers threatening the caravans. As to the fairs, at the terminals of those routes, they became more and more difficult to maintain, unable to sustain the Ngoni's raids, unsafe, and facing shortage of local supplies and trading items. In 1831 Manica was abandoned, the same happening to Zumbo between 1830 and 1839. But, according to Newitt, "the Portuguese perceived the connection between the trade decline and the drought and saw the attempts to revive trade as an essential part of their response to the drought conditions".³⁴ The decline of traditional trading activity was seen by contemporaries as having been the result of the famine, not of the slave trade, and it was only when the Portuguese attempts to restore the old trading system failed that "the slave trade gained the ascendancy that historians have all detected".³⁵

The *prazos*, localised in a strip along the river and spread over the region of the delta, as an important food supplier within the Zambezi valley, were deeply involved in the agricultural decline, as we have seen. Simultaneously, the instability throughout the region practically eliminated the traditional trade circuits. Heavily hit by the drought, unable to get the support of the feeble and badly fed Portuguese military forces, the *prazos* had to rely on themselves to cope with the crisis, and rapidly sought to meet international demand, solving at the same time the problems they were facing. The outlet was the above mentioned increase

³³Newitt 1988:23.

³⁴Newitt 1988:31.

³⁵Newitt 1988:31.

of the slave trade.

At first, this trade affected the areas of the near hinterland, the *prazo*-holders of the lower Zambezi raiding around their estates in order to capture people. A new pattern arrived in which European adventurers and traders were renting *prazos* in order to make quick profits through the slave trade, and who often lived outside their estates, in Sena, Quelimane, Rio de Janeiro or Lisbon. Meanwhile, the raids for slaves organised by the *prazo*-holders soon depopulated the areas on the environs of their *prazos*. Without structures to further the reach of the captures, the *prazeiros* began selling the people of their own estates.³⁶ Vail & White wrote, about this apparently contradictory trend, that "the willingness of the *prazo*-holder to sell their own people and thereby undermine their own security is explainable in terms of a shift of ownership",³⁷ with the emergence of that new type of *prazo*-holders who were there not to stay but to get rich and leave. This induced a break in the social relations within the *prazos*. Harassed by the *prazos*' *achikunda*, entire villages of *colonos* disappeared, their inhabitants being sold as slaves or simply running away to safer areas. Frequently, the turn came of the *achikunda* themselves to play the part of victims, captured and sold to the slave markets. Groups of *achikunda* rose then against their masters, destroying properties or fleeing in errant bands, pillaging on their way and waylaying on the routes.

These phenomena, combined with the Ngoni pressure south of the Zambezi, accentuated the disruption of the *prazos* and the absentecism of their owners. Deprived of population, unable to seize control over their estates, the smaller and powerless *prazos* began to be engulfed by the surrounding African states or by a few strong *prazo*-holders, capable of protecting the fugitive *colonos*. A new pattern was emerging within the region.

d) Macanga and the Military States of the 19th Century

Following the above described trends, a few strong *prazos* emerged in the first half of the 19th century. If, on the one side, they can be seen as a development of the previous *prazo* pattern, on the other, it was such an extreme development that ended in what could be

³⁶See Capela in Cirne 1990:61.

³⁷Vail & White 1980.

considered as a totally new political reality, which would come to characterise the Zambezi valley throughout the century. Like the former *prazos*, the new ones were characterised by living both from exploiting the agricultural surplus of the community villages and from the slave trade, under the rule of a holder which was backed by uprooted *achikunda* groups. From the previous *prazo* pattern they also inherited the dubious relationship with the Portuguese authorities.

The units which came to form this new pattern have been designated in several ways, according to specific aspects privileged differently by different authors. The terms "macro-*prazo*" or "super-*prazo*" focus both the link with the previous *prazos* and the obvious growth induced in the territorial area of these new units, as well as in their power. Pélissier refers to them as "Secondary States",³⁸ following a metaphorical perspective in which the Zambezi society would be a three levelled pyramid on top of which the Portuguese settlements would be located, the African states being at its footing and these states at the intermediate or secondary level. This seems somewhat problematic due to the fact that society, in the Zambezi valley at this time, rather than a vertical set of layers, suggests an horizontal and complex relation of different sectors. For Isaacman the term "Secondary States" seems to be rendered salient because of their place in the prevailing international relations.³⁹ We have adopted here the term "Military States"⁴⁰ to keep the focus on the uncontrolled military development of these units, surely their most outstanding characteristic. It was argued that the main characteristics of the former *prazos* were undergoing important changes. First of all, the heavy military action south of the Zambezi, undertaken by the Mwenemutapa state and by Ngoni groups between the 1820s and the 1840s, affecting a line from the westernmost parts of the actual Tete province to Sena, led to the vanishing of the small *prazos*. The *prazos* which survived on the southern bank of the Zambezi were the ones which could stand facing the threats from the south, thickening their *achikunda* ranks with fugitives they protected, seizing hold of smaller abandoned *prazos* or conquering others. Thus, their military character was extremely developed and accentuated.

³⁸Pélissier 1987(I):74-5.

³⁹Isaacman 1979:56-7. He based his assertion on a quotation from Paul Bohannon & Philip Curtin (*Africa and Africans*, New York, 1971:271): "the result came to be a new political phenomenon known as secondary empires - secondary because they were based on European military technology, not being however controlled by a European power, as would be the case of the primary colonial empires in the period after the 1880s".

⁴⁰Used by Serra (Coord.) *et al.* 1988:117-8.

In broad terms, it can be said that the structure of the *achikunda* ranks did not change substantially. They were still composed of aliens to the land, uprooted people, fugitive *colonos* from other *prazos*, or slaves. They still lived in separate villages, the *butakas*, subdivided in *insakas*. They were still headed by a *mukazambo*. However, in the mid-19th century they were no longer just the former group of military slaves of the *prazo*-holder, but quite an independent army with whom he had to deal cautiously. Isaacman mentions that, although varying considerably from state to state, the number of *achikunda* armies in some of them would have reached more than 10,000 men.⁴¹ Their main functions were still the protection of the state borders and the keeping of order inside them, as well as the undertaking of raids for conquest or to capture slaves.


The extreme development in the military nature of these states also produced a deep transformation in their village pattern, as well as the accentuation of some trends already observed in the former *prazos* regarding territorial organisation. The Ngoni pressure, together with the continuous state of war between the different political units, produced the transformation of the existing most important villages - namely the one of the *prazo*-holder - into *aringas*. An *aringa* was a sort of stronghold, a village and surroundings encircled by wooden stakes. Both Isaacman and Newitt wrote that the origin of the *aringa* could be found in the Tonga and Shona villages, which used to be usually surrounded by heavy wood fences which gave them the appearance of a fortification,⁴² which would explain the *aringa* prevalence on the southern bank of the Zambezi. The wooden stakes usually grew to form an "alive" stockade of strong trees, very resistant even to artillery attacks. Many *aringas* had improved defence systems besides the wooden stockades, such as stone walls and bases on which to mount artillery. Localised often near water sources, the *aringa* would enclose the site of the *prazo*-holder and his family (near or far from European living standards, depending on each case), as well as the places where his military garrison and the *colonos* lived. Some *aringas* had an area so vast as to include small agricultural fields and pastures for livestock. Newitt mentions that some *aringas* "would thus house many hundred and even thousands of people and would attain the dimensions of a considerable town".⁴³

⁴¹Isaacman 1979:65.

⁴²Newitt 1973:226; Isaacman 1979:62.

⁴³Newitt 1973:227.

MAP 2.2: THE MILITARY STATES IN THE UPPER ZAMBEZI (1800s)



The defence system represented by the *aringa* is understandable in the context of the war pattern of those days. Notwithstanding the military apparatus at the service of the *prazo*-holder, the rudimentary transport and communication systems did not prevent him from being caught by surprise by some army of invaders. Indeed, it frequently happened so, and in many cases he just had time to lock himself with his people inside his *aringa*, where he could resist sometimes for a very long period. However, the *aringa* had also frequently the function of territorial control. The most well-known *aringa*, at Massangano, one of the most important military states localised at the south bank of the Zambezi near its confluence with the Lwenha, besides its defence purposes, had the important role of controlling the traffic through the Zambezi.⁴⁴ From the *aringa* of Massangano, and using artillery, it was possible to stop completely all the river communications between Tete and the coast, which in fact happened several times. Almeida de Eça wrote an interesting account of the *aringa* as a means for territorial control. According to him, besides the *aringa* or *aringas* of the *prazo*-holder, the military state had also smaller strongholds strategically disseminated along its borders, the *bzitata*, certainly a development of the ancient *achikunda butakas*, as the *aringa* had been a development of the ancient *prazo*-holder site. In Eça's words, the *bzitata* were "less resistant and with a smaller periphery; they worked as advanced posts for small garrisons, and although the building system was very much the same of the *aringas*, they would not resist as long neither were they so very well built".⁴⁵

Finally, another important aspect of the military character of these states was provided by improved weaponry used in their activities. Isaacman mentions that as a result of European innovations in military technology, obsolete weapons were available in great quantities to be sold in Africa during this period.⁴⁶ But the *achikunda* armies were supplied not only through these channels. Several contemporary accounts mentioned that they had access to modern weaponry such as automatic rifles or the artillery mentioned above, which equipped several *aringas*, through obscure trade or military victory over Portuguese forces.

The territory of the present Tete province, as part of the region, did not escape the influence of the military states. While the present day Mutarara district came to be occupied

⁴⁴See Castilho 1891; Newitt & Garlake 1967.

⁴⁵Almeida de Eça 1953:218.

⁴⁶Isaacman 1979:56-7.

by the Massingire state, the remaining area, a vast territory north of the Zambezi, between the Revubué and the Aruangua rivers, suffered the influence of Macanga, who managed to gain ascendance over the Undi's Chewa state. On its southeast borders, Tete was bounded by Massangano, one of the most important military states. Finally, in relation to its west and southwest parts, this process came later (starting about the second half of the 19th century) which, while diminishing its intensity, prevented the formation of dynasties such as the ones ruling other states.

Macanga was headed by the Caetano Pereira family, a dynasty started with the arrival of Gonçalo Caetano Pereira, alias *Dombo Dombo*, in the region about 1760, from Goa, to trade and to prospect for gold. Together with his son Manuel Caetano Pereira, he exploited some of the Portuguese *bares*, developed trade activities with the Biza-Kazembe, and gave support to Portuguese expeditions throughout the region, namely the ones intending to establish trade links with Kazembe. Both Pereiras, father and son, received the Portuguese title of capitão-mor. Manuel Caetano Pereira, whose action lasted until the 1830s, is a classical example of the settlement pattern the Portuguese were interested in, supporting their initiatives and spreading their influence throughout the northern Zambezi areas. On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand the conditions which favoured the growth of the Pereiras' influence. The slave trade was becoming dominant and, although it used very much the same trade routes, the same can hardly be said regarding the trade channels. In fact, the trade was more and more being done at village level, increasing the autonomy and authority of local *anfumu*, and eroding political relations among the Chewa. Besides, the "slave trade encouraged raids and kidnapping by people from one Chewa area on the people of another area".⁴⁷ With the region transformed more and more into a set of independent villages and small territories, over which the Undi experienced growing difficulties in imposing his authority, the Pereiras had enough room to grow. The next Pereira in power, Pedro Caetano alias *Choutama*, did not show himself so collaborative towards the Portuguese. In the context of the already mentioned process of local legitimation, he married inside the Chicucuru house of the Undi, receiving further land from the *mambo*, and adopted Chewa rituals and behaviour, and inclusively appointed new *anfumu* and *amambo*.⁴⁸ On the other hand, he refused to support the 1831 official Portuguese expedition of Gamitto to Kazembe. While the

⁴⁷Langworthy 1973:144-5.

⁴⁸Isaacman 1979:67.

Portuguese were facing with great concern Choutama's monopoly over the ivory and slave trade north of the Zambezi, he, in his turn, felt perhaps that he could outspokenly challenge the Portuguese attempts to influence the area. In the 1840s started then what the Portuguese called the "Zambezi wars", a series of incidents and clashes not just between the two parties but also with Chewa groups aligning on both sides, the Biwi having asked the Portuguese for help against Choutama threats. Clearly, the military states were becoming a third party in the Zambezi valley.

With Pedro Caetano Pereira alias *Chissaka*, son of *Choutama* (who had died in 1849), Macanga reached its "highest point", engaged in an extensive slave and ivory trade to supply the Biza and Yao caravans, fighting on the Shire valley (near where even an important Portuguese settlement like Sena was attacked) to impose its influence, and making its presence felt in as far as the Aruangua, to the west. But above all *Chissaka* started a series of bloody wars against the powerful southern state of Massangano, which he accused of having assassinated his father, *Choutama*. Behind this confessed motive was perhaps *Chissaka*'s attempt to prevent Portuguese and Massangano trade influence from spreading to the north, and to dispute the Zambezi route which was dominated by Massangano from near the Lupata gorge. Between the struggle of these two giants, the Portuguese from Tete adopted a "flexible" posture, helping one and another through selling arms or sending people from the *prazos* of the environs to participate in the fights.⁴⁹ But after the 1850s began the inexorable decadence of Macanga, as a result not only of internal quarrels and of the incapacity to neutralise Massangano once and for all, but also of the pressure of Mpezeni's Ngoni up north and the rise of the proslavery Zumbo *muzungos*. The Ngoni of Mpezeni had come to settle in southern Zambia, near the northern border of Tete, and from there they raided the Chewa area for slaves. Although not being known as gun users, their military organisation made the Ngoni feared throughout the region. Many Chewa *amfumu* and *amambo* were forced to fortify their villages or to move their people to shelters up in the mountains, where they could resist better to the action of the Ngoni. Macanga must have felt that same pressure. Kanienzi, who ruled Macanga after the short period dominated by pro-Portuguese Chinkoma (1858-1863), is said to have built a new *aringa* in the Macanga mountains, a sign, according to Newitt, that Ngoni raids were now a real threat to security of the state.⁵⁰

⁴⁹See Newitt 1973; Pélissier 1987(I):89-93.

⁵⁰Newitt 1973.

e) The Zumbo *Muzungos*

In the meantime, further west the Portuguese were able to regain some influence, after a long interregnum and following the 1861 expedition of Albino Manuel Pacheco, who managed to reopen the Zumbo fair. It is Newitt again who establishes a connection between the growth of Portuguese influence in Zumbo and the decline of Macanga, the disintegration of the western Maravi chieftaincies under Ngoni attacks, and the encouragement of the authorities for individuals to acquire new lands around, as *prazos*.⁵¹

In the region centred at Zumbo the slave *prazos*, although having the same nature as in the other military states - mainly slave and ivory trading supported by military activities - were to develop specific characteristics. First of all they developed later, in the last three or four decades of the 19th century, and developed a more intimate relationship with the Portuguese authorities at Zumbo. This fact, surely due to the Portuguese presence being here even weaker than in Tete (obliging the latter to a more temporising attitude towards the activities of these *prazos*), dictated a pattern in which the land occupation had much more than elsewhere the appearance of being officially sanctioned. While in Macanga, for instance, the area beyond the small *prazo* belt which surrounded Tete came the Pereira's territory, either offered or conquered by him, but in any case without the Portuguese having to do with and surely its exact outlines not being of their knowledge, around Zumbo the *prazeiro* would commonly conquer the land, offer it to the authorities and lease it himself immediately afterwards. Although that land was auctioned publicly, no one would dare to make an offer against the influential and powerful landlord who had conquered it.⁵² This resulted in the officially registered *prazos* around Zumbo being much more spread throughout the region than in Tete. Besides, those slaver *senhores* frequently held official posts at Zumbo, where most of them lived an important part of their lives. These differences, considered as imparting a specific characteristic to the process at Zumbo, led to the local landlords being commonly referred to as *muzungos*.⁵³ In 1864, existence was already noticed of "traders who, with their armed people assisted some African rulers against others, fishing, in the meantime, ivory and

⁵¹Newitt 1973:297-8.

⁵²Amongst several accounts on this respect, see Wiese 1891:252.

⁵³Originally, *muzungo* was the word to designate the 'whites'. However, its meaning was generalised throughout the Zambesi valley, particularly in the western region of Zumbo, designating black and coloured people who had managed to achieve some degree of power and influence.

slaves in these muddy waters, a trade they did shamelessly, as if it has not been abolished within the Portuguese dominions".⁵⁴ José do Rosário Andrade alias *Kanyemba*, and José de Araújo Lobo alias *Matakenya*, were found amongst these people. Following the usual pattern, *Kanyemba's* family had come from Tete in the 1850s, to trade in the region. Some years after the restoration of Zumbo *Kanyemba* was already firmly settled at his two main *prazos* of Inhacoe, to the west of Zumbo, and Chipera, to the south of the Zambezi and opposite to Zumbo, where he was said to head 600 *achikunda*.⁵⁵ *Matakenya*, son-in-law of *Kanyemba*, had a similar record, his *prazos* being located on the north bank of the Zambezi immediately to the east of Zumbo - Pangura and Pimbe - and in the Aruangua valley - Hilara.

Although the slave trade was officially banned in the Portuguese dominions since 1836, the slaving activity of these and other *muzungos* was viewed by Zumbo authorities with some benevolence for several reasons. First of all, they pursued the myth that the *muzungos* were spreading out the Portuguese influence through the demarcation of *prazos* in the deep interior, a play in which the *muzungos* had a keen participation since after the formal auctions they would usually hold property over the lands they had conquered. Secondly, these bloody activities led to the permanent state of rebellion of the African units in the environs - particularly the Bruma - which the small Zumbo forces were useless to cope with unless they had the support of these very same *muzungos*. It was in the context of campaigns to break local resistance that *Kanyemba* was appointed *Sargento-Mor*, and *Matakenya* *Capitão-Mor* of Zumbo in 1877.⁵⁶ The administrative and military ranks held by *muzungos* seemed here much less formal than elsewhere. *Matakenya*, for instance, was on several occasions the provisional commander of Zumbo, while the newly appointed commander had not arrived. Thus, in parallel with his activities as a cruel slave trader *muzungo*, he pursued an honourable career as a Portuguese officer. In 1873, he was already "deputy for lands", assuming provisionally full command of Zumbo in 1875. Appointed *Capitão-Mor* in 1878, he held this post until his death in 1894, when he was already Lieutenant-Colonel. The involvement of *Matakenya* is clearly unequivocal in the words of a contemporary, the Governor himself, who wrote that

⁵⁴Solla 1907:257.

⁵⁵Solla 1907.

⁵⁶Solla 1907:322-3.

"the book-keeping of the public finances has been until today under the responsibility of an *ad hoc* commission headed by the Governor, and including the Secretary of the Government and voter Lieutenant-Colonel (...) José de Araújo Lobo. The Secretary, besides those duties, is also the Commander of the District forces and in charge of the treasury and equipment".⁵⁷

Kanyemba pursued a similar career, holding different posts and having been proposed to occupy the post left vacant by *Matakenya's* death.⁵⁸ Besides, the formally appointed authorities could do little to impose their authority. Usually coming from outside the region, lacking the local contacts and often the health to face the African climate, underpaid or not paid at all, and having to rely on just a few and badly fed soldiers, they stood in the hands of the powerful *muzungos*. During the couple of years they remained in charge what they usually tried to do was to start their own cloudy business, to get rich as fast as they could. The ones "noble" enough not to fear confrontation usually ended in losing their posts, if not their lives. Besides a few occasional quarrels produced by the attempt of some fearless authority to try to curb some of the most notorious crimes of a *prazo*-holder, the only cause of conflict that seemed to have existed between the Zumbo authorities and the *muzungo* families developed around the curious question of the struggle for the spoil of deceased *muzungos*. Abundantly mentioned in contemporary sources, this question often appeared as the family trying to make use of the property while the authorities claimed the right to control the transmission of it, thus taking the opportunity to exercise influence upon successional processes.⁵⁹ In extreme cases, such as after the death of José Anselmo de Sant'Anna, the authorities in Tete did not claim his spoil, fearing the rebellion of his son Manuel Anselmo de Sant'Anna and his *achikunda* followers.⁶⁰ Clearly, the point here, for the Portuguese, was the survival of the *prazos* as such, indicating that in spite of the fact that the conflicts were permanent, so was compromise, and the rupture which occurred elsewhere along the Portuguese Zambezi, between the authorities and the *prazo*-holders, was never consummated here.

⁵⁷Ignacio 1891:304.

⁵⁸See Solla 1907. Several other examples could be listed not only of this successful collaboration but also of the interest shown by these *senhores* in acceding to official posts. In 1883 *muzungo* Sebastião Morais de Almeida saw his proposal for *sargento-mor* of Mussenguez withdrawn under the accusation of selling guns and gunpowder to the African chief Dande (Solla 1907:340).

⁵⁹See Solla 1907:279, 342, 442, about the struggle for *Matakenya's* spoil.

⁶⁰Solla 1907:276-7.

On the relationship between the *muzungos* and the local African political units, and in spite of the fact that some similarities with other military states can be traced, such as the process of "Africanisation" of the *prazo*-holders, we find, however, important differences. Legitimation through political alliance, local marriage or religious profession, that seemed so important in the case of Macanga and other military states, did not seem so central in the western areas of Tete. Certainly, the slave trade enforced by military action brought with it, everywhere in the Zambezi valley, a procession of horrors and violence. But regarding the Macanga state, at least in the core of the system, we saw that the free communities of *colonos* were important to keep up the flow of foodstuffs production to feed the armies of *achikunda* and the slave stock, even if some of these communities had their people sold as slaves. In so far as the *muzungos* are concerned, we hardly can find the search for a new social order. Perhaps even more here than in the eastern parts of Tete, the *achikunda* were the most important means, if not the only one, to enforce the power of the *prazo*-holder. Isaacman mentions that under the pressure of Ngoni invasions the *achikunda* had mainly migrated to the west, to the region of Zumbo and its environs.⁶¹ Using these armies and based at their *prazos*, the *muzungos* raided the *amambo* and *amfumu* villages of the region, their action extending sometimes considerably far from their properties.

There are also several contemporary accounts of *muzungo* intervention in the political and military conflicts between African rulers, giving military support to one party to receive their reward in ivory and slaves. A suggestive example is mentioned by Wiese,⁶² when Chincôco, a *mambo* from the house of Undi who intended to unify eastern and western Maravia, and who had lost the succession in favour of Chigaga, sought the support of Vicente José Ribeiro alias *Chimbango*, who came to do the fighting and receive the ivory. The other party reacted, when Chigaga asked the support of *Matakenya*, whose son came and defeated Chincôco, capturing his people and family as slaves. Many other examples show that the *muzungos* were much more inclined to achieve military superiority and quick profits than to make political alliances against the Portuguese. *Kanyemba*, for instance, attacked *mambo* Bandagwa to abduct his wives and daughters, and castrated young males to place them guarding his harem.⁶³ The result was catastrophic in most of the western areas. According

⁶¹Isaacman 1972a:459-60.

⁶²Wiese 1891:391-3.

⁶³Solla 1907:356; 324.

to Wiese,

"perhaps ten years ago [about 1879], the Sengas homeland (...) was densely populated, and today the traveller who goes to that unfortunate land, soon turning into a desert, still come across two or three ruined villages in each day of his journey. There, elephants used to be found abundantly, the inhabitants used to hunt, the foreign hunters would arrive, and every year a valuable amount of ivory was exported to Zumbo, Cachombo, and Tete, and from there to Quelimane (...). But today these markets do not receive ivory from Senga any more (...). The reasons for the lack of Senga ivory are the devastating wars conducted by these magnates (...). This is the reason why Senga turned into a desert, where the traveller comes only across burned villages, human skulls and bones. Local hunters went away to other places or were sold as slaves, or even, as happened to many, mercilessly killed in the course of assaults to the *aringas* (...). In these cruel marauding the places are devastated as if suffering the action of an impetuous hurricane. The atrocities are permanent while the harvest of ivory does not satisfy the potentate's ambition. Men are, as I said, murdered or sold; everything that cannot be taken away or eaten is destroyed and the villages are burnt! Women and children that escape death are traded with the Arabs for gunpowder and fabric (...)."⁶⁴

Under these pressures, migrations were increased from the region to the west or northeast. Great numbers of Senga and Chewa *amambo* and *anfumu* sought the protection of the northeastern Ngoni, in spite of the Ngoni also being feared as slave traders and dreadful warriors. Chofombo, an important tributary *mambo* of the Undi, after suffering continuous attacks, abductions and pillage undertaken by several *muzungos*, including *Chimbango* and *Matakenya*, went away to settle in Mpezeni's territory. There, he turned from a feared opponent of Mpezeni's raids in the west, into an ally, increasing Ngoni threats to Zumbo and stirring up conflicts with the *muzungos*. Wiese describes the relationship between the Senga refugees and the Ngoni in the following terms:

"The people that live inside this village [where Chofombo was resettled] and in other four governed by him [Chofombo], are also Sengas(...). Chofombo is not happy with his dependent situation. He remembers his former sovereignty, his country, his lands and his former wealth. Here he has plenty of food, produced by his people, and he rules some villages; but he is out of the ivory circuits, which under the rules of the Mpezeni's state he cannot hold, and without such resource he lacks the necessary means to obtain cloth and so many other useful things which one can buy with such precious item. He still has further motives for his grief. He is well treated by Mpezeni but faces permanent disdain from the other *landins* [Ngoni], by whom he, as well as his people, are called Senga, a less noble race (...)."⁶⁵


As to the relations between *muzungos* and Ngoni, they were always characterised by great hostility. Wiese⁶⁶ wrote that for Mpezeni there was no *General* [Portuguese governor] living in Zumbo. For him Zumbo was ruled by a *mfumu*, *Matakenya*, acting on his own and who he despised above all.

⁶⁴Wiese 1891:248-9.

⁶⁵Wiese 1891:409-10.

⁶⁶Wiese 1891:525-6.

MAP 2.3: THE ZUMBO MUZUNGOS (1800s)



Source: Newitt 1973.

In the last decades of the 19th century, in the western parts of Tete, a pattern had thus developed in which the *prazo*-holders had a much greater proximity towards the Portuguese authority at Zumbo, in many instances, and even merged with the latter. From the Portuguese point of view, this 'association' turned to be, after all, the only way of claiming sovereignty over the African units of this immense region, an aspect that would be of extreme importance in the conflict that in the 1890s opposed Portugal to England over the demarcation of the western frontiers. In fact, the Portuguese presence there, if we can call it so, was secured by men such as Matakanya. Also important is the fact that this 'association' allowed Portugal to pursue covert participation in the late slave trade, while permanently protesting against it in official circles. On the other hand, and helped by masses of either locally recruited or immigrant *achikunda*, the *muzungos* influenced the political set up of the region in a profound manner, ultimately transforming it, through their military action, into chaos. Although they occasionally became involved in instigating African rebellion against Zumbo, it must not be forgotten that military action to crush African resistance, such as the one mounted against the front created by chief Bruma between 1887 and 1890, was mostly headed by and composed of *muzungo* forces seeking the war booty.⁶⁷

This pattern was considerably different from the one found in the eastern military states. Instead of a vast area controlled by one dynasty, what could be found here was a complex of several *prazos* and *fatiotas* (defined plots), most of them officially registered although many not having the lease paid, held by several *muzungos* often related but frequently fighting amongst themselves to impose their interests. In this sense, the map of the military states proposed by Isaacman⁶⁸ is hardly acceptable in so far as *Matakanya*, *Kanyemba* and *Carazimamba* are concerned. The area shown as ruled by *Matakanya*, for example, was in fact an area of permanent conflict between *muzungos* and with not one but dozens of *prazos* registered in several names in it. On the other hand, instead of a territorial unit where villages of *colonos* coexisted with *achikunda butakas*, the latter controlling the former, what was found here was a process in which the former inhabitants were enslaved, killed or forced to run away, leaving their lands to be settled by new *achikunda* villages. Depleting the lands in all possible senses, the *muzungos* were thus condemned to permanent movement, seeking new reserves of elephants and slaves. Facing powerful enemies and

⁶⁷See Carlos 1888; 1889.

⁶⁸Cf. Isaacman 1979:12.

competitors on the east, the *muzungos* proceeded then with their devastating action to the west. That is why Newitt wrote that "if there had been no 'partition' [meaning the frontier definition between Portugal and England], Central Africa would probably have been settled by a series of chikunda 'tribes' under chiefly families with Portuguese names".⁶⁹ Clearly then, the *muzungos* acted as a front line of the imperialist forces, using European weaponry to supply the international markets with slaves and profoundly transforming the settlement pattern of the region. However, they belonged to a system that was condemned to disappear, which happened rapidly by the turn of the century.

f) Towards Colonial Rule: The Decline of the *Prazo* System

Throughout the 19th century the *prazo* system never ceased to be a matter of great debate within the Portuguese circles at various levels, in Lisbon as in Mozambique. Ultimately, the question ended up being how the authorities, with their feeble resources, could exercise control over an institution continuously biased towards autonomy and on challenging Portuguese sovereignty, and how they could transform it (according to projects for colonial development) into a means of effective colonisation. With shortage of people to colonise and of capital to support colonisation, Portugal was sentenced to rely on the *prazos*, while undertaking a permanent effort to conciliate the system as it really existed with the one they legislated for.

At the beginning of the 19th century, Villas Boas Truão, Governor of Rios de Sena, was already proposing profound modifications, considering that the *prazos* themselves were causing the decline of population and agriculture within the region. He indicated lack of security, land concentration in the hands of a few powerful but idle proprietors, absenteeism of the *prazo*-holders, and violence over the African communities, amongst others, as such causes.⁷⁰ The solution for this problem could be found in the arrival of new skilled settlers, in the improvement of water-borne communications, and in a thorough transformation of the *prazo* legislation, amongst other measures, so that agriculture and colonisation could be

⁶⁹Newitt 1973:306.

⁷⁰Quoted in Ribeiro 1907:169-73.

effectively developed.⁷¹ But Truão was powerless to face the strong community of *prazo*-holders and died in 1807, one year after his proposals had been written on paper. Other authorities carried on writing about the situation. Governor Botelho proposed severe punishment for the slave-traders, the combat of *prazo* absenteeism and the division of the territories into much smaller *prazos*, so that they did not appear as immense 'realms'. Every effort should be directed towards agricultural development.⁷² But the few who maintained such perspectives were still powerless to counter the general trend. Moreover, lacking capital and people, their ideas were not real alternatives but mere visions.

In Portugal, in spite of profuse legislation which included the decree of the 13th of August 1832 extinguishing the *prazos* (article 7), and of several regulations and decrees brought forth between 1838 and 1841, it was not until 1854 and 1855 that a serious legislative effort was undertaken towards countering the situation, with the liberal decree of the 22th of December 1854. Considering, in its introduction, that the *prazo* system "far from producing the awaited benefits, was on the contrary powerfully countering agricultural development", a situation that "could not be repaired unless the conditions of acquisition, possession and transmission were to be completely modified", the decree again abrogated the *prazos* in its article 1, provided measures to compensate the *prazo*-holders (article 4) and, regarding the *colonos*, determined that they would simply be obliged to pay an annual hut-tax to the state (article 3). In the analysis that had come together with the proposal, Sá da Bandeira, the liberal Portuguese minister, considered that if taken, those measures would bring a swift development to the region.⁷³ In the same year Sá da Bandeira was able to have a bill passed envisaging a process which would free the local slaves in the long run of twenty years. But measures such as this one, as well as the 1836 ban on slave trading, only produced new slave routes out of official reach, the extension of the trade into the deep interior, and the growing of a bitter hostility of the *prazeiros* towards the authorities.⁷⁴ The 1850s were times of great confusion in the Zambezi valley, as we mentioned above, and Portugal had absolutely no means to enforce such legislation. An account of 1854 is clear:

⁷¹Vail & White 1980:11-13.

⁷²Ribeiro 1907:184-5.

⁷³Ribeiro 1907:174-9.

⁷⁴Newitt 1973:222-3; Vail & White 1980:15.

"we just have to look generally at the inventory to make an idea of the invasion which is spreading throughout the district. Excluding the small area of the 'fatiotas', from the 72 *prazos* of the district, 54 are fully invaded, the remaining ones being certainly threatened. The immigration of the Kaffir tribes, coming from everywhere and squeezing Zambezia, invading it from the south up to the Aruangua-Pungue line, from the north in the *prazos* of the Chire, and on the west in the *prazos* of the Upper Zambezi, is encircling the Portuguese settlements each day more and more tightly, as an iron belt".⁷⁵

Between the 1850s and the 1880s, Lisbon liberal efforts seemed to have been guided by a threefold objective: to transform the *prazo* system into a settler system based on agriculture and under the control of the authorities; to make use of military action to enforce that transformation and to bring to an end all forms of resistance in the valley; and to end with slavery so that labour could be provided to the new plans reserved for the *prazos*. However, and in spite of the liberal efforts and of international pressure to end with the slave trade, namely through British surveillance of the Indian Ocean coast and the travels of Livingstone to the hinterland in 1858 and 1866, such trade was still finding both internal and international space to develop. In fact, following the abolition, France, with just a few small colonies in India, could not supply her Indian Ocean plantations with 'coolie' labour (as Britain had done some time before), and had had to turn to the African coast. Even if it had now a new cover, as a migration of free labour (the so called "libertos"), this meant the persistence of the old slave trade, either through the official port of Quelimane or the Yao-Swahili routes, fed by the slaver activity in areas such as Niassa and Zumbo-Makanga, as well as by trade with the Ndebele of Mzilikadzi.⁷⁶

Throughout the 1870s, Lisbon liberal policies were pursued under the action of Andrade Corvo and the influence of Sá da Bandeira. The struggle against protectionism in trade, and for the building up of a free peasant class which would work under a contractual basis with the State and individuals, continued. According to Duffy, Lisbon still believed that good legislation was bound to produce good results.⁷⁷ On the other side, Lisbon was not unaware of the situation in the valley. Liberal plans faced the continuous vacillation of local authorities, who knew very well their incapacities to enforce the regulations, as well as the open hostility of the slave world, which was still as large as to include *prazeiros*, some African rulers and also considerable numbers of administrative officials involved in the slave

⁷⁵Bordallo in Ribeiro 1907:194.

⁷⁶See Vail & White 1980:29-37; Medeiros 1988a:33-36.

⁷⁷Duffy 1967:60-2, for this subject.

trade. As early as 1863, the governor's instructions included measures to set up a strong military presence through the "building of strategically placed stockades and by opening adequate communication routes between them and the coast".⁷⁸ But instructing was much easier than putting in practice such principles, and for almost fifty years the long *aringa* wars were to take place, in which the Portuguese were forced to adopt a multiform posture ranging from direct collaboration, as happened in Zumbo, to direct confrontation, as was the case with Massangano. But confrontation seemed a hard method to pursue, and the seizure of the vital *aringa* of Massangano, for instance, which was hampering commodity flow through the Zambezi between Tete and the coast, took several decades, nine government expeditions and five sieges, before it finally became possible, in 1888.⁷⁹

During the 1880s, Lisbon liberal policies were still far from resolving Portugal's problems in the Zambezi valley. The administrative and military problem was still a cloudy matter since rebellions between Tete and Sena would come to be defeated only by the end of the decade. Other regions, such as northern or western Tete, would have to wait an extra decade in this regard. The *prazeiros* were still very much entrenched at their estates. Therefore, the measures concerning the economy had had a modest impact, limited to the lower Zambezi and not at all to be taken at ease, since trade was there 60 percent in the hands of British Indians, the remaining being operated mostly by two French firms. Serious problems like transport costs and difficulties in general communications had kept Tete and other distant regions of the hinterland out of the liberal experiments concerning agriculture. Meanwhile, the slave trade was still left as a temptation, flourishing not only there but even in some coastal zones. The late 1880s saw, then, what Vail & White⁸⁰ called a "shift away from liberalism". It was the time for another serious effort towards proposing policy changes regarding, once again, the property regime in the Zambezi valley, that is to say the *prazos*. Governor Castilho, who had been arguing against the "continuous survival" of the *prazos* and proposing their direct administration by the state, as well as several other measures towards agricultural development and the strengthening of the Portuguese military forces, did not have concrete responses from Lisbon and resigned. But as a result, a high level commission was appointed in November 1888 to study the *prazos* and propose reforming measures. This

⁷⁸Vail & White 1980:52.

⁷⁹Newitt & Garlake 1967:134.

⁸⁰Vail & White 1980:83-7.

commission concluded that there were two main types of *prazos*: the first included the hinterland *prazos*, which were facing permanent hostile activities by the "enemies of Portugal", while the second type was referred to as including the so-called "fiscal" *prazos*, where the main activity was the mere collection of the *musso* or head-tax. The very few commercial *prazos* of the lower Zambezi were also eventually acknowledged as constituting a third type.⁸¹ While the first type of *prazos* were viewed with a certain benevolence, since they were considered as defending Portugal's frontiers against its enemies, the second type were indicated as being the main cause of the problem. They were increasing in power with the slave abolition and did not at all guarantee agricultural development. Concerning the future of the system, some considerations were made. As direct state administration was not considered as a solution leading to economic development, the commission proposed a development based in the establishment of a plantation economy, together with several recommendations aiming at fostering investments and agricultural works. Land tenure should be longer to provide greater security; a certain percentage of the *prazo* area should be obligatorily cultivated; the *musso* should be paid partially in labour.⁸²

From November 1890 to 1892 a series of laws were issued, under the influence of António Enes and very much developing the 1888 commission proposals on the *prazos*. Enes clearly opted for an economic development based in the idea of the evolution of the old *prazos* headed by individual entrepreneurs, instead of foreign companies. The decree of 18 November 1890, put into practice in Mozambique in 1892, re-established the *prazos* (in so far as legislation is concerned, because in practice they had not ceased to exist). Again two main groups of *prazos* were considered, the first being that of invaded or threatened *prazos*, and the second of the pacified ones. The *prazos* in the first group should be rented for ten year periods and their main activity should be defence and tax collection, while waiting for the conditions to move into the other group. The pacified *prazos* of the second group were considered as the base for Enes strategy and the ones that should undergo deeper transformation. They were supposed to be rented for periods that could go up to 25 years, so that more stability could be achieved in terms of investment and agricultural works. These would include the two main components of plantation and indigenous agriculture. The Article 4 of the decree indicated that the *prazeiro* was obliged to cultivate an area at least

⁸¹See Vail & White 1980:83-87; Newitt 1973:353-355.

⁸²See also Alvares 1916:145-7.

proportional to the number of *colonos* living in his *prazo*, and to pay a rent equal to half the potential yield of the *mussoco*. As to the *mussoco*, half should be collected in labour, as a measure to increase agricultural works within the *prazo*. Together with these measures came a series of other, commonly ascribable to governmental institutions, such as the right of each *prazeiro* to raise an army to ensure public order, and the duty to take the census in his *prazo*, to build schools, to keep the roads and river channels clear, to arrest criminals, to report epidemics, and so forth.⁸³ Clearly, the *prazos* were to provide not only economic development but also the basic structure of colonial administration the government was incapable of providing. Finally, in 1893 came the creation of the General Prazo Inspection, a governmental service aiming at monitoring the obedience to all those regulations.

However, in less than a decade all this legislative effort showed itself useless, and subsequent measures tried to attenuate intervention, instead of enforcing it. In 1901, the General Prazo Inspection was replaced by a Land Commission formed by part-time members, the inspection being completely suppressed some years later. Free trade became more difficult inside the *prazo*, in favour of the renter's monopoly. Obligations to be accomplished by the *prazeiros* inside their lands, such as periodical enrolment of *colonos*, cultivation, and collection of half the *mussoco* in labour, were systematically ignored.⁸⁴ On the other hand, the military situation was still far from being stable, and by the turn of the century the second category of the pacified *prazos* was restricted to a few *prazos* on the lower Zambezi, around Quelimane. In Tete, the military campaigns, together with British action on the northern and western borders, besides pushing back the threats to Portuguese "sovereignty", could do little in so far as the progress of the *prazos* was concerned. Poor soils, tse-tse fly and, above all, lack of communications for exporting agricultural *prazo* production, prevented it. Therefore, the "fiscal" *prazos* remained as such - a set of African villages living on their subsistence agriculture and regularly visited by the *prazeiro*'s agents who came to collect the *mussoco*. There was no population census, no plantations, no fulfilment of most of the legal regulations. Meanwhile, Enes' strategy regarding *prazo* evolution did not achieve the expected results, since no Portuguese individuals could be found to rent the *prazos* in the auctions, under the new conditions. In Tete, starting from 1897, the overwhelming majority of the *prazos* ended up being rented by the new and huge foreign capital based Zambezia Company.

⁸³Newitt 1973:355-360.

⁸⁴Alvares 1916:154-162.

Chapter 3:

TETE: THE MAKING OF A LABOUR RESERVE (1900-1926)

a) Introduction: Tete on the Threshold of the 20th Century

By the turn of the century, developments in the Zambezi Valley followed the general lines of Portugal's colonial policy of trying to transform an essentially mercantile colonisation into a new form. In the aftermath of the 'pacification' process through military campaigns, this would allow the colony to accomplish its expected role as supplier of raw materials for the development of Portuguese industry. However, the incapacity of bringing the weak metropolitan bourgeoisie to invest in the colonies, added to the state's own incapacity to administer them, gave rise to the two essential lines which came to characterise that policy: on the one hand, the opening of the territory to foreign capital, and on the other the development of the economy to assist the needs of capital accumulation in the neighbouring territories of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.¹ While the latter factor would mainly be evident in the organisation of labour for export, or through the effort to achieve control over clandestine migrant labour, the former involved the concession of vast areas of central and northern Mozambican territory to chartered companies dominated by non-Portuguese capital, which were going to have full power in developing and administering it. While the territory corresponding to present day Niassa and Cabo Delgado provinces was leased to the Niassa Company in 1891, the Mozambique Company had already acquired since 1888 the same sort of rights and duties in the central part of Mozambique. With this leasing system, also adopted by other colonial powers in Africa, the Portuguese colonial state aimed at achieving both economic development and political administration without having to employ its own resources, creating what was called a "blend of capital and state".²

As was already mentioned, the lack of response of the metropolitan capital to the attempts of Enes to reanimate the old *prazo* system, following the 1888 Commission recommendations, did not apply to foreign based initiatives. Thus, from the initial definition

¹See Wuyts 1989:15, on this point.

²Serra (Coord.) *et al.* 1983:152.

in the decree of the 26th of December of 1878, which granted rights to develop mining activities, to obtain lands up to 100,000 hectares and to explore forests, to the decree of the 20th of February of 1903, the Zambezia Company, another chartered company, saw its powers immensely increased to the point of gaining inclusively rights over almost all the *prazos* as the existing concessions were expiring. So, it came to rent most of the *prazos* put into auction in the last decade of the century, forming an immense 'realm' which included most of the present day provinces of Zambezia and Tete.³ Two different strategies would be followed. At the Lower Zambezi, The Zambezia Company and a few others, backed by the colonial state, occupied the positions formerly held by small renters and tried to develop a plantation economy backed by foreign capital, to which was added a new strategy of labour supply based in the *mussoco* or head tax, and in the obligation for the peasant to pay half of its defined value in work, ultimately transforming the former independent small producer into a semi-proletarianised labour force. For a number of reasons, however, Tete was not to witness such developments, having to endure a second strategy instead. First of all, security was still an important problem in vast areas, their *prazos* being kept as 'fiscal' with no other activities beyond defence and *mussoco* collection (whenever possible). In fact, the so-called 'pacification' activities went on well into the first decade of the 20th century. In the far interior, at the Zumbo region, we have mentioned Portugal's difficulties in controlling the activities of *muzungo* families such as the Araújo Lobo and the Rosário Andrade, at least until 1900, the same happening in Angónia, where Lieutenant de Brito concluded the 'pacification' process in that year. In Macanga, this process was even slower, with the same Lieutenant de Brito breaking the Muchena resistance only in May 1902 with the collaboration of Ngoni warriors.⁴ South of the Zambezi, Mwenemutapa Chioco was still resisting in 1902, and it can be considered that the Portuguese rule began being effective only after November 1904, when the authorities defeated the Mwenemutapa and crushed a rebellion at Boroma.⁵

Lack of communications to take the products (whether agricultural or mineral) from the Tete District to the coast was another main disincentive to the Zambezia Company

³For the formation of the Zambezia Company, which resulted from the fusion, headed by Albert Ochs, of the Zoutpansberg Exploration Company and the Société des Fondateurs de la Compagnie Générale du Zambéze, see Vail & White 1980:112-120. An excellent analysis of the Company can be found in Andrade 1907(I):150-154.

⁴See, for this process, Fernandes Júnior 1956:87 and *passim*; Pélissier 1988(II):127-131; Isaacman 1979:229-232.

⁵Isaacman 1979:232-238.

investments in the region. In the first two decades of the 1900s the only routes connecting Tete with the exterior were the Zambezi river and the roads running from Tete to Fort Jameson, to Angónia/Blantyre and, in the south, to Macequece. The difficulties of navigation on the Zambezi were described by some contemporary authors. Its utilisation involved a general contradiction since the steamers now being used required massive consumption of riverine trees which, together with local slash and burn farming techniques, lowered rainfall and, consequently, the river levels throughout this period.⁶ The Zambezi had, in terms of navigability, two main sections, the first one linking Chinde, on the coast, to Cahora Bassa, heading up-stream, and the second from there to Cachomba. There were three main types of boats navigating on the river: steam ships driven by one rear paddle-wheel, often towing flat-bottomed cargo barges; small paddle-wheel cutters; and local *almadias*. Significant traffic was carried only from Tete down-stream, and in steam ships which only travelled in some periods of the year, namely between the first rains of December and throughout the big March rains. Often arduously dragged by local riverine people through some sections, the larger boats navigated only by daylight to avoid striking sand banks. At the beginning of the century an up-stream trip would take around ten days for steam ships, or even a whole month for sailing boats from Chinde up to Tete. Down-stream journeys were obviously faster.⁷ Improvement of river communications was a very difficult matter to envisage since dredging works could not be supported, for instance, by taxation over the low levels of cargo transported through the river. Measures of this kind would only have had the result of killing the already feeble river movement.⁸

But more than that, there were serious difficulties with communications within the District, in particular the transport of products to the city of Tete and the flow off of products

⁶Andrade referred in a note to the gross damage caused by steam ships which seem to have been navigating on the Zambesi since 1891. According to him, "although long droughts not being rare in Zambezia, they seem to occur more often over the last years; according to some information, the Zambesi river is now carrying less water perhaps due to the scarcity of rain in the District and in spite of the immenseness of its basin. It is a researched and known fact that deforestation has a powerful influence over rainfall; in Zambezia, the felling of wood for fuel has utterly ruined riverine forests. Millions of trees have been cut down without being replanted, which is probably causing irregular and scarce rainfall, more severely in the lower part of the river, where crops are more developed". Andrade 1907(I):185-186 (footnote).

⁷Sant'Anna 1911:190-192.

⁸Governador de Tete 1913:40-41. While Andrade mentions some 27 steam ships navigating on the rivers of Zambezia by 1907 (Andrade 1907(I):216), four years later the Tete Governor alludes to only one, the *Lubeck*, connecting Tete with Chinde.

from there. From Tete up-stream, the Zambezi was still more or less navigable for smaller boats to the Cahora Bassa gorge, where one of the larger dams in Africa would be erected some sixty years later. This small section of the river was only used by the boat of the Boroma Mission and occasional paddle boats transporting goods to Zumbo. From Cahora Bassa these goods had to be taken by porters to Cachomba, from where they could regain the river.⁹ Besides the Zambezi and within the District, the Aruangua, the westernmost of its tributaries which defined the border between Tete and Northern Rhodesia, was the only river with some movement of European boats, namely the one from the Miruro Mission (which made also the connection with Zumbo and Cachomba), and the small cutter of the Feira administration, on the British side of the border.¹⁰

Concerning the roads, which hardly deserved to be considered as such, to the north of the Zambezi there were only two during this period, the first running from Tete to Missale and Fort Jameson (around 175 miles), and the second from Tete to Angónia (125 miles).¹¹ South of the Zambezi, only the one running from Tete to Macequece would allow some traffic. The remainder were nothing but tracks where the only work done had been the cutting down of taller trees. The roads running from Tete to Chioco, Chiranga, Cachomba and Zumbo could be included in this grouping. The road to Missale and Fort Jameson was supposed to transport production of the northern mines, and for a period some attempts were also made to bring cotton from the British North-Charterland Company through Tete to Chinde.¹² On the northeastern side of the District the road to Angónia and Nyassaland, used intensively by local people in several periods, was expected to bring to Tete the exports of

⁹As early as 1806 Villas-Boas Truão advocated "the removal of obstacles to navigation" in Cahora Bassa as an important measure to improve water-borne communications. See Vail & White 1980:12.

¹⁰Sant'Anna 1911:192.

¹¹Governador de Tete 1907:54-55.

¹²Governador de Tete 1913:41, who refers to the efforts of the North Charterland representative to bring Portuguese authorities to conclude the works on this road. According to him, the British were prepared to pay taxes to support these works as well as the construction of a mole on the northern margin of the Zambesi opposite to Tete, or even to do themselves these works. Already in 1906, Freire d'Andrade reacted to the efforts of the Tete Governor to cooperate with the North Charterland in this regard, saying that the Government would not spend money on a work which would not bring quick returns. According to him, the road would be improved with the development of the mining industry in the northern Tete, paid thus by the concessionaries. Clearly, Andrade did not like the point made by the Tete Governor, who considered the construction of roads to the north as an obligation dictated by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of the 11th of June, 1891. This treaty, still fresh in the memory of the Portuguese rulers at that time, was considered as an outrageous imposition, which had been accepted only by force. See Andrade 1907(I):196-200.

prazo Angónia, although with very limited success.¹³ Finally, the authorities always had great expectations of the southern road, which connecting the District to the territory of Manica and Sofala, ran by the Mozambique Company, and indirectly to Southern Rhodesia, would bring great benefits to the region. However, this one, as the remaining, was used only by oxcart and porters, making each trip an arduous and onerous enterprise. If we add to this picture of long and difficult distances, not always safe, the relatively poor soils and an almost absent administrative structure it can perhaps be understood better why the Zambezia Company was slow in taking initiatives, reluctant in employing capital which, in addition, seems not to have been available in great quantities.

b) The Zambezia Company and its Sub-Concessionaries: A New Pattern

The Zambezia Company received thus a huge territory with no relation whatsoever with what it was prepared to explore. On the one hand, as Isaacman pointed out, the Zambezia Company, like the other ones, was highly speculative, with no inclination or capacity to develop the territory, and with no capital either.¹⁴ But on the other hand there were also other obstacles to take into account, such as the immense distances associated with the lack of means to market productions, lack of knowledge to decide what crops to grow and where, irrigation and climate difficulties, several diseases affecting the crops, and so forth. Under the conditions produced by these two sorts of factors, plus the occasional irruption of serious resistance movements in several parts of the country, only by miracle or illusion dictated by a strong will (as was the case of the colonial authorities) could something be expected other than the caution showed by the Zambezia Company. On the contrary, it found a way out in renting parts of its immense realm to sub-concessionaries, a system which provided safe incomes without great efforts,¹⁵ and which although representing some continuity in relation to the old *prazos*, would lay out the foundations of an underdevelopment peculiar to Tete.

¹³Governador de Tete 1913:149, referred to the attempt of Raphael Bivar, sub-concessionary of *prazo* Angónia, to introduce a tractor and a wagon on this road to transport graphite from his mine at Mucutumula to Matundo-Tete, which had been formerly carried by porters. The experience was a complete failure due to the state of the road.

¹⁴Isaacman 1979:141. Andrade 1907(D):149-150 for a focus on the financial aspects of the Company.

¹⁵According to Governador de Tete 1913:11-12, in 1911-1912 the Zambezia Company paid to the State as rent 30:617\$480, and received 73:630\$275 (28:051\$200 from the *colonos* (peasants) living in the *prazos* directly administrated by it and 45:579\$075 from the sub-concessionaries), making, thus, a credit balance of 43:012\$795.

To conclude from a detailed account on the *prazos* provided by Sousa Ribeiro, by 1907 the Zambezia Company had concessionary rights over 111 *prazos*, 92 per cent of the total registered *prazos* in Tete, the remaining 9 *prazos* being rented by individuals or catholic missions.¹⁶ From these, 61 were directly run by the Company while 50 were rented to sub-lessees. However, since the definition of *prazo* was quite vague, applying to diverse realities ranging, for instance, from property with four inhabitants, like the *prazo* Canhimbe-holm, to territory with 82,000 inhabitants like *prazo* Angónia, and since numbers of people were central to the exploitation system as we will see, data related to people are likely to give a much more accurate picture than property, in spite of some reservations on the numbers given.¹⁷

TABLE 3.1:
PRAZOS AND THEIR POPULATION IN 1907

	No. of <i>Prazos</i>	Population	% from Total <i>Prazo</i> Population
Zambezia Co. (directly)	61	27,623	11.7
Zambezia Co. Sub-Lessees	50	174,073	73.6
Individual Concessions	9	34,868	14.7
Totals	120	236,554	100.0

Source: Sousa Ribeiro (ed.) 1907.

Sub-concession appears clearly as a pattern. The vast sub-leased territory was, in turn, divided into a relatively small number of sub-lessees, more exactly 12, two of them outstandingly more powerful in terms of population controlled.¹⁸

¹⁶Sousa Ribeiro (ed.) 1907:269-307.

¹⁷The following are some data on the total of *prazo* population in Tete at this period: 212,388 in 1904, according to Andrade 1907(I):224 (Báruè probably included); 230,802 in 1905, according to Álvares 1916:210-211; 165,755 in 1906 according to Andrade 1907(I):222 (Báruè excluded and low numbers probably due to incorrect estimation or to flight of *colonos*, according to the author); 272,814 in 1908, according to Governador de Tete 1909 (census); 141,479 in 1910, according to Álvares 1916 (excluding the *prazos* directly run by the Zambezia Company); 210,643 in 1912, according to Governador de Tete 1913; 180,000 in 1914, according to Carrilho 1916:138 (numbers referred to people paying *mussoco*, from which the author estimated a total population of 350 to 400 thousand); and 301,854 also in 1914, according to Álvares 1916.

¹⁸Carrilho, for example, described the Carl Wiese territory as an empire, with an area more than 25,000 square kilometres (Governor de Tete 1913:13). He took 14 days to cross it, horse riding (Carrilho 1916:376).

TABLE 3.2:
THE ZAMBEZIA CO. SUB-CONCESSIONARIES AND THEIR *PRAZOS*

Zambezia Co. Sub-Lessees	No. of <i>Prazos</i>	Population	% from Total <i>Prazo</i> Population
Raphael Bivar	2	120,000	69.0
Carl Wiese	7	26,865	15.5
F.F.Couto	3	7,880	4.5
João Martins	13	5,878	3.4
Miruro Mission	2	4,500	2.6
J.P.Carvalho	1	2,731	1.5
J.I.R.Sousa	11	1,868	1.1
Boroma Mission	1	1,507	0.9
A.J.C.Silva	1	1,200	0.7
J.Moctezuma	2	813	0.4
J.D.Monteiro	2	544	0.3
Anacleto Nunes	5	287	0.2
Totals	50	174,073	100.0

Source: Sousa Ribeiro (ed.) 1907.

When taking charge of his *prazo*, the sub-lessee was supposed to follow several rules defined in the profuse legislation on the matter, which reflected Enes' principle to "put the Africans to work". The first and most important aspect of the system was the *mussoco*, through which the coloniser integrated the already subject African communities to form the peasantry and provide migrant labour. Meanwhile, the *mussoco* was also the reference when the colonial state established the amounts the lease-holder had to pay as rent for the *prazos*. At the auctions, the starting value of a *prazo* was defined as half of 800 réis multiplied by the number of *colonos* living in the *prazo* obliged to pay *mussoco*. This number was determined through an initial census. Moreover, the inhabitants of the *prazo* were to pay half of the tax they were obliged to in the form of work. Thus, the only income the lease-holder could aspire to would come from cultivation, as Enes expected in the defence of the decree introducing the system.¹⁹ Legally, then, the sub-lessee appeared in an awkward position, having to pay a settled amount to the Zambezia Company and expecting to improve his situation only through the development of plantations. But a plantation was a very difficult

¹⁹Decree of the 18th of November 1890, art.4, #2, b) and f); Branco 1909:257-258.

landscape to find throughout this period, according to the succeeding Tete governors. In 1907, J. Bettencourt, then Governor, mentioned the "impracticability of farms here, as the ones which can be seen being located at the Zambezi delta, since climatic conditions and type of soils only render it possible to big firms with large amounts of capital".²⁰ In 1909 the Governor mentioned some agricultural experiences in the northeastern parts of the territory, Macanga and Angónia, and also in some irrigated margins of the Zambezi at Mutarara, consisting of some cotton, sisal, agave, coffee, tobacco and a few other.²¹ But a couple of years later, the complaints of the new Governor, J.L. Carrilho, were eloquent on the development of such experiences:

"Except for some plantations of sub-concessionary Raphael Bivar in Macanga (...) only the following can be found: an unlucky cotton experiment of the Zambezia Company at Benga, a few kilometres from Tete, almost abandoned (...). The Company has also a sisal plantation in Mutarara, said to be prosperous (...). After Raphael Bivar, Jorge de Moctezuma is the sub-concessionary who has done something for agriculture. However, his efforts will never succeed because his lands are 'poor and dry' (...). The Miruro and Boroma Missions do not cultivate in the proper sense of the word, keeping instead some orchards for their own use (...). We have to admit that this is very little for the 90,000 or 100,000 square kilometres of the District".²²

In the same year of 1911, a report from the inspection of the *prazos*, supposed to enforce the law, raised the central question:

"nobody could expect that a modest sub-concessionary like, for instance, Mr. Gouveia (I mention this one because he is the most distant) would be as mad as to start farming west of Mussenguez. Supposing the soil is fertile and his plantation is growing encouragingly, where would he place his products and how would he transport them?"²³

Incapable of developing cash crops, the sub-concessionary assumed generally a parasitic role, trying to obtain everything possible from the meagre *colono* agriculture, mainly through the *mussoco* but also through other means. There were three possible ways through which the sub-concessionary could demand *mussoco*: in cash, in agricultural products and in labour. In spite of the several laws and regulations prescribing the payment of half the *mussoco* in labour or giving the *colono* the freedom to choose the way of paying either in

²⁰Governador de Tete 1907:12.

²¹Governador de Tete 1909.

²²Governador de Tete 1913:12.

²³Mello 1911:442.

cash or in agricultural products,²⁴ the fact is that it was the sub-concessionary who dictated the rule. Throughout the period, a *mussoco* in cash would amount to 1\$260 réis per *colono*, the equivalent of three to four weeks' work. However, E.F. Galliau of *prazo* Cachomba, for example, was demanding 1\$500 réis per *colono* in 1911.²⁵ There was the tendency for the more remote *prazos* to be the ones collecting higher *mussoco*. Near the frontiers the sub-concessionaries were obliged to lower them, even if breaking the law, in the attempt to balance theirs with the situation in the British territories, hence avoiding the flight of their *colonos* across the border, looking for less grievous living conditions. While in the British territories northeast of Tete the *colonos* paid around 3 shillings per hut (the equivalent to \$900 réis), on the Portuguese side a normal *mussoco* would amount 2\$500 réis.²⁶ In the northern territories the *mussoco* was thus much lower, of around 5 shillings in Macanga or even 3 shillings in Angónia. In addition, in these territories Portuguese currency was almost unknown or openly unaccepted. In the northwestern Senga territory, for instance, sub-lessee Wiese refused Portuguese currency for *mussoco* payment, a currency to which *colonos* would not have access anyway, since they used to work in the British side to earn *pondos* (corruption of pounds) and *shirenes* (shillings) to pay their *mussoco*. According to the manager of a *prazo* in Zumbo,

"This whole region [Zumbo] is extremely poor in so far as money or products generating money are concerned. In spite of being very rich in terms of agriculture, there are no markets to sell the products. Thus, people from this region go annually to the Rhodesian mines in great numbers, just to earn money for *mussoco* because the sub-lessees, deprived of markets to place their products, incapable of making use of labour in agriculture or other works, are obliged to impose the *mussoco* collection in money".²⁷

Although the law prescribed the possibility for the *colono* to pay his *mussoco* in agricultural products, many sub-concessionaries like Wiese, in Senga, simply refused to accept it, or would only accept it in particular periods and up to particular amounts, to feed their men or to make an occasional exchange. *Mussoco* in products is very difficult to quantify since it greatly varied from place to place. In 1911, the *mussoco* of a married man (including thus his share and his wife's) would be 8 *panjas* of maize flour in Cachomba, or only 2 *panjas* in Penhame and Chipera. All these *prazos* were run by the same sub-

²⁴See Decree of the 18th of November, 1890; Regulation of the 10th of July, 1882.

²⁵Mello 1911. All information, except when referred to specifically, from Mello 1911 and Branco 1909.

²⁶Durão 1903:208. There are several accounts on this matter.

²⁷Governador de Tete 1907:11.

concessionary, E.F.Galliau. Moreover, the *panja*, a measure of capacity, would vary in accordance to the interest of the sub-concessionary.²⁸

Labour was, together with money, the most common way of paying *mussoco*. Another way was work in the *luane* (house and surroundings) of the sub-lessee, growing his vegetables or doing all sorts of services, providing firewood, building his huts or cutting down fuelwood for the steam ships in the riverine areas of the Zambezi and Chire rivers. But according to the evidence, the most feared way of paying *mussoco* was, by far, the work as a porter, carrying products from the *prazo* to Tete or vice-versa. At *prazo* Chicoa, for instance, a *mussoco* could mean two out and home travels as a porter - around 300 miles of walk through difficult tracks carrying heavy loads.²⁹ Porterage work was particularly common in the northern Angónia *prazos*, and also in Macanga, from where people often fled to Wiese's *prazos*, where "work was not so hard". In some particular cases as in some of Wiese's *prazos*, *mussoco* was also paid through work in the mines.

Besides the several ways to amplify the extraction of *mussoco* from the inhabitants of their *prazos*, the sub-concessionaries used also the most lucrative stratagem of distorting the census to include old men, children and emigrated labourers in the ranks obliged to pay *mussoco*, fabricating non-existent marriages, considering "trees of the way" as family members in order to demand augmented *mussocos*. But the mere fact of having completed the *mussoco* obligation would not free the *prazo* population from the concessionary arbitrariness. The law was already providing an opening when saying that *colonos* were not obliged "to work for no payment more than a week per year, in clearing the roads, rivers and *mocurros* of the *prazo* where they lived, and in building local houses for troops and officials".³⁰ Thus, from the several types of work for low wages to merely unpaid, the *colonos* were submitted to all sorts of arbitrariness. With the *mussoco* settled, they would continue travelling as porters to Tete, often without *poço* (daily food ration for the way), cutting down trees to supply the steamers or working two months in groundnut peeling for a cup of salt, as was common for women and children in Macanga.

²⁸See Andrade 1907(I):163. According to Branco 1909:232, one *panja* was around 27 litres in *prazos* Guengue, Mahembe and Sungo.

²⁹Branco 1909:236.

³⁰Regulation of the 7th of July, 1892, art.34.

Although some concession holders would accept *mussoco* in products, most demanded cash. Generally, except for their needs at the *luane*, concessionaries had difficulty in marketing their products, as was already mentioned. Moreover, in the absence of important cash crop production, these products would necessarily be from *colono* agriculture, i.e. mainly maize. From the 120 *prazos* listed by Sousa Ribeiro for 1907, some 65 percent were reported as producing exclusively maize. Most of the remaining associated this crop to millet and sorghum, and also some groundnuts and beans. Only a very small number would grow rice, sesame and a few other crops. The sub-concessionaries were then interested in some work but, above all, in cash. On the other hand, the reports on very low payments in cash in exchange for hard labour are numerous. Cash that the concessionary would rapidly retrieve in the shops he had disseminated throughout his *prazo*, where he would sell poor quality fabric for high prices. One American cotton *braça*³¹, for instance, priced at 125 *réis*, had been defined by the sub-lessees as valuing 200 *réis*. On top of that, the custom duties for a kilo of imported cotton fabric would amount, in 1903, to 200 *réis*, while on the British side of the border valued only 50 *réis*.³²


According to the law, namely the 46th article of the *Prazo* Regulation, trade inside the *prazos* should be open and free, although only in fairs, since itinerant trade was proscribed. However, the instruments of the state were too weak to enforce the law, and it was the rule of the concessionary which prevailed inside the *prazo*. If some peddler could be found there, he was surely trading on behalf of the concessionary or at least paying him a generous percentage. Some authors even allude to the common use of renting the monopoly of trade inside the *prazos*.³³

³¹Linear measure, one *braça* being equal to 86.62 inches.

³²Durão 1903:209. The author refused these high custom duties as being a measure to protect Portuguese cotton industry, since Portuguese cotton could not be found in the District, but only cotton from India or Manchester.

³³Andrade 1907(I):163-63; Branco 1909:255.

MAP 3.1: THE ZAMBEZIA COMPANY AND ITS SUB-CONCESSIONARIES



Source: Ribeiro (ed) 1907.

c) The First Steps of Colonial Administration

In face of the extent of these new sub-concessions throughout the territory, the knowledge of the role of the state comes very much from its articulation with the Zambezia Company and its sub-concessionaries. In Mozambique, between the 1890s and the first quarter of the 20th century, the role of the state consisted mainly in accomplishing the 'pacification' process and in establishing control over the labour force so that colonial exploitation could become possible.³⁴ The installation of an administrative structure was slow and suffered successive reorganisation in connection, among other causes, with the territorial concessions made to the chartered companies and, far from being consistent, suffered a series of 'ad hoc' adaptations to a reality in rapid transformation. In the northernmost territories of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, for instance, the Niassa Company took charge not only of the exploitation of an immense concession but also of its administration, assuming the role of 'a state inside the state', while the colonial state remained confined to a feeble presence in some coastal locations. But at the Zambezi valley some ambiguity prevailed, as the installation of the Zambezia Company and its sub-concessionaries was accompanied by the colonial state's weak but persistent efforts to reach the remote parts of the Upper Zambezi, both militarily and administratively. Behind these efforts were certainly British pressures on the western borders as well as the unwillingness of the Company to assume a military role in spite of Portugal's initial hopes.³⁵ In this context, the year 1891 marks an important administrative reform in the sequence of the concessions made to the companies. Mozambique was designated as the State of Portuguese Oriental Africa and divided into two provinces, Mozambique and Lourenço Marques, as well as three intendancies occupied by the Niassa Company, the first province including Tete.³⁶ In the following years Tete would suffer successive administrative reorganisation. In 1893 the District was abolished and its territories integrated in the District

³⁴See in this regard Serra (Coord.) *et al.* 1983:88-107, particularly 95.

³⁵The District of Zumbo was perhaps the most emblematic example of administrative rearrangement under British pressure. In fact, through the decree of the 7th of November 1889, to counter British influence in the Upper Zambesi, Portugal created the District of Zumbo as well as the military commands at Cafucué and Macheza (BO 5, 1890), which gave rise to strong British protests. According to Lord Salisbury, not only was the territory subjected to British influence under a treaty with Lobengula, but also there was no Portuguese effective occupation of the area (BO 8, 1890). The conflict grew to culminate in the British Ultimatum, followed by the delimitation of frontiers and the extinction of the District of Zumbo in 1891. See Pinhal 1971:189-191.

³⁶Decree of the 30th of September, 1891.

of Zambezia.³⁷ At the same time, a Superior Military Command was established at Tete, with a subordinated Military Command at Zumbo. For almost ten years this structure was maintained, and by the decree of the 10th of October, 1902, the Military District of Tete was created, showing how military activities were still a more important matter than civil administration.³⁸ Besides the territories of Tete and Zumbo, the District included also Zambezia and some areas of Barué. Meanwhile, new military commands appeared, such as Maravia's, mentioned as having been recently created in 1904.³⁹ In 1907, the decree of the 23th of May imposed a new major reorganisation, the Province of Mozambique being divided in the districts of Lourenço Marques, Inhambane, Quelimane, Tete and Mozambique, with the Gaza territory being integrated in Lourenço Marques and Inhambane.

The district, as perhaps the prevailing administrative unit, included the council, centred on the capital city, and the general captaincies, which were divided into commands and military posts. A district could also be divided simply into general captaincies and subdivided into independent military commands, although subordinated to the District Governors.⁴⁰ By this period Tete District was divided into the military commands of Zumbo, Chicoa, Chiranga, Chioco, Marávia, plus the Residence of the Angonis and the General Captaincy of Báruè, which included the military commands of Mungari, Inhacafura and Catandica.⁴¹ From 1907 on, Tete could be considered as a pacified district in military terms, as the meagre contingent of soldiers undoubtedly testifies (around 100 in 1911). Progressively losing their military role, the military commands seem to have survived instead as a testimony to a previously turbulent era and as a draft of the civil administration structure which was going to come. Their precarious conditions (almost non existent facilities and few officers,⁴² long delays in payment) prolonged their ruthless methods of dealing with the people, whose effects were described by a sub-lessee in the following manner:

³⁷Decree 1, 27th of April, 1893.

³⁸BO 50, 1902.

³⁹Anonym 1905:211.

⁴⁰Pinhal 1971:191.

⁴¹Governador de Tete 1907:29-31.

⁴²In 1907, the Tete Governor complained about the absence of Europeans in the vast areas of the military commands of Zumbo, Chicoa, Chiranga and Chioco. Governador de Tete 1907:29-31.

"Once the command is settled, [the population nuclei] begin to disappear, mainly because of the continuous labour requisitions over the nearby population, considered by commanders as urgent procedures (...). The commands at Cachomba and Zumbo are a clear example of that; not only have they no population around but also the roads leading to them are void. The soldiers, frequently for months without pay, live on local people (...). On the road between Cachomba and Zumbo, where formerly hundreds of villages were located, the traveller can today hardly buy the supplies for his journey. The native people, tired of these permanent demands, have simply disappeared".⁴³

Moreover, the precarious condition of the military commands placed them at the hands of the concessionaries. There are several accounts, for instance, of military commanders receiving *mussoco* from the surrounding population on behalf of the sub-lessee. With no major threats to its rule (if the late Bárue outbreak is excluded), the colonial state tried, from 1907 on, to accomplish its second major assumed role of population control, by creating an administrative network. The expression "territorial circumscription" appeared identified with the *prazos* already in the decree of the 18th of November, 1890, the concessionaries being considered as the public authority inside them.⁴⁴ However, in spite of attempts to see the *prazo* as the "lowest level" of the colonial state apparatus,⁴⁵ it is obvious that the concessionaries acted much more in defence of their self interests rather than as state agents. It seems more likely that the very state representatives such as military commanders collecting *mussoco* or state agents living in the *prazos*, and thus depending on the good will of the concessionaries, were much more subjected to the rule of the latter. The new approach of the state seems therefore to have started being implemented by 1907, with the Mozambique Administrative Reform, published in BO 26 from the 1st of July. It defined district sub-divisions and transmitted the guiding principles for the civil administration network to be built. According to this, the main district sub-divisions were councils, civil circumscriptions and general captaincies. While the first were to appear when justified by the importance of European agglomerations or by the level of trade or industrial development (art.84), the last were to exist whenever the territory was not completely pacified, having therefore a provisional character (art.86). As to the civil circumscription, it had more directly to do with population control. According to art.85, "civil circumscriptions are administrative sub-divisions containing one or more completely subject and pacified native territorial divisions, but whose civilisation status and progress of their inhabitants is not yet compatible with a

⁴³Wiese 1907:243-244.

⁴⁴BO 52, 1890; BO 27, 1901.

⁴⁵For example, Pinhal 1971:94-95.

more perfect administration system...".⁴⁶ Through BO 50, of December 1912, Tete military commands were transformed into the circumscriptions of Bárue, Chicoa, Macanga, Mutarara, Maravia and Zumbo. However, there was still a long way to go. In the same year, Governor Carrilho emphasized the ineffectual character of the legislation, writing:

"The 1912 decree did not stop with converting general captaincies into civil circumscriptions: in the useless craving after standardising everything it also considered as civil circumscriptions the prazo supervision circumscriptions. The supervisor, who represented the Governor in each of these circumscriptions, had his name also changed into administrator, being as such a civil servant of the provincial public staff. However, the 1912 decree forgot to abolish the Prazo Regulation, and therefore the uniformity aspired for is purely theoretical. The misunderstanding is as notorious as the fact that even the budget which appeared with the District Organic Law, allocated a percentage of the collected mussoco to the circumscription administrators, while it is a known fact that in the prazos mussoco is collected by the concessionary, who gives to the state only the fraction stipulated by his contract. The sub-lessee is also the administrative agent in his circumscription; he is the one who solves milandos [conflicts], and who is recognised by the native as his master, etc. As to the Government representative, whether called fiscal or administrator, he has no other role but to inform the Governor...".⁴⁷

Although some *prazos* had their concessions renewed until 1932, the majority of leases were supposed to end by 1917, their territory being progressively integrated under state control. The administrative network seems, therefore, to have departed much more from what was considered as previous local territorial organisation, although one obviously deprived of its real power. Meanwhile, the state had, for some years, to put up with concessionary supremacy.

d) Labour Migration Flows

The *prazos* of the Zambezia Company and its sub-lessees did not work out as a system promoting and developing the region through agriculture. There were several reasons, from the argument that it was not possible to transform a country suitable for mineral industry into a plantation colony, to the unavailability of investments. As late as 1914, a traveller around the country like Governor Carrilho could hardly see a plantation landscape except for a couple of fruit trees or vegetable gardens planted for "self enjoyment". Incapable of developing new forms of agriculture, the concessionaries had therefore to rely on the old forms, developing instruments to extract the meagre surpluses and often going beyond that, threatening the very

⁴⁶BO 26, 1st of July, 1907.

⁴⁷Carrilho 1914:157.

survival of their *colono* communities. *Mussoco* and labour were these instruments, and the harsh *sipai*⁴⁸ violence the way to enforce them. To escape from the *prazos* was the only way of avoiding such violence, but its effectiveness depended on the capacity or the chance to deceive *sipai* surveillance. Somewhat ironically, thus, the concessionaries were following Enes' idea of educating the native through work and developing the country through agriculture. The problem was that it was an apprenticeship done in an neighbouring country and the "wrong" agriculture, not the one Enes had looked forward to implement.

Colono agriculture, however, was not directly 'squeezable' beyond certain limits, and so people began to move elsewhere to find new ways of earning money to pay *mussoco*. The fact that the concessionary would allow the departure of his *colonos* could appear as contradictory, since the numbers of people were the most objective way of measuring his wealth, as was argued above. However, he knew very well how to defend his interests, and *colono* agriculture surpluses did not satisfy his "needs". On the other hand, he often had no work to oblige the *colono* to perform. Short stays abroad, where *colonos* could earn money to pay *mussoco* or to spend in his shops, appeared therefore as a suitable solution to the concessionary.

In 1907, Carl Wiese, one of the most important Zambezia Company sub-lessees, published an accurate analysis of population drainage occurring, at the turn of the century, from the region north of the Zambezi to the British territories.⁴⁹ He pointed out four of its main causes: the different taxes people were obliged to pay on both sides of the frontiers, not only in terms of value but also in terms of method, the *mussoco* or head tax appearing as much more hard to support than the British hut tax; the system of forced labour which prevailed as a menace even after the fulfilment of the *mussoco* obligation - through which concessionaries imposed any sort of hard work against derisory wages; the free labour prescribed by the *Prazo* Regulation, normally involving arbitrary labour requisitions for cleaning roads, river channels, telegraphic lines and so forth; and finally, the conscription for military services which, although not massive, was made in a way which affected the entire population - through recruiting raids which caused panic in the villages. People knew that the military service meant leaving home and family to live away, on irregular daily wages, often

⁴⁸*Sipai* was the African member of the police of the colonial state or the concessionary companies.

⁴⁹Wiese 1907:241-246.

having to steal to survive.⁵⁰ For Tete Governor J. Bettencourt, who replied to Wiese's article and could not deny the main accusations, the cause of such problems was undoubtedly the *prazo* regime and not the state, and Wiese, as a notorious sub-concessionary who retained immense territories from where people fled massively, was not in a moral position to accuse.⁵¹

Exploitation under the *prazo* system of the Zambezia Company and its sub-lessees, and structures enveloping the *mussoco*, provided therefore the main cause for a pattern of emigration from the District of Tete to the surrounding districts and foreign territories. During its initial phase the state revealed an ambiguous attitude towards this process. On the one hand, it was a process contrary to all previous perspectives of Enes vision of an endogenous self-fed development, and there were several protests from the state's superior officials.⁵² On the other hand, the state did not have the strength to counter that tendency,

⁵⁰"A military conscript who has defected is a lost *colono*. The concessionary can well lose hope of receiving more *mussoco* from him. He will eventually visit his village once more, but only to fetch his wife, children and belongings, transferring them to the British territory; he will do that furtively and suddenly" (Carrilho 1916:399). Governador de Tete 1913:52-53, also insists on this aspect and on the unwillingness of the sub-concessionaries ("to whom *mussoco* is their blood") to capture their *colonos* for military service.

⁵¹Bettencourt 1910:388-395. In page 394 he wrote: "The causes of the population exodus are one and only the *prazo* regime; and they will continue to act as long as it lives. Let us not mislead ourselves: The black is beginning to appreciate the justice he finds on the other side of the border, against the treatment he receives from the "kaffrarianised" *canarim* agent surrounded by his harem of black women. The need to develop himself, to learn, takes him out of the burrow where he was born, attracting him towards the working and teaching centres, and since there is nothing to do in the *prazos*, nothing to work in or to learn, he naturally emigrates(...). As long as the *prazo* regime exists, so long will the mines stay in the hands of the companies and unless I am greatly mistaken, there will not be any progress to transform the actual conditions of this country(...)."

⁵²On the 13th of May, 1908, through the Provincial Order no.268, Governor General Freire de Andrade ordered an investigation to be conducted by his Secretary of Native Affairs, F.X.F.Castello Branco, who later wrote in his report: "[*Prazos*] is the heading I chose to entitle the second part of my report; (...) Effectively, I could not mention the flight of natives from our territories without referring to the regime ruling such territories; in this regime I find one of the forces impelling the natives to outside our territory; in the complex machine which a *prazo* is, I find the source of a great evil, the almost total absence of goodness..." (Branco 1909:221); Or Mello, in the report of an inspection to the *prazos*: "If [migration] is clandestine in the eyes of the state, the same does not happen as far as the sub-concessionaries are concerned, rather pleasing them and deserving their protection(...). However, Mr.Governor General, I cannot either concede or listen to the protests of some sub-lessees, against migration to Transvaal, to the vociferations of these paladins and humanitarian citizens, rising up against territorial depopulation, against the way the natives are treated, against what they call disguised slavery. I cannot stand these protests, these complaints and clamours which stir my blood, because these people entirely lack the moral authority to act that way. They are the ones exploiting the blacks in all senses, feeding inclusively the *sipais* at *colono* expense; they are the ones protecting emigration to Salisbury, because without it natives would not have money to pay *mussoco*; they are the ones incapable of giving work to the native, from which he could earn a couple of coins; finally, they are the ones not raising their voices in protest when the Zambezia Company released its *prazos* to WNLA recruitment, thus proving that there was nothing to do here, since they needed

beholden to the *prazo* economy throughout the territory as it was. During this period it therefore fought to achieve control over labour migration, so that profits could be obtained from the institution of labour export.

But this pattern was not built simply upon the factors pushing people out of the country. To be also taken into account is the other main pillar, the conditions outside the District attracting labour, which determined the labour migration routes. Excluding some minor migration to Northern Rhodesia or São Tomé, or migratory movements to Nyassaland very localised in time,⁵³ the main migration routes were the ones leading to South Africa through the port of Chinde, to Southern Rhodesia and, internally, to the Mozambique Company and to plantations in Zambezia, particularly the Sena Sugar Estates. In addition, much of the history of labour migration from Tete was marked by competition amongst these labour importing entities. Emigration from Mozambique to South Africa had already been occurring since the 1870s, either for plantations in Natal or to diamond diggings in the Orange Free State. The first documents legitimating it date from 1875 and 1888, although emigration permits from the all territory were issued only from 1896.⁵⁴ But recruitment from Tete to Transvaal started some years later, by 1909,⁵⁵ and lasted for the short period of three or four years. It was a period of intense activity led by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA), the recruiting entity. The Tete Governor referred to it in the following terms:

no labour..." (Mello 1911:429-430).

⁵³In 1910, Sant'Anna made a very interesting study on sleeping-sickness in Zambezia (including Tete). He studied population movements and flows to assess the risks involved in tse-tse spreading throughout the territory. According to him, the relationship between northern Tete and the territories northeast of Macanga and Angónia, very intimate until 1900, had almost vanished because of the wide spread trypanosomiasis in Tanganyika, affecting heavily also lake Malawi, and of the relative failure of agrarian projects in Nyassaland (Sant'Anna 1911:183-186). Also a decline in the relationship between Tete and northern territories could be mentioned for the northwestern parts of Zumbo if we consider the aim of Zumbo *muzungos* to achieve control over the areas on the left bank of Aruangua river, precipitated by the Anglo-Portuguese delimitation of frontiers, in 1891.

⁵⁴Order no.152, August 2, 1875, "On the Voluntary Emigration of Workers (Former Slaves) from Lourenço Marques to Natal"; Order no.569, December 8, 1888, "Authorising Emigration from the Districts of Lourenço Marques and Inhambane to Natal"; and Order 129-A, April 23, 1896, "Authorising Emigration from the Entire Mozambique Territory to South Africa". See Covane 1989:18-20, 22.

⁵⁵In 1910, the Tete Governor referred to migration to Transvaal as a new phenomenon, just starting and whose effects could not yet be assessed. He estimated that 1,215 was the number of emigrants departed so far (Camacho 1910:364-65).

"When the powerful WNLA invades a territory it is as if it was a capture of a monstrous octopus; its tentacles are immense, the organisation is exemplary, its agents very skillful and much dedicated to its interests, which are the same as theirs since they are generously paid, in such a way that a mere emigration agent can earn a better salary than the Governor of this District".⁵⁶

In Tete, WNLA acted southwest of the Zambezi and in Angónia, and was at least expecting to recruit in the Aruangua valley, in 1910. Its recruiting methods were several and included strong pressure on the population. In 1911, for example, a certain Lipovich, an emigration agent working for WNLA, was operating in *prazos* Cachomba, Panhame and Chipera, in connivance with their sub-concessionary, E.F.Galliau. A good speaker of the local language, Lipovich would "enchant *colonos* with the wonders they would find in Transvaal". Meanwhile, he would lend money which the *colonos* would spend drinking Galliau's cheap beverages, or would run *colonos* into debt through gambling.⁵⁷ The end of the story would invariably be the *colono* travelling to Chinde, indebted or simply curious, from where he would embark on a steam ship to South Africa. For sub-concessionary Galliau was of course reserved a percentage on each *colono* migrating from his *prazos*. WNLA had also its agents in Angónia, where they recruited not only Mozambicans but also Ngoni from Nyassaland who had crossed the border, since WNLA was allowed to recruit only up to a certain limit in Nyassaland.⁵⁸

Emigration from Tete to Southern Rhodesia was already occurring at the beginning of the century, through 'natural' or clandestine channels. In fact, it was a movement built onto the logic of the *prazos*, as was suggested already, and on the development of Rhodesia's mining industry. To Southern Rhodesia were flowing, by 1900, people not only from all the southern margin of the Zambesi river but also from Macanga, Angónia and, broadly, the whole frontier zone. In addition, Tete was traversed by several routes through which migrants from Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland headed to Southern Rhodesia. Being a clandestine migration, it was very hard to quantify or control. After a short period of open criticism, authorities in Tete began to accept the phenomenon as resulting from the problems affecting the *prazo* system - essentially, migration appearing often as the only way for the *colono*

⁵⁶Camacho 1910:366.

⁵⁷Mello 1911.

⁵⁸Sant'Anna 1911:189.

population to find means to pay *mussoco* with.⁵⁹ Moreover, even in case of disapproval, the authorities would not have the instruments to prevent it as long as the sub-concessionaries continued to withstand the flow, since they had only the four military commands of Marávia, Chioco, Zumbo and Massanga to oversee the immense frontier. The way out for the colonial state, concerning this matter, was provided by the Rhodesians themselves, in their effort to increase labour supplies from Mozambique, in particular from Tete. The fact was that, in spite of the 'natural' flow, the sub-concessionaries' connivance, the lack of control by Portuguese authorities, and the Rhodesian emigration agents clandestinely recruiting inside Tete,⁶⁰ labour was still insufficient. The reasons behind this scarcity were the fear of the Rhodesians that South Africa would intensify recruiting activities in northern Mozambique and, above all, the nature of labour provided by the 'natural' flow from Tete, which was highly unstable. Effectively, the migrant worker from Tete normally stayed for one or two months, the time required to obtain money for *mussoco* and some small purchases. In such a short period he would have time to do nothing besides learning the digging work. Consequently, they were commonly employed in farms which provided the mines with food.⁶¹

However, the efforts of the Rhodesian Labour Board to get recruiting permits from the Portuguese authorities found the opposition of the powerful mining industry of South Africa. A settlement had to be made in 1900, through which WNLA would do all the recruiting, delivering to Rhodesia 12.5 per cent of all recruited labour in Mozambique. As WNLA did not perform its part in the agreement, not providing the labour required, the struggle for labour continued through the first decade of the century. While WNLA was not allowing southern Mozambican labour to migrate to Rhodesian mines, Southern Rhodesia, on

⁵⁹"What sort of work have we to engage the native in? How can we rouse in his soul that work ennobles men, that work is a life requirement and, inclusively, a joy? What is the use of referring to, again, the sad state of neglectfulness of this region? And, on the other hand, would we be entitled to prevent these natives from going to Rhodesia, used as they are of doing so for many years, to earn the profit with which to pay their taxes and to buy their wives the fabric to replace ancient bark which covered their nakedness, when they are back home? Would we have a reasonable motive to prevent the native from dignifying himself through work? Nobody would dare say so" (Branco 1909:262).

⁶⁰In 1910, the Tete Governor complained about these recruiters, whose activities were very difficult to control since they ranged the country as "mining prospectors, hunters or merchants, holding legal permits, and as they are not denounced by the natives" (Camacho 1910:369).

⁶¹Sant'Anna 1911:188.

its turn, did not agree in authorising WNLA to recruit in Rhodesia's southern regions.⁶² The conflict was finally settled in 1913, when WNLA agreed to withdraw its recruiting activities north of the 22nd parallel, allegedly due to the high mortality rates among Mozambican workers coming from central and northern Mozambique. Behind this argument a major re-arrangement of labour supplies was on the way. Although WNLA continued recruiting for some time northern workers who crossed the parallel southwards, looking for the next recruitment station,⁶³ the fact is that from then on both Southern Rhodesia and the colonial state could proceed with the re-arrangement of labour supplies from central and northern Mozambique to the benefit of both the Rhodesian mines and farms, and the Zambezia estates, which was done through the 1913 Agreement.⁶⁴ To Rhodesia it meant a big step forward, as it ensured it a delimited labour reserve, which would be out of reach of South Africa in case the latter expanded its recruiting activities at some future date. It also meant larger contingents, and also more stable ones, since the agreement foresaw that the workers would stay for one year, or even more under special conditions. For the colonial state, the agreement brought enormous advantages too. It put aside the need for controlling the clandestine flows, simultaneously providing safe and stable incomes through emoluments on passports, several taxes and the deferred payment of half the workers' salaries. The increase of control over the migrant flows also meant that the state might be more able to supply the Zambezia estates with labour.

While the withdrawal of WNLA from the areas north of the 22nd parallel put an end to the conflict opposing Southern Rhodesia to South Africa over labour supplies, the 1913 Agreement brought a certain peace to the struggle between Southern Rhodesia and the Zambezia estates over the same issue. Until then competition between these parties had taken the form of the plantation economy of Zambezia not being able to go along with the salaries offered by Rhodesian mines and farms. Unless they raised the salaries they would not be able to counter clandestine migration to Rhodesia. In order to satisfy the needs of Zambezia the state had thus to open migration to Rhodesia, regulating the clandestine flows.⁶⁵

⁶²On struggles for labour between Rhodesia and WNLA, see Duffy 1967:156-59.

⁶³Covane 1989:60.

⁶⁴Published in BO of October 2, 1913.

⁶⁵Adam *et al.* 1981:60-61.

e) Conclusions

During the first quarter of the twentieth century Tete suffered a rapid but profound transformation. In the short period of little more than two decades 'pacification' was concluded, the Zambezia Company and its sub-concessionaries took hold of the country to suck the meagre surpluses from politically disarticulated and subject African communities, the colonial state drafted its territorial settlement and several factors combined to draw the profile of Tete as a labour reserve.

The *prazo* regime was the main constant feature throughout the transformation, responding to the character of the economy, imposing a pattern of parasitic seizure of peasant surpluses, whether in products, cash or labour, as a result of lack of investments, on its part as well as on the state's. The expected counterpart of this parasitic exploitation, in the form of technological improvements and production reform simply did not occur in the Upper Zambezi, and the continuation and increase of this trend of absolute surplus extraction led, together with the needs of Mozambique's more developed neighbours, to the development of labour migration as a generalised phenomenon. However, the lease-holders had to be cautious with migration from their *prazos*, trying to balance what they could draw from it - in cash for *mussoco* and to feed the trade of their local shops - with the risk of depopulating their lands through it.

As to the colonial state, it had at first to live on illusions of a development financed by others, who never came, and from legislation it profusely issued but was incapable of enforcing, exhausted as it was by the 'pacification' war effort and lacking the capital support from Portugal. At the lowest levels, its officials and agents were paid and fed by the lease-holders, to a point that it became reasonable to ask who were they serving after all. The prospects for the state of raising local capital to alter its position also appeared diminished. The *mussoco* went on being collected by concessionaries, taking away from the state a considerable source of income, while Tete prevailed as a district showing great budgetary deficit.⁶⁶ As to other sources of income, such as customs, for instance, although providing one third of the District's total incomes, its policies greatly contributed to the area becoming

⁶⁶Pélissier 1988(II):167 wrote, quoting Governor Carrilho, that the District of Tete lived from one sixth of the incomes collected by the Zambezia Company and its sub-concessionaries, on the eve of 1914. Some years before, Tete Governor Bettencourt estimated that the state could collect an income of 200 *contos* but was collecting only 70 *contos* thus having a deficit of more than 100 *contos* (Governador de Tete 1907:5-6).

further depopulated.

During this period, notwithstanding the incipient nature of achievements on the transition from the outdated and inefficient military commands to the circumscriptions, persistent state efforts can be traced pointing to the establishment of an administrative network which would provide it with the control over population and territory, after the subjection process of the African communities was consummated. The emblematic 1907 Administrative Reform of Aires de Ornelas included, furthermore, a totally new profile for the local administrators, replacing *ad hoc* military officers with a new career staff supposed to possess deep knowledge and practice of "native affairs". Aware of its limited resources, the state started this new edifice from what appeared as "native traditional organisation", integrating under the authority of the new administrator subject native leaders or their successors.⁶⁷ Enes' old ideas of administrative decentralisation were retrieved after the advent of the Republic, in 1910, leading to the transformation of the Protectorate State into a new State for Natives and setting the foundations and guidelines of the administrative apparatus to be developed in the following decades.⁶⁸ Clearly, the state was setting up the structures to accomplish its role as labour provider, both to the Rhodesian mining industry and to the Zambezia plantation economy. Through such means, it began controlling the clandestine migration flows, increased its incomes and granted the amounts of migrant labour⁶⁹ and their return after the periods of contract. It also became more capable of providing labour supplies to the plantations. This trend continued in parallel with the decay of the anachronistic leaseholder economy, as can be seen in the typical case of *prazo* Angónia, which was sold by the indebted leaseholder Raphael Bivar to the Sena Sugar Estates, who immediately transformed it into a huge labour reserve.

Obviously, these transformations affected the rural population in a deep manner.

⁶⁷This integration had obviously little to do with the native authorities keeping some sort of political power. As early as 1889, Wiese was already denouncing the humiliating conditions which characterised the process of their subordination (Wiese 1892:342-43). According to Rita-Ferreira, "As happened in the rest of the Province, after the effective occupation the traditional political aggregates were integrated in the administrative apparatus (...)". Fernandes Júnior, a precious eyewitness, elucidates us about this process in Macanga, where commandant Brito suppressed the rebel chiefs with the simultaneous indication of their legitimate heirs as successors".

⁶⁸See, in this regard, Serra (Coord.) *et al.* 1983:91-93.

⁶⁹Established at 15,000 workers abroad per month by the 1913 Tete Agreement.

Firstly, at the village level the 'pacification' process, bringing with it political subordination,⁷⁰ had given way to the spread of the lease-holder pattern, destroying much of the previous territorial organisation which had survived through the 19th century.⁷¹ The integration of rural villages under the lease-holder rule meant *mussoco*, labour and food requisitions, all sorts of arbitrariness and *sipai* violence, all combining to produce considerable village mobility. In parallel, the settlement of military commands provoked the almost unique phenomenon of village withdrawal from the few existing roads, as was reported by several records.

Inside the village, the lease-holder rule led the family economy into turmoil. Censuses conducted on a man-and-wife family basis created individual obligation, destroying community solidarity ties. The anachronism was that rural people were being transformed into colonial peasants on the basis of their very natural economy. The "incentive" to increase production was thus the violent lease-holder action exerted on the family. But more than that, the system further affected peasant output capacity by taking men (and often women and children) away from family production through several forms of labour exploitation. Throughout the period, the *mussoco* prevailed as a permanent demand, with no concern for the several imponderable factors affecting natural economy, such as droughts. Droughts which were brought, in the Middle Zambezi, by the steam ships of colonialism itself. With the advent of the first circumscriptions and the migrant labour, managed by an increasingly more capable state, local households suffered heavier blows. Lacking conditions in Tete, men went to become rural proletarians elsewhere, in Rhodesia or Zambezia, their absence further weakening the domestic economy. Depopulated⁷² and depleted, Tete appeared with the profile of an underdeveloped country inside the underdevelopment brought by colonialism.

⁷⁰Carrilho 1916:389, shows very well what had become of important leaders as Undi, "a tall and broad-shouldered, very slim old man, with a proud glance, the perfect type of a kaffir chief. He wears a British army uniform presumably bought by one of his subjects in Rhodesia or Transvaal. Some twenty years ago he was taken to Tete under arrest, considered by someone as having broken the order. There he apparently learned the few Portuguese words he thought would be convenient to retain in his memory, not losing a chance to pronounce them when in the presence of any white man, together with very unreserved gestures: brandy... rum... goodbye".

⁷¹It must not be forgotten that the 'first' *prazos* only occupied a small fraction of the country, and that they were settled, in a great extent, over the social and political organisation previously existing.

⁷²Notwithstanding the difficulties in quantifying, Álvares 1916:210-11, gives us some population numbers in some major *prazos*, respectively in 1905, 1910 and 1915. Angónia: 82,000, 62,861, and 74,407; Macanga: 38,000, 25,163, and 29,305; Maganja: 11,700, 15,402, and 11,972; Mugovo: 19,106, 11,278, and 19,349; Goma: 4,977, 2,040, and 3,397.

Chapter 4:

TETE AND THE *NEW STATE* REGIME (1930-1960): POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

This chapter focuses on the thirty year period initiated with the break established by Salazar's *New State* (*Estado Novo*) and ending in the early sixties, at a time when events started being influenced much more by nationalist struggles than by the internal logic of the regime. After a summary characterization of the *New State*, of its efforts to set up a mechanism to ensure the administration of local communities and of its first attempts to implement state-run resettlement schemes, we will try to assess its impact on the peripheral District of Tete,¹ imposing a development which came to be based on the contradiction between labour and agriculture.

a) Summary Introduction to Salazar's *New State*

The 1930s are commonly acknowledged as years of major changes in Portuguese colonial policies, a transitional decade during which a new regime forged a new colonial reality. Left behind were the turbulent years of the Republic, whose major characteristics had been considerable political unrest and a high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the colonies under their full-powered High Commissioners, economically deep dependence towards colonial powers other than Portugal, and an almost total lack of entrepreneurial interest or capability of the Portuguese to take advantage of their situation as holders of potentially wealthy colonial

¹Tete is considered here, in broad terms, as the territory corresponding to the present-day Province of Tete. In fact the territory was not the result of an homogeneous creation but rather the result of progressive integration of *prazos* under state authority. As an example, Macanga was part of a *prazo* with the same name, a concession granted to the Zambezia Company, being transformed into a circumscription by the Legislative Diploma No.255 (23/08/30). Concerning the period under focus, Tete was an autonomous district until 1934 when by the decree 42,621 (31/10/34) it was annexed to the then Province of Zambézia. In 1942 the decree 31,895 (21/04/42) integrated Tete in the district of Manica e Sofala, under the authority of which it remained until 1952. Internally, during this period Tete was divided into the *Concelho* of Tete and the circumscriptions of Mutarara, Angónia, Macanga, Marávia and Zumbo. The governmental order No.7,566 (13/11/48), in BO 46(I) 1948, annexed the circumscription of Mutarara to the district of Beira, but in 1959 Mutarara was back into Tete, while the former *Concelho* of Tete was subdivided into the newly created circumscriptions of Moatize and Mágoè.

possessions. The already weak economic structure of Portugal had been further affected by the international capitalist crisis of the late 1920s and Salazar, after a four year period as Minister of Finances, between 1928 and 1932, emerged as leader of a new regime which, supported by an alliance between the strong class of rural land-owners and the new ascending bourgeoisie, fought for rapid capital accumulation at the expense of the colonial possessions, through protectionist measures and a set of principles designed to ensure the transformation of the colonies from traditional financial burdens into effective sources for metropolitan development.

Whether Salazar's seizure of power appeared as the corollary of developments initiated by the 1926 military coup or, on the contrary, operated a sudden and radical break with the past,² the fact is that Mozambique and Angola were, in the 1930s, already experiencing the efforts of the *New State* to implement its general policies. These, on the one hand, had to do with diminishing the role of foreign capital in the colonies, a slow and difficult process which, in northern Mozambique, started in 1926 with the rescinding of the rights of the Niassa Company, and ended in 1942 with the transferral to the Portuguese state of the lands controlled by the Mozambique Company. On the other hand, Salazar's main guidelines concerned the setting up of an effective administrative network capable of assuring the state presence down to the local level, collecting taxes and mobilizing labour for its agricultural undertakings, designed to produce raw materials for supplying metropolitan industries. Stability and austerity in public expenditure in order to keep balanced budgets, were the key words of Salazar's strategy. Since the new regime "had no more money to spend in Africa than previous Portuguese governments",³ its perspective was, as declared by the Minister of Colonies at the opening of the 1932 Imperial Conference, to avoid big development undertakings and onerous settlement of white colonists, having thus to rely more

²While authors such as Roberts 1986:500 tended to consider the first steps of the new regime as the development of legacies inherited from the Republic (he writes that "[Salazar] was soon to discover that the republic had overcome the worst colonial problems, and had initiated policies which the *Estado Novo* could adopt with few alterations"), others as, for instance, Smith 1974:661, considered, on the contrary, that the "'dictatorship without a dictator', as [the military dictatorship emerged from the 1926 coup] euphemistically referred to itself, was to propose no significant alterations in the direction of the colonial policy", and sought "only to improve the already existing system, rather than to question the fundamental principles on which it was based", placing the fundamental change as the result of Salazar's personal action. Smith 1974:653-667.

³Duffy 1970:187.

and more on the work of the African peasantry.⁴ For the following decades the colonies, then, would have to face the double task of balancing their budgets and supporting the growth of the Portuguese economy.

Three main legislative instruments helped the new regime in developing its colonial strategy: the Colonial Act of 1930, the 1933 Organic Charter of the Colonial Empire, and the 1933 Overseas Administrative Reform. The four chapters and forty seven articles of the Colonial Act prescribed all the principles referred to above: a stronger supervision by Portugal in its colonies concerning politics and finances, more control of the African people under the euphemism of "protecting the natives", more obstacles to the operation of foreign interests, assuring the turning "from a regime of plain autonomy which administrative and political tradition render hard to maintain, to a well conceived decentralization",⁵ undoubtedly a timid way to express Salazar's iron grasp.

b) The *New State* Administrative Network and the Role of the "Traditional Authorities"

The period of colonial conquest, which the Portuguese designated by the euphemism of "process of pacification", brought necessarily with it a major disorganisation of social, economic and political structures of the African societies, as was referred to in the previous chapter. African leaders had their powers weakened or suppressed; labour was massively captured to work outside the framework of these societies. And yet, in the perspective of the *New State* it was extremely urgent to "normalise" the colonial territory to prevent the recurrence of rebellions and, particularly, to induce the communities to produce raw materials to feed metropolitan industries. This required full integration and close control of African societies, a process which would be rendered possible by the development of an improved administrative network.

Seeking to organise a chain that would ensure Portuguese presence down to the local level, as well as effective command of the colonial Governor General under close supervision exerted from Lisbon, the old 1907 administrative network was improved and made more

⁴Hedges (coord) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.2.

⁵Monteiro Júnior & Silveira 1931:52.

efficient. The district was divided into *concelhos* and *circunscrições*. While the former were created in "civilised regions", i.e. when justified by the existence of a significant presence of white settlers or industrial and commercial undertakings, the latter were the largely African areas.⁶ Both were directed by *Administradores* (henceforth referred to as District or Circumscription Commissioners). The circumscription, as an administrative unit corresponding to a territorial area, was subdivided into two to six posts, each one headed by a *Chefe de Posto* (Head of Post, henceforth referred to as Local Administrator), the basic administrative unit where a European was in charge. Commonly, the description of the colonial state services places the Local Administrator at the bottom level of the administrative hierarchy, the one which operated the interface between European colonists and the African peoples. As the sole representative of the entire colonial state apparatus in a given territory, the Local Administrator had to perform an endless number of tasks. The 1933 Overseas Administrative Reform, in the seventh section of its chapter three, prescribed no less than 93 different attributions of the District Commissioner (and, consequently, of the Local Administrator at his level), related to civil and judiciary authority, administration, native policy, taxation, protection of economic interests and information.⁷ In the following two decades, numerous other obligations were to be added to these, such as the duty to undertake regular censuses in order to keep up-dated tax collections. The picture was one of an isolated European surrounded by thousands of Africans whom he was supposed to administer and protect - the 'white father figure' in Duffy's expression.⁸

However, reality was more complex. In fact, a great effort was directed by the state towards setting up a whole African administrative structure and policy beneath the Local Administrator - as elsewhere in colonial Africa - with considerable results.⁹ This structure

⁶This process is described, among others, in Henriksen 1978:100-101, and particularly in Duffy 1961:287-288.

⁷Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique [hereafter AHM], Fundo do Governo Geral [hereafter FGG], Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze", Dezembro 1962:44-45.

⁸See Duffy 1970:171-193; 181, on this point.

⁹See, on this regard, Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:117. She writes that "contrary to the stereotyped picture opposing British indirect rule to Portuguese authoritarianism or French assimilating centralism, the colonists - whoever they were - sought an effective collaboration of local chiefs". Effectively, without platforms of collaboration with elements from the African communities there was little the Local Administrator could have done in performing his tasks. For the discussion of the role played by Africans in rendering possible the imposition of an apparently weak structure see Robinson 1972:117-142.

consisted basically of territorial subdivisions of the administrative post, down to village level. Roughly, the administrative post was subdivided in several *regedorias* which, on their turn, could include several *groups of villages*. Each group of villages, as the name indicates, contained a set of villages. This three-levelled structure was entirely run by African authorities, and could be considered as the "African bottom segment" of the colonial state apparatus. In its ideological discourse, the New State considered the *regedorias* as legitimate inheritors of traditional "tribes".¹⁰ This effort at keeping the African socio-economic and political structures or, put in a better way, in trying to set up new political structures resembling, as much as possible, the "traditional" ones, had thus a clear colonial purpose. Under the cover of this apparent *respect* towards the subjugated societies, and of preserving their political systems, the state managed to preserve the indigenous social and technical forms of production which it was, anyway, incapable of transforming.¹¹

The Portuguese authorities had been pursuing the policy of *regedorias* in the early aftermath of their military campaigns. Chiefs willing to collaborate were confirmed in their posts through intervention in the succession processes, while more reluctant ones were rapidly replaced.¹² Large or strong chieftainships were broken up into several smaller and less "threatening" *regedorias*. However, this development, which originated more from *ad hoc* adaptations than from a coherent policy, resulted in a multitude of non-homogeneous units, differentiated in rank of their chief and in the size of their territories, as well as in the numbers of population integrated. In addition, a chief willing to collaborate was not, necessarily, one respected or accepted by his community. On the contrary, the process of submission of local institutions to the colonial order must have acted against the prestige of local authorities. In 1942, for instance, the Local Administrator of Ancuaze, in Mutarara, complained that

¹⁰The Commission of Studies and Plans for Development wrote that "military and, later, administrative occupation wisely took advantage of these traditional political aggregates [the tribes], integrating them in the administrative organism of the state. The *regedorias*, contrary to some suppositions, are not artificial or arbitrary divisions created by the colonist to facilitate his administrative task. They are the modern projection of these organic, operative, frequently secular aggregates the military met once the effective occupation was concluded". AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos e Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze" (Dezembro 1962):44-45.

¹¹On this particular see Hedges (coord.) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.4.

¹²For this process in Tete, mentioned in Rita-Ferreira 1966:58-59, see the account of a contemporary witness in Fernandes Júnior 1956:*passim*.

"Due to the excessive numbers of [native authorities], 33 *regedores* [*régulos*], it is difficult to find a single one suitable for the post. A great number are inveterate drunks, completely lacking prestige in the eyes of their native subordinates; and most of them invested as "inhacuanas" [authority] are selected *à la diable*; recruited amongst *Prazo sipais* and *machileiros* [porters] (...)"¹³

This explains the approach of the state, particularly of Governor-General Bettencourt in the 1940s, in reducing the number of *regedorias* and standardising their characteristics, in an attempt to make them real administrative subdivisions of the circumscription, but ones conducted by prestigious leaders, in a process designated as "reorganisation of the staffing of authorities".¹⁴ A good *régulo* meant one who, at the same time, was legitimate, faithful and a good "conductor", and who therefore could assure good performance of activities such as tax-collection and labour recruitment. The reduction in the numbers of *regedorias* extended, in itself, the scope of the *régulo*. However, additional measures had to be adopted in order to strengthen his prestige and influence over his community, if this policy was to be successful. Along with such measures as the adoption of special uniforms for "black leaders" and special schools to train them and their sons, came others offering material rewards. In fact, they received a percentage in tax-collection or labour recruitment, improved houses were built for them during the promotion of cotton campaigns, they were the first ones to benefit from extension services, they could mobilise labour to work on their lands, and they received salaries as state officials. After going through several modifications throughout the period of the *New State*, including the 1944 regulation, the system had its major codification in the legislation issued in September 1961.¹⁵

¹³Chefe do Posto de Ancyaze in AHM, Fundo do Governo de Tete [hereafter FGT], Cx.s/n: Administrador da Circunscção [hereafter AdCirc] da Mutarara, Sebastião Chambino, "Relatório do Ano de 1942".

¹⁴In 1946, the District Commissioner of Mutarara, the most south-eastern circumscription of Tete, wrote that "In this circumscription, the *regedorias* and groups of villages included in the mentioned arrangement are yet to be extinct. But it is most convenient to extinguish some of them due to death of their *régulos* and group chiefs. On the other hand, we are thinking of extinguishing a number of groups of villages with less than 50 tax-payers. This administration has 84 *regedorias* and 100 groups of villages. According to the project aiming at reducing the staffing of traditional authorities, designed by Administrator Bento Gonçalves Ferreira, from the Government of Zambezia Province (Service Order No.20/A/1941), these numbers will be reduced to 22 and 97, respectively (...). Broadly speaking, the *regedorias* to be extinguished are mere villages (family aggregates with a chief). 63 *regedorias* have less than 63 tax-payers; from the 84 *regedorias*, only 43 will be existing by the end of this year; 58 groups of villages have less than 150 tax-payers(...)". AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, António de Magalhães Alves, "Relatório do ano de 1946".

¹⁵See BO 36(I) (14/09/61), particularly: Decree No.43,896 ("establishing the measures aiming at organizing the *regedorias* in the overseas provinces"); Decree No.43,897 ("recognizing, in the overseas provinces, local tradition regulating private juridical relationships, already or not yet compiled but traditionally used in the *regedorias*").

The idea of simply drawing a line between colonists and colonised as Europeans and Africans, implying that the African auxiliaries of the Portuguese state were simply the ones who had trespassed that line, prevents the view of a far more complex and rich reality. For understanding such a reality it seems important to distinguish between two main groups of "collaborators". One included the individuals who, for several reasons and through diverse ways came to be at the service of colonial administration, comprising *sipais*, interpreters, administrative guards, "trackers", and so forth. Often recruited among the ranks of former soldiers of the colonial army, they had made some sort of break with their original communities, even if in many cases their new status brought them increased social importance and prestige. In the other group of "collaborators" stood community leaders such as *régulos*, heads of group of villages and village chiefs, corresponding to the three levels of the "black structure" in the administration. Being either original community leaders *legitimised* by colonial authorities or simply installed by them, the fundamental difference from the first group seems to be the ties the *régulos* kept with their communities, since they still held their value as "collaborators" precisely as long as they were able to keep some level of legitimacy inside their own communities. This particular characteristic conferred on the *régulos* their ambiguous nature as influential leaders of their communities and, simultaneously, as agents of the colonial state.¹⁶

c) Towards Colonial Villages: The First State-Run Resettlement Plans

We tried earlier to define, in the particular case of northern Tete, the village as the basic unit of agricultural production and social and economical life, and the *district* of the *mwini dziko* as the territorial unit where a set of interrelated villages co-existed.¹⁷ The first impact of European penetration, although indirect, was brought by the *Prazo* system, which in spite of producing enormous changes through the ivory and slave trades, as well as through its

¹⁶Ferreira 1972:71, wrote of *régulos* that "these authorities being [the] links connecting developed services of public administration and a traditionally conservative and backward society, they suffered the shock between the necessary dynamism of the administration and the cultural stasis which determines the relative immobilism of the native population. This position of having to decide the questions places these authorities in a situation we consider the most difficult to perform amongst all overseas public functions".

¹⁷See Part I, Chapt. 1: "Tete Pre-Colonial Rural Settlement".

military characteristics, was based on the production unit, the community village.¹⁸ Yet, the military submission and the subsequent Portuguese control of the Zambezi Valley, in the first quarter of our century, created conditions for a deeper change in so far as these basic level units were concerned. With the successive administrative reforms, Salazar's *New State* assured a fundamental change in the nature of political power at local level, as well as a new territorial definition. Beyond appearances, and in spite of the ideological discourse of colonialism, one could hardly find any resemblance between the *regedoria* and the former chieftainship. Yet the villages inside the *regedoria* appeared to be still much the same, even if surrounded by a completely new reality for several reasons, which included the colonial need to maintain the old forms of production.

The administrative effort of the new regime in destroying the former chieftainships through the submission of their political autonomy and their pulverisation in smaller *regedorias*, eroded the villages enclosed in these new territories in a profound manner. The great geographical mobility which had been started, in the first place, by the violent military campaigns, had begun to increase, for two main reasons. On the one hand, the new *regedoria*, with a rigid definition of its boundaries, was in deep contradiction with the traditional techniques of slash and burn agriculture and often included insufficient land reserves, largely because of land concessions to European agricultural undertakings; on the other, mobility increased because of the *New State's* need to rationalise its access to labour and tax gains, and to promote its agricultural projects. As was argued, this encouraged a pattern of labour migration and led to the gradual introduction of monetary elements in the local economy, which undermined the productive and social life of the village. However, geographical mobility was obviously not what suited the new regime. Stability meant better labour control and more accurate censuses for tax purposes. It is in this context that one can place not only the measures to increase the power of the *régulo* but also the first debates to create villages of a new nature.

¹⁸For a general and operative definition of the African village see Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:67: "Rural communities are effectively, as agricultural production units, the true basis of economy and society. Commonly, this production unit takes the form of a village: a more or less restricted group of families finding almost the whole of their subsistence in working the land, in a frame of a poorly differentiated social division of labour, where even specialized or privileged individuals or groups - artisans, chiefs, priests - need to participate, or to bring their family members or dependants to participate in agricultural production, in order to assure their living".

Certainly, some general guidelines had been established earlier, in the most important legislation. The Organic Chart prescribed, in article 235, the "organisation of native population for purposes of assistance, public administration and military defence", and the Overseas Administrative Reform, somewhat more explicit, determined in section no.10 of article 51 that the administration should create conditions "to develop, through persuasion, the usages and customs of the natives, seeking to progressively adapt them to our civilisation", and in the no.11 of the same article, that the administration should "watch over the cleaning and alignment of the native villages, aiming at placing them along the roads, in salubrious locations where the best agricultural lands can be found, as much as possible in accordance with the health authorities".¹⁹ However, these general and vague prescriptions were largely ignored by colonial governors, who were fully authorized to establish the rules in so far as villagisation was concerned.²⁰ In addition, the initiative of local authorities, usually guided by practices such as forced labour recruitment and obligatory unpaid labour, and the lack of continuity in action from one authority to the next, prevented the implementation of a consistent policy regarding these matters. This situation was behind the 1941 debate on the "social and economic organisation of native populations", also referred to as the "project for native villagisation", which occurred at higher circles of the regime. The debate was supposed to find out, according to Marcello Caetano, the technique of villagisation, since its doctrine was already clearly defined.²¹ Ideologically this doctrine concerned "civilising the native", bringing him to coexistence with European institutions and to live under Catholic principles and, in the social and economic sphere, concentrating the dispersed residential pattern in order to make administration more effective and fixing the shifting nature of the local agricultural economy.

The village defined in the decree proposal was based in the concept of family and property according to European standards. Notwithstanding the written assurances that local

¹⁹See "Organic Chart of the Portuguese Colonial Empire", decree 23,228, November 15, 1933, and "Overseas Administrative Reform", decree 23,229, November 15, 1933. State interventionism in the "social and economic organisation of the native population" was also based in the following legislation: "Civil and criminal political statute of the natives in Portuguese colonies", decree 16,473, February 6, 1929; "Organic Statute of national Catholic missions", decree 12,485, October 26, 1926; "Natives' Labour Code", decree 16,199, December 6, 1928; "Colonial Act", decree 18,580, July 8, 1930; "Political Constitution of the Republic", February 22, 1933; and the decree 16,474, February 6, 1929, "On the civil and commercial legal relationships between natives and non-natives".

²⁰Cancelas 1966:143-144.

²¹Cancelas 1966:144.

particularities and beliefs would be respected, the state was to exert close supervision over the entire process. The administration was to define the new location, in fertile lands and near water sources and roads, and to provide education, medical services, house-building and agricultural assistance. As to administrative organisation, it was to be adapted to the already established regulations, the village headman being appointed by district authorities.²² One first question arising in the discussion was the strong resistance of local communities to previous projects of this nature, wherever they had been attempted.²³ According to the statement of the Minister of Colonies, Captain Teófilo Duarte, popular reticence had to do with the system of forced and unpaid labour practised by circumscription authorities.²⁴ The Local Administrator had no financial reserves to mobilise labour for opening and keeping roads, patrolling, doing portage, and so forth. Consequently, he conscripted men living in villages nearby to force them to do the "administration's work", causing a situation of permanent threat in which the population only felt safe when living far away from the administrative centres. But the population's unwillingness to cooperate had additional, deeper reasons. The scattered and shifting settlement pattern prevailing in most of the areas was determined by the agricultural techniques and the general organisation of society. Slash and burn agriculture required a good carrying capacity of the area, meaning not only good soils but also low densities so that new land would be available every five or seven years to open new fields when the soil in the existing ones was exhausted. If a certain limit was reached and new lands were no more available, the village had to move away.²⁵ Connected with the limits imposed by agricultural techniques was the whole kinship and social organisation which regulated the concession of productive lands and, as was argued earlier, the whole life in the village. In this context, the prospect of not only an entirely new space for the village, but also a new form of social organisation based on individual integration (as an alternative to former community strategies), on different ownership patterns and definitive settlement, could not but appear as threatening. Without replacing the entire production system, which was beyond

²²See "Projecto de decreto destinado a fazer progredir a organização social e económica das populações indígenas mediante um aldeamento metódico e realizado por meios suasórios", in *Boletim Geral das Colónias* 1941:65-70.

²³For instance, the villagisation attempt in Nhangau, near Beira, under the Mozambique Company, with "not very encouraging results so far, certainly because villagisation is not in harmony with the psychology of the natives". Costa Pereira 1949:43.

²⁴*Boletim Geral das Colónias* 1941:75.

²⁵These factors had several implications for material culture, including the provisional nature of houses, which could rapidly be dismantled and rebuilt elsewhere. See, for instance, Costa Pereira 1949:39-41, 88.

the imagination of the community, permanent settlement and definitive demarcation of *machambas* meant scarcity of lands and hunger in the short run, a prospect that concentration in larger villages would do nothing but aggravate. Leadership, in the previous sense which included also organising property and production, would not be exerted in the new village, at least in the same terms. Kinship ties, which included a meaning of protection, would also be absent, as well as traditional mutual assistance systems, in spite of the unconvincing assurances of the authorities. Therefore, future colonial propaganda, apparently full of promises of a new and developed life, was perhaps viewed by local communities as the shortest way to widespread chaos.

Some of the participants in the 1941 debate were well aware of these implications. Vicente Ferreira, condemning the decree project, said in his statement that "the assistance to be delivered by the project would require the destruction of native societies followed by their reconstruction in different terms - a prolonged action, or very dangerous if brusque (...). In the future [the project can] provide cause for violent antagonism and, therefore, for disorganisation in a society which we intend - on the contrary -to organise".²⁶ Arguments openly against villagisation continued to be presented by important officials in the state apparatus. Aires Pinto Ribeiro, director of the Health Services in the Colony affirmed that the prospect of "building aligned huts one near the other" would never be successful,²⁷ while colonial Inspector Nunes de Oliveira, former Governor-General, argued in favour of a dispersed form of habitation which was "more harmonious with native religious and economic principles" and with several advantages such as the prevention of pestilences. He concluded by saying that "villagisation will never be a point of departure, the building foundation, but its final coping stone instead".²⁸

The risks and obstacles brought to light by the discussion of this first project underlined the need to develop studies in order to reach a deeper knowledge of "native economy and society", a reason which was probably behind efforts to collect the opinion of local experienced authorities such as the ones undertaken in Zambezia in 1944 by colonial Inspector Franco Rodrigues. He developed his study as an inquiry, with several items

²⁶*Boletim Geral das Colónias* 1941:89.

²⁷Costa Pereira 1949:66, 69.

²⁸Costa Pereira 1949:39-41.

extensively covering all aspects of villagisation, to which all administrators from the District of Zambezia had to answer.²⁹ His first conclusion was that no general rule should be established concerning resettlement since the factors conditioning this process differed from colony to colony and from area to area. Therefore, any effort should be preceded by careful studies "involving aspects of geography, agriculture and cattle breeding, and ethnography, covering the economic and social problems concerning the native village in itself and in its relationship with the European element and its activity". Criticising the dominant concept of village, he argued that the new settlement should not lose its rural character and proposed the concept of *ruralato*, a compromise between dispersed habitation and concentration, based in the binary hut-*machamba*. In other words, breaking this relationship between dwelling and cultivated plot would obstruct the success of any project of this kind. To attain the objective of the *ruralato* the first and fundamental step would be transforming shifting agriculture, fixing the community to the land through the introduction of permanent cultures of both foodstuffs and cash crops, as well as of cattle breeding. This process, based on persuasive means and availing itself of periodical shifting, would have to be slow and progressive, starting from the villages of the most important chiefs and the ones where permanent cultures would be easier to implement. In Zambezia, this would be the case of coastal villages where permanent cultures of *euphorbeaceous* plants existed. Model-villages assisted by authorities should be developed as an example for the remaining ones. In the *ruralato* each family would receive 2 to 8 hectares of land, according to the particular nature of soil and crop and to the existence of cattle. Community property would prevail in such cases as plant-breeding plots, pastures, etc. Several measures to counter soil exhaustion were envisaged.³⁰ State support, providing seeds and implements, would be an additional measure to establish permanent crops and as an incentive to villagisation. The new houses would be built of *traditional* building materials, except for the chief's house, the warehouse, the sanitary post and the school, which would be built of masonry as an extra incentive for permanent settlement.

²⁹AHM, Fundo da Inspeção dos Serviços Administrativos e dos Negócios Indígenas [hereafter ISANI], Cx.62: José Franco Rodrigues, "Relatório e documentos referentes à inspeção ordinária feita aos concelhos de Quelimane e Chinde, às circunscrições de Gurué, Ile, Lugela, Massingire, Nhamarroi, Zambeze e respectivos postos administrativos", 1944; Costa Pereira 1949:75-99.

³⁰Several measures were proposed by F.Rodrigues, namely: rotation of crops, controlled burn of leaves after harvest, manuring through movable stables, water drainage in slope lands, deep ploughing and digging in clay soils, irrigation and watering where possible, 8 to 10 years fallow periods, and compact tree planting around agricultural land to protect it from the wind. See Costa Pereira 1949:87-88.

However, these apparently progressive prospects obscured the controlling measures the state was trying to set up as revealed in the answers of most of the local authorities to the inquiry. Significantly, the prospect of exempting the peasants adhering to the new villages from paying taxes for a period, provoked much discussion and was rejected by all, with Inspector Rodrigues only managing to defend the exemption of women. In parallel, respondents candidly stressed that villagisation would be very negative in terms of mobilising labour for European undertakings if the proposed measures for the peasant to reach self-sufficiency were to be successful. On the other hand, all the answers were unanimous in supporting the absolute role of the state in controlling the whole process. The administrative authorities should direct the economy in the village, control trade through setting up periodical trade fairs, develop schools and agricultural training, and so on. Regarding the limits imposed by *traditional* social organisation, previously considered as an important obstacle to villagisation, nothing was said besides the need to study the singular characteristics of each region and "the previous education of the native in order to break, through persuasion and training, the hostility of his psychology", an effort to be undertaken by the church in conjunction with the administrative authorities. Inspector Rodrigues clearly showed that any changes in the profile of rural villages required, in order to be successful, a slow and careful process based in the *technique* of the *ruralato* - the preservation of spatial unity between residence and production - in which a new production system was the key factor. This strategy was followed in several districts in northern Mozambique, in the 1940s and early 1950s,³¹ and probably paved the way for the establishment of "cotton concentrations".

Cotton had been cultivated under a new system since the promulgation of the New State decree No.11,944, of July 28, 1926.³² This is considered the decree of the regime of concessions since it prescribed that cultivation should be carried out in the areas of African agriculture while industrial processing was reserved for European undertakings with influence over demarcated zones. The state kept for itself the role of supervising such activity, whose

³¹Amongst others, experiences of this nature were reported in Alto Molócuè and Montepuez. In the former, a slow three-phased program is reported, for implementing in 6 years the settlement of 182 families in individual plots of 1 to 8 hectares. In the latter, the idea of *ruralato* (or rural *colonato*) is vigorously supported in the following terms: "As opposed to classical villagisation we support a system of rural *colonato* capable of providing the benefits of association without the inconvenience of the sordid promiscuity of tropical villages, where soil pollution paves the way for numerous pestilences". AHM, FGG, Cx.442: AdCirc/Alto Molócuè, António Lopes Henriques de Oliveira, "Ruralato Indígena" (n/d); AHM, FGG, Cx.442: AdCirc/Montepuez, No.1.229/B/11 (11/12/52).

³²In BO 37(D) (11/11/26).

importance came from the fact that cotton was one of the three products most contributing to the deficit of the Portuguese trade balance.³³ Although the process of implementation of such measures was slow, burdened by adverse factors such as the international 1929 crisis and the time the *New State* took to assume control of the territory and economy, it led to considerable results, particularly in so far as peasant integration was concerned.

TABLE 4.1:
MOZAMBIQUE COTTON PRODUCTION FOR EXPORT (in tonn.)

YEAR	TOTAL PRODUCTION	PEASANT PRODUCTION	% OF PEASANT PRODUCTION
1931	1,484	300	20.2
1938	8,916	8,500	95.3

Source: Sousa Ribeiro (ed.) 1940:321.

From the 1930s, therefore, the development of its administrative network allowed the *New State* to penetrate more and more into the sphere of peasant production. Through more efficient techniques of population control and tax-collection, and an increasingly brutal method, cotton production was extensively imposed on local communities. Further steps helped to enforce this trend, such as the creation of the *Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial* (Board for Export of Colonial Cotton, JEAC), in 1938,³⁴ centralised in Lisbon, in charge of cotton development and supervision, including the capacity to lend capital to the concessionaries or make direct purchase of the cotton crop. This system was locally developed and perfected in the 1940s, under the direction of Governor-General Bettencourt, with the promulgation of several regulations aiming at controlling peasant labour, resulting in tangible production increases.³⁵ According to Lemos³⁶ Mozambique was transformed by then into Portugal's main supplier, increasing its production from an average of 18,938 tons in 1936-1940, to an average of 60,116 tons in 1941-1945. But it soon became clear that a limit had been reached: on the one hand, in spite of the increasing demands on the peasants, labour was

³³See Lemos 1985:5.

³⁴Decree No.28,697 (25/05/38), in BO 27(I) (6/07/38).

³⁵See on this regard Lemos 1985:5-7. Amongst these regulations, "Regulamento de Identificação Indígena de 1941" and the introduction of the identification card, *caderneta* in Order No.4,950 (19/12/42); "Regulamento do Imposto Indígena" in Order No.4,763 (27/06/42); and "Regulamento da Contribuição Braçal Indígena", in Order No.4,963 (12/12/42).

³⁶Lemos 1985:6.

lacking for various other colonial needs; on the other, production increases could not continue by means of traditional technical forms of production,³⁷ and since cotton production withdrew more and more lands and time from production of foodstuffs, the very survival of the peasants began to be threatened. That is why from 1946 on, there appeared a series of state efforts trying to rationalise the system, in what could be considered as a new policy. JEAC began the recognition of suitable areas for intensive cotton production and its Technical Services presented, in 1947, a "pre-project for cotton concentrations". This was nothing but a scheme aiming at: intensifying production through closer supervision of each producer; assuring the production of foodstuffs adequate for peasant reproduction; identifying the "bad cotton producers" in order to send them as labour to other colonial undertakings; and rationalising administrative control and distribution costs.³⁸


The scheme, not very different from the classical *ruralato* defined by Inspector Rodrigues, was to be adapted to the characteristics of each area and took account of two main types: lowland and slopeland concentrations.³⁹ Its agronomical objectives included: the maintenance of soil fertility, fundamental for the prospect of fixing a permanent settlement; the production of both cotton - as the basic crop - and foodstuff cultures normal in each region, thus avoiding monoculture and its consequences of impoverished soils and shortage of food; rotation of crops through the several plots of each family (1 to 8 hectares in total), with grazing areas where cattle breeding was possible, or simply in fallow; and through these and other measures, combat against erosion. In parallel, the socio-economic measures to be taken were the following: Division into parcels, in order to install native families according to the productive capacity of each one and to render possible the mechanisation of certain agricultural operations; definition of the family as the "economic production unit"; building of several community facilities such as social centre, school, sanitary post, well and fountain, houses for the teacher, the nurse and the foreman of the concessionary company. The program implementation was to be directed by JEAC technicians, local administrative authorities and the concessionary company in the area.

³⁷See, in this regard, Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:153-154. "Cash crops can still increase while they do not require great modifications in the rhythm of the traditional system: Tanzanian coffee increased from 235 tons in 1905, to more than 10,000 tons by the mid-1930s; however, by then it had reached a limit in the framework of lands and labour available in the traditional structure. From then on production stagnates at the same level (...)"

³⁸Hedges (coord.) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.4.

³⁹AHM, FGG, S3: J.Fonseca George, "Ante-Projecto para Concentrações Algodoeiras" (1947).

MAP 4.1: SCHEME OF A COTTON CONCENTRATION FOR 40 FAMILIES (1940s)



1. School
2. Fountain
3. Infirmary
4. House of Teacher
5. House of Nurse
6. House of Guard
7. Threshing Floor
8. Cotton Store
9. Cotton Marketplace
10. Seed Store
11. Silo
12. Machinery
13. Machine Shop
14. Fuel Tanks
15. Pond
16. Disinfection Tank
17. Gardens

- | | |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| Forest | A, B... Cultivations |
| Family Huts | Fallow |
| Roads | Grazing |
| Plot Limits | |
| Parcel Limits | |
| | Parcel Area = 100 m ² |
| 1, 2.. Parcel Numbers | I...IV Block Numbers |

Source: AHM, FGG, S3: J. Fonseca George, "Ante-Projecto para Concentrações Algodoeiras" (1947).

The cotton concentrations did not bring the expected results, either in terms of the increase of cotton production and peasant food security nor as an example of a new settlement to be adopted as a generalised alternative to "native villages". As to the first aspect and in spite of administrative interventions and repeated legislation, the fact was that cotton production was still relying on community forms of production, which had reached a limit.

The focus on intensification through administrative measures rather than transforming the production techniques and organisation created a reality of cotton concentrations as highly controlled villages that could hardly be used as models capable of attracting voluntary adherence. This fact was to underlay the later state attempts to create a new doctrine, in the early 1960s, based in the concept of "Community Development", as will be discussed below.

d) The Impact of the *New State* Regime's Policies on Tete: Labour versus Agriculture

We previously referred to the economic and social background which historically produced the Tete emigration pattern, particularly to Southern Rhodesia. The *prazo* economy, with its increasing tax demands in cash, and the absence of local cash earning work alternatives, the system of forced labour characterised by great violence, capturing people to work as porters, make roads, clean water channels, instal telegraph posts, cut down trees or "fulfil their military duties", all these can be considered as internal reasons pushing people to work outside the district. The resulting migration was well suited to Southern Rhodesia's farming and mining needs, and this combination created from the turn of the century and throughout its first quarter, a pattern of labour emigration in northwestern Mozambique.

Between the 1930s and the 1950s, this process was influenced by economic and political developments in Southern Africa, as well as by the policies of the Portuguese *New State*, and was punctuated by the 1934 and 1947 Labour Agreements between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. It shows that the shape of Tete *development* continued to be determined by external demands (both from the Province and the neighbouring territories), with heavy costs for local communities. In this context, the *New State* would not bring profound or sudden changes, even if its new approach to Mozambique's development required more and more labour for its cash crop producing projects. The gross earnings brought by migrant labour were to keep on playing an important part in investments in the colony, and

competition over labour was to be continued, between the needs of neighbouring territories and the domestic state and private undertakings. Confirming its role as labour administrator, the *New State* would thus seek to keep the difficult balance between foreign and domestic labour demands, trying simultaneously to combat the prevailing reality of clandestine labour emigration.

After the short and somewhat singular period of the 1929 world recession, in which labour supply was greater than demand and the Portuguese state took the opportunity to monopolise labour recruitment and control, things began to change. Southern Rhodesia, like most of the region, was recovering from the crisis and fearing South African labour competition, which became a reality after 1938, when WNLA, which was already attracting labour from southern areas of Southern Rhodesia, started again recruiting in Mozambique north of the 22nd parallel. Similarly, the recovery of Northern Rhodesia copper industry and the development of agricultural projects in Nyassaland also contributed to the shortage of labour felt in Southern Rhodesia, which led its Governor to sign the 1934 Agreement with Mozambique.⁴⁰ In their turn, by means of the Agreement, the Portuguese authorities sought to increase their control over clandestine migration flows. Mozambicans in Tete, as in other regions, still had the same reasons to emigrate clandestinely: to flee from forced and contract labour, and to seek better wages as well as cheaper and better quality consumer goods in neighbouring territories.

In the mid-1930s, Southern Rhodesian needs in terms of Mozambican labour were, therefore, greater than what the clandestine flows and the Portuguese authorities could provide, which led British authorities in Southern Rhodesia to play a more active role recruiting inside the territory of Tete, in an effort to increase and facilitate the flow of labour across the District to the border. This initiative was based on an old 1891 agreement allowing Southern Rhodesia authorities to transport workers recruited in Nyassaland and Northern Rhodesia through Tete territory. Two main pillars supported this action, the first being the direct recruitment of workers, and the second a system designed to provide free transport from the original workers' zones to the border. The action of Arthur H. Holland, who directed the recruitment inside Tete, is a clear example of how this system came to be established. Holland had come to Chicoa in 1924, and in November 1925 he was already controlling some

⁴⁰The 1934 Agreement between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique in BO 39(I) (26/09/34). See on this regard Adam *et al.* 1981:64-65; Neves 1990:27-30.

river crossing points in M'sussa (28 miles from Tete), Cassanha (on the margins of the Zambezi river, down-stream from Tete) and Massanangua (near Cahora Bassa), where he conducted his recruitment. Later he got permission to establish rural shops in Cassanha and along the Tete-Blantyre road, and asked for permission to open more shops in Angónia, Macanga, and Mutarara, which was refused under the strong influence of the Sena Sugar Estates, which felt its labour sources threatened.⁴¹ Until at least 1937, Holland was still active in Tete, spreading posters "throughout the bush" which offered free rides to the border in a militarily organised fleet of trucks known as "Uleres" (literally meaning "for free" in ciNyanja, or "free transport"), supervised by a certain Captain Garlake and driven by British soldiers.⁴² Originally set up to drain the labour flow from Nyassaland and Northern Rhodesia, the "Ulere" system was soon illegally carrying thousands of Tete workers.⁴³ According to one account, local workers were carried by "Uleres" through main roads such as the one linking Angónia to the southwestern border through Tete and Changara, and ordered to get out just before the villages and posts where control barriers were set. They then walked through tracks avoiding these barriers and joined the trucks again further on, and were taken to the border.⁴⁴

⁴¹In April 1927, Captain António Montanha, then Governor of the Tete District, wrote: "I believe that what Mr. Holland really aims at is recruiting natives from our territory to Southern Rhodesia, and this is why he is establishing himself in the most populated areas, from where he can spread out - through his food stations he can recruit to Rhodesia *colonos* from *prazos* Angónia and Macanga, thus greatly taking from Sena Sugar and the agricultural undertakings in this latter *prazo*. In establishing a station of his in village Xirundo, he would easily get *colonos* from parts of the Quelimane district, from the circumscription of Mutarara, from the Mozambique Company and possibly even from Bárue. Consequently, in a short period we would witness an alarming increase in the 14,000 number of *colonos* we actually have in Rhodesia (...). Tomorrow, Nyassaland would be protesting against this permission, alleging that we were collaborating in the increase of their non-controlled emigration. This is why I ordered the suspension of such permission (...)". Governor of Tete, as quoted in AHM, GG, Cx.225: Inspector Administrativo do Serviço dos Negócios Indígenas Francisco Melo e Costa para o Governador da Colónia, "Relatório" (28/10/38):VIII-IX.

⁴²AHM, FGG, Cx.225: Inspector Administrativo dos Negócios Indígenas Francisco Melo Costa para o Governador da Colónia, "Relatório" (28/10/38):VI-VII.

⁴³According to one source (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Intendente do Distrito de Tete [hereafter IDT] António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do ano de 1948"), in 1948 the "Uleres" carried 13,428 non-Mozambican workers, broken down as follows: from Nyassaland to Southern Rhodesia: 4,494; from Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia: 2,513; from Southern Rhodesia to Northern Rhodesia: 2,561; and from Southern Rhodesia to Nyassaland: 3,860. Meanwhile, the total number of workers transported by "Uleres" in 1949, according to a compilation undertaken by Neves of data from the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (Neves 1990:39), was of 72,660. This certainly gives room for one to conclude that an impressive number of Mozambicans were travelling this way to Southern Rhodesia.

⁴⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

During the Second World War most of the general conditions under which Southern Rhodesia was attracting Mozambican migrant labour still prevailed. In fact, under the war situation Southern Rhodesia, like other British colonies, was forced to create new industries in order to replace goods formerly imported, and projects capable of providing raw materials to Great Britain, thus contributing to the war effort. According to official statistics the numbers of Mozambicans working in Southern Rhodesia increased from an estimated 68,304 to 93,977, between 1940 and 1944.⁴⁵ However, faced with Nyassaland and Northern Rhodesia reserves in furnishing the numbers of migrant workers demanded, and having to respect an agreement signed with these territories for controlling clandestine labour, Southern Rhodesia enhanced its recruiting services with the creation of the Rhodesia Native Labour Supply Commission (RNLSC) in 1946, and assured its activity inside Tete through the 1947 Supplementary Agreement. The Portuguese state continued, with this Agreement, to fight to enhance its control over the clandestine migrant flow and increase its earnings. The RNLSC could set up structures to operate inside the territory of Tete but only through Portuguese individuals working on its behalf, and all Mozambican workers, either legally or clandestinely recruited, had to be registered by Rhodesian authorities and repatriated after their two year contract period.

If the 1947 Supplementary Agreement brought with it an increase in the state's earnings, the control over migrant labour flows seemed rather problematic to enforce, not only due to the lack of Southern Rhodesia's interest but also because it benefited the private interests of some Portuguese officials. District Commissioners and Local Administrators in Tete often received calls from their superiors recommending that the needs of some recruiters should be satisfied.⁴⁶ At the same time recruiter Pinto Bastos⁴⁷ was prosecuted for activities related to clandestine recruitment.⁴⁸ Particularly mentioned is the association between Magoé's Local Administrator, Carlos Andrade Clara, and Bastos, with the former's *sipais* capturing peasants who would be taken to Southern Rhodesia by the latter.

⁴⁵Hedges (coord.) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.3.

⁴⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁴⁷Bastos was acting in Tete for some years, recruiting for "Cam & Motor Mining Co." and "Gaths Mine" (see Neves 1990:30-31). Perhaps the difficulties in recruiting legally, and his own personal interests were what led him to diversify his recruiting methods.

⁴⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948", where several aspects of illegal recruitment are mentioned.

Figures from 1948 give us a clear idea of the seriousness of the problem with clandestine emigration. The Intendant estimated the numbers of Mozambicans working clandestinely in Southern Rhodesia at 80,000, which is not far from other estimations. However, the numbers of workers from this group coming from Tete are harder to estimate. If we consider 72,660 as the number of migrant workers transported in "Ulere" trucks in 1949⁴⁹ and subtract 13,428 as the number of non-Mozambican workers transported in "Ulere" trucks,⁵⁰ we get a round figure of 60,000 minimum for clandestine Tete emigrants, because many clandestine emigrants did not take "Ulere" trucks to cross the border. Other estimates put the number at 77,000 for 1943 (including workers from Bárúè), and 68,841 for 1944.⁵¹ We could then consider a round number of 70,000 as a reasonable estimate. Meanwhile, in the same year of 1948 only 258 workers are referred to as having been furnished by the state to the RNLSC.⁵² The fact of legal emigration being roughly 0.4 percent of total emigration shows that clandestine labour was clearly the pattern of labour offered by Tete to Southern Rhodesia. Even so, the 1947 Supplementary Agreement was very much an achievement for the Portuguese state, which between 1947 and 1958 saw its earnings continuously increasing, while for Southern Rhodesia it meant an increase from 72,120 Mozambican workers, in 1946, to 117,000 ten years later⁵³. However, soon the British authorities were denouncing the Agreement, for reasons which will be mentioned below. Meanwhile, the Portuguese problems were increasing exactly in proportion to the increase in the numbers of workers emigrating. Effectively, in parallel with Southern Rhodesia's growing labour demands came the needs of domestic undertakings fostered precisely by the same state that was exporting labour. A contradiction clearly revealed in the words of Tete District's Intendant, in 1948:

"Recruitment to [Southern] Rhodesia has deserved our best attention. We are well aware of the political reasons which took the government to sign the agreements with Rhodesia, but we also have it in mind that every action preventing our people from leaving to the neighbouring territories will be seen with good eyes

⁴⁹Data from the RNLSC in Neves 1990:39.

⁵⁰Hedges (coord.) *et al* 1993:Chapt.2.

⁵¹AHM, ISANI, Cx.57: João dos Santos Monteiro, "Relatório da Inspeção à Intendência do Distrito de Tete" (20/06/46). According to the author, figures for 1943 had been furnished by the supervisor of the RNLSC.

⁵²AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos: "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁵³Hedges (coord.) *et al* 1993:Chapt.4.

by the government (...).⁵⁴

The contradiction raised by this policy of feeding both external and domestic labour needs was quite real and the authorities only managed to postpone its effects by simultaneously fighting clandestine flows and refining its recruiting methods until the depletion of the Province's labour resources was no longer avoidable. Serious measures to combat clandestine migration would have implied the removal of all causes which led people to emigrate, i.e. better contracts in terms of lesser violence, better salaries and the availability of good and cheap consumer goods, goals obviously beyond the reach of authorities. On the other hand, measures such as the attempt to supervise the immense frontiers, to control the recruiting camps or to prosecute the recruiters of clandestine labour could only have had very limited results. Besides, as one Tete Intendant pointed out, excessive surveillance would only result in greater numbers of emigrants not coming back.⁵⁵ The state had thus to rely on its efforts to get more and more labour to satisfy everyone, instead of making a better use of the labour already available. This was done through perfecting its recruitment methods.

In spite of previous efforts, the recruiting system had still a lot of room for improvement. Some improvements were made in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, through enlarging the contract periods, imparting more accuracy to the censuses with the participation of "traditional" authorities, and through the administration increasingly assuming the task of recruitment in areas where formerly such work had been done by private recruiters. The District Commissioner of the *concelho* of Tete explained how he did this work in collaboration with his *régulos*:

"Every six months the *regedores* [*régulos*] bring to me the workers of their *regedorias* (...). [Now and then] a *regedor* brings men a little advanced in age, or youngsters under 18 years of age (...). It also has occurred that the *regedores* have brought workers who had recently concluded a labour contract (...). Every month, then, I receive workers brought to me by the traditional authorities, since I organised this service in such a way that there is not a single month in which such presentations do not take place. (...) Of course, at the time due for the *regedor* to present his workers many able men escape to Rhodesia or hide themselves in the bush because, being complete idlers, they fear being picked up by the *regedor*. When the time of *crisis* is gone they come quietly back, knowing that the *regedor* has already presented the required men. But it also has happened that the *regedor* captured some of these idlers, bringing them to me (...). This way it has been possible for me to know about the work capability of each *regedor*, about his artfulness, deficiencies or qualities, in order to replace in due course the ones who are not suitable for the good functioning of the

⁵⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁵⁵See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951".

services or to native policy".⁵⁶

Of course, the definition of potentially hireable workers in each *regedoria* did not depend on the *regulo's* calculations, as the administrator's account might lead us to believe. During the 1940s, a considerable effort was directed towards carrying out good censuses, in spite of the difficulties of such a task, which depended very much on a good administrative network.⁵⁷ Although the censuses were not always accurate, the reasons for such inaccuracy, namely tax payment and labour recruitment, were developed to unbelievable extremes of ruthlessness and "productivity". In 1948, the District Commissioner of Macanga, in a report addressed to the Intendant, justified the delay in *mussoco* collection by the lack of *ammunition* and *sipais*.⁵⁸ In the same year, the District Commissioner of Marávia complained about the depopulation of his area, undoubtedly linked to the attraction exerted by neighbouring territories and the fierce methods employed by the administration.⁵⁹ Table 4.2 offers an example of the high levels reached in terms of this "productivity". According to the Intendant, there should be one able bodied man (i.e. recruitable for contract work, collectable for tax purposes) in each 4 or 5 population units which, being legitimate, gives us the round figure of 75,000 able bodied men in the total Tete population.⁶⁰ Also considering our earlier estimate that in 1948 around 60,000 Mozambicans from Tete had crossed the border to work in Southern Rhodesia, that would leave 15,000 able bodied men in the district which, if compared with the totals of 12,342 of the recruited ranks, shows how far contract labour had gone.⁶¹

⁵⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Administrador do Concelho [hereafter AdConc] de Tete, Jayme Luiz da Rocha Picardo e Sousa, "Relatório do ano de 1946".

⁵⁷In 1948, analysing the results of tax collection, in which most of the circumscriptions registered more than 100 percent of collections, the Intendant concluded that such an anomaly was due to outdated (some were working with 1945 censuses) or erroneous censuses. See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do ano de 1948".

⁵⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Macanga, João Granjo Pires, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁵⁹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Marávia, António Crawford de Freitas Ferraz, "Relatório do Ano de 1948". The Intendant also writes that Macanga's Post of Vila Gamito, which some years earlier had around 10,000 tax-payers, was reduced in 1948 to only 385 (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948").

⁶⁰In 1946, a census had given the number of 68,841 "able" men, aged between 18 and 55. See AHM, ISANI, Cx.57: João dos Santos Monteiro, "Relatório da Inspeção à Intendência do Distrito de Tete" (20/06/46).

⁶¹See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948". Of course some of the numbers are questionable, but that does not reduce the impressiveness of the picture.

TABLE 4.2:
TETE, 1948: POPULATION, TAXES AND RECRUITED LABOUR

	Population	Taxpayers	Recruited
Tete Conc.	88,827	14,176	2,886
Mutarara Circ.	96,770	18,066	3,099*
Angónia Circ.	65,681	14,000	3,500*
Macanga Circ.	42,829	6,768	1,616
Marávia Circ.	42,676	5,885	941
Zumbo Circ.	35,218	5,640	300*
District of Tete (TOTALS)	372,001	64,535	12,342

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

*Approximate numbers.

More accurate data, related to the district of Angónia, allow the confirmation of such a picture. In 1947 Angónia had 12,962 able bodied men registered in the census, of which 7,000 were thought to have clandestinely emigrated from the District, while 2,703 were working under contracts.⁶² Table 4.3 shows how the situation had evolved five years later, in 1952:

TABLE 4.3:
ANGÓNIA, 1952: POSITION OF THE HIRABLE LABOUR

Absentees (clandestine in RSA and S.Rhodesia)	7,000
Recruited in 1951 (resting in 1952/1953)	5,129
Recruited in 1952 (resting in 1953/1954)	4,965
Recruited locally (in Angónia)	180
TOTAL	17,274

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

According to the Angónia District Commissioner the surplus in terms of hireable workers diminished continuously from 1946 until 1952 when it reached a limit, due to the growing state requisitions. And he concluded: "(...) there are now little more than 300 available, and the state's needs are already (in February 1953), for 500 men (...). We have

⁶²AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Elísio de Figueiredo, "Relatório do Ano de 1947".

reached the limits of our capacity".⁶³ More than half of the volume of Tete engaged labour went traditionally outside the District. With no European agriculture or industry,⁶⁴ no cotton projects if Mutarara is excluded, Tete's labour needs only began slowly increasing in the late 1940's. Table 4.4 shows the destiny of contracted labour in 1948.

However, even if Tete was a traditional labour supplier, that did not prevent it from experiencing labour scarcity when some larger projects of its own began to be implemented. Or, put in another way, that scarcity was felt precisely because Tete was not traditionally a labour consuming province. Intendant Santos wrote, in 1948, that when he took charge the public works were struggling against labour scarcity, having to rely in a few thousand workers from Zambezia and Niassa, since Tete could not provide more. He proudly announced the "normalisation" of the question, asserting simultaneously that "as long as I stay here lack of manpower will definitely not be a problem". Since he could not perform miracles, the increase in the numbers of engagees was probably due to harsher recruiting methods and artfulness such as ignoring the rest periods between labour contracts, "small illegalities" which, he was sure, had the good purpose of "meeting the wishes of His Excellencies the Minister of Colonies and the Governor General".⁶⁵

Tete's most important project during the period was the railway which was to transport the coal extracted in Moatize mines. The works were initiated in 1938 and, after an interruption during the Second World War, reached Moatize in 1949.⁶⁶ In 1942, four years after the works started, the railway was progressing at an average of 17.5 kilometres per year, having to face enormous labour problems with the work brigades, in spite of the administration in Mutarara having furnished to Pauling Co., which was directing the works, more than 8,000 engaged workers in the two year period of 1940-1942.⁶⁷

⁶³AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

⁶⁴As late as 1951 the Intendant of Tete could still write that "District's industries are very limited, not more than two oil factories, six mills and two limekilns". AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951".

⁶⁵AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁶⁶Stopping, therefore, only a few kilometres from Matundo, in the opposite Zambezi margin of the capital city of Tete, as the Intendant was complaining in 1951. AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951".

⁶⁷AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Chefe do Posto de Ancuaze, Jorge Alberto dos Santos: "Relatório do Ano de 1942"; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, Sebastião Chambino, "Relatório do Ano de 1942".

TABLE 4.4:
TETE, 1948: DESTINY OF RECRUITED LABOUR

DESTINY	Recruited
Tete Railway construction	2,623
Public works and roads	1,168
Several state works	585
Works for private farmers	2,478
Cereal producers corporation	1,361
Cheringoma activities	376
Buzi Company	842
Vila Pery Cotton Company	657
Sena Sugar Estates	1,730
Mozambique Company	114
Trans-Zambezia Railway	54
Beira Railway	96
Rhodesia Native Labour	258
TOTAL	12,342

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

In 1948 the railway brigade was employing 6,000 workers.⁶⁸ The second major labour consuming sector in Tete was "Brigade No.3" for road construction. Based in Zóbuè, it worked during the late 1940s and the 1950s on the improvement of the important road running from Tete/Matundo to Zóbuè, on the border with Nyassaland, and constructing the road from Zóbuè to Vila Coutinho, in Angónia, which when ready would offer a 115 miles way out, allegedly rendering viable the expectation of transforming the region into a centre of agricultural production for export. Several other brigades operated in the province, such as the one for mining development and the one to combat the sleeping sickness, all focusing their work mainly in the eastern part of the District.⁶⁹ Besides public works, contracted labour continued to be furnished to private employers, as can be seen in the example of

⁶⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁶⁹The Angónia District Commissioner referred to the great increase in the numbers of recruited workers in 1952 in Angónia, from an annual average of 3,600 to 5,050, due to the construction of the road V.Mouzinho-Zóbuè and the zootechnics post at Angónia. AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

Angónia in Table 4.5. The same Table also reveals that as late as 1952, at a time when important works were being undertaken in Tete, only 19 percent of Angónia labour remained inside the District. The Province of Manica e Sofala, with 56 percent of Angónia labour force, was clearly the main beneficiary.

TABLE 4.5:
ANGÓNIA, 1952: DESTINY OF RECRUITED LABOUR

EMPLOYING ENTITIES	REGION	No. of WORKERS
Private Employers:		
Inhansato timber works/Inhaminga	Sofala	241
Trans-Zambezia Railways/Inhaminga	Sofala	148
Sena Sugar Estates/Marroneu	Sofala	473
Lusalite de Moçambique/Dondo	Sofala	30
John Souglides/Gondola	Manica	167
Sociedade Algodoeira Colonial/V.Pery	Manica	686
Chinizuia timber works/Inhaminga	Sofala	40
Mozambique Company/Dondo	Sofala	25
Co. Carbonifera de Moçambique/Moatize	Tete	294
Zambézia timber works/Caia	Sofala	44
Luso Ind. Comercial Agrícola/Gondola	Manica	10
State:		
Beira Railways	Sofala	915
Tete public works	Tete	361
Angónia zootechnics post	Tete	145
Administration of Angónia Circ.	Tete	150
Southern Rhodesia (under Agreement)	S. Rhodesia	1,236
TOTAL		4,965

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria: "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

Obviously, this pattern as labour supplier, traditionally imprinted on the province, had a great impact on the development of agriculture, the main economic activity of its people. Besides profoundly affecting community agriculture, this pattern simultaneously prevented the development even of the *New State* strategy of a modern agricultural sector producing for export, if some eastern parts of the District are excluded. Some of the reasons which had led

the old Zambezia Company and its sub-concessionaries to withdraw remained active: routes to export products were non-existent. Rapidly the Zambezi river, which had never been an easy communication route, ceased offering a solution while the railway, as was already mentioned, only became operational in the early 1950s.⁷⁰ Furthermore, customs and transport tariffs almost doubled the prices of goods if compared with Beira's,⁷¹ or more than doubled them if compared with those of the neighbouring territories, which led peasants to sell their products beyond the borders and inhibited the development of other agricultural undertakings. As to District roads, works were still going on in order to connect Angónia to the railway line in Caldas Xavier,⁷² the District Commissioner saying that without it, an increase of production was not worthwhile since the export of the existing stocks was already problematic enough.⁷³ Apart from some projects, such as the one to continue the railway to Macanga, which never became a reality, and the few truck-lines to the east and southeast, the only roads linking Tete to the west were old tracks of a previous age. As late as 1959 the authorities were still eagerly awaiting the conclusion of the Southern Rhodesian road linking Bindura to Mucumbura, in the border, which would allow the transportation of southwestern Mágoè products to Lourenço Marques through that neighbouring territory.⁷⁴ Having to face all these constraints, plus strong competition for labour, foreign capitalist agriculture did not develop as early as in other parts of Mozambique, and never in the same numbers. State or private investment only occurred as late as the 1950s, and was only limited to derisory levels and to the eastern areas, based on the railway line and in the exceptionally fertile Angónia soils. For the rest it hardly consisted of more than the distribution of cotton seeds, or of refining the means to extract surpluses, wherever they could be found. The overwhelming bulk of exports thus came from the peasant sector, while even European agriculture carried

⁷⁰"The village of Tete remains, in years of great rains, frequently isolated because it is difficult to cross the Zambesi, Revué and Luenha rivers. (...) Fluvial navigation, which used to be the main route to supply Tete (...) has disappeared for good (...) being today limited to not more than a couple of small boats that carry people and goods across the river (...)" AHM, ISANI, Cx.58: Inspector Administrativo A.S.F. de Castel-Branco, "Relatório da Inspeção Administrativa ao Concelho de Tete" (1951):87-89.

⁷¹See AHM, ISANI, Cx.57: João Mesquita, "Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária à Intendência do Distrito de Tete" (1946):1-3.

⁷²"Tete railway ends in Moatize, some twenty five kilometres from the left margin of Zambezi river. From there the railway keeps truck lines connecting with Macanga (Furancungo), Angónia, Tete, Bárue and Vila Pery" (AHM, ISANI, Cx.58: Inspector Administrativo A.S.F. de Castel-Branco, "Relatório da Inspeção Administrativa ao Concelho de Tete", 1951:91).

⁷³AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

⁷⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Governador do Distrito de Tete [hereafter GDT], "Relatório do Ano de 1959".

the marks of the chosen strategy, as one contemporary account clearly testifies, referring to the *concelho* of Tete:

"European agriculture in the *concelho* of Tete is insignificant. A kind of primitive husbandry not different from native agriculture, and therefore not conducive to the prestige of European initiative and labour which must dignify our colonising and educative mission as a sovereign people. Products grown by European agriculture are limited to maize and *sorghum*. That is the reason why agriculture in the *concelho* of Tete depends entirely on native husbandry (...)"⁷⁵

Besides some small European undertakings in Angónia, and even smaller ones in Macanga, agriculture was thus, in Tete District, entirely run by the peasant sector. The District of Tete appears therefore as a clear example of the overall *New State* strategy of imposing a "self-fed" development on the region so that it could export its wealth without investment, that is to say, safely and without risk, based on the existing social and technical forms of production since there were no conditions for private European initiative. Not surprisingly then, the state attitude towards agriculture in Tete in the 1940s lacked commitment. In 1948, the Intendant complained that there was not one single professional from the field in Tete, which obliged him, a mere amateur, to act as agricultural director. In 1951 the agricultural department was still run by low level staff, while lack of state provided seeds was impoverishing products such as beans and potatoes.⁷⁶

The absence of a "modern" agricultural sector for export and the generalisation of labour export in Tete during the 1940s and 1950s, could appear then as contradictory with Tete's profile as a food supplier for the northern and central parts of Mozambique, and even for the south in some cases.⁷⁷ Evidence shows, however, that such a profile was built at the expense of what was called the traditional agricultural sector and often occurred in parallel with famines inside the District, particularly to the south of the Zambezi.

⁷⁵AHM, ISANI, Cx.58: Inspector Administrativo A.S.F. de Castel-Branco, "Relatório da Inspeção Administrativa ao Concelho de Tete" (1951):94.

⁷⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948"; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951"; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Angónia, Mário Freiria, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

⁷⁷Exports are difficult to quantify in so far as foodstuffs are concerned. However, there are references to exports, e.g. of 15,000 tons of maize; of 5,000 tons of potatoes from Angónia to Zambézia, Beira and Lourenço Marques; from the southwestern areas to Lourenço Marques (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT "Relatório do Ano de 1959"), cattle from Changara to Beira (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948"), and so forth.

TABLE 4.6:
TETE, 1948: MARKETED PRODUCTS (in Kgs)

PRODUCTS	PEASANT SECTOR	"MODERN" SECTOR	% OF PEASANT SECTOR
Shelled peanuts	270,344	81,494	76.8
Shelled rice	102,445	16,274	86.2
Rice	8,475	6,600	56.2
Potatoes	236,914	3,135	98.6
Wax	9,535	2,740	77.6
"Nhembra" beans	370,706	35,215	91.3
Dry peas	6,542	176	97.4
Maize flour	34,558	202,002	14.6
"European" beans	464,125	87,059	84.2
White beans	503	740	40.4
Sesame	2,441	255	90.5
<i>Sorghum</i>	382,744	19,703	95.1
Millet	30,386	14,423	87.2
Maize	2,047,606	274,814	88.2

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

First of all, the absence of men who emigrated or were in contract labour from family slash and burn agriculture affected the latter directly due to the importance of men's work in completing the process of land clearance initiated by burns. It necessarily reduced the family's capacity to open new production fields, thus shortening the fallow periods in the existing ones and diminishing its output.⁷⁸ Of course some officials, keen to please their superiors, kept writing in their reports that labour recruitment did not affect food production at all, since all cultivation was done by women and children.⁷⁹ However, that was not the case and local

⁷⁸The cultivation process, more or less inherent to slash and burn agriculture in Africa and all over the world, is described for Angónia in Lucas 1951:6-7, as follows: "Like peoples from other races, the [ngoni] practices [agriculture] through rudimentary processes. Lacking manure, he is obliged from time to time to find new lands, felling its trees in order to cultivate. In the autumn, in September, he starts felling the trees, and between the end of October and mid-November, when felled trees and bushes are dried enough he burns them, and the resulting ashes are what fertilises the soil. Once slash and burn works are concluded, the women will do the remaining agricultural work, assisted by their children who are grown enough to help. Once the harvest is concluded the man, assisted by his wife and grown up children, does the transport of products to the market place".

⁷⁹For example, the often quoted AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948", who wrote quite openly that the "man generally does not cultivate the fields in his village. That kind of work is done by his wife and children. That is why I do not accept the excuse

authorities knew it very well. Macanga's District Commissioner, for instance, promised "the natives [that] I will not do [recruiting] raids in October and November in order for them to have the possibility of preparing their plots for cultivation. After that date raids will be resumed against idleness".⁸⁰ Furthermore, besides such general factors as the establishment of *regedorias*, which brought with it the definition of precise boundaries often incompatible with the needs of shifting agriculture, other aspects of the state's action debilitated family agriculture. In fact, state policies towards the traditional sector were mainly limited to pressing for grain production through furnishing seeds, undermining its fragile balance.⁸¹

Cattle breeding was an important part of the domestic economy in most of the areas not affected by tse-tse, particularly in Angónia and in extensive areas south of the Zambezi. It revealed the same tendencies as agriculture, namely being run almost entirely by the peasant sector and, within it, by men. Cattle breeding faced analogous constraints to those of arable farming, a fact which, however, did not prevent Tete from being a cattle exporter to the northern and central parts of Mozambique throughout the period, particularly to Beira. In 1947 Tete furnished 1,500 cows to Beira while the Intendant claimed that such a supply could be increased to 2,500 or 3,000 in the following year.⁸²

of some AA [the acronym for Administrative Authorities] for not sending more men to public services alleging that they are needed in their own agriculture".

⁸⁰AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Macanga, João Granjo Pires, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁸¹According to Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:147, "all the crop operations - manual cultivation of lands, fallow, burns, effective if under a system of long fallow - have a very precise role, well adapted to a particular economic system in a balanced context of limited production. (...) Neglecting these two important statements: that the agrarian system progressively refined along millennia by generations of African peasants bears an undeniable wisdom, but is also characterised by great fragility, (...) [has often led] to major agrarian catastrophes. (...) The attempt to modify the cycle or the agricultural technique, replacing for instance yams by cash crops, or introducing a new culture in the second annual cultivation, thus breaking the soil balance, (...) [often resulted] in less calories available per workday (...)".

⁸²AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

TABLE 4.7:
TETE, 1951: CATTLE DISTRIBUTION

	FROM AFRICAN SECTOR	FROM "MODERN" SECTOR	% AFRICAN SECTOR
Cattle	115,530	7,761	93.7
Goats	98,967	2,081	97.9
Pigs	2,884	433	86.9
Donkeys	440	59	88.1

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira,
"Relatório do Ano de 1951".

The introduction of forced cotton cultivation in the 1940s, although in limited regions, further aggravated this trend. Tete was never a main cotton producing area in Mozambique,⁸³ the crop being limited to the rich irrigated plains of Mutarara, particularly to its southern half, where a concession had been granted to the Zambezia Company. In the 1950s it slowly spread to other areas, mainly Macanga, although on a small scale,⁸⁴ and in 1959 was beginning in the southwestern areas, in the circumscription of Mágoè.⁸⁵ The introduction of the crop meant here, as in other areas of Mozambique, a direct threat to domestic subsistence since it removed domestic labour from foodcrop production. In fact, the agents working for the concessionary company supervised not only cotton production but also the other peasant activities in their area, to avoid "idleness". In 1940, for instance, the local Mutarara staff of the Zambezia Company, the largest cotton concessionary in Tete, received orders to furnish seeds to every African family; to assure that each person had one hectare prepared for cultivation by December, which should be done before the cultivation of foodcrops of any sort; and to assure that the ones not doing so would be punished.⁸⁶ The introduction of cotton thus faced popular opposition in Mutarara as elsewhere, particularly in 1946, when the concessionaire attempted to develop cotton without also producing food

⁸³According to Sousa Ribeiro (ed.) 1940:321, peasant cotton production occupied 100,000 hectares in that year, of which 65,000 in Moçambique District and 20,000 in the District of Porto Amélia (Cabo Delgado), the remaining 15,000 being of scattered production throughout the colony.

⁸⁴Until 1959, the Mutarara post of Inhangoma produced more cotton than the rest of Tete District. AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Relatório do Ano de 1959".

⁸⁵AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Relatório do Ano de 1959".

⁸⁶In Hedges (coord.) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.3.

crops.⁸⁷ Cotton production grew slowly but continuously in the province, reaching the record level of 9,015 marketed tons in 1959.⁸⁸

In this scenario of an unbalanced peasant sector producing for export in spite of being greatly weakened by the colonial impact, an important question remains therefore of how the peasant sector was led to produce cash crops, since colonial violence, although spread throughout the region and every sector of activity, could not explain it all. Tax demands were certainly a powerful "incentive" since they obliged the peasants to earn money in every possible way, even if it cost a critical part of their seldom excessive harvests.⁸⁹ Taking into account the large numbers of emigrant men, the fact that in 1948 almost 20 percent of the total population were taxed shows how far the system had been perfected, the involvement of "traditional" authorities and *sipais* assuring its effectiveness down to local level. The amounts revealed in Table 4.8 were considerable if it is realised that they might have been enough to support the entire state apparatus' expenses and its initiatives in the area.⁹⁰

TABLE 4.8:
TETE, 1948: POPULATION AND TAXES

Administrative Area	Population	No. of Taxes Collected	Totals
Tete (Conc.)	88,827	14,176	1,544,015\$00
Mutarara	96,770	18,066	1,730,900\$00
Angónia	65,681	14,000	1,485,230\$00
Macanga	42,829	6,768	793,275\$00
Marávia	42,676	5,885	657,570\$00
Zumbo	35,218	5,640	605,295\$00
Totals	372,001	64,535	6,816,285\$00

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁸⁷AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, António de Magalhães Alves, "Relatório do Ano de 1946".

⁸⁸Of which 8,000 tons in Mutarara, under Zambezia Company, the main concessionary, and 1,015 tons under the Sociedade Algodoeira de Tete. AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Relatório do Ano de 1959".

⁸⁹See, on this regard, Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:157.

⁹⁰In 1946 the administration in Mutarara, certainly the largest and "most integrated" administrative division in Tete, reported expenses of 1,161,345\$86, while taxes collected in 1948 amounted 1,730,900\$00 (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, António de Magalhães Alves, "Relatório do Ano de 1946"). Not very differently, Maravia administration had in 1946, expenses of 689,942\$50, while incomes generated solely by tax-collection amounted 657,570\$00 (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Marávia, Augusto de Lima Vidal Júnior, "Relatório do Ano de 1947").

However, taxes were not the sole motive behind the apparent increase in peasant production. In fact, the growing contacts with a different world, either through emigration or with the goods displayed on sale in rural shops, or even but not least, due to a greater imbalance in their economies, increased the peasants' needs for products, some of them foreign to their economies. Salt, sugar, soap, matches and particularly cloth and food were among these products. This increase in consumption affected the very survival of peasant communities in the sense that what they disposed of on the market, far from being a mere surplus was indeed a growing fraction of their reserves. Coquery-Vidrovitch writes that

"It is necessary to deny the simplistic idea according to which what the peasant delivers to the market is a "surplus", considered as the net fraction available after the group survival have been assured. It is not a question of disposing of a part of the harvest after family consumption and exploitation needs are satisfied and several obligations and stocking losses deduced. The amount of product effectively sold does not support family needs and can exceed the available reserves, particularly if the peasant sells in order to be able to face an urgent monetary expense: he shall buy again in the market later on, when his stocks are finished, a part of the product he previously sold, eventually with monetary incomes (...) unless the domestic group is obliged to restrain its food consumption. Definitely, the flexibility of the system is that of group consumption, meaning its capacity to resist to sub-nutrition or malnutrition. To prove this is the fact that an increase in a small producer's incomes or production generally does not result in increased marketing generating capital accumulation, but rather in increased subsistence stocks, either directly or through conversion to a consumption of more nutritive crops (wheat or rice instead of maize). It is then necessary to put aside the idea that the market is generated by unstable and accidental presence of surpluses. Instead, it is induced by diversification of needs in money".⁹¹

In the context of a policy according to which the colony should provide its own sustenance and feed the industry in the centre of the empire, trade networks were strategic since they operated the necessary osmotic process which assured the capture of local production. This condition, more or less common throughout Africa, was aggravated in Mozambique by the *New State* policies of trade exclusivity between the colony and Portugal to a point that, for instance in the 1950s, Mozambique paid twice the international price for its imports in blankets.⁹²

Local trade was operated by rural shops or *cantinas*, which assured the trade of peasant products by supplying the consumption goods which were increasingly required. In Tete this process was slow and, in a way, restrained to limited areas due to the isolation of

⁹¹Coquery-Vidrovitch 1985:158.

⁹²Hedges (coord.) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.4.

the District⁹³ and lack of private or state support to the shop owners. In 1942 Marávia had only one rural shop which, "not having enough capital is obliged to exchange product by product with the native". But nothing could be more symbolic than the fact that in 1948 there was only one trader established in Macanga, who worked part-time since his main occupation was as "Ulere" driver.⁹⁴ In the rural shops of the interior, peasant production was bought at cheaper prices, owing to the difficulties in exporting it, lack of competition and of a state policy for controlling prices, while conversely goods were sold at much higher prices, overburdened by the same factors acting in reverse. Local authorities were fully aware of this situation when saying:

"I keep on defending [the view] that it is necessary to regulate the prices to buy native-produced foodstuffs (...). Naive as he is, [the native] is seduced by the spoonful of brown sugar, the handful of salt or the string of beads, leaving everything he brought for a trifle. What the Asian does with the products of native harvest is not trade; what he does is impudent robbery, but also legal robbery since he is backed by the law. Everyone buys at his own price to sell later at a price agreed between all the Asians, exploiting not only the native, to whom they sell for 6 what they had bought for 1, but also the remaining buyers, the state amongst them".⁹⁵

Certainly, the burden borne by the peasant was attenuated in the frontier areas, since he could there seek the alternative of marketing in the neighbouring British colonies where duties were much lower, as testified by Marávia authorities in 1947:

"In this area there are 7 commercial shops (...). All of them trade with the native, selling their products at almost prohibitive prices because of the very high transport costs goods have to incorporate (...). That is why natives prefer rather to walk a couple of hundred kilometres in order to trade with British shops, and that is why trade done in shops of this District is so poor".⁹⁶

⁹³"The special conditions of our district, far away from the coast, deprived of economical means of transport and inlaid amongst foreign countries where commerce is understood and operated differently, prevent the development of a European trade" (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951").

⁹⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Marávia, Acácio Heitor Ferreira, "Relatório do Ano de 1942"; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Macanga, João Granjo Pires, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁹⁵AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, Sebastião Chambino, "Relatório do Ano de 1942".

⁹⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Marávia, Augusto de Lima Vidal Júnior, "Relatório do Ano de 1947". The disparity between duties in both sides of the border was chronic throughout the colonial period and was behind endless local authorities' complaints, from the letters of Portugal Durão, in the beginning of this century. In 1951 the Intendant of Tete kept arguing that "while the great difference actually existing in duty and railway transport tariffs persists, higher in our territory than in the neighbouring one, it is useless to hope for tangible development in European run trade in the District; while our side will still live an existence of difficulties and stasis, the other will witness the establishment of important trade centres, concurring to development and progress in its territory" (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT Domingos da Encarnação Vieira, "Relatório do Ano de 1951"). The competition represented by British markets sometimes enraged Portuguese authorities to the point of forbidding tobacco culture in Macanga, in spite of being very popular and remunerative, because there were no Portuguese markets attracting it, and consequently the entire harvests

However, the vast majority had no alternative other than submission to the rule imposed by rural shops. The increase of cotton cultivation, in the 1950s, further aggravated the situation because the concessionaries established close control not only over peasant foodcrop production but also over the terms of trade. The 1948 Intendant revealed that

"the native cultivates the land and in due course he sells his harvest to the concessionary at a price of 1\$70 per kilo of cotton. [The concessionary] extracts the seed, which he sells at 2\$50 per kilo, delivering the remaining ginned cotton to factories at 110\$00 [sic] per kilo. Since the sun rises for everyone, except for natives in this particular case, the factories will, in their turn, sell that same cotton transformed into different types of fabric at 300\$00 per kilo! That is why, I think, we will never be able to compete with foreign goods sold in several Asian shops along our border. One yard of white tick or kaki costs 20\$00 along the border, while the same fabric costs 40\$00 per metre on our side".⁹⁷

The picture was no different in the cattle trade since a peasant obtained in Changara an average price of 150\$00 per unit which, in Beira, the trader would sell for 600\$00 or more. As a result the Intendant complained about the peasant practice of hiding their cattle, avoiding trade fairs.⁹⁸ Finally, the monetary character implanted in the domestic economy by rural shops, labour migration and the colonial environment in general, also had the effect of completing the destruction of ancient traditional forms of mutual assistance. Formerly, for fundamental tasks such as felling or harvesting, which the nuclear family could not perform by itself in some cases, there was the assistance of other family members or neighbours, in a system regulated by traditional rules, as was argued in Chapter 1. The general trend towards reducing the size of families and the absenteeism of men, in conjunction with monetary circulation, brought a gradual end to these important usages, replacing them by the offer of remunerated labour inside the villages.⁹⁹ Not surprisingly then, Tete was hit by recurrent famines throughout this period: a disorganised peasant sector, deprived of food reserves and depleted by generalised malnutrition could not cope with occasional droughts. There are several accounts on this matter, particularly in extensive regions of the *Concelho* of Tete, south of the Zambezi river, where chronic hunger obliged the government to allegedly keep

went to the northern British territories. See, in this regard, profuse correspondence in AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Macanga, João Granjo Pires, "Relatório do Ano de 1948.

⁹⁷AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT, António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

⁹⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948". In 1952, just in the *Concelho* of Tete, there were no less than nine weekly trade fairs for cattle in Tete, Mazoe, Rego, Changara, Mandié, Matambo, Marara, Mufa and Chioco (AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdConc/Tete, João da Conceição Pereira, "Relatório do Ano de 1952".

⁹⁹See on this matter Eliseu & Medeiros 1991:181-184.

severe control over its food stocks.¹⁰⁰

In the late 1950s the *New State* had thus brought to Tete a modest development limited to a few eastern areas and completely precluded in the remaining ones. If Mutarara could count already 44 commercial shops in 1947, Macanga, on the contrary, was still exporting peasant production on the backs of porters.¹⁰¹ While in 1959 Moatize experienced a timid industrial development¹⁰² associated with the railway line, the coal mines¹⁰³ and the cotton factory of the *Sociedade Algodoeira de Tete*, and Angónia could report relatively "important European agricultural undertakings exporting to the whole country", the westernmost district of Zumbo continued to be "incapable of exporting its production (...) due to the bad luck of being isolated for 6 months per year", a similar condition to that affecting Marávia.¹⁰⁴ The prospects of a change in the situation were remote. Effectively, from 1958 Southern Rhodesia dramatically altered its position towards migrant labour reducing the size of the contingents,¹⁰⁵ deeply aggravating the problem of the peasant economy in Tete which was already depending to a great extent on monetary inputs coming from there. As to internal prospects, a similar movement was occurring with the mechanisation of some processes in the economy of plantations, while the silence of the First Development Plan of the colonial government (1953-1958), in so far Tete was concerned, seems eloquent enough.

¹⁰⁰AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdConc/Tete, Jayme Luiz da Rocha Picardo de Sousa, "Relatório do Ano de 1946". See also AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Substituto do AdConc/Tete, Fuas de Bivar Pinto Lopes, "Relatório do Ano de 1948"; AdCirc/Marávia, António Crawford de Freitas Ferraz, "Relatório do Ano de 1948"; IDT António Policarpo de Sousa Santos, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

¹⁰¹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Mutarara, J.G.T.Pereira, "Relatório do Ano de 1947"; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdCirc/Macanga, João Granjo Pires, "Relatório do Ano de 1948".

¹⁰²Outside this area no industrial undertakings were reported during the period besides a couple of grain-mills and lime-kilns. If in 1946 two gold concessionaries were still operating in Macanga (José Bonifácio Machado de Carvalho, and Sociedade de Minas da Machinga Lda.), in 1959, the year in which the last three mines of Chifumbadzi, Missale and Muchinga were abandoned, this activity came completely to a stop.

¹⁰³In 1951 the *Companhia Carbonífera de Moatize* was selling 7,000 tons of coal each month to: Tete railways (3,000), Nyassaland railways (1,000), Trans-Zambezi railways (500), Sena Sugar Estates (500), *Fábrica de Cimentos do Dondo* (1,800), and others (200). AHM, ISANI, Cx.58: Inspector Administrativo A.S.F. de Castel-Branco, "Relatório da Inspeção Administrativa ao Concelho de Tete" (1951:passim).

¹⁰⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Relatório do Ano de 1959". According to AHM, ISANI, Cx.57: A.S.Ferrão de Castel-Branco, "Relatório da Inspeção Ordinária à Intendência do Distrito de Tete", 1952:10, in 1952, while the *Concelho* of Tete had 663 whites and 127 Asians, the circumscription of Zumbo had only 13 whites and 1 Asian, one assuming a relationship between European presence and "development undertakings".

¹⁰⁵About the reasons behind this change, dictated by structural transformations in the Rhodesian economy, see for instance Adam *et al.* 1981:68-71.

e) State and Settlement Policies in the Early 1960s: A Short Interregnum

According to its mentors, the general principle of Portuguese native policy, revealed in the legislation issued by the *New State* on this matter¹⁰⁶ between 1926 and 1961, was to achieve "native" integration in the moral, social and economic setting of the Portuguese nation. In order to avoid widespread chaos produced by a sudden change, they argued that the final objective had to be pursued gradually, taking into account, although on a transitory manner, "native" culture and social and economic organisation. Until the process of this transformation-integration was concluded, native peoples could not have a "Portuguese status" and the state would remain performing the role of controlling and protecting them.¹⁰⁷

From the viewpoint of its economic aims, the *New State* could present, in the early 1960s, outstanding results in so far as integration was concerned. Broadly speaking, Portuguese industries were benefitting from an increased peasant production in the colonies. Administrative structures had been set to the local level and the series of 1961 legislation had concluded the political and territorial definition of the *regedorias*. However, this apparent success had its reverse side for example in the sense that the villages within the *regedorias* were undergoing a development not entirely controlled by the state, even if resulting from its influence. Labour migration and forced crop production had an important role in weakening the village economy, and the impact of monetary exchange in general had induced great transformations. The price the village economy was paying for its increased role in the colonial economy was depletion and, in many cases, growing signs of incapacity for self-sustenance. The old 1941 debate on villages of a new nature and the several attempts which came afterwards, namely the implementation of cotton concentrations, could not solve what was perceived as the main problem in integrating the peasant economy: that of effectively transforming shifting agriculture and of fixing the population inside the *regedorias*. In order to avoid the complete destruction of the peasant economy, to assure further production increases and to safeguard its sovereignty, the colonial state directed its native policy towards seeking, through a new approach, "to integrate the peasantry in a modern economy". This

¹⁰⁶Decree No.16473 (6/02/29), "Estatuto Civil e Criminal dos Nativos da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique"; Decree No.16474 (6/02/29), "Diploma Orgânico sobre a Relação Jurídica entre Nativos e Não-Nativos"; Decree No.18570 (Julho 1930), "Acto Colonial"; Constituição da República, 1933; Decree No.23228 (15/11/33), "Carta Orgânica do Império Colonial Português"; and Decree No.23229 (15/11/33), "Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina".

¹⁰⁷Silva Cunha 1960(I):199-205.

new approach has to be considered as part of a wider strategy according to which a developmental dynamic had to be established in the colonies and it would be white settlement which would lead that process, determining the future social and economic arrangement in the colonies and implying that in the rural areas African settlement would be subordinated to that factor. Emigration of white settlers to the overseas territories was expected, on the one hand to solve rural unemployment in Portugal, and on the other to contribute to development, through an osmotic process with African communities, and to the making of a mulatto culture¹⁰⁸ which would ensure Portuguese sovereignty in its colonies, in the long run. It is also important to note that this effort was developed in a context of growing international pressure against the fierce labour regime in the Portuguese colonies which obliged the state, in its struggle against political isolation, to humanise its procedures. Moreover, that effort took place in an environment of nationalist struggles throughout most of the African continent. Most importantly, it was greatly influenced by the first signs of nationalist rebellion inside the Portuguese overseas territories, namely in northern Angola in 1961. For a growing number of colonial opinion and policy makers, social and economic development was the only way out for Portugal, in this context.¹⁰⁹

The strategy selected was implemented in the set of laws issued in September 1961 and revealed in the colonial state quinquennial development plans for Mozambique; the *Planos de Fomento*. The first one (1953-1958) was already paving the way for the development of this new approach when giving great attention to the establishment of white settlers, allocating some 34 percent of the total state investment in Mozambique to the exploitation of resources and settlement, namely by white colonists. The second *Plano de Fomento* (1959-1964) further developed this trend. According to Hedges, "it is impressive to note that the entire investment effort (...) was openly connected with the installation of white settlers. On the whole, we can affirm that more than 75 percent of state investment had this objective during this period".¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸BO No.36(I) (1961):1127-1128, mentions the need to have "always present the supreme objective of a national symbiosis, both racially and culturally, in completely integrated societies".

¹⁰⁹For this aspect, namely the linkage of development to state security see, for instance Neto 1962:57, particularly when writing that "if we fail in the field of social action in the overseas territories, in a more or less near future the very existence of the Portuguese state will be seriously threatened".

¹¹⁰Hedges (coord) *et al.* 1993:Chapt.4.

As to the 1961 laws, they certainly provided the state with instruments to pursue such a strategy. Effectively, it is revealing that at the same time different but connected decrees were published, dealing with matters such as the repealing of the "*Estatuto dos Indígenas*", the occupation and concession of lands, the organisation of *regedorias* and the creation of rural settlement boards.¹¹¹ With the *regedorias* delimited and, thus, the rural African population stabilised in terms of territorial arrangement, the state could now organise its strategy of settlement through the rural settlement boards.¹¹² In its preamble, the decree no.43:895 was very clear when saying that "in so far as land occupation is concerned, we have understood that it is very advantageous to promote the fixing of the native agricultural population in parallel with the settlement of more developed rural populations", obviously meaning white settlers.¹¹³

During the 1941 debate on villagisation, Marcello Caetano had said that the principles were clear and what was needed was a technique to implement them. Certainly the principles remained the same, in connection with a permanent Portuguese presence and supremacy in the colonies. As to the technique, the term *community development* was very often referred to during this period. It was a designation borrowed from a strategy much discussed in the late 1950s by the United Nations and colonial powers such as Britain and France, and adopted in many colonies and newly independent countries. This movement was included in the prospects of what was considered as a new era for the Third World countries. Colonial occupation had been characterised by investments seeking quick returns in the export of raw materials, resulting in imbalanced development of a small and very localised modern sector

¹¹¹The decrees issued by the Overseas Ministry and published in BO No.36(I) (14/09/61), were the following: Decree-Law No.43:893, repealing the Decree-Law No.39:666 which promulgated the "*Estatuto dos Indígenas Portugueses*" living in the provinces of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique; Decree No.43:894, approving the regulation which concerned occupation and concession of lands in the overseas provinces; Decree No.43:895, instituting rural settlement boards (*Juntas Provinciais de Povoamento*) in the overseas provinces and creating the Provincial Rural Settlement Boards of Angola and Mozambique; Decree No.43:896, inserting dispositions aiming at organising *regedorias* in the overseas provinces; Decree No.43:897, recognising in the overseas provinces the local usages and customs ruling private juridical relations, either the ones already compiled or the ones not yet compiled but traditionally being in use in the *regedorias*; Decree No.43:898, regulating the running of municipal judges' posts in the overseas provinces; and Decree No.43:899, reorganising the various registration services in the overseas provinces.

¹¹²Usually the designation *Juntas de Povoamento* has been translated as settlement boards (e.g. Jundanian 1974:529), or councils for settlement (e.g. Henriksen 1978:196). Their "philosophy" was allegedly to promote the occupation of empty regions, covering both the *settlement* of whites coming from Portugal and the *resettlement* or *arrangement* (*ordenamento*) of local African nuclei, even if its priority went clearly to the settlement of immigrants.

¹¹³BO 36(I) (1961):1125.

surrounded by a vast sector usually designated as traditional. It was this dualist system that community development theories were seeking to counter, trying to integrate and modernise the peasant economy through the implementation of low cost local projects in the rural areas of the newly independent countries. During the 1950s, community development was considered in several UN documents as the set of activities through which inhabitants of a specific country joined their efforts to the ones of public authorities in order to improve the economic, social and cultural situation of local communities and to integrate them in the national effort against poverty and for promoting development. It was a definition which included as its main aspects the self-reliance of each community in order to improve its own life, and availability of state support to grant the implementation of local initiative.¹¹⁴

Behind the inclusion of such a debate in its colonial policy was certainly the Portuguese wish to keep pace with international initiatives and to lower the voices of those protesting against social reality in its territories. Moreover, from the 1961 events in Angola, this debate was closely linked to the thesis that insurgency menacing Portuguese overseas territories could only be countered by social and economic development. Last but not least, community development was considered as a low-cost technique for development, in the sense that the bulk of its costs would be supported by the beneficiary communities, thus in harmony with the old state prospects and allegedly with its own capabilities.¹¹⁵ The debate on community development became very much a vogue in scholarly circles in the early 1960s, and entered as a concrete possibility for the state in 1962, when a Working Group for Social Promotion was created in the Commission for Studies of Development Plans, in the context of the preparatory activities for the Third Development Plan (1964-1969). Its findings, entitled "Promotion of the rural population integrated in *regedorias*",¹¹⁶ defended the view that community development focused on peasant agriculture was more than an option, it was the only possible method to adopt in order to promote a developmental dynamic for Mozambique

¹¹⁴For the reading of international definitions of community development by Portuguese contemporary scholars and politicians, see Neto 1962:41; Sousa 1963:553; Cancelas 1966:120, 126-128.

¹¹⁵Sousa 1964:294, summarised the three main advantages community development could bring to the state, as follows: "Communities create themselves the basic capital which will serve to attract new investment; conditions are created to rationalise community structures through which they will become more permeable to progress; production increases augment local buying capacity, attracting new productive activities otherwise not encouraged to settle down in low consuming regions".

¹¹⁶AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze" (Dezembro 1962).

and, thus, to assure social stability.¹¹⁷ Since volunteer participation was the only way for true mobilisation and communities would be participative only in undertakings considered by them as important,¹¹⁸ the need for an in depth knowledge of the culture of the people whose participation was expected took the Working Group to develop several studies on social and economic community organisation, as well as on the relationship established with the authorities. The context of intervention in peasant agriculture remained, as in previous times, around the question of "how to replace traditional subsistence agriculture by a modern one, capable of creating a solid economic basis for improving life inside traditional *regedorias*",¹¹⁹ and the problems of dealing with the impact of modern forms of property on the traditional system were also addressed.

Regarding the target communities, another interesting debate was developed around the issue of villagisation. The Working Group, following its guidelines of departing from the community and depending on its initiative, did not consider resettlement as a necessary step, though it did consider scattered settlement as an extra obstacle for state intervention. However, other followers of this technique considered, as Cancelas did, that no previous community development projects had been undertaken to address this question simply because their target populations were already "villagised". According to his opinion, community development undertakings in Mozambique had to be preceded by a resettlement that would concentrate the small communities. Behind this step was the need to render productive further land areas, and to make the state capable of reaching the local level with some rationality,

¹¹⁷AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze" (Dezembro 1962):17-20. Its findings were summarised in the following way: "It is an illusory supposition to assert that external aid, acting through insemination, could provoke development. Besides the fact that private investments, either national or foreign, are scarce, one cannot hope for a considerable metropolitan help (...). Firstly, the growing numbers of population demand increasing food resources (...); secondly, it is only in the context of rural economy that full employment can be assured (...); thirdly, primary activities - agriculture, mining, fishing - are the only ones capable of diversifying the economy (...); fourthly, the development of native agriculture can and must contribute to reduce greatly massive labour migration. It is true that particularly in periods of rapid economic change it is advantageous to have a highly mobile labour force. However that mobility becomes socially malign and burdensome if it jeopardises community and family cohesion, due to long absence of males working abroad. One cannot expect this unceasing drainage of able men to be carried out indefinitely without seriously affecting the stability and progress of native communities. Only development of domestic rural economy or permanent fixing of families in the working centres can bring an end to this socially dangerous and economically anachronistic system; fifthly, development of native agriculture does not demand either mobilisation of a large staff with European-level salaries, or large social investment (...); sixthly, an increase in the incomes of the rural native population will act for the maintenance of social stability (...)".

¹¹⁸Cancelas 1966:153.

¹¹⁹Cancelas 1966:147.

even if it took long time, through a process led by a sympathetic part of population.¹²⁰

Another contextual step which had to be taken in order to facilitate community development projects was the strengthening of the *regedorias* as institutions. Interestingly, the Working Group for Social Promotion concluded that if the administration, on the one hand, had increased the power of the "traditional chiefs" when giving them the support to exert their role in the colonial context, on the other it had altered the conditions and beliefs traditionally underpinning the power of these chiefs, resulting in a continuous deterioration of their prestige. Moreover, the contact with the monetary economy had corrupted a great number of *régulos*, who were using their posts as useful sinecures to acquire material advantage.¹²¹ Since the *régulos* continued to exert an important role in distributing and controlling the agricultural land and since they continued to be a fundamental basis for rural social stability, the institution had to be urgently strengthened. As was said above, community development implied a certain leading role by local communities, which rendered the integration of local civil authorities an extremely delicate matter to deal with. Although both education of the peasants and training of the authorities were presupposed,¹²² it was clear that a central part in this sort of task, concerning the role of the state, could not be performed by the administrative services. While the argument against the central role of the state was that District Commissioners and Local Administrators were already overloaded by multiple roles and tasks, higher authorities were well aware of their paternalistic attitude and of the extremely hierarchical and severe nature of administrative services commonly established in their areas of command.¹²³ In parallel, a debate was therefore pursued concerning how such

¹²⁰Cancelas 1966:148, 162-163.

¹²¹AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze" (Dezembro 1962):11-12.

¹²²Cancelas 1966:131.

¹²³Neto 1962:49 mentions that such activities had been formerly included in the duties of the *Direcção dos Serviços de Administração Civil e dos Negócios Indígenas*, which did little or nothing to accomplish their tasks. More clearly, AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social 1962:44-45, explains why administrative authorities could not perform an important role in this matter: "In the eyes of the natives, administrative authorities are particularly responsible for administering justice, maintaining law and order, censuring, collecting taxes (...); the multiplicity of regulations - a characteristic of underdeveloped countries - means that most people have small legal infractions to hide (...) and thus deliberately avoid contact with the administrative authority; (...) most of these legal regulations represent the social values of an alien culture (...); the [administrative authorities] have entrenched autocratic and paternalist attitudes (...); some of these authorities tend to present their superiors with visible works, neglecting human development (...), and this is opposed to a true action of community development (...)".

a structure should be organised to act in concrete terms. According to Sousa,¹²⁴ it should have three levels, namely provincial, regional and local or village level. However, two main alternative solutions were envisaged to the local level, the first being the constitution of interdisciplinary teams of experts whose territorial scope should be wide, including several communities or villages in a region, and the second based in "front-line workers" who, though not being experts, should have a basic training in a wide range of matters, act alone and be backed by regional experts. The second alternative would have been more adapted to the situation of Mozambique since it lacked the means to finance local operations as well as local experts and was not provided with a dense administrative network.

In May 1961 the words "community development" appeared for the first time in an official regulation, the one which created the corps for labour and economic recovery in Angola.¹²⁵ Shortly afterwards rural settlement boards were created, as referred to above.¹²⁶ Ascertaining the fact that detailed knowledge of local community dynamics was vital to the implementation of this new conception, and seeking the establishment of a single coordinating body for the enterprise, the *Junta Provincial de Povoamento* of Mozambique integrated former organisms such as the Boards for Agrarian Settlement (*Juntas de Povoamento Agrário*) and the Missions and Brigades for Development and Settlement (*Missões e Brigadas de Fomento e Povoamento*).¹²⁷ The rural settlement board was also provided with special departments such as the Settlers Department, concerned with the immigration and state support to the installation of European settlers. The policies concerning African settlement and activities falling in the scope of community development came to be

¹²⁴Sousa 1963:561.

¹²⁵Legislative Ministerial Diploma No.24, *Corpo de Trabalho e Recuperação Económica*, which in paragraph 9 of its article 9 prescribed that 20 percent of the state incomes in areas where labour was recruited should be directed to works directly benefitting the local population in these areas, under specific community development plans. See Neto 1962:53.

¹²⁶The *Juntas Provinciais de Povoamento* were enthusiastically received by the promoters of community development theories. Neto 1962:54, wrote that "these *Juntas* are a true mark announcing a new era of our overseas policy, since it is through them that we aim at creating a genuine pluriracial society, simultaneously promoting the aborigines and the settlement of nationals coming from other parts of the Portuguese territory".

¹²⁷Respectively created the former by the decree No.41:482 (28/12/57), reviewed by the decree No.43:339 (21/11/60); and the later by the decree 41:169 (29/06/57).

coordinated specially by the Department for Social Action.¹²⁸

Shortly following the creation of the Rural Settlement Boards, however, the Overseas Minister, Adriano Moreira, created for Mozambique a Service for Psycho-Social Action (*Serviço de Acção Psicossocial*).¹²⁹ Apparently, the Rural Settlement Board remained more concerned with population movements, while the new service would have the role of promoting development action in already settled communities. The *Serviço de Acção Psicossocial* was to establish the "psycho-social doctrine" all over the territory, aiming "at strengthening national cohesion through spiritual, social and material improvement of the population's condition". It was also to design the action plans, coordinate and direct their implementation and invoke the collaboration of other state organs. In particular, it was to coordinate operational activities of the militarised and para-military organisations.¹³⁰ Certainly, the *Serviço de Acção Psicossocial* was, in part, establishing its structure in accordance with the prospects of community development techniques. Its top level was the pompous *Gabinete Provincial de Estudos, Doutrinação, Orientação e Inspeção Superior* (Provincial Cabinet of Studies, Indoctrination, Guidance and Higher Inspection), which directed the structures of zone, sector and sub-sector. However, beneath the sub-sector were the mobile brigades, integrating nurses, social assistants, monitors, etc., showing the first signs of divergence between the findings of the "studies sector" and the concrete steps taken by a state more and more pressed by events. "Front line workers" were not available or not "trustable", and the services did little more than sending to the field their "mobile health units [which] administered inoculations, treated minor ailments and furnished preventive medicine information before moving on to the next village".¹³¹ Effectively, these brigades, more than community development promoters, were acquiring a profile of intelligence gatherers and propaganda units instead. Further divergences came in the sense that the supposedly autonomous structure for promoting community development was working more and more closely with the local administrative structures. In fact, already in August 1962, a legislative diploma prescribed that the posts of sector and sub-sector deputies of the psycho-social

¹²⁸The Settlers Department and the Department for Social Action in Decree 43:895, art.7, respectively b) and c), BO 39(I) 1961:1129.

¹²⁹Legislative Ministerial Diploma No.28 (19/10/61), in BO 41(I):1360-1361.

¹³⁰Legislative Diploma No.28 (19/10/61), in BO 41(I) 1961:1360-1361.

¹³¹Henriksen 1977a:401.

services should be performed, in addition to other duties, by deputies of District Commissioners and Local Administrators in their areas of command.¹³² It was thus not surprising that some voices of careful protest began to emerge, considering that "the results achieved by that [Psycho-Social Action] service, concerning the improvement of material condition in rural communities, cannot be considered as profound, long lasting or generalised. And yet, without a visible improvement in material conditions, all the work aiming at captivating, raising and integrating the population will be irremediably jeopardised. Psychological action techniques are insufficient in our view, since they do not assure conquest of the population". Such critics kept on proposing the replacement of these services by a community development service with juridical character and administrative and financial autonomy.¹³³

In the early 1960s Portugal tried to develop a new strategy for its colonial territories, on the one hand conditioned by international criticism about the living conditions of the African peoples subjected to its rule, and by a generalised nationalist context throughout the African continent, and on the other hand aiming at creating a basis to perpetuate Portuguese sovereignty in Africa. International pressure gave room to the development of an internal line of thought defending community development, based in community initiative backed by state support, as a genuine way to foster development in the rural areas. According to this line of thought, represented by scholars and some members of the administration staff, socio-economic development of rural communities was the only way to counter the nationalist threat to Portuguese rule. Moreover, in the knowledge of the previous performance of the civil administration in dealing with rural communities, this line defended the establishment of an independent state structure which would promote, through resettlement or not, the development of rural communities through a slow process to some extent led by the beneficiaries themselves. However, the colonial state did not have that time to spare. Nor, definitely, did it have the same intentions. Its policies came to be guided by the principle that, in order to preserve Portuguese supremacy against nationalist attempts to challenge it, not only was a new attitude necessary towards peasant settlements, but also the establishment of settlements of white immigrants. These would be more reliable in terms of defending Portuguese interests and capable of imparting a developmental dynamic to the rural areas,

¹³²Legislative Diploma No.2267 (11/08/62).

¹³³AHM, FGG, Cx.244, Doc.243: Comissão de Estudos de Planos de Fomento/Grupo de Trabalho de Promoção Social, "Promoção Social no Vale do Zambeze", Dezembro de 1962.

thus, according to the official discourse, bringing modernisation through an osmotic process with local settlements, in the context of a *mulatto* culture. The *Planos de Fomento* witnessed the effort devoted to such a cause, which included issuing new legislation and establishing state structures as the *Junta Provincial de Povoamento*, created to direct this process. However the establishment of the *Serviço de Acção Psico-Social*, appearing shortly afterwards, shows how the community development perspective and state policies were diverging. Closely working with the civil administration services, the Psycho-Social services spread their units through the territory delivering medical support in the villages but, above all, gathering intelligence and making propaganda, anticipating what would be in the following years a truly *hearts and minds* campaign. The limited community development prospects, although continuing to emerge sporadically, were clearly diminished by an understanding that would gradually subject rural settlement to principles integrated in a wider counter-insurgency strategy against the nationalist forces.

PART II

WAR AND RURAL SETTLEMENT IN TETE, 1968-1974:

THE *ALDEAMENTOS*

Chapter 5:

WAR AND VILLAGISATION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE OF MOZAMBIQUE, 1964-1974

a) Introduction

During the ten-year period between 25 June 1964, the day of the first armed operation, and April 1974, when the Portuguese regime was overthrown by a military *coup*, the nationalist struggle was to be the main factor influencing developments in Mozambique, not to mention the rest of Portugal's overseas possessions and the metropolitan territory itself.¹ In general terms, this war was provoked by the Portuguese position, somewhat unique amongst colonial powers, of remaining in possession of its African territories at any cost, producing what came to be known as the first liberation war pursued through military means in sub-Saharan Africa.

With respect to rural settlement, the influence of the war was exerted both at the general and the particular level. In general, the northern provinces, as the main theatre of military operations, witnessed extensive population movements, common in wars. In particular, it was in the effort to counter the nationalist struggle that the colonial state implemented resettlement plans in an extensive manner throughout the northern provinces, namely Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. Rural resettlement, which had been under discussion in Portuguese policy-making circles for at least two decades, thus emerged as part of a wider counter-insurgency strategy.

If some minor nationalist movements are to be excluded, acting particularly in the first years of the 1960s, this war to gain independence had as its main protagonist the *Frente*

¹Of course this period has to be extended if one considers that the military action of the liberation wars in Angola and Guinea-Bissau are commonly acknowledged as having started in 1961 and 1963 respectively, and that some military action was pursued even after the April *coup*.

de Libertação de Moçambique, or Frelimo. The abundant literature on the struggle conducted by Frelimo has reached consensus in considering as its two main characteristics, firstly guerrilla warfare as its tactics for confronting Portuguese forces, and secondly marxism as its ideology. These two characteristics were explained by the movement as having been generated by internal dynamics. Guerrilla warfare was adopted only when, after several negotiating attempts, it became clear that Portugal would not agree to concede independence through peaceful means. As to the revolutionary stand, it resulted from internal conflicts settled in Frelimo's 1968 Second Congress, when it became the movement's line that, more than the achievement of independence as the sole objective of the struggle, it was also necessary to fight against all forms of class exploitation.

The Portuguese regime, on the contrary, considered the same characteristics as revealing the nationalist movement as integrated in the worldwide communist strategy, and therefore induced from the outside to start the conflict. This led to the categorisation of Frelimo as a classical example of a modern insurgent or subversive movement in what could be considered as the typical western military analytical framework of the time.

In spite of its "uniqueness" the nationalist war of Mozambique was not original in the sense that it can be included in a pattern which associates, in a profound manner, the political objectives of independence and revolution with guerrilla military strategies and tactics. But similarly, the Portuguese war effort can also be included in a wider type of counter-insurgency in which western-orientated countries, colonial or not, sought to counter what was viewed by them as communist insurgencies, in the context of the Cold War. It is also important to stress that, in both cases, the inclusion in a wider pattern results not only from analytical effort but also from direct "international" influence and support, even if this conflict developed, as every conflict, a specificity of its own.

Our approach, far from trying to establish an equidistant stand for analyzing both parties in this period,² seeks to understand the western concept of counter-insurgency as a set of strategic and tactical measures designed by a state precisely to counter the revolutionary effort threatening the rule imposed by it. Such an approach is motivated by the fact that this concept and its practical applications exerted a deep influence in the formation of Portuguese strategy to confront the liberation movement. In addition, this line of analysis is adopted

²For a tentative "equidistant reading" of this issue see the classical Henriksen 1983.

because rural resettlement came to be an important part of this counter-insurgency strategy, in Tete as in other northern parts of Mozambique affected by the revolutionary war, as it will be argued.

This chapter, guided by the above considerations, will present a summary view of the historical development of what was considered as patterns both of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency. Afterwards, it will discuss the war in Mozambique, considered as a particular case of confrontation between these two "traditions". The emphasis will be on the Portuguese effort to counter "insurgency" through the development of state and military apparatuses, in order to better understand how rural resettlement emerged under criteria guided by a counter-insurgency plan. This particular aspect will be approached in the third section of the chapter.

b) Revolutionary Warfare versus Counter-Insurgency: Strategies and Tactics

Of course insurgency had always to face counter-insurgency throughout the history of human conflict: each war has, by definition, at least two parties facing each other to achieve victory. On the other hand, each conflict is particular in the sense that it carries locally produced motivations and locally generated developments. However, in this century, particularly from the end of the Second World War, the decline of the colonial world system went along with the development of insurgent movements having a great deal in common, namely a nationalist stand, a colonial enemy, a social basis amongst the lower urban or rural classes, weaker military resources particularly regarding military organisation and weaponry, etc. Moreover, if early or primary resistance movements are excluded, support from the countries of the socialist world, particularly the Soviet Union and China, could also be aligned as a common element playing an important role in the definition of modern insurgency as a pattern.³

Of course guerrilla warfare is, on the one hand, only one amongst several revolutionary tactics while, on the other, it might be as old as war itself, in so far as it is a form of struggle naturally adopted by a party self-conscious of its weaknesses in directly

³Related to the approach of guerrilla warfare as a prevailing pattern, O'Sullivan & Miller 1983:110 made the assertion, even if vague, that "between 1945 and 1975, there were 54 colonial and civil wars [with irregular, guerrilla tactics employed by one or both sides] with 8 million victims as opposed to 17 conventional, international wars causing 2.9 million deaths".

confronting its stronger enemy on open ground.⁴ In its old or traditional form, the tactics of guerrilla warfare appear connected with the attempt at expelling an occupying army or foreign power, aiming at preserving or restoring local values or previously established forms of local power.⁵ Mozambique, like other parts of the world, witnessed several manifestations of this kind.⁶ Activated by a variety of motives mainly resulting from a social sense of being threatened, guerrilla warfare appears here as merely a technique, even if integrating cultural forms in it. And as a technique it unquestionably reached a highly developed strategic form, as witnessed by Fairbairn referring to T.E.Lawrence:

"(...) Lawrence believed in forcing a long period of passive defence on the enemy, he appreciated the importance of a base (Aqaba), he comprehended the inter-relation between distance and strength and between space and time ('Our cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and these gave us a strategic rather than a tactical strength. Range is more to strategy than force'.) and he avoided attacking enemy garrisons. ('The garrison of Medina, reduced to a defensive size, were sitting in their trenches destroying their power of movement... it was not a base for us... what on earth did we want it for?')"⁷

However, what is commonly considered as the modern revolutionary pattern appeared with the Chinese revolution, in which guerrilla warfare as a military technique was consciously integrated in the wider strategy of the nationalist anti-colonial forces or, put in a better way, in which the military aspects, both strategic and tactical, were subordinated to political objectives. The author who operated this break was undoubtedly Mao Tse-Tung, thus considered as the father of modern revolutionary warfare. Although invoking the heritage of

⁴Questioning the origin and nature of the term guerrilla, Davidson 1981:3 first found it "coined in Spain during the Napoleonic wars of French invasion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, (...) meaning simply a 'small war', a diminutive of the Spanish word *guerra*, a big regular war. But guerrilla soon acquired a second meaning. It became used to define not the 'small war' itself, but the bands of Spanish peasants and soldiers who harassed the rear units and lines of communication of the invading French armies, and were often cruelly effective."

⁵A characteristic conferring on it a conservative nature, according to Fairbairn 1968:149.

⁶To point out just one example, the combats carried by the Macuana people against Portuguese attempts to penetrate in the hinterland of the present-day province of Nampula, by the turn of our century, were described by a military source, Botelho 1936:499, in the following way: "It is important to recall that the combat procedures carried out by the people from this area of Macuana differ essentially from the ones adopted in the central and southern parts of the colony, as we have already noticed. Here, the enemy, very familiar with handling fire-guns, which according to the testimony of our ancient governors he employed already in the late eighteenth century, hides himself in the bush, from where he shoots at the adversary. Far from perishing in a position he would steadily defend, he strikes from various hide-outs, his procedures being comparable to the ones adopted by guerrillas. Under these conditions, the tactics of the square [disposition of the colonial army in square on open ground, from where the enemy attacking in crowds could be easily slaughtered], which had brought us so many victories in the south, is not likely to produce here the same outcomes."

⁷Fairbairn 1968:152.

the Soviet October Revolution, he established his own strategy based in Lenin's principle that "the most essential thing in Marxism, the living soul of Marxism, is the concrete analysis of concrete conditions", thus building a particular strategy for the Chinese revolution. According to his view of the concrete situation, China was essentially a semi-colonial country unevenly developed, the peasantry forming the crushing majority of its people; the revolutionary army was weak and small, having to confront a powerful enemy; through an agrarian revolution, the revolutionary party was winning the peasantry to its side. From here, Mao Tse-Tung developed the strategy of the popular protracted war, in which military action was clearly subordinated to the political strategy of the revolution, and popular support in the rural areas was vital both politically and to the extent it allowed guerrilla warfare to be pursued.⁸ Mao's theory greatly influenced other nationalist and revolutionary struggles throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. In the words of Lin Piao:

"The basic political and economic conditions in many of these [Asian, African and Latin American] countries have many similarities to those which prevailed in old China. As in China, the peasant question is extremely important in these regions. The peasants constitute the main force of the national-democratic revolution against the imperialists and their lackeys. In committing aggression against these countries, the imperialists usually begin by seizing the big cities and the main lines of communication, but they are unable to bring the vast countryside completely under their control. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the broad areas in which the revolutionaries can manoeuvre freely. The countryside, and the countryside alone, can provide the revolutionary bases from which the revolutionaries can go forward to final victory. Precisely for this reason, Comrade Mao Tse-Tung's theory of establishing revolutionary base areas in the rural districts and encircling the cities from the countryside is attracting more and more attention among the people in these regions".⁹

The spread of Maoist influence¹⁰ obviously went along with the development of measures aiming at countering it. To this extent, counter-insurgency evolved through history in close connection with the evolution of insurgency and, as a response, was in some way dictated by it. That is why if revolutionary warfare has a history and a pattern, even if quite general, counter-insurgency in the western world also began to develop its own history, in part mirroring the history of the former. Mao himself stressed the importance of Chiang Kai-Shek's counter-measures in establishing his Officers Training Corps at Kuling and launching

⁸Mao Tse-Tung in Pomeroy 1969:177-183.

⁹Lin Piao in Pomeroy 1969:198.

¹⁰Of course this is not to deny the importance of locally produced drive in each conflict, or even some sort of continuity from the early resistance form to the modern one. After all, Mao's paramount principle was the one of departing from concrete conditions. Our purpose here is merely to underline the importance of the break initiated by him in so far as a revolutionary guerrilla pattern may be concerned, and the worldwide importance of this factor.

a politically and militarily well designed campaign of "encirclement and annihilation" which practically destroyed all the revolutionary bases, obliging the Red Army to retreat 8,000 miles to the north, in a movement which became known as the Long March.¹¹

However, according to their mentors, counter-insurgency theories only forced a change comparable to Mao's in the history of revolutionary insurgency when they were able to exactly comprehend insurgency as not merely a military occurrence but as a wider phenomenon essentially moved by political and ideological drive, which guerrilla warfare had the role of rendering possible. In this view, the French 19th century colonial experiences under Marechal Bugeaud, which started a tradition, would mean a stage comparable to that between old and modern insurgency to the extent that it was an exception to the prevailing primarily military approach to counter-insurgency.¹² With his theories based on the development of very mobile flying columns, he started a continuum which ran through the experiences of military commanders such as Gallieni and Lyautey, to base the French response against the nationalist and revolutionary movements in Algeria, Madagascar and Indochina, in the 1950s. The basic concept of Gallieni and Lyautey was the *tache d'huile*, after the image of an oil drop slicking over a paper surface as colonial forces would rapidly spread over insurgent territory, with the military shortly followed by the civil authorities and based on high speed and in the greatest amount of intelligence they could gather. The progression was methodical and systematic:

"An initial target region was partitioned into operational areas. This was *quadrillage*. In the next step, *ratissage*, the force assigned to a *quadrille* cleared out insurgents with fast, ever-moving units seeking friendly ties and intelligence from the population. Their speedy, swirling movements were described as *tourbillon* - whirlwind tactics. (...) The holding and pacification functions were an integral part of Lyautey's *tache d'huile* strategy. The military actions were only the necessary prerequisite and were alone insufficient to attain the desired end state. Once cleared of insurgents the *quadrille* was taken over by the civil authorities who won over the tribesmen with protection and the prospect of economic and social progress. The oil drop on these spots spread French influence slowly and methodically, over the land".¹³

These theories were already half-way towards achieving the main elements which would characterise modern counter-insurgency strategy, namely the comprehension that there was more at stake than just military confrontation, that revolutionary political warfare should

¹¹Mao Tse-Tung in Pomeroy 1969:178.

¹²Beckett & Pimlott 1985:4.

¹³O'Sullivan & Miller 1983:116, 118.

be opposed by propaganda around prospects of economic and social progress, and that military tactics should borrow some of the guerrilla imprints such as high mobility and the trade of space for time.

A similar path was pursued in British counter-insurgency campaigns, particularly Malaya's, which included practically all the strategic and tactical elements of what would be considered as the modern theory on this matter, therefore deserving some attention here, even if succinct. Certainly British achievements in Malaya were due, to a great extent, to the social and economic conditions of the country, the inability of the liberation movement to keep the strategic initiative and the massive deployment of military force.¹⁴ However, the Malayan campaign also witnessed the introduction of new strategic elements playing an important role in bending events to the side of the British forces.

Although what the British considered as the campaign against communist insurgency in Malaya lasted from 1948 to 1960, the crucial years of British effort to assure supremacy occurred between 1950 and 1954. The first phase of the campaign was conducted by Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs, as Director of Operations under the authority of the High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney. The "Briggs plan", as it came to be known, consisted essentially in close coordination of the civil administration, the police and the armed forces, to cope with the emergency, in a population policy based in trying to get their support and in resettling to isolate the MRLA (Malaya Revolutionary Liberation Army) guerrillas, and in aggressive military tactics. Coordination of forces was secured through the formation of war executive committees at all levels, assuring police action in populated areas, army restriction to military operational areas and sharing of intelligence between the different forces, amongst one other.

The action for establishing the first known Resettlement Areas, later called New Villages, fell upon the Chinese population.¹⁵ In the three-year period between 1949 and early

¹⁴This was in spite of the British emphasis on "minimum force". According to Beckett & Pimlott 1985:9, in 1952 British troops outnumbered the guerrillas by 15:1, albeit representing an on the ground ratio of 2.5:1. Pomeroy 1969:33 affirms that British troops, "totalling no less than 400,000, were perhaps the largest armed force in proportion to population used in a colonial war".

¹⁵The population in Malaya at the time was acknowledged as being composed roughly of 40% Malays, 40% Chinese and around 15% Indians, with some small numbers of Sakai aborigines. The liberation movement, with backup from China, was mainly linked with the Chinese community.

1952, the authorities managed to concentrate the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, over 400,000 squatters, in 400 New Villages.¹⁶ Squatter homesteads were enveloped in sudden combined operations and people, livestock and belongings transferred overnight to new sites controlled by special police elements and protected with barbed wire and perimeter lighting. In parallel with villagisation a huge "Operation Starvation" was launched to control every single source of food, in this way completing the strategic move towards depriving the guerrilla movement of foodstuffs and people's support. The second phase of the campaign was directed by General Templer, appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations four months after the death of Sir Henry Gurney in a guerrilla ambush. Under Templer the main pillars of the British campaign gained a new vigour, particularly villagisation - the later often quoted "battle to win the hearts and minds" of the people was his favourite expression, underlining the importance of people's support in counter-insurgency. Villagisation was extended so as to also include the Malayan community and a serious effort was directed towards altering the image as concentration camps which the New Villages were incurring. A Rural Industrial Development Agency was established for fostering economic development at village level through small industries and cooperative organisation. Water supplies and electricity were installed and schools and medical centres opened. From 1952, a policy of locally elected village councils was started, aiming at establishing local government in every village, including the raising of taxes to finance local initiative. In addition, a new police programme allowed the training of 12,000 Home Guards for village defence in that same year. Military operations also underwent great transformation in order to accomplish the strategic aims, guided by Liddel Hart's principles directly borrowed from or mirroring guerrilla strategy. In general, the armed forces tended to be organised in smaller operational units with greater flexibility and mobility,¹⁷ following the principle of dispersed strategic advance and seeking to strike the guerrillas behind their lines.¹⁸ In 1953, small Special Operational Volunteer Force (SOVF) platoons were created by the police, composed of surrendered former guerrillas for tracking and intelligence gathering. Soon the SOVFs were integrated in small army mixed platoons of soldiers, police

¹⁶O'Ballance 1966:110. According to numbers in Smith 1985:18, 600,000 "uprooted and resettled" squatters and 509 New Villages were formed in the same period.

¹⁷According to Liddel Hart, the purpose of strategy is to diminish the possibility of resistance by movement and surprise. "Movement and surprise bear a dual relationship to one another. Movement creates surprise and surprise generates movement". See O'Sullivan & Miller 1983:81.

¹⁸O'Sullivan & Miller 1983:115.

and ex-guerrillas.¹⁹ These were intended to act in accordance with what was defined by Sir Robert Thompson, the most renowned British counter-insurgency theorist, as the "same element theory", which is to say ground hunting the guerrillas in their own areas by using their own methods. These "hunter-killer" platoons, with helicopter-borne logistical support, allegedly broke the little initiative which had remained with the guerrillas, killing and expelling most of them from the operational theatre.²⁰ Finally, the counter-insurgency campaign had also a strategic pillar in psychological warfare. From the official news and propaganda broadcast by Radio Malaya to the distribution of leaflets and the deployment of "voice aircraft" over the jungle, this effort was directed to affect the MRLA morale and to encourage desertion from its ranks, rewards and good treatment being promised to the ones who surrendered.²¹ Concerning the population controlled by the government, psychological messages instilled the idea of the New Villages as protected self-governed homes for the squatters, where democracy and development were taking place for the benefit of everyone not adhering to subversion.

With the Malaya campaign, western counter-insurgency theory reached its modern stage.²² It understood more deeply the nature of revolutionary guerrilla warfare and

¹⁹O'Ballance 1966:130.

²⁰The importance of this aspect is underlined by Beckett & Pimlott 1985:10, who also gives an idea of the advantageous position of the colonial platoons when saying that in Malaya ten minutes by helicopter was calculated as the equivalent of ten hours by foot. However, in the line of the "same element theory": "(...) experience has shown that the tendency to become 'heliborne' (...) must be resisted. (...) The reliance on technology in counter-insurgency, although not entirely misplaced (...) inevitably carries the risk that it will dominate the conduct of the campaign. Generally speaking the less sophisticated the army, the better able it has been to defeat insurgency."

²¹O'Ballance 1966:131.

²²The American strategy developed in Vietnam, although including some elements which based the Malayan campaign, is often considered in British literature as the opposite to a well designed counter-insurgency campaign. The essential characterising element in the American strategy was the reliance in technological warfare and the quantitative bent. "When the USA became directly and totally involved in Vietnam in 1965, their theatre commander was Westmoreland, an artillery man with a quantitative bent (...). The number of people killed, euphemised as the 'body count', became the objective of the exercise. This was pursued with search and destroy spoiling operations, seeking to block and envelop the Viet Cong. The emphasis was on killing rather than holding territory". In 1962 the Americans started with the government a programme of building 'strategic hamlets', the equivalent of the Malayan New Villages. But contrary to the advice of Sir Robert Thompson of a *tache d'huile* of villages spreading from the Mekong delta, "the net was cast over the entire country (...) to fortify 11,000 hamlets (two-thirds of the total) before the end in 1963. The civil and military personnel and apparatus to operate this system did not exist. The money involved provided a honey-pot for corruption and in many instances the hamlets were little more than concentration camps. What was lacking more than anything was the personally intense relationships which the Viet Cong cultivated with the people". Summarising the differences in attitude, an American general commented on Sir Gerald Templer's strategy of winning "the hearts and minds" with an often quoted phrase

developed its strategy accordingly.²³ Essentially, it was a strategy aiming at conquering the people to its side through a clear political and economic prospect of development, a villagisation programme to control that people and isolate the guerrillas from their natural support, a reorganisation of the army so that it would be able to hold the military initiative in the terrain, and a psychological campaign to end the task initiated by the army.

c) Counter-Insurgency in the Nationalist War in Mozambique: An Outline

The people's protracted war conducted by Frelimo against the Portuguese rule in Mozambique is perhaps one of the most paradigmatic cases of a revolutionary guerrilla struggle opposed by a modern counter-insurgency campaign as indicated above. In fact, the principal elements of rural-based guerrilla warfare to attain a political objective can be found throughout its development, and the unquestionable specificity generated, that is African and particularly Mozambican, only account for the first principle of all: to depart from concrete conditions. On the other hand, a great number of strategic elements of counter-insurgency with a western imprint were adopted by the Portuguese regime, even if this process revealed considerable differences in criteria. We ought to recognise that the general strategy of guerrilla warfare, in its form of a rural-based people's protracted war and considering its acceptance as a pattern, was not adopted by Mozambican nationalists from the beginning and as a whole. This is corroborated by Frelimo leaders when repeating almost to exhaustion that their strategies were adopted and being decided throughout the development of the process of national liberation, as a response to the questions concretely raised. All along denying, therefore, that these elements were imported as a formula which had worked elsewhere with good results.²⁴

that would certainly leave him horrified: "Grab 'em by the balls and the hearts and minds will follow". As to flexibility, another US general was quoted saying that "I will be damned if I will permit the US Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war". See O'Sullivan & Miller 1983:118-119; Beckett & Pimlott 1985:7.

²³Sir Robert Thompson summarised this theory in his five principles: The need for a clear political aim on the part of the government, the need to adhere to the rule of law, the need for a coordinate plan, the need to establish secure base areas, and the need to concentrate initially on destroying the political infrastructure of the insurgents. See Beckett & Pimlott 1985:6.

²⁴For instance, Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo, said to Aquino de Bragança, in an interview dated from 1968: "A common base we all had when we formed Frelimo was the hatred of colonialism, and the need to destroy the colonial structure and establish a new social structure... but what type of social structure nobody knew. Some of us had theoretical ideas, but even these were transformed by the struggle. The evolution in thinking which occurred in the past 6 years permits me to conclude that Frelimo is, at present, much more socialist, revolutionary and progressive than ever, and our tendency is

The process leading to the formation of Frelimo was not preformed by a core of Marxist militants. Instead, it was the result of a wide variety of conditions, both internal and external, leading to the formation of a wide Front. Of course the harsh conditions imposed on Africans by colonialism within the territory cannot stand as the one and only cause, in spite of the understandable nationalist propaganda, since these conditions were not new. They should be seen rather as the background against which more specific causes, datable to the late 1950s, would act. One of them was the increasing process of fleeing by African students and employees, resulting from a certain degree of development imprinted on Mozambique's southern regions, which included a greater access to secondary schools, particularly protestant ones: people who had a certain degree of organisation revealed in the existence of associations such as NESAM, the nationalist-biased Nucleus of the African Secondary School Students of Mozambique, existing since 1949. These circles had been able to follow the nationalist struggles under way throughout the African continent, and from them great numbers made their way into the northern neighbouring territories such as Northern and Southern Rhodesia, Nyassaland, and particularly Tanzania, where a nationalist environment was strongly developing within the context of their own political processes.²⁵ Moreover, it is also important to note that that very same environment was greatly influencing the northern and northwestern parts of Mozambique, since every frontier people there had great affinities with the neighbouring territories, being part of larger ethnic groups divided by the historical process which led to the delimitation of colonial frontiers. These were the cases of the Shona-Tawara, with affinities with Southern Rhodesia, of all the Maravi peoples and the Nguni, with profound connections with Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland,²⁶ the links of the Yao from Niassa with Nyassaland and Southern Tanzania, and the case of the well defined Makonde, placed both north and south of the Rovuma river. Such links were obviously made more profound by the historical process of labour migration, particularly to Southern Rhodesia and

towards a socialism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. That was the result of the conditions of life in Mozambique, of the type of enemy we have in Mozambique, who does not give us any other choice." Bragança & Wallerstein 1978(II):200-201.

²⁵Tanzania was the first to become independent, in December 9, 1961. Malawi and Zambia were to gain their independence later on, in 1964, in July 6 and October 24, respectively.

²⁶For example, see the detailed account of the influence exerted in eastern Tete by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the party headed by Dr. Banda and struggling for independence of colonial Nyassaland, in Borges Coelho 1984:3-12, based on Portuguese administrative and military records. These included relatively widespread filiation of Mozambicans in the MCP, and extensive MCP propaganda inside the territory of Tete. According to worried Portuguese authorities this process had its origins in family and commercial ties between both sides of a frontier the Portuguese had no means to control.

Tanzania. Besides southern nationalist militants, northern occasional refugees, and migrants, Mozambican students also streamed towards Tanzania from a very important nursery of African nationalists in Portugal, the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império* (House of Students from the Empire). Some Mozambican students living in Europe, organised particularly in the UNEMO (Mozambique Students Union), formed in Paris in 1962, were also to join the nationalist movement in Dar es Salaam, later on.

Under that same influence several groups and associations of Mozambican migrants, with more or less clear political purposes, began emerging in these territories. More favourable conditions, such as the fact of avoiding colonial risks, led to the concentration of these movements in Nyassaland and particularly in Tanzania.²⁷ In this latter country several small associations began to emerge, such as the Tanganyika-Mozambique Makonde Union, the Zanzibar-Mozambique Makonde Union and others, apparently all of them pursuing narrow prospects of ethnic autonomy and seeking from the Portuguese the immediate concession of negotiated independence.²⁸ Maybe it was the very same influence of the process through which the British territories were achieving independence that gave the Mozambican nationalists a prospect of achieving sudden and negotiated independence through increasing pressure on Portuguese authorities.²⁹ The popular gathering, in 1960, in front of the building of Mueda Administration to request independence was certainly guided by this understanding, and the massacre that followed, of allegedly 600 peasants, clearly showed to the nationalists that only through a war could they hope to defeat the Portuguese or have their minds changed. In Frelimo's discourse Mueda has unquestionably the symbolical value of the event which led to a transformation in the overall strategy towards achieving independence,

²⁷According to some sources, Joshua Nkomo, then leader of the most important nationalist party in Southern Rhodesia, the National Democratic Party, advised the Mozambicans to pursue their political activities in Tanzania in order to avoid British interference. See Brito, Borges Coelho & Negrão 1985:24.

²⁸One example among several is the transcription of a newspaper article dated from January 1961, according to which three nationalists, Aurélio Bucuane, Adelino Gwambe and David Chambale, having formed an alleged Party of National Unity, were trying to go to Lisbon for talks with Salazar, to whom they would present such contradictory claims as immediate independence of Mozambique and the right of their party to be represented in the Portuguese Legislative Assembly. See AHM, Fundo de Moatize [hereafter FM], Cx.97: GDT no.78/GAB (16/02/61).

²⁹A reading of the kind in the editorial of Frelimo's *Mozambique Revolution*, no.51, April-June 1972, namely: "It was such [exile] politicians who also tried to obstruct the efforts of the newer recruits to organised nationalism to elaborate a programme, analyse carefully the nature of the enemy, and prepare for protracted struggle. *The old guard's model of an anti-colonial campaign lay elsewhere, in the more restrained manifestations of mass nationalism which characterised neighbouring British-held territories*"[emphasis added].

the root of the armed struggle as a self-defence strategy.³⁰ On the other hand, political unity was vital in order to increase the chances of success. Several factors concurred for such a trend, from the pressure of TANU (Tanzania African National Union), the governmental party of Tanzania headed by Julius Nyerere, to that of the CONCP, the Conference of the Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies, formed in Morocco in April 1961 and integrating UDENAMO, one of the most preeminent Mozambican nationalist organisations.³¹ But it was of course within the Mozambican movements that the "fight for unity" grew, particularly under the influence of Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of Frelimo, quoted as saying that "all the Mozambican political organisations wrote to me, asking me to join each one of them individually, but I insisted that I would only adhere to the independence party which would fight for unity with the other Mozambican groups in order to form a front... Then I went to Dar es Salaam and helped to organise the Conference which created [in June 25, 1962] the Mozambican Liberation Front".³² This process culminated with the 1st Frelimo Congress, held in Dar es Salaam in September 23-28, 1962, which thus gave the important step of defining political unity, even if yet a fragile one, and the principle of the armed struggle as the only way to achieve independence.³³

During the year of 1963, Frelimo made a great effort to find support for its struggle. Mondlane went to the Soviet Union and China. Algeria received two groups of Mozambicans to be trained as guerrillas in that same year, the first headed by Filipe Samuel Magaia and the second by Samora Machel. Soon afterwards China and the USSR were also training Mozambican guerrillas. In parallel, training camps were set up in Tanzania, namely

³⁰For the view of the popular war as primarily moved by self-defence see Davidson 1981:4-5. "(...) in self-defence of their 'just rights, liberties, properties, privileges and immunities against tyranny, arbitrariness and oppression'". Frelimo stressed in several instances that the armed struggle was the last resort, for example in the pronouncement of September 25, 1964: "(...)Frelimo sought, through a pacific effort, to convince the colonial-fascist government of Portugal to meet the fundamental exigencies of the Mozambican people. (...) In spite [of this pacific effort], Portuguese colonialism pursues the aim of exerting its domination over our mother-land. (...) Today, considering that the Portuguese government is still refusing to recognise our right to independence, Frelimo reaffirms that the armed struggle is the only way for the Mozambican people to attain their aspirations of justice and welfare." See Bragança & Wallerstein 1978(ID):132-133.

³¹See in this regard Mondlane 1977:127-128.

³²Brito, Borges Coelho & Negrão 1985:32. The Conference officially unified the three principal movements, UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI.

³³The Congress activities were summarised by Mondlane 1977:131-133 as "consolidation [of unity] and mobilisation; preparation for war; education [of cadres] and diplomacy [in order to obtain international support]."

Bagamoyo, in 1963, and Kongwa, in 1964. Other camps and facilities would be created further south in the Tanzanian territory, nearer to what would be the military theatre, such as Songea, Tunduru and Nachingwea. According to Frelimo accounts, these camps, particularly Kongwa, were the scene of acute internal conflicts and discussions before a narrow nationalist race-based understanding could be replaced by revolutionary principles. It was in these camps, therefore, that the conception of a popular war began to emerge.³⁴

If this "preparatory" stage is excluded, the nationalist war of liberation can be divided in three main periods, defined according to the general strategy of both parties. The first period runs from the outset of the war, in 1964, to 1968, when Frelimo held its 2nd Congress and the profile of the war as a people's protracted war was definitively settled. It was, therefore, a period initiated with the definition of independence as the main goal and armed struggle as the means to achieve it, during which the movement evolved to acquire a revolutionary stand. The second period runs from 1968, when Frelimo's overall strategy was put into practice, to 1970, the year of perhaps the most serious Portuguese military counter-offensive, Operation *Nó Górdio* (Gordian Knot), the only clear attempt to wipe out the guerrillas from the Mozambican territory in one move. Finally, the third period, from 1970 to 1974, when the military *coup* took place, was a period of permanent Frelimo initiative, in spite of the diversification of Portuguese counter-insurgency measures. Interestingly, these three periods have in common the fact of starting with a guerrillas' initiative, followed by the reaction of Portuguese security forces leading to a deep crisis within the nationalist forces, with perhaps the exception of the last one, in which the military *coup* broke this *cadenza*. The mere fact of one period giving way to the next means, therefore, that Frelimo was able to overrun its strategic crises and set up new forms of keeping the initiative. Another interesting element to note is that in both transitions between the periods, in 1968 and in late 1970, the territory of Tete played a central part in Frelimo's response to the Portuguese military offensive, as we will discuss below.

In the historiography of Frelimo, the attack on the Portuguese administrative post of Chai, in September 25, 1964, marks the "official" start of the armed struggle. In parallel, other military operations were undertaken on the banks of lake Niassa (lake Malawi), followed by an alleged attack on a Portuguese garrison in Zambézia, near Tacuane. Three months after Chai, a military operation was undertaken against the administrative post of

³⁴ Brito, Borges Coelho & Negrão 1985:48-55.

Charre, in the frontier of Tete with Malawi.³⁵ The first attacks held by Frelimo guerrillas had an important meaning other than military. In fact, though militarily they were nothing but a couple of small, scattered and short operations against some minor administrative posts, they caught the Portuguese security forces by surprise, both strategically and tactically. Strategically because they did not understand at first that military action was being preceded by intense guerrilla contacts in order to get a maximum and multiform support from people in local villages. The oblivion to such a vital aspect had led the Portuguese to the tactical error of placing their defence along the border-line of the Rovuma river, in the form of landing strips, bush-cleared corridors and troop concentrations. They were, thus, caught in the wrong place in the outset of the war. Moreover, these attacks were also of extreme importance in the sense that they showed the populace that the movement, besides having a concrete project was capable of implementing it. This advantage allowed the guerrillas to keep the initiative during 1965 and 1966, rapidly progressing southwards both in Cabo Delgado and Niassa,³⁶ crossing the defence line hastily set up by the Portuguese on the Messalo river in the former, and outflanking the defence line established in the axis Cantina Dias-Muembe in the latter, by progressing through eastern Niassa. The guerrilla forces operated through hit-and-run raids, according to Mao's strategy of the "thousand small cuts", without confronting the enemy in direct face-to-face battles. Simultaneously, land-mines were increasingly used in order to cut road communications, thus hampering army mobility. Soon the guerrilla forces were reaching the proximities of the Lúrio river, in Cabo Delgado, and the outskirts of Nova Freixo in Niassa, encircling the capitals of the two present-day provinces and leaving the colonial administrative posts and military garrisons as "isolated islands in a sea of insurgency".

The Portuguese response was, at first, far from what could be considered as a counter-insurgency campaign in the coordinated sense considered above, even if some evidence shows the concern, in some circles, with establishing a proper "counter-subversion" plan. The following instances of such a concern may be cited: the publication of texts from

³⁵For a description of the circumstances leading to the attack on Chai by Alberto Chipande, who headed the guerrilla group, see Mondlane 1977:147-149; for a description of the first military operations in Niassa, namely Metangula, Cóbuè and Messumba, see Paul 1977:117-122; for a description of the attack to Charre, in Tete, see Borges Coelho (ed) 1991:157-159, and for a direct official account, AHM, FM, Cx.100: GDT, Boletim de Informações [hereafter BI] no.37/65.

³⁶As to Tete, the action against Charre did not have continuity for reasons mainly related with a fragile Frelimo establishment in the interior and with the reluctance of Malawi to provide sanctuaries for the guerrillas, as we will discuss below. See on this regard Borges Coelho 1984:41-58.

important guerrilla commanders or from other counter-insurgency campaigns,³⁷ the discussions and articles published in Portuguese periodicals such as the bulletin of the *Junta de Investigações do Ultramar* (Board for Overseas Research),³⁸ or the visit of western counter-insurgency experts to address conferences in Mozambique.³⁹ An important military source summarised the preparation of the army for the war, in the years which preceded it, as intensification of recruit training, translation and publication of texts on counter-subversion and development of military intelligence.⁴⁰ But, in practice, the months following Frelimo's offensive were characterised by indiscriminating and extensive terror exerted over the population. Army platoons and PIDE teams appeared suddenly in the villages and rural missions, in "search and destroy" operations, burning down houses and food reserves, killing people or carrying them away to detention camps where they would be screened allegedly in order to detect the ones compromised with supporting the guerrillas. Once the security forces realized the full extent of the popular support for the guerrillas everyone was a suspect, which led to the complete disruption of life in the affected areas.⁴¹

But Frelimo was, meanwhile, strengthening itself. The 250 guerrillas from the outset of the war⁴² rapidly grew to several thousands, as shown in Table 5.1; the numbers benefitted, to a great extent, from local recruitment in the areas already affected by the conflict as well as among the refugees. On the other hand, contemporary accounts reveal how

³⁷For example, Corpo de Polícia da Província de Moçambique 1963: *A Arte da Guerra de Guerrilhas de Mao Tse-Tung*, Lourenço Marques; Corpo de Polícia da Província de Moçambique 1963: *Cento e Cinquenta Perguntas a um Guerrilheiro*, Lourenço Marques. And, later on, General António Augusto dos Santos 1968: *Contra-Subversão: O Isolamento da Guerrilha*, Nampula (a summary translation and adaptation of Sir Robert Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, 1956).

³⁸For example, its issue no.62 from 1963 includes, under the general heading of "Subversion and Counter-Subversion", articles as: J.O. Leandro, "A Nação e a Contra-Subversão"; Tenente-Coronel Hermes de Araújo Oliveira, "Resposta à Guerra Subversiva"; Tenente-Coronel Joaquim Franco Pinheiro, "Natureza e Fundamentos da Guerra Subversiva".

³⁹For example, the conference of French Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Closterman in Mozambique, in May 1961, about the necessary conditions to prevent guerrilla insurgency. See AHM, FM, Cx.97: GDT, "Conferência do Tenente-Coronel Pierre Closterman" (23/05/61).

⁴⁰See Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):65.

⁴¹For example, a local account of the terror which followed Frelimo's first attacks in Niassa, in Paul 1977:117-122. Henriksen 1978b:186 mentions, for instance, the numbers of 10,000 Mozambican Makonde refugees in Tanzania in 1965, as a result of "hut burning and coercion", numbers which would increase to 55,000 by 1971.

⁴²Mondlane 1977:152-153. According to the same source the movement had around 8,000 guerrillas by 1967, which coincides with Portuguese military estimates presented in Table 5.1.

efficiently the movement was managing to benefit from international material aid, from wherever it could.⁴³ As to the Portuguese army, which faced from the outset of the war great difficulties in recruiting,⁴⁴ its material support came obviously from the western countries, particularly from the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

TABLE 5.1:
FRELIMO COMBAT POTENTIAL IN MARCH 1967, ACCORDING TO AN ESTIMATION BY
PORTUGUESE MILITARY SOURCES

	EFFECTIVE				UNITS	
	FPLM ^a	Militia	FD ^b	Total	Battal.	Comp.
Niassa	1,900	800	125	2,825	4 to 5	14
C.Delgado	2,500	2,500	26	5,026	5 to 6	18
Reserve	1,500	-	-	1,500	5	13
Infiltrating	1,500	-	-	1,500	5	13
Total	7,400	3,300	151	10,851	19 to 21	58

^aAcronym for Forças Populares de Libertação de Moçambique, Frelimo's army; ^bFeminine Detachment.
Source: RMM/QG (2a.Rep.): *SUPINTREP* no.18, *Potencial de Combate das Forças da Frelimo*, Nampula (Março 1968).

⁴³Whitaker 1970:12-14, concisely reveals that while the African states provided political support, aid in terms of military equipment or military-related came from the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, China and Cuba, and humanitarian, educational and refugee aid from Europe and the United States. He also underlined this ability of Frelimo in maintaining contacts with everyone when writing that "Soviet aid seems to have been largely free of one of the major inconveniences of China aid, which is reported often to have been conditioned on the recipient parties signing propaganda statements condemning the West for neo-colonialism or the Soviet Union for revisionism (...). Frelimo, which receives the largest amount of Chinese assistance, has arranged to have all transfers officially made to the ALC [Africa Liberation Committee] through Tanzania, whose representative is chairman of the ALC, with the understanding that the arms are to be passed on to Frelimo. Thus Frelimo avoids offending the Soviets or the West by signing Chinese statements and continues to enjoy support from both the Soviet Union and China, while the ALC enhances its prestige by serving as the official channel of external resources for the liberation efforts". For the type of weaponry Frelimo was receiving see AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Região Militar de Moçambique [hereafter RMM]/Quartel-General [hereafter QG] (2a.Rep.), *SUPINTREP* no.18: "Potencial de Combate das Forças da Frelimo", Nampula (Março 1968). It included several pistols such as German Parabellum, Soviet Tula Tokarev, and Czechoslovakian M-50; semi-automatic (Soviet Simonov) and automatic guns (Soviet Kalashnikov AK, which came to be the symbol of the guerrillas); short machine-guns such as French Matt and Mac, North-American Thompson, and Soviet Shpagin M/41 (PPsh); light machine-guns such as Soviet Dagtyarev DP and Dagtyarev RPD; heavy machine-guns such as Soviet Dagtyarev-Shpagin DShk; grenade-launchers such as Czechoslovakian P-27 or Soviet RPG-2; several types of British and Soviet grenades; Soviet land-mines, etc.

⁴⁴As tables 5.1 and 5.2 show, the war presented, in its first period and in terms of numbers of combat forces, a ratio of almost 1:1, quite different, for instance, from Malaya's on the ground ratio of 2.5:1, according to Beckett & Pimlott 1985:9 (see footnote 14 in this chapter).

TABLE 5.2:
PORTUGUESE COMBAT POTENTIAL IN CABO DELGADO AND NIASSA IN MAY 1967,
ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE MILITARY SOURCES

	EFFECTIVE	BATTALIONS	COMPANIES
Niassa	4,800	7	33
Cabo Delgado	4,600	4	28
Total	9,400	11	61

Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4): 123-124 and Chart 13.

It would be only with the pursuit of the Frelimo offensive southwards, both in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, that the Portuguese forces began to coordinate their effort to counter the guerrilla forces. This included an impressive increase in the army contingents in Cabo Delgado and Niassa,⁴⁵ the development of intelligence and information services and, broadly, a "new attitude" towards the population in the war zone, namely through psychological warfare and resettlement. Militarily, a new type of operation appeared besides routine *quadrillage*, based in small detachments and integrating peasants recruited by their chiefs and using traditional weaponry.⁴⁶

According to some authors Frelimo had, by this time, over-extended its effort in the sense that its progress was so fast that it could no longer be preceded by proper indoctrination

⁴⁵Between October 1964 and July 1965 the first modifications took place regarding the Portuguese military disposition in the territory, connected with the increase of guerrilla activities and including both a re-arrangement and an increase of the contingent. Until then Niassa and Cabo Delgado were provided with 2 battalions each, roughly totalling 2,000 men in the operational theatre. From July 1965 on, the region was reorganised, with the until then Northern Territorial Command being sub-divided into *Agrupamento 23* (Cabo Delgado) and *Agrupamento 25* (Niassa, Moçambique and Zambézia). While Cabo Delgado was provided with 3 battalion sub-sectors, Niassa, within *Agrupamento 25*, was equally provided with 3 battalion sub-sectors, resulting in a total of around 3,500 men for the northern theatre of operations (Cabo Delgado and Niassa). See Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):81-90, including charts. Although admitting variations and since this information is not explicit in the source, it was considered that there was an average of 120 men per company and 30 men per platoon, and a battalion as composed of 4 operational companies plus one company of command and administration.

⁴⁶A number of operations of this nature in southern Tete were described in Borges Coelho 1984:49-52, namely operations *Goma-Doa*, *Nhapale*, *Chire*, *D/CX*, *Cavernas* and *Ponta do Bico*, taking place between June 1966 and March 1967. All these operations placed contact with village population before fighting the guerrilla forces, and integrated local population carrying traditional weaponry and led by their head of group of villages. "The administrative and military authorities coordinated the operations and sometimes placed a couple of armed soldiers at the disposal of the group leaders in a manoeuvre considered as a 'psychological artifice'. When the operation was over there invariably followed the so-called *socialisation* with the people, which included the inevitable distribution of cigarettes and wine in great quantities, 'under the Portuguese flag'."

actions aimed at preparing the populace to receive the guerrillas, having thus increasingly to face more "unknown" or relatively hostile regions such as the districts of Moçambique and Zambézia.⁴⁷ An important set-back occurring in southern Niassa deserves some attention. In fact, throughout the year 1965, Frelimo attempted to progress southwards, aiming at establishing a base at Nova Freixo, from where through Mecanhelas and Milange the guerrillas would reach the final target, the areas of Tacuane and Mongué. Here two principal bases were to be set. The reasons for such a deep penetration through "hostile" territory lay in the difficulties the guerrilla were experiencing in trying to use Malawi as a rear-base to penetrate the central parts of the country, namely Tete and Zambézia. Having to face the growing firm refusal of Dr. Hastings Banda, who needed some kind of settlement with the Portuguese to assure a way out to the sea, and who therefore avoided direct involvement in the conflict, the guerrillas sought then to reach the central region through a corridor crossing Niassa and Zambézia. From there they would spread their action to Tete, Zambézia and Sofala. However, this operation was detected and dismantled in February and March 1966, with heavy losses for the guerrillas.⁴⁸

However, important reasons for the decline of the nationalist forces in the terrain are also to be found in the political struggle developing inside the movement. This process, although perhaps ever present since the constitution of the first sanctuaries in Tanzania, developed more acutely from 1966, when guerrilla struggle was experiencing a military decline, reaching a climax during the 2nd Congress, in July 1968. Having become central in the historiography of the movement, it was a prolonged conflict which opposed the young guerrilla commanders, backed by the people from the liberated areas, to the old traditional leaders and so-called "political" nationalists, or nationalists not directly involved in the military fighting. What was at stake was finally the transformation of the nationalist struggle

⁴⁷See this argument in Henriksen 1983:128-129.

⁴⁸The role of local population was important in detecting and going after the guerrillas. A Portuguese commentary is revealing of how hostile was the environment the guerrillas were in: "Detected in the *Concelho* of Amaramba a heavy armed group, allegedly progressing to Milange, in Zambézia. They were being chased already. (...) The authorities organised with the *régulos* popular groups who went after the guerrillas in a 'widespread enthusiasm' of *régulos* and their populations". The document concluded by underlining the important role the populations could play in the combat against subversion, if properly indoctrinated. See AHM, FM, Cx.102: Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações [hereafter SCCIM], BI no.57/66 (1/03/66); and the most important source for this episode, AHM, FM, Cx.102: SCCIM, Relatório de Informações [hereafter RI] no.1 (14/03/66), where it is referred to that the guerrillas were obliged to avoid the villages so as not to be detected, and therefore great numbers died of starvation. See particularly the transcription of the diary of a captured guerrilla.

for independence into a social revolution which would put an end to the social and economic forms of exploitation already taking place, particularly in the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado. There, the old "chairmen" who had adhered to the struggle were taking personal advantage from collective production and trying to reproduce the old social relations. In spite of the growing "complicity" between peasants and guerrillas, the latter being seen by the former as true liberators, the party of the old chiefs was still strong and held important positions inside the movement. While men such as Uria Simango, the vice-president of Frelimo, could not see the "threat" of a new African class of capitalists which would justify the steps against it designed by the revolutionaries,⁴⁹ important leaders in the liberated areas such as Lázaro Nkavandame began to openly defy the Frelimo leadership, opposing themselves to the revolutionaries and their strategies and defending new military tactics like massive attacks on important cities as a means to achieve rapid military victory over the Portuguese, in an apparent manoeuvre of diversion to hide their counter-revolutionary stand. This had also to do, therefore, with military strategy and tactics, and against massive attacks the revolutionary opposed the prospect of a people's protracted war as emerging from the practice of the struggle itself.⁵⁰ The revolutionaries took important steps towards strengthening the line of the protracted war. The Central Committee session of 1966, in subordinating all the civil activities of the movement to the armed struggle, imposed a more serious concern on the war matters. The Frelimo military apparatus underwent profound re-organisation,⁵¹ and decision-making was centralised at the provincial level, where until then military and civilians had been subject to separated chains of command. At the 2nd Congress, the victory of the revolutionary line began to emerge with the adoption of the idea of a protracted revolutionary war and the attacks on the chairman-type organisation of the liberated

⁴⁹See Simango's famous document "The gloomy situation in Frelimo", accusing an alleged plot of the revolutionaries in 1969, in Bragança & Wallerstein 1978(I):205-208.

⁵⁰In May 1968, an article in the no.8 of *Voz da Revolução* explained: "Why is a protracted war necessary? Some of our comrades think it would be possible for us to rapidly win the war. That is why, according to them, we should concentrate all our forces and throw them against the enemy. But of course the comrades thinking that way did not analyse very well the situation in Mozambique. Our forces are yet much inferior to the enemy's: we only have around one fifth of the soldiers the enemy has in Mozambique. Besides, the enemy has much superior weaponry - aeroplanes, tanks, bombs, cannons. In case we concentrated all our forces to fight the enemy in a single battle he would send his aeroplanes, his tanks and his 60,000 soldiers to destroy our forces. That is why we cannot do that: it would be to uselessly sacrifice our soldiers and bring the Revolution to a halt; it would be adventurism. Then what shall we do? We shall fight a long term war. Why? Because only through a protracted war we can win and liberate our motherland". See Bragança & Wallerstein 1978(II):237.

⁵¹For the re-organisation of Frelimo's military apparatus the most important source remains Mondlane 1977:167-170.

areas. In spite of pursuing the internal struggle with heavy losses for both sides, such as the assassination of president Mondlane and the defection of Nkavandame to the Portuguese, from the 2nd Congress emerged a strengthened revolutionary line which would take full charge after Uria Simango was expelled from the presidential *troika* and Samora Machel appointed as president of the movement. This was, therefore, a stage in which Frelimo defined itself as a revolutionary guerrilla movement.

Frelimo's military strategy to counter the problems weakening its two fronts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado consisted mainly of the opening of a third front in Tete, from March 8, 1968,⁵² which became possible with the establishment of sanctuaries in southern Zambia.⁵³ This move, besides obliging the Portuguese to divert forces from Cabo Delgado and Niassa also caught them, to a great extent, unprepared⁵⁴ for war in this part of the country. On the other hand, the announcement by the colonial state of plans to construct the Cahora Bassa dam also induced the nationalists to increase their presence in the area, worried as they were by the extent to which western involvement in the region, through considerable investments, could break the political isolation of Portugal and perpetuate its presence in the region. As a matter of fact, the dam would involve important western powers such as Great Britain,

⁵²The day of the first two military operations. One was a 45-minute attack on an army garrison in the administrative post of Gago Coutinho, near the Zambian border, in which around 20 guerrillas used two mortars, a bazooka, machine-guns and automatic rifles, from which resulted two militaries wounded and one guerrilla dead. The attack was supported by local *régulo* Chimuara. The second operation was an ambush in the slopes of Chimanto mountains, in the Administrative Post of Chofombo, resulting in two wounded for each side. AHM, FM, Cx.106: GDT, Sitrep Circunstanciado [hereafter Sitrep] no.10/68 (8/03/68), transcribing Administrator de Posto [hereafter AdPa] Chofombo, Mensagem-Rádio [hereafter MR] s/n (8/03/68), and Posto de PSP/Milícias de Cassuende, MR no.14 (8/03/68).

⁵³Zambia's restraints in supporting Mozambican guerrillas were in part the same as Malawi's. It was also a hinterland country which needed Portuguese outlets to the sea, a situation rendered even more difficult after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). However, Zambia maintained always a more positive attitude towards the liberation movements, as attested by its being the third major contributor to OAU's Liberation Committee. In the first years of the Mozambique nationalist war it was the politics of the Zambian government to support all the liberation movements equally. It was only from the end of 1967 that Frelimo was given more facilities, perhaps in part as a result of Tanzanian pressure on Zambia. See Borges Coelho 1989:58-60.

⁵⁴According to Bruce 1973:9, the reasons for the neglect of Tete by the Portuguese were threefold, namely the fact of Nampula headquarters being convinced of having stopped the progression of the guerrilla forces southwards; the low level of guerrilla activities in Tete so far; and the fact of the inhabitants of the District being "peaceful" and occupied with working in Cahora Bassa. While the third seems implausible, we would agree that the Portuguese were caught by surprise with the rapid increase in the level of a war which was unknown until then.

France, the United States and Sweden,⁵⁵ whose firms were presenting their bidding, and would also guarantee a more direct military presence of South Africa and Rhodesia in the theatre of war, since they would be the most important customers of the power produced by the hydroelectric scheme.⁵⁶ Frelimo established then as a primary objective the prevention of the construction of the dam.⁵⁷ The movement's rapid progression southwards, in Tete, included the whole province in the theatre of war, while in Cabo Delgado and Niassa the situation began to deteriorate again for the Portuguese. The colonial state was, therefore, in great need of taking steps in order to reverse the situation.

In March 1970, on the eve of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army in Mozambique, General Kaulza de Arriaga explained in an interview that the guide-lines of his mandate would be promoting the less developed African sectors of the population, retrieving the population under guerrilla control, and "destroying the enemy", in this order.⁵⁸ However, it would be the third aspect he would put first into practice, through the often referred to Operation Gordian Knot, perhaps the only attempt of the entire war to settle the conflict definitively through military means. Revealing the heavy influence of the American line of strategy,⁵⁹ Operation Gordian Knot was planned to be launched in Cabo Delgado, for two main reasons. First, Cabo Delgado was considered by then as the most difficult of the three war fronts from the army's point of view, in Niassa the situation being

⁵⁵In fact, Swedish ASEA, whose expertise was in long-distance direct-current transmission systems, withdrew from the scheme on the basis of the new Swedish laws on sanctions against Rhodesia. See Hance 1970:20.

⁵⁶Hance 1970:20 writes that it was the Portuguese intention to secure greater US and British involvement in order to offset South African influence. We would rather agree that every involvement of important western powers such as the ones chosen were welcome, including South Africa's, whose presence was important in the terrain, as long as the Portuguese state could assure a certain level of control.

⁵⁷Among several statements of Frelimo on its politics on the matter, see Monteiro 1968:73, particularly when writing: "In March a new front was opened, precisely in the province of Tete, where the Portuguese are trying to construct the dam of Cahora Bassa: our successes allow us to foresee considerable difficulties, if not even the impossibility of the Portuguese to accomplish their plan".

⁵⁸*Noticias da Beira*, no.7385 (26/03/70).

⁵⁹Henriksen 1983:49, mentions Kaulza's visit to the United States soon after his appointment as commander-in-chief, for consultations with General W. Westinoreland about American tactics in Vietnam; a former Portuguese commando officer referred to the fact that in his regular check-visits to combat units Kaulza was usually accompanied by an American strategist. Sarmiento 1991: Personal Communication; Flower 1987:139, though for a somewhat later period, mentions Kaulza's enthusiasm in directing the war from an operations room, "beneath flashing lights as he surveyed the wall maps, liberally decorated with coloured pins". According to Flower, a "magnificent" battlefield with nothing to do "with the men dying out there in the African bush".

more or less under control and Tete, though revealing a tendency to get worse, being still a relatively "young" battlefield. Secondly, the defection of important Frelimo elements, such as Lázaro Nkavandame and other Cabo Delgado "chairmen", would have provided the Portuguese army with important intelligence on the deployment of Frelimo forces on the terrain. Operation Gordian Knot deployed great numbers of Portuguese soldiers, probably around 10,000, plus a reserve of 15,000 to enter combat in later phases.⁶⁰ It began with massive bombing of Frelimo bases, during May and June, followed by heliborne commando assaults. Bulldozers rapidly opened new roads in the bush, through which infantry companies could progress to complete the process with the occupation of the zones. Intelligence gathered in these operations allowed the localisation and attack of new bases. Simultaneously, thousands of leaflets were spread and "voice aircraft" heard in the bush, day and night, inviting guerrillas and the population to surrender. The result was 61 bases occupied and 165 weapon-caches and hide-outs destroyed, 651 guerrillas killed, 1,804 captured and 6,854 peasants retrieved.⁶¹ However, in spite of the colonial euphoria which followed, with Kaulza promising some small "cleaning" operations to finish the work initiated by Operation Gordian Knot and end the war for good, this "American way of doing the war" cost a high price for Portugal and did not bring such definitive results as was proclaimed.⁶²

In spite of the heavy losses and the disorganisation of its base areas, Frelimo managed to maintain the pressure in Cabo Delgado and Niassa and, particularly, to react to Portuguese pressure in the northern fronts by sharply increasing guerrilla activities in Tete once again, in the beginning of the third stage of the periodisation established above. Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show very well how serious the situation became in 1971-1972. The most impressive numbers are perhaps the ones related to Tete, revealing not only the most radical increases

⁶⁰According to Henriksen 1978a:32, in spite of the lack of availability of direct sources, these numbers being commonly indicated by several authors. Henriksen 1977a:399 had considered the same 10,000 soldiers involved plus 25,000 as reserve troops; Brito, Borges Coelho & Negrão 1985:197, give the much higher numbers of 18,000 soldiers involved plus a reserve of 17,000, which seems improbable if we take into account the calculation based on the charts of operational forces provided by Portuguese army sources, which give an approximate number of 6,500 regular troops in Cabo Delgado in July 1970. See Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):155-156 and chart 24.

⁶¹Numbers in Henriksen 1983:51; Brito, Borges Coelho & Negrão 1985:214, agree on the number of bases occupied, giving though the number of 294 hide-outs destroyed and a very different number of casualties, namely 100 guerrillas and "hundreds of Portuguese soldiers".

⁶²Henriksen 1983:51, established Portuguese casualties as 132 dead and twice as many wounded, which was regarded very reservedly since previous commanders had managed to conduct the war with an average of 100 dead per year. Moreover, after Operation Gordian Knot around 1,000 guerrillas were considered as still operational in Cabo Delgado.

but also that by 1972 Frelimo action in Tete was already exceeding the levels of Cabo Delgado.

TABLE 5.3:
FRELIMO MILITARY ACTIVITY PER DISTRICT IN 1971/1972, ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE SOURCES

DISTRICTS ⁶³ ACTION	NIASSA 1971/1972	C.DELGADO 1971/1972	TETE 1971/1972	BEIRA ^a 1971/1972	V.PERY 1971/1972	TOTAL 1971/1972
Land-Mines (activated)	126/111	283/213	167/390	-/-	-/-	576/714
Land-Mines (detected)	159/143	852/650	395/1040	-/-	-/-	1239/1476
Against the Army	135/156	556/525	246/499	-/25	-/13	937/1218
Other	23/49	628/665	558/895	-/66	-/39	1426/1963

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GG/SCCIM: *Relatório Anual de Informações*, 1972.

TABLE 5.4:
CASUALTIES OF PORTUGUESE ARMY FORCES IN 1971/1972, ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE SOURCES

DISTRICTS CASUALTIES	NIASSA 1971/1972	C.DELGADO 1971/1972	TETE 1971/1972	BEIRA 1971/1972	V.PERY 1971/1972	TOTAL 1971/1972
Dead	39/54	90/101	73/118	-/1	-/8	202/282
Wounded	257/227	615/628	503/817	-/9	-/9	1375/1690
Abducted	5/-	3/2	12/23	-/-	-/-	20/25
Disappeared	2/-	1/-	7/2	-/-	-/1	10/3

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GG/SCCIM: *Relatório Anual de Informações*, 1972.


TABLE 5.5:
FRELIMO CASUALTIES IN 1971/1972, ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE SOURCES

DISTRICTS CASUALTIES	NIASSA 1971/1972	C.DELGADO 1971/1972	TETE 1971/1972	BEIRA 1971/1972	V.PERY 1971/1972	TOTAL 1971/1972
Dead	90/125	566/269	141/425	-/11	-/3	797/833
Wounded	51/47	120/96	52/91	-/4	-/-	223/238
Captured	250/1335	1207/928	2168/875	-/25	-/12	3625/3175
Total	391/1507	1893/1293	2361/1391	-/40	-/15	4645/4246

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GG/SCCIM: *Relatório Anual de Informações*, 1972.

⁶³Manica e Sofala was transformed in the two separated districts of Beira and Vila Pery in July 1970.

MAP 5.1: THE NATIONALIST WAR IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE



Here the Cahora Bassa project has to be recalled, as a central aspect of the strategic battle. It has to be said, more accurately, that the project was not restricted to the construction of the dam, but rather also included other components such as the creation of an immense acreage of irrigated land, which would be eventually rendered possible through flood control provided by the dam, where it was planned that white settlers, brought in large numbers, would produce food crops, citrus fruits and beef.⁶⁴ Related projects in this immense scheme included also the resettlement of 15,000 to 25,000 Africans, who would have to be removed from the area to be occupied by the lake created by the dam, projects for the exploitation of mineral resources, forestry, and so forth. While the Portuguese could claim to have pursued the construction of the dam in spite of Frelimo's attempts to bring it to a halt, the guerrillas managed, however, to retard the other components of the scheme, gaining time to perform what was perhaps the most important strategic move of the entire war. This was the crossing of the Zambezi river, out-flanking the barrier the Portuguese were trying to set up, and spreading their action in the central areas of Manica and Sofala. Keeping the same tactical line of not confronting the Portuguese army directly, the guerrillas had managed to bring their "protracted war" to the first areas of relatively dense white occupation, once again acting behind the Portuguese barrier-lines. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 also reveal how the escalation of the war was producing heavy casualties for both sides, and how Beira and Vila Pery were increasingly being involved in the open conflict. Against the rampant appearance of Frelimo in the central regions of the country the Portuguese army gave up the last hopes of a war of fronts, basing its new strategy on the increase of the contingents and in fighting with smaller and Africanised units, a process which was developing when brusquely interrupted by the military *coup* in the 25th of April, 1974.

The military apparatus played obviously a central part in the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign. Initially organised according to NATO standards, the army went through several re-organisations and adaptation to the terrain and fighting conditions in Mozambique. In general, these measures consisted in the development of infantry and air-force, artillery generally being kept in reserve due to its high cost, the difficult terrain and the type of war developed by the guerrillas, who made abundant use of land-mines and anti-tank weaponry.⁶⁵

⁶⁴For instance, Braga 1966:*passim*; Hance 1970:21.

⁶⁵See, on this regard, Beckett 1985a:149-150.

TABLE 5.6:
FRELIMO MILITARY ACTIVITY PER TYPE AND DISTRICT IN 1972 ACCORDING TO
PORTUGUESE SOURCES⁶⁶

Frelimo Military Activity	Niassa	C.Delgado	Tete	Beira	V.Pery	Total
Land-mines activated	111	213	390	--	--	714
Land-mines detected	143	683	650	--	--	1,476
Total of land-mines placed	254	896	1,040	--	--	2,190
Against the Army						
Ambushes/attacks	36	117	209	4	5	371
"Whipping bursts"	99	306	196	11	1	613
Against vehicles			1	3	7	11
Against garrisons/detachments	16	73	59	7	--	155
Against airplanes/helicopters	4	28	30	--	--	62
Other (unspecified)	1	1	4	--	--	6
Against Population						
Against population nuclei ^a	10	17	96	--	1	124
Kills ^b	--	--	22	2	4	28
Abductions ^c	43	35	121	6	3	208
Robbery of militia weaponry	--	--	20	--	--	20
Other						
Against bridges	17	10	13	--	--	40
Against railways	10	--	30	--	--	97

^a*Aldeamentos*; ^bGenerally referring to traditional authorities suspect of collaborating with Portuguese authorities; ^cReferred to number of actions, not to persons abducted.
Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GG/SCCIM: *Relatório Anual de Informações*, 1972.

Regarding the weaponry, in the infantry the G3 automatic-gun, which Portugal produced under West German licence, became a sort of "symbol". The small air-force was organised, in one air base (BA) and four aerodrome bases (ABs). In 1970, BA No.10, in Beira, had 8 Nord-Atlas and 4 PV-2; AB No.5, in Nacala, had 16 Alouette helicopters, 5 Auster, 12 DO-27, 8 G-91 Fiats, 12 T-6 and 2 Cherokee; AB No.6, in Vila Cabral, had 4 Auster, 8 DO-27, 10 T-6 and 1 Cherokee; AB No.7, in Tete, had 4 Auster, 8 DO-27, 10 T-6

⁶⁶Though issued by the same source, when compared the present table and table 5.3 reveal some disagreements.

and 1 Cherokee; and AB No.8, in Lourenço Marques, had 4 C-47.⁶⁷ By 1974, the Portuguese air-force in Mozambique included 12 Fiat G-91 and G-92, 15 Harvard T-6 converted trainers, 14 Alouette and 2 Puma helicopters, 5 Nord-Atlas and 7 DC-3 transport aircraft.⁶⁸ The navy did not have such a fundamental role as in Guinea-Bissau, for example. It was used mainly in patrol missions in Lake Malawi and in the northern Mozambican coast.⁶⁹

The profound transformations the army went through, revealed not only in the quantitative increase in the numbers of troops but also in its organisation and territorial deployment, is a fundamental element to the understanding of how the war evolved. The brief account presented here only takes into consideration the number of soldiers directly related to the fighting, aiming at establishing the combat potential of the Portuguese army and therefore excluding the large numbers of troops attached to administrative and logistical roles. Neither were other staff taken into account, such as village militia, frontier guards, rural guards, OPVDCs, *Flechas*, PSPs and other police corps,⁷⁰ since they were not submitted to the command of the Mozambique Military Region. The numbers presented in the tables below are connected with the years established above for the periodisation which guided our analysis, and in revealing how those years effectively were turning points in the history of the war give that periodisation further substance. Map 5.2. is concerned with the army territorial organisation on the eve of the war, revealing the colony divided into three military commands, northern, central and southern, with a disposal very much like the one of the civil

⁶⁷AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: CCM/Nampula, Sitrep no.19/70 (11/05/70).

⁶⁸Beckett 1985a:154. Davidson 1970:10-11, listed, since 1952 and from the USA, 50 Thunderjet fighters, 30 Cessna for training and security work, 18 Lockheed bombers (PV-2 Harpoons), and 12 other Lockheed bombers. Also used were Harvard T-6 bombers and French transport Nord-Atlas. But from 1966 on, the most important were the 40 NATO Fiat G-91 and G-92 fighter-bombers, "particularly suitable for 'counter-insurgency operations' since [they required] a relatively short runway."

⁶⁹Where patrolling was conducted by "sixteen 50-ton boats armed with 20mm Orlikons", according to Beckett 1985a:150.

⁷⁰Amongst the several police corps there were the PSP, acronym for *Polícia de Segurança Pública* (Public Security Police), the colonial branch of the metropolitan police, essentially with an urban role but attaching elements to conduct the militia corps of the *aldeamentos*, and others such as the Security Police of Ports and Railways; OPVDC is the acronym for *Organização Provincial de Voluntários e Defesa Civil* (Provincial Organisation of Volunteers and Civil Defence), a white militia directly connected with the fascist party, created in 1964, through the Decree-law 45,974 from the 17th of October; the militia were security corps of local enlisted Africans for village protection, created in 1961, through the Decree no.17, from the 17th of October, by 1973 having had their designation altered to Rural Guards; the *Flechas* (Arrows) were special military corps depending on PIDE/DGS, the fascist secret police, very much employed in the war in Angola and just appearing in Mozambique by the end of the war.

administration apparatus. The basic structure of the combat forces was the company, 4 to 5 companies forming one battalion.⁷¹ Roughly each former district (present-day province) was provided with one battalion, and like the civil government the military headquarters were also located in Lourenço Marques. There were two main "types" of combat battalions, according to the role they performed: the positional (or *quadrillage*) troops, attached to an area under their control, and the intervention troops, mobile companies with the command of their battalion usually located in a fixed place. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 reveal a greater importance obviously conceded to the northern zone and, after 1971, to the central zone too. This aspect is clearly connected with Frelimo's response to Portuguese military pressure in the northern fronts by increasing its action in the Tete front.

As a matter of fact, by this time the territorial criteria of the Portuguese higher commands ceased to be the division of the colony into three zones, with the creation of ZOT, the Tete Operational Zone, now an entirely independent territorial command to which a lot more troops were attached and where civil government was subjected to military rule (Map 5.4). This trend was also pursued in 1973, when COFI (Operational Command of Intervention Forces), created in 1969, was attributed an area north of the Central Territorial Command (Map 5.5). Further indication of the growing importance of the northern regions was also found by some authors in the prospects of transferring the capital city of Mozambique from Lourenço Marques to Beira, where it would be "nearer to the centre of gravity", and of appointing generals to command war zones such as Tete and Cabo Delgado.⁷² This greater attention to the northern and central zones was also conceded at the expense of the southern zone, which by 1974 had no more than one battalion, this providing further evidence of growing Portuguese difficulties in recruiting. Evidence in tables 5.7 and 5.8 also reveal a great increase in the numbers of combat troops during the entire war period and particularly in 1967-1968 and in 1973-1974, in apparent contradiction with the recruiting problems referred to above. For the 1967-1968 period, which appears as a response to the escalation of Frelimo action in the beginning of the "protracted war period", it is important to take also into account that the relatively late reaction of Portuguese high commands in achieving that increase probably had to do with growing recruiting difficulties in Portugal itself, since the

⁷¹The estimations presented here are based on an average of 120 men per company and 550 men per battalion (3 to 4 combat companies plus one company of command and services), as stated in footnote 45 above.

⁷²Calvert 1973:83.

war was, in these first years, fought by white metropolitan soldiers. Further reasons for that "late reaction" were also given by the army commands when saying that although foreseeing the beginning of the war in Mozambique, the Portuguese military authorities were obliged to give priority to Angola and Guinea-Bissau, in terms of allocation of personnel, where the war was already taking on serious proportions.⁷³ Besides, of course it is also to consider the chronic emigration flows from Portugal to European countries such as West Germany and France, linked with the peripheral place of Portuguese economy in Europe, and with the growing resistance of youngsters to conscription.⁷⁴ As to the sharp increase in 1973-1974, it is certainly connected with the massive enlistment of African troops, both because Portugal seemed to have reached a limit in terms of human potential and as a new strategy.

TABLE 5.7:
COMMANDS OF PORTUGUESE OPERATIONAL BATTALIONS ATTACHED PER ZONE

	1963	1968	1971	1974
Northern Zone	5	20	20	18
Central Zone	3	7	8	14
Southern Zone	3	3	2	1
Total	11	30	30	33

Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4).

TABLE 5.8:
APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF PORTUGUESE COMBAT TROOPS PER ZONE

	1963	1968	1971	1974
Northern Zone	3,540	15,000	15,000	16,800
Central Zone	2,460	4,080	6,480	17,640
Southern Zone	1,440	1,560	1,320	840
Total	7,440	20,640	22,800	35,280


Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4).

⁷³Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):81. According to Henriksen 1977a:404, "apart from Israel, Portugal had more of its population under arms than did any other nation in the late 1960s and early 1970s".


⁷⁴According to Beckett 1985a:151, around 110,000 Portuguese declined to report for military service between 1961 and 1974.

5.2: THE PORTUGUESE ARMY:
TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION (1963)

Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4)




5.3: THE PORTUGUESE ARMY:
TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION (1968)




5.4: THE PORTUGUESE ARMY:
TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION (1971)

Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4)



5.5: THE PORTUGUESE ARMY:
TERRITORIAL ORGANISATION (1974)



Notwithstanding the great recruiting difficulties, the Portuguese army managed to increase its numbers in an impressive manner, which was done through the enlisting of African elements in the combat units, as well as the creation of units almost entirely composed of Africans. Wheeler,⁷⁵ who declines to accept a "single cause" for this phenomenon, takes into consideration Portugal's shortage of man-power, and the need to cut down expenses in a war that was consuming 40-50% of the country's annual budget by the pragmatic attitude of making the colonies pay for the war effort wherever and whenever possible. Finally, particular relevance is given to African recruitment as a propaganda issue, this assertion being driven by the "colonial mystique of the *New State*", according to which there were Africans voluntarily defending the Portuguese flag against guerrilla attacks. However, there is a fundamental reason for the Africanisation of the army missing above, which is concerned with how the Portuguese military commands overcame the restraints already mentioned in an important strategic move, attachable to Sir Robert Thompson's "same element theory". The African soldier, besides being certainly cheaper to maintain and his eventual death in combat "lesser repercussive", had a more in-depth knowledge of the terrain and local cultures, their use being likely to involve, therefore, more efficiency. Consequently, from 1972, units of GEs, *Grupos Especiais* (Special Groups), and GEPs, *Grupos Especiais de Para-Quedistas* (Special Groups of Parachutists), were being trained in Dondo, near the city of Beira. With the GEs, what was intended was to form combat units of Africans who, after being trained, were supposed to go back to their home areas to act as a specially prepared militia combatting the guerrillas in the "same element" as theirs.⁷⁶ As to the GEPs, the difference from the former was in that they received additional parachute training.

⁷⁵Wheeler 1976:239. He estimates that the Africans were around 35% of the regular army, and 50% to 66% if the special units are included. In his table on page 237, numbers are indicated for the army in Mozambique, in 1974, of 20,000 European troops and 40,000 African troops. Some special units reached a percentage as high as 90% of Africans. See, for instance, Henriksen 1978a:33.

⁷⁶Sarmento 1991: Personal Communication, gave details of sophisticated mechanisms to imprint on the GEs the profile of a rooted militia. One interesting aspect was that, according to him, the weapon received by a GE soldier "belonged", in part, to his family, this meaning that in case he died the weapon should be proudly accepted by his next brother to carry on the fight.

TABLE 5.9:
QUANTITATIVE EVOLUTION OF SOME COMBAT UNITS ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE
MILITARY SOURCES

	1963	1964	1965	1968	1970	1973	1974
Companies of Hunters (CCaç)	46	48	51	105	105	116	128
<i>Commando</i> Companies	--	--	--	4	5	8	8
Special Groups (GEs)	--	--	--	--	--	40	83
Special Groups of Parachutists (GEPs)	--	--	--	--	10	10	12

Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):193.

These new units, particularly the GEs, seemed to have been a more direct answer to Frelimo's activity in the central zones, since they were placed for operations particularly in Tete and northern Vila Pery, which is to say in the infiltration corridors of the guerrillas. They were also the product of General Arriaga's⁷⁷ last attempt to reverse the course of events, after the failure of the Gordian Knot-type operations and before his replacement. Finally, notwithstanding the fact of indicating the search for flexible answers, this project was still the creation of an army concerned with retaining control of all counter-insurgency operations. In parallel, other attempts were being made, namely the introduction of unconventional or pseudo-guerrilla units of *Flechas* (Arrows). These had been operating in Angola since the 1960s, under the direct control of PIDE (see below) and, therefore, not concerned with the army. The *Flechas* were not necessarily seen by the army ranks in Mozambique as a negative solution in some cases,⁷⁸ but the strong opposition of General Arriaga to the *Flecha* project led to its persistent delay. Arriaga had probably two principal motives for refusing to accept it. On the one hand, he was not prepared to accept a project of military units not directly controlled by the army. On the other, as it was set up, the project was being produced by a close connection between DGS (see below) and Rhodesia's secret services, the CIO, as an important part of the counter-insurgency strategy of the latter

⁷⁷In connection, it has to be said, with Jorge Jardim, a preeminent settler who financed part of the project and whose facilities in Dondo were used to train the Special Groups.

⁷⁸For instance AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: QG/ZOT, no.8/B (10/09/71). "In Angola, where such a close operational collaboration [between the army and PIDE/DGS and in order to establish the combination of military power-intelligence] has not been achieved... DGS established itself this combination through special African forces created by its own structure, the *Flechas*. In Tete, considering the very ingenious way of the enemy in conducting subversion, the extensive areas impossible to control through search operations, and the presence of great numbers of people we cannot consider as enemies, it is imperative to find similar solutions [*Flechas*-type], though eventually with a different shape..."

country and, therefore, largely controlled by it. The Mozambican *Flechas* were to include Africans from both countries, on the basis of ethnic affinity, who completely ignoring the frontiers should develop 'head-hunting' type operations and 'hot pursuit', which the Portuguese army had never carried out for fear of the international repercussions. Arriaga did certainly not want to be involved in the Rhodesian war, and this conflict of interests led to personal hostility between him and Ken Flower, the chief of Rhodesia's CIO and Rhodesian mentor of the *Flecha*-concept designed for acting in both countries simultaneously. Delayed for some years, the project was being re-activated in 1974, precisely at the time of the military *coup*, when a personal friend of Flower's, São José Lopes, the director of PIDE/DGS in Angola and "father" of the Angolan *Flechas*, was appointed as Joint Controller of DGS Operations for Angola and Mozambique.⁷⁹

Portuguese intelligence and information in Mozambique was, during the war, organised in three main services with independent chains of command, each one of them provided with central, district and local structures. The most salient was perhaps SCCIM, the *Serviços de Centralização e Coordenação de Informações de Moçambique* (Mozambique Services for Centralising and Coordinating Intelligence). Initiated in the former intelligence service attached to the Governor-General's cabinet, they were created in 1961 to "gather, analyse and divulge information relevant to the politics, administration and defence of the province".⁸⁰ Such a wide field of activity modeled SCCIM as an "office service" with rare field-work operations,⁸¹ depending on all the civil services producing intelligence which it was supposed to coordinate, its lowest level being the district's. In addition to the SCCIM, PIDE/DGS or International Police for State Defence, later General Security Directorate, the political police of the fascist regime, had also its own channels for intelligence gathering, being organised in terms of a provincial delegation, district sub-delegations and local

⁷⁹See on this matter, the important testimony of Flower 1987:300-302. This little known question has been misread by some authors. Henriksen 1983:62, for instance, confuses *Flechas* with GEs when describing them as financially supported by Jardim and acting openly in the theatre of war from early 1973. In fact, the quest for military answers outside the Portuguese army, with the agreement of Marcello Caetano himself, was only beginning in 1974. Sarmento 1991: Personal Communication, described the first secret *Flecha* operations in 1974, in areas previously cleared out of military.

⁸⁰According to the Decree no.43,761 (29/06/61), published in BO 28(I) (15/07/61), which created such services in the overseas provinces.

⁸¹This fact turned the SCCIM essentially into an entity producing coordinated intelligence for the remaining services, actually the reason why the SCCIM are perhaps the most valuable Portuguese written source for the study of this period.

brigades, enjoying a high degree of autonomy. The army was also provided with intelligence services itself, the SIM or *Serviços de Informação Militares* (Military Information Services). Finally, also to be noted in this field of activity was the civil administrative apparatus, with district and local level "on-the-field" fixed or itinerant mechanisms for collecting information, generally divulged in written form in the intelligence documents issued by the District Governor.

The production of intelligence documents followed, to a considerable extent, a sort of pattern, at least in terms of what concerned the SCCIM, the administrative services and, also, the army.⁸² Generally common to all services involved was the issuing of official letters, telegrams, radio messages, reports, research requests and circular letters (at some echelons). In addition, the District Governor issued BIs (Information Bulletins) and, more regularly, weekly ISUMs (Information Summaries) in 1965, and after that weekly SITREPs (Situation Reports), while District Commissioners and Local Administrators produced RIs (Immediate Reports) and BIs (Information Bulletins). The most relevant information documents produced by the military were, at the highest level, SUPINTREPs (Supplementary Information Reports, analyzing information related to a period of time, or gathering information of a different nature for an operation), and PERINTREPs (Periodical Information Reports, summaries of research notes related to a specific period). At battalion and company level the army also produced weekly SITREPs, and Reports at platoon level. Finally, the SCCIM issued several types of information documents, including Reports, RIs (Information Reports), RNs (News Reports), BIs (Information Bulletins), BDIs (Bulletins for Divulging Information), two-weekly Situation Reports, and yearly Annual Information Reports.⁸³ The complex relationship between the several services involved was regulated, in principle, by a set of rules issued by the Governor-General in 1965,⁸⁴ according to which the SCCIM should assure the coordination and orientation of all the civil information services (SIC), as well as the coordination either of SIC and civil authorities with SIM or of SIC with PIDE.

⁸²This issue is more difficult to assess regarding the PIDE/DGS because a great part of its documentation disappeared, was destroyed or was taken out of the country after the military *coup* of the 25th of April, 1974, and it is not yet available for consultation in Portugal. What PIDE/DGS left behind in the Mozambican archives were, therefore, only scattered documents.

⁸³This list is not exhaustive and has the mere purpose of showing how far the production of information documents had gone in terms of complexity and intricacy.

⁸⁴AHM, FM, Cx.102: GDT, "Normas Gerais para a Actividade da Informação na Província de Moçambique" (21/08/65), particularly its chapter V, "Normas da Relação".

The relationship between SIM and PIDE was supposed to be direct, and was some times privileged by military commands, considered as the ideal binary combination of power and intelligence.⁸⁵ However, reality was frequently quite different from what was defined in the regulations, the total autonomy enjoyed by such services predictably being behind the many problems raised in their relationship. On the one hand, acute competition grew amongst them, with, for instance, PIDE/DGS' visits to the sites being feared by District Commissioners and Local Administrators, or openly unwelcome by the army in the field because of PIDE/DGS' secretiveness and ruthless methods.⁸⁶ Conflicts were particularly acute when the relationship between local administrative authorities and the army was concerned. One first and important reason for this was that, for instance, in many cases a Local Administrator did not view with favour the settlement of a military company in his territory, creating a duality of powers. The military, provided with more means, often relegated the administrative authorities to a secondary role in the own territory of the latter.⁸⁷ However, though weaker, the Local Administrator had commonly a more rooted presence in his territory, since he "had always" been there, while the military companies were often replaced.⁸⁸ This was due to the fact that the civil authorities had, in most of the cases, better information networks amongst local communities, through civil informers and a better connection with traditional authorities, an

⁸⁵AHM. FGT, Cx.s/n: ZOT/QG, no.8/B (10/09/71), where it is argued by ZOT commanders that the DGS network on the terrain should be strengthened and enlarged in Tete, having in consideration the high level of results it achieved in so far as intelligence was concerned.

⁸⁶An example of the authoritarian stand is shown by PIDE/DGS in its relationship with the administrative authorities in AHM, Fundo de Caldas Xavier [hereafter FCX], Cx.1: PIDE, info no.1/65/INV (14/10/65), in which it is clearly stated that the detention of individuals suspected of subversion should be always done by PIDE. In case there was not a PIDE agent in the site, the local authority should interrogate the prisoner and send the elements to the nearest PIDE sub-delegation, which would decide the destiny of the prisoner. Sarmento 1991: Personal Communication, gave details of the frequently unexpected and secretive visits of PIDE agents to areas under army control, and the unsubtle manner with which, in some cases, the military received them.

⁸⁷Illustration of conflicts between staff of the civil administration and the military, quite acute and generalised, for instance in Vasconcelos 1992: Interview.

⁸⁸See, for instance, AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Comando Sectorial F [hereafter ComSec F] (Batalhão de Caçadores [hereafter BCaç] 17), no.348/B/71, p.4.1/5 (7/09/71): "This command is making an intense effort towards obtaining up-dated news and/or intelligence in order to act militarily in anticipation, and to defeat the IN [enemy]. (...) The service of military information is still very much in its early stages. It has been very difficult to recruit civil informers. (...) We have been trying to establish liaisons with all AADM [administrative authorities] and making every effort to obtain from them a *sincere* collaboration (...)". [Emphasis added]. Answering to the criticism of the local authorities, the superiors of this battalion stressed that in spite of all the problems involved in this collaboration, administrative information was, due to the nature of its sources, the quickest, and thus very important. "Losing contact and penetration amongst local population is, from the point of view of operational intelligence, one of the worst facts in the struggle against a well conceived subversion plan (...)". See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: ZOT/QG, no.8/B (10/09/71).

advantage they used in their own favour, resulting a situation in which their superiors, as District Commissioners and even the District Governor, knew about the facts before their next-door military neighbours or PIDE/DGS agents on the site.⁸⁹ In general, it can be concluded, therefore, that the operational effectiveness of the Portuguese intelligence effort was greatly disturbed by the coexistence of several autonomous and often competitive information services, and that the effort to coordinate them tended to be reduced at the lowest levels, the ones in the field where the fight was undertaken and, thus, where this question was posed in a very sensitive manner.

Psychological warfare also played an important role in the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign in Mozambique. It was widely employed, targeting everyone from the African population and the guerrillas to the white settlers and the army itself. If in its wider sense psychological warfare is difficult to define and approach, since it was present in all aspects of the war,⁹⁰ in its stricter sense its origins can be traced in the already mentioned brigades of the Service for Psycho-Social Action (SAP), which visiting the small villages from 1961 on, aimed at instilling in the village community a picture of a state committed to raising of their condition and well-being. Anticipating the beginning of the military conflict, the SAP brigades were from the outset combining their "developmental" role with one which included intelligence gathering and the preparation of what was called African civil defence.⁹¹ All these aspects were part of psychological warfare, understood by the colonial state as a complex three-notion set of psychological action, social action and psycho-social action. According to their definition by the army commands,

"Psychological action is the action which consists in implementing a set of measures, properly coordinated, aiming at influencing the opinion, the feelings, the beliefs, and therefore the attitudes and the behaviour of friendly, neutral and adverse environments with the objective of:
-strengthening the determination and combative spirit of the friendly environment;

⁸⁹See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.105: SCCIM, no.132 (27/01/67). The chief of SCCIM complained to the District Governor on this matter, mentioning a case in which a Local Administrator transmitted important information to his superiors, namely the District Commissioner, neglecting to report it to the sub-delegation of PIDE, which learned of the facts much later, when such information was not sensitive any more.

⁹⁰Psychological warfare could be a notion as wide as to include, for example, the "Africanisation" of the army as a process presenting the war as a conflict between Africans.

⁹¹"(...)orientating work for the self-defence of the population, bringing them to prepare fixed groups for defence and itinerant groups for information and vigilance, in connection with the military and militarised services, in order to create a network for collective defence (...)". In AHM, FM, Cx.100: Serviço Distrital de Acção Psicossocial [hereafter SDAP], no.8/C/9/T (11/02/65).

-attracting the active sympathy of the neutral environment;
-elucidating the opinion of both the environments mentioned, and counter-acting the adverse influence being exerted over them;
-modifying the activity of the adverse environment in a sense favourable to the objectives we intend to reach".⁹²

As to social action, it was understood as

"the implementation of a properly coordinated set of measures of assistance, which improving the living conditions of the population and raising their cultural level, contribute to gaining their trust and conquering their hearts; it has the fundamental objective of sensitising the population in order to render them more receptive to psychological action".⁹³

Finally, psycho-social action, combining the two, was defined as

"the action exerted over the population in a given territory where we intend to undertake a struggle against subversion, conducted under two forms - psychological action and social action - the latter with the role of supporting the former".⁹⁴

According to these guidelines, psychological action comprehended a vast set of state measures which included the creation of state organisms and services, while the social action could be seen as the gathering of people, in most of the cases scattered until then, in new strategic villages, the *aldeamentos*. Not only would contacts between them and the guerrillas be prevented in the *aldeamentos* but also the gathering of the population would render possible the implementation of psychological action, as defined, in a concentrated environment. While villagisation will be discussed in the next section, we will briefly approach here this view of psychological action.

In the early 1960s, a doctrine having the people, particularly the African people, in the midst of its concerns, began to be developed as a result of the effort of institutions such as the SAP, the SCCIM and others. In 1965, the SCCIM published a seminal work for this doctrine, Ferraz de Freitas' *Conquista da Adesão das Populações* (Winning Population Adhesion), which provided backbone concepts such as the ones of *comandamento* and *accionamento*:

⁹²AHM, Fundo da Macanga [hereafter FMA], Cx.107: RMM/QG, "Estágio na ZOT", Nampula (Agosto 1971).

⁹³AHM, FMA, Cx.107: RMM/QG, "Estágio na ZOT", Nampula (Agosto 1971).

⁹⁴AHM, FMA, Cx.107: RMM/QG, "Estágio na ZOT", Nampula (Agosto 1971).

"While *commanding* means to direct and requires the knowledge and the ability to handle the 'social forces', *ordering* means rather to impose, and for it having physical power is enough. *Commandment* requires participation and promotes adhesion; *ordering* may provoke repulsion, namely when exerted over culturally different populations, which are not understood, and the efficiency of *ordering* decreases in proportion to the diminishing of the physical power of the one who exerts it. And in the Province [of Mozambique] the physical power of the Administration will decrease until being unable to control the populations if they, rather than conceding us their support concede it to the subversive forces"[emphasis added].⁹⁵

Accionamento, in English "driving" or "setting in motion", was understood as

"the set of moves one needs to take in order for the population to work with us and to be rendered prejudiced towards the propaganda of the enemy (...). [Through *accionamento*] we try to bring the populations to our orbit, to integrate them in our environment, in our culture, in our civilisation and nationality (...). This would be one of our purposes. The other purpose to be achieved is to take them to work actively with us in detecting and combatting subversion (...)"⁹⁶

Of course this approach implied a great importance conceded to the *regedorias*, as the set of laws issued in September 1961 was already revealing. Several questionnaires, enquiries and reports were requested from the District Commissioners and Local Administrators, aiming at defining the communities' *estado de espírito* ("mood"), meaning how they reacted to the arrival of the nationalists and to what extent they genuinely submitted to the colonial rule. Roughly, the rural people were considered as integrated in a scale which ranged from the "mass" to the "elite", the former including ordinary peasants integrated in tribal society, and the latter including the African students in high schools and the ones who had achieved important working posts in the state apparatus or as private business owners. In between remained the so-called "evolved group" who though integrated in the tribal society had achieved important positions there, and the "intermediary group" formed by nurses, low-level school teachers, interpreters, etc.⁹⁷

In order to better define and increase state coordination of an activity which was very complex and had very much in common with intelligence, the Governor-General Costa Almeida issued, on February 15, 1966, the first "rules for the activity of information and formation of public opinion", and created, one year later, the GIFOP, *Gabinete de Informação e Formação da Opinião Pública* (Office for Information and Formation of Public

⁹⁵Freitas 1965:6.

⁹⁶AHM, SE, 237: GDT/Serviços Distritais de Administração Civil [hereafter SDAC] 1966:45.

⁹⁷See AHM, FCX, Cx.1: SCCIM, "Questionário sobre a Subversão", in AdConc/Moatize, no.330/A/1 (6/08/65).

Opinion),⁹⁸ directed by the Secretary-General and including the director of the SCCIM, the deputy-director of PIDE and a delegate of the Commander-in-Chief's military office as permanent members. The GIFOP developed its action according to the three main lines of psychological action, which were propaganda, counter-propaganda and information.⁹⁹ It was concerned with centrally produced "psychological action", namely radio broadcasting, cinema, and production of materials for the information centres. The radio activity consisted in support for the already existing *Voz de Moçambique* (Voice of Mozambique),¹⁰⁰ a powerful short-wave broadcast in eleven of the main Mozambican languages, virtually covering the entire country.¹⁰¹ The programme was fed by interviews and sound stories collected at the local level by several departments, which gave their views as to the biases it should follow, though the final control was exerted at the central level. Similarly, local state departments, particularly the ones located in the war zones, were invited to produce films which could be used as propaganda, namely interviewing former guerrillas "against the background of an administrative building with the national flag flying" or groups of peasants retrieved from the guerrillas, "telling about the hard times they went through and the attention they are now receiving from the Government".¹⁰² As to the information centres, these were first implemented in early 1967 as the most important element for psychological propaganda at the village level, conceived as a centre where information panels, consisting of photos, leaflets,

⁹⁸AHM, FM, Cx.105: GG, "Criação do GIFOP" (25/01/67). "The study and determination of the methods and systems for propaganda and counter-propaganda aiming at informing and forming public opinion in the area of counter-subversion is, from now on, directed by an Office for Information and Formation of Public Opinion (GIFOP), answerable to the Governor-General, represented by the Secretary-General".

⁹⁹Propaganda was defined as "the issuing of news, facts, comments, explanations, appeals, etc., with the objective of influencing the opinion, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of individuals or human groups, to the benefit of the issuers. *Propaganda does not aim, therefore, at enlightening public opinion, but at imposing on it certain ideas and doctrines instead* [emphasis added]. As to counter-propaganda, "it is issued to neutralise adverse propaganda". Finally, information was defined as "the issuing of news, facts, comments and explanations (but not appeals), but its objective is rather to enlighten the individuals, providing them with elements to objectively base their opinion and not trying to impose ideas and doctrines on them". Of course the distinction between propaganda and information was here highly subjective, in relation to public opinion, meaning exactly the same thing in most cases. See AHM, FMA, Cx.107: RMM/QG, "Estágio na ZOT", Nampula (Agosto 1971).

¹⁰⁰Produced by the services of radio-broadcasting, and informative and educative cinema of the CIT (Centre for Information and Tourism).

¹⁰¹These languages were Shangane, ciRonga, ciSena, ciNhungwe, Xuabo, eMakwa, eMakwa Methu, ciMakonde, Yao, ciNyanja and kiSwahili. See AHM, FM, Cx.105: SCCIM/Tete, "Meios de comunicação de massas/Rádio" (20/06/67); and AHM, FM, Cx.111: SDAP, no.53/72 (29/01/72).

¹⁰²For instance, AHM, FM, Cx.105: SCCIM/Tete, no.271/D/35 (28/07/67), and no.273/D/35 (2/08/67).

posters and other material, carried propaganda to the peasants.¹⁰³ They were implemented principally in the social centres of the *aldeamentos*. Tete provides a good example of such complexity when, in 1968, one notes that such different elements as the armed forces, the administrative authorities with their several departments, the SCCIM and PIDE/DGS were considered as involved in psychological campaigns. The general objective of them all was

"to conduct a jointly psychological operation, civil and military, aiming at keeping the support of the population, gaining the support of the vacillating population, winning over the subverted population, collaborating in action for social promotion, retrieving population held by the guerrillas, inducing the latter to betray their chiefs and integrating everybody in a normal life".¹⁰⁴

On this occasion, therefore, it was suggested that a new body be created, operating at the District level, which led to the creation of the COCAP, *Comissão de Coordenação da Acção Psicológica* (Commission for the Coordination of Psychological Action), a board directed by the District Governor and integrating the army, public services, SCCIM and PIDE.¹⁰⁵

The escalation of the war, implying the involvement of a multitude of institutions and services, with particular relevance to the army, brought even more complexity to this process. The social action seems to have been left in the early 1970s with the district villagisation programmes, where the army was performing a growing role. This "administrative profile" of the army was closely connected with the chronic weakness of the civil administration services in the rural areas,¹⁰⁶ and had probably become established already as a tradition. In fact, Wheeler quotes the Decree-law no.42,564 of 1959, according to which the Portuguese army's mission, besides its "orthodox" defence functions, was already "to collaborate in activities related to the development and progress of the national territories, especially those

¹⁰³AHM, FM, Cx.105: GIFOP, s/n (2/05/67). "The information centre collaborates with the *current psychological operations*; it carries news thought important to the target people and about the community and its elements. (...) The information centres can be used, *though subsidiarily*, for educative purposes such as sanitation, principles of child care, agricultural techniques, fishing, etc." [emphasis added].

¹⁰⁴AHM, FM, Cx.106: GG/GIFOP, "Directiva no.1 de Acção Psicológica para o Distrito de Tete" (25/05/68).

¹⁰⁵AHM, FM, Cx.106: GDT, Circular no.154/D/35 ("Criação da Comissão Coordenadora de Acção Psicológica" - COCAP).

¹⁰⁶Calvert 1973:82, affirmed that "the Portuguese armed forces are mainly being used to carry out this policy [of raising the standard of living by a vast social and economic offensive] until such time as an efficient civil administration can take over".

Overseas, serving as an educating and civilising element of the human potential of the Nation".¹⁰⁷ By this time, therefore, some 50% of the armed forces¹⁰⁸ were assuming several roles in this kind of operations in the villages, providing assistance in such fields as sanitation, agricultural training, well digging, schooling, and so forth. At the same time, the psychological aspects of the war came to be coordinated by the *Gabinete Provincial de Acção Psicológica* (Provincial Office for Psychological Action) and its district branches, also under heavy military influence. With the army during military operations several other means were used, such as "voice-aircraft" and spreading of leaflets from aeroplanes, of which Operation Gordian Knot provides a good and well-known example. However, by then the villagisation programme had already produced hundreds of *aldeamentos* all over the northern theatre of operations, which allowed the mentors of psychological action to nurture more ambitious plans. In fact, along with the classical radio-broadcasting and cinema lines, the information centres were further developed and more informal procedures tried. These included "face-to-face communication", particularly through *banjas*, meetings with village communities, and even the seeking of individuals who were fit to be turned into opinion-makers, due to them having enough influence over their communities to be used by the government to spread propaganda at the local level. This programme was so ambitious as to reach the level of the head of family inside the *aldeamentos*.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷Wheeler 1976:236.

¹⁰⁸According to Calvert 1973:84. Henriksen 1983:168-169 mentions that in the 1970s, in Mozambique, 25% of the military budget was directed to the construction of asphalt roads, hospitals and airfields. Of course this was directly connected with the military activity, and again Calvert 1973:83, mentions "The road programme alone which is running at a rate of 1,400 km of tar macadam highway a year for six years compared with the American's total of 1,400 km of high class road in six years in Vietnam and our 140 km in 12 years in Malaya, will cost more than the whole Cahora Bassa complex..."

¹⁰⁹AHM, FM, Cx.111: Gabinete Distrital de Acção Psicológica [hereafter GDAP], no.101/GDAP (25/11/71), is so revealing that it deserves to be quoted at some length: "It is necessary and urgent to know, as completely as possible, the 'opinion makers' amongst the local population, the ones who can transmit a more direct Apsic [psychological action] to this population, so that it is possible for us to plan the psychological work to be exerted on these individuals, either at the provincial or at the district and local levels. In order to establish a uniform criterion, by 'opinion maker' is understood every individual who, for any reason, *exerts notable influence over a human group*. It is an individual who is attentively 'listened to' by the members of that group. Thus, 'opinion makers' can be *régulos*, heads of villages, old witch-doctors, religious chiefs, nurses, foremen, teachers, trainers and other individuals with some level of education or occupying particular public or private posts, preferably integrated in the social structure of the group, shop-keepers, specific workers naturally influencing their companions, etc. (...) Of course, at the district and local levels we should identify, besides the appointed ones, other 'opinion makers' who, though not exerting such wide influence, are attentively listened to by more narrow groups. At the local level it is important to reach down to the head of family."

d) Villagisation in the Portuguese Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Mozambique

Villagisation was, along with the military and intelligence aspects, and with psychological warfare, a fundamental component in the Portuguese counter-insurgency strategy in Mozambique. Again, it was an initiative which had little innovation in its principles, even if it developed particular characteristics and was carried through, in comparative terms, to an outstanding level. In fact, the Malayan counter-insurgency experience produced the New Villages, just as that of Vietnam produced its Strategic Hamlets.¹¹⁰ In turn, all the experiences mentioned, including that of Mozambique, were a reference in the setting up by Rhodesia of its Protected Villages.¹¹¹

The principal motive behind villagisation in modern counter-insurgency campaigns is that of resettling the people in controlled villages in order to isolate them from the guerrillas, denying the latter the possibility to live among the former as the fish swims in water, to use Mao Tse-tung's often-quoted metaphor. Ideally, therefore, a perfect villagisation programme would create, from the viewpoint of the counter-insurgent, a situation in which the guerrillas could not rely on people's support to be fed, to gather intelligence, to hide behind or to recruit new combatants, remaining thus isolated and easily detectable.

The concentration of people in protected villages brings with it the appearance of extensive, entirely vacant regions, once the scattered pattern of habitation disappears. This allows the army to develop scorched-earth-type operations, acting freely and burning crops under the sinister metaphoric designation of *destruição dos meios de vida* (destroying the means of life), very common in the operational reports of the Portuguese army in Mozambique. In northern Cabo Delgado, along the Rovuma river, a project was defined to establish a line of *aldeamentos* to seal off the frontier, followed by a large strip of vacant land. Similarly in Mutarara, in the southeast of Tete, plans were drawn up to establish a line

¹¹⁰As a rough comparison of resettlement schemes in counter-insurgency campaigns, Malaya built 500 New Villages for 500,000 villagers; Vietnam had around 8,000 Strategic Hamlets; Rhodesia built consolidated or Protected Villages for a quarter of a million Africans; and the Portuguese in Mozambique settled around 1 million Africans in 1,000 *Aldeamentos*. See Weinrich 1977:207; Marston 1979:47-48; Henriksen 1983:155.

¹¹¹The fact is mentioned for Rhodesia, in Weinrich 1977:207-208, that "Government strategists had two models in mind when they embarked on their policy: the protected villages of Malaya, set up in the 1940s (many Rhodesians had served in the British army after the Second World War and were familiar with these settlements) and the *aldeamentos* put up by the Portuguese in Mozambique during the last years of the war for independence in that country."

of *aldeamentos* along the Malawian border, and another one further south, along the Zambezi river. In between, a large strip of land was to be left vacant, where the military, theoretically not disturbed by the presence of a "friendly" population, could shoot on sight at every moving target.¹¹² Connected with the strategy of establishing *aldeamentos* was, therefore, the concept of a "war of fronts" which prevailed until 1972, when Frelimo crossed the Zambezi and entered Vila Pery and Beira.

The isolation of the guerrillas, while certainly being the *main* reason of the programme, has tended to be reduced by some authors to the *sole* reason, influenced as they are by a view of the counter-insurgent states as merely cynical powers ignoring the existence of people as a component in war. On the contrary, modern counter-insurgency developed a sophisticated concept of people as its main concern, an interpretation which is confirmed by the complex procedures of psychological warfare. The recognition of this important aspect enables us to find, at least in some villagisation programmes, a concern with the social and economic development of the new villages, even if with only a "psychological" purpose of "winning the hearts and minds" of their villagers.

Each pillar of the villagisation strategy - the military and the one concerned with development - presupposes that the programme has to be developed in advance if results are to be expected. As a matter of fact, it would be very different for a group of guerrillas to enter an area of dispersed habitation and traditional peasant economy, compared to an area of concentrated villages provided with infrastructure such as schools, sanitation, and a certain degree of economic and commercial development. The population in the first scenario would have no special reason to support the government and would be within reach of the nationalist effort of mobilisation, whether voluntarily or not, while in the second it would be, for that same population, a question of trading some material achievements for a nationalist stand, implying uncertainty and even great risks. Of course this line of argument must be used carefully since there were obvious limits to what the counter-insurgent state was inclined to do or capable of doing in terms of social and economic development under the banner of psychological warfare. In addition, "psychological methods" tended to be replaced by plain brutality when the programme could not be established in advance of the guerrillas. In

¹¹²On the other hand, empty zones are created, emptied of population, where our troops can act freely in going after the terrorists with no worries of shooting at populations inclined to support us". AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, "Relatório relativo à execução de Aldeamentos nas regedorias Tundumula e Mantenga deste Concelho" (28/07/70).

Mozambique, where for centuries the colonial state was not capable of imprinting a dynamics of development, it is a fact that the bulk of villagisation was undertaken not in advance of the guerrilla war but rather when the guerrillas were already imposing heavily their presence, as we will attempt to show in more detail in the case of Tete, later on. Deprived of the vital element of anticipation, the programme of *aldeamentos* was developed in close connection with the unfolding of the war. Thus the first period, between 1964 and 1968, was characterised by a hasty construction of *aldeamentos* in the districts of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, south of the Tanzanian border. In the former, the scheme started with the concentration of around 250,000 people in 150 villages,¹¹³ forming a belt between the Montepuez and Messalo rivers, while in the latter, perhaps the most comprehensive one in a district which was the one with lowest population density in the country, two main nuclei of *aldeamentos* were established, one on the western side, near Lake Malawi, and the other in the southeast, continuing the belt of villages being formed in Cabo Delgado (see Map 5.6).

This effort was pursued during the second period, between 1968 and 1971, while Tete, where Frelimo had initiated hostilities, also witnessed the beginning of its programme, particularly north of the Zambezi river. Table 5.10 reveals the situation in 1971, in the transition from the second to the third periods of the war. Niassa and, in a way, Cabo Delgado, had their programmes by then fully developed, from then on being a matter of "consolidation", i.e. of providing the villages with more permanent infrastructures and improved security systems. The *aldeamentos* planned for 1972 in Cabo Delgado were located in a strip of its southern area, between Montepuez and Porto Amélia, completing the belt referred to above, which became the most concentrated zone of *aldeamentos* of the entire colony. Also during this period General Arriaga developed his plan of constructing a highway along the Rovuma river, linking seven large *aldeamentos*, with more than 5,000 inhabitants each, to seal off the Tanzanian border.¹¹⁴ Code-named *Operação Fronteira* (Frontier Operation), the plan included the well-known Nangade *aldeamento*, built in cement and fully provided with amenities for 2,500 villagers, simultaneously intended as a model for future village development and a showpiece of international propaganda.

¹¹³Henriksen 1983:155.

¹¹⁴See, for instance, Calvert 1973:83; Henriksen 1983:157.

TABLE 5.10:
STATE OF THE PROGRAMME OF *ALDEAMENTOS* IN DECEMBER 1971¹¹⁵

DISTRICTS	No. <i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. Population	% From Total Pop.	No.Sanitary Posts ^a	No. Schools ^a	Water Supply ^b
Niassa	119	174,189	67.6%	99	97	97
Cabo Delgado	234	254,999	44.9%	101	143	234
Tete	109	84,458	17.1%	38	40	101
TOTAL	462	513,646	38.9%	238	280	432

^aBoth definitive and provisional; ^bNumber of *aldeamentos* where the "water problem" is said to have been solved.

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador dos Aldeamentos" (22/12/71); Direcção dos Serviços de Planeamento e Integração Económica: "IV Plano de Fomento, Parte 1 - Diagnóstico da Situação Económica e Social", 1971.

As to Tete, Table 5.10 captures the programme at its half-way stage, with the authorities fully convinced that this district had become a key factor in the destiny of the war. Thus Tete, which in 1971 had already received the highest budget, 41,875,000\$00 (compared with the 4,952,000\$00 of Niassa, or the 6,848,000\$00 of Cabo Delgado),¹¹⁶ would maintain an intensive rhythm in its programme for 1972, only comparable to that of Beira and, eventually, Vila Pery.

The third period, initiated after 1971 with Frelimo's strategic response to Operation Gordian Knot by increasing guerrilla action in Tete, crossing the Zambezi and progressing towards the central regions, had a corresponding villagisation effort, again a late one, undertaken in the District of Tete as referred to, as well as in the ones of Beira, Vila Pery and Zambézia.¹¹⁷ Table 5.11 reveals the concern of the authorities with these areas, by then

¹¹⁵The percentage of population living in *aldeamentos* revealed in the table differs, for example, from corresponding numbers presented in Jundanian 1974:524, namely 54%, 47%, and 42%, respectively for Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete. Although based in the same 1970 totals of the population (with a difference in the totals of Tete), Jundanian's table concerns the years of 1972 or 1973, depending on the data he had available, while the present table covers the period up to 1971. Considering the sharp increases which occurred in the years which followed, the estimations do not remarkably diverge. However, the percentage for Niassa is somewhat different.

¹¹⁶AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador dos Aldeamentos" (22/12/71):4-7.

¹¹⁷References to the late *aldeamento* schemes of Beira, Vila Pery and Zambézia are scarce in the Portuguese documentation available. Henriksen 1983:155 mentions them as a "hasty and ill-conceived regroupment".

within reach of the guerrillas. By the end of 1972, the expenses of the *aldeamento* scheme in Mozambique were as high as 175,000,000\$00, or roughly 5 per cent of the military cost of the all three Portuguese overseas campaigns.¹¹⁸ This was indeed considerable, if one takes into account that the budget for the armed forces was, in 1972, 33.4 per cent of the Portuguese national revenue.¹¹⁹

TABLE 5.11:
STATE FORECAST OF THE PROGRAMME OF ALDEAMENTOS FOR 1972

DISTRICTS	No. of Aldeamentos	Population involved	Budget
Niassa	n/a	n/a	4,744,000\$00
Cabo Delgado	78	n/a	15,296,000\$00
Tete	88	100,600	42,000,000\$00 ^a
Vila Pery ^b			
Beira	231	146,592	43,915,000\$00
Zambézia	121	114,000	28,520,000\$00

^aBudget of 35,000,000\$00 plus 7,000,000\$00 remaining from the previous year; ^bUnspecified plan and budget said to have been presented for approval; (n/a), not available, and probably none in the case of Niassa, the budget being allocated for "consolidation".

Sources: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador dos Aldeamentos" (22/12/71); AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT, "Aldeamentos Previstos para 1972 no Distrito de Tete".


Figures available for 1974, when the war came to its end, report a total of some 953 *aldeamentos* established, comprising 969,396 Mozambicans and being equivalent to 67.7%, 63.3%, and 44% of the total population of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete, respectively.¹²⁰

¹¹⁸Which amounted 4,438,800,000\$00, according to Beckett 1985a:150.

¹¹⁹Number in Wheeler n/d:204.

¹²⁰Numbers in Henriksen 1983:155, based on Anthony Astracham, "Portugal Aims at Hearts and Minds in Struggle to Hold Mozambique", *Washington Post* (25/12/68); David B.Ottaway, "Guerrillas Winning Control of Mozambique", *Washington Post* (14/08/74); and Henry Kamm, "Mozambique Guerrillas Achieving Main Aim Making War Costly to Portugal", *New York Times* (26/05/74). Numbers in Portuguese documentation were not available to us. For the case of Tete we will return to this issue below.

MAP 5.6: THE PROGRAMME OF ALDEAMENTOS IN 1971



The last two years of the war revealed a Portuguese army deprived of initiative, the programme of *aldeamentos* diminishing its strategic role in a "war of fronts" which had ceased to exist. From then on *aldeamentos* and guerrillas were everywhere in the northern half of the country, and for the colonial state it was just a matter of defending every village at all cost. This close connection between the programme of *aldeamentos* and the progress of the war is perhaps the reason why several authors commonly consider such a programme to have been constructed essentially by the army. However, the bulk of the programme was carried out by the District Governments. In Tete, for instance, military engineering had only constructed around 5 percent of the total *aldeamentos* by mid-1972.¹²¹

The *aldeamentos* greatly varied in accordance with the previous settlement pattern, which in turn had to do with factors such as land and water availability, crop profile, etc., and also depending on aspects imposed by the war. Thus in Cabo Delgado, where there was a tradition of larger villages and higher population density, the average *aldeamento* reached several thousand inhabitants, while in Tete, with a typical dispersed pattern of habitation, the new concentrations were much smaller, though a few reaching also far beyond 1,000 inhabitants. In the meantime general guidelines were pursued to establish a pattern for the programme on a province-wide basis. These concerned physical and political aspects, as well as, obviously, security principles. The general rules¹²² began by approaching such questions as the need to find favourable conditions of land and water availability. The state was to provide the transportation of people's belongings from their villages to the new settlements, as well as the clearance of 0.5 hectares of land per family.¹²³ As to the village itself, it was to be formed of 600 square meter plots per family of man, wife and children. Polygamous families were entitled to an extra 300 square meters per extra wife, the same area as was conceded to single males. While the state cleared the bush inside the plots,¹²⁴ the peasants were to take care of building their houses with local materials, in some cases brought from

¹²¹Estimate based on AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Reunião do Governador da Província, Engenheiro Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes de Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição de Tete" (23/06/72).

¹²²See AHM, FM, Cx.97: GDT, "Normas gerais para implantação de aldeamentos" (10/02/72).

¹²³The area for agriculture allotted per family varied from region to region, as the result of factors which we will discuss later, sometimes reaching more than 5 hectares. The 0.5 hectares considered here were the ones cleared by the state in a measure included in the installation procedures.

¹²⁴A recommendation was issued to avoid extensive bush clearances in order to keep zones of shade within the plot.

their former villages. Latrines and small gardens were also to be included in the plots. With regard to political aspects of territorial organisation, the *régulos* were entitled to double sized plots as a measure of their importance. In cases where two or more traditional authorities co-existed in the same *aldeamento*, their unity was to be preserved, with specific areas allocated to each such authority, separated by the main roads. These should be 20 meters wide, or 10 meters in the case of secondary roads. Once the *aldeamento* was established, good security and communications were considered as key factors.¹²⁵ Security in the *aldeamento* was assured by small African militia detachments headed by a European police or military element, and complemented in some cases by nearby army garrisons. Militia families were conceded plots in the perimeter of the *aldeamento* and armed with weaponry going out of use in the army.¹²⁶

Conceding that the authorities were genuinely seeking a "better life" for the villagers, in the context of psychological warfare, what they offered in exchange for the social and economic conditions of the previous communities could hardly be considered as an improvement. For a start, it has to be said that the priority of military criteria did not always give room to a proper consideration of land and water availability, an obviously crucial aspect in peasant communities. In fact, resettlement under a war climate made the impoverishment of the communities, in terms of land, a common feature, through a process accompanied by the destruction of family ties which dictated access to land. The disregard of the land and water question tended to be more complete with the increase in the scale of the war, when the authorities ran out of time to raise questions other than military, and as was argued above, lack of anticipation was the rule. Besides, the hasty community resettlement in the new *aldeamento*, in order to keep the effect of surprise and to deny Frelimo the development of mechanisms to preserve contact with the villagers in the new settlements, meant often that the *machambas* had to be abandoned while the crops were still growing. Even in cases where permission was granted to return to do the harvest, crops would stay, meanwhile, unprotected

¹²⁵Santos 1968:2-3. "The first step, once the strategic *aldeamento* is created, consists in setting security conditions to enable its people to make the choice between the forces of subversion and the ones of the government. Firmly established and consolidated, constructed from the expansion of a safe base, armed to ensure their own protection and supported by military or para-military forces, which assure the safety of the complex's external perimeter as well as of lateral communications between them, the strategic *aldeamento* provides the conditions so that the villager can safely support the government against the terrorists".

¹²⁶As we will discuss below, in the case of Tete, a typical *aldeamento* detachment could be composed of a European PSP corporal armed with a G3 automatic-gun and leading 10 militia with rifles. In some cases a radio-set kept them in contact with a nearby military garrison or with the city of Tete.

from ransack, monkeys, birds or other animals. On top of these considerations, the land available in the new settlement was, in almost every case, insufficient, in great part controlled by the leaders of the previously existing communities on the site and only workable a few hours per day, when the peasants were allowed to leave the *aldeamentos* to go there, escorted by militia or army troops. Under such conditions commerce had no incentive to grow. On the contrary, low surpluses for selling locally, and high risks caused by the war, took the *cantineiros* out of the country instead of bringing them into the *aldeamentos*. Not surprisingly, emergency food supplies delivered by the state were becoming more common towards the end of the war.

e) Conclusions

The ten-year conflict between the Portuguese colonial state and Frelimo, Mozambique's Liberation Front, was in spite of its particular features a classical guerrilla war, typical of the period following the Second World War in many Third World countries, opposing a revolutionary peasant-based movement to a counter-insurgency campaign developed by a western-orientated regime. Our purpose, in this chapter, was to discuss the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign considered as part of a wider pattern, with a western imprint and formed by some correlated strategic elements such as the military and psychological ones, the intelligence gathering and the resettlement effort.

The military aspect was obviously the central one. The Portuguese state, with very limited capacities in terms of human and economic potential, developed an outstanding effort to cope with three simultaneous wars, in Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, until 1974 when its forces reached the edge of "nervous-psychological exhaustion", in the famous words of a Portuguese officer-general. Left behind were ten years of an escalation in which the Portuguese army progressively adopted a defensive stand for two reasons. First of all, because of the brilliantly displayed guerrilla tactics of Frelimo on the terrain, based in avoiding direct confrontation and in fighting a war of land-mines, "hit-and-run" ambushes and the *flagelações* ("flagellations") which the Portuguese soldiers feared so much. The result was a war in which the counter-insurgent army increasingly avoided fighting, ending up in a situation in which it kept control of cities, villages and *aldeamentos*, while losing it in the space around them. The second reason for the defensive stand of the Portuguese army was no less important and

resulted from the lack of political drive to support the war effort. According to Sir Robert Thompson, one of the mentors of the counter-insurgent war, there is scarcely any military victory in a guerrilla conflict, the role of the army being one of securing the situation until a political solution can be reached. The Portuguese soldier was not motivated to fight a dangerous war five thousand miles from home, and his commanders, after dropping the mirage of a military victory over the insurgents, vainly waited for a political solution which the fascist regime was never able to provide. When political prospects began to appear, late in the war, these were not truly settlement prospects but mere attempts at a way out by local settlers who felt deceived by an army which was not able to cope with the situation. This only led to an increase in the reservations nurtured by army and civilians against each other, further weakening the colonial position. The nationalists, knowing that the time factor was on their side, skilfully exploited this aspect, rapidly proceeding on the terrain, while for the Portuguese late changes consisting in Africanising the army and reducing its units did not prevent the transformation of a "no win" war into a "losing" one, particularly from 1972.

Soon in the conflict the counter-insurgent state realised the importance played by the people in the affected areas. This understanding underlay several measures aiming at bringing them to its side under the broad label of psychological warfare. Several departments, civil and military, worked intensively in this field, which was, by the end of the conflict, an important part of the general war effort.

The root of the immense resettlement scheme which took place can be found, therefore, in this struggle for the population, both as a military strategy to "drain the water where the guerrillas, like fish, intended to swim", and as a broad psychological plan to reveal to the people the advantage of defending colonial rule. However, in the nearly 1,000 *aldeamentos* settled in ten years only a few could be included as following the vital principle of anticipation which had made them an important element in previous modern counter-insurgent strategies.

We have also argued that behind this scheme was a "genuine" effort to foster community development, at least as a means to win the psychological warfare. In spite of this belief, the limited capacities of the colonial state transformed great ambitions into unimpressive results. Consequently, a multitude of protagonists and a weak coordination, ambitious targets and limited potential to reach them, were some of the characteristics of the

Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign which limited the resettlement scheme to a mere "draft", only partially accomplishing its strategic role both militarily and as a means to foster development. A "draft" not to be neglected though, since it directly affected at least half of the inhabitants in the northern areas, dramatically changing their lives. How this happened in Tete is what we intend to discuss in the next chapter.

Chapter 6:

THE TETE PROGRAMME OF *ALDEAMENTOS*, 1968-1974

a) Introduction and Periodisation

We sought, in the previous chapter, to discuss the roots of the general villagisation process which occurred in Mozambique from the second half of the 1960s, having considered it as part of a wider strategy aiming at countering the nationalist war effort. The present chapter, based on a periodisation established for the whole process in Tete, will discuss the *aldeamento* programme implemented in that Province during the seven year period which corresponded to the nationalist war there, between 1968 and 1974. Particular attention will be paid to the role of the state at the Province (then District) level since it was obviously a main actor conceiving and conducting the villagisation process. This will include, on the one hand, how it organised itself to coordinate and implement the programme and the conflicts which arose between the several departments and interests; on the other hand, reference will be also made to the political and administrative structures implemented by the state in the *aldeamentos*, in a clear attempt to root itself at the local level as a fundamental means to perpetuate the colonial presence in the region, a process abruptly interrupted by the military *coup* of the 25th of April 1974. When the war began, in 1968, the state at the District level, as it is understood here, included not only the District Government and services, but also the military structure and state services directly subordinated to instances beyond the District level (thus preserving a certain level of autonomy), such as the Office for the Zambezi Plan (*Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze*, or GPZ). The main characteristics of the colonial state in Tete were perhaps, on the one hand, the separation of civil and military authorities, and on the other the double subordination of its departments. This means that the army, consisting of four battalions integrated in the Sector F Command, obeyed the Centre Territorial Command whose headquarters were in Beira, and had no subordination to the Tete District Governor. And that most of the civil services, while obeying to the District Governor, were also subordinated to their sectoral authorities at the level of the then Province of Mozambique, based in its capital city of Lourenço Marques. Thus, for instance, the District Services for Health or Education were responsible to the District Governor and to the Provincial Health and Education Offices, while the District Civil Administration Services, which included all the District

Commissioners and Local Administrators, had also to respond both to the District Governor and to the Provincial Secretary for Civil Administration. Such complexity greatly influenced the "shape" and pace of villagisation. Besides performing specific tasks in the general effort to set up the District *aldeamentos*, some of these sectors ended up assuming responsibility for fostering their "own" *aldeamentos* in their areas of influence. As will be seen, the 1972 villagisation plan, for instance, foresaw the establishment of 88 villages, of which 66% to be installed by the District Government, 21% by the GPZ, 8% by the Mozambique Railways, and 5% by the military engineering services. This "sectoral participation" was, in a way, moved by different objectives, besides the one of supplementing the Government effort. While, for instance, the Mozambique Railways sought to establish their *aldeamentos* as a means of protecting the railway line, the GPZ aimed at the resettlement of the people who had to leave their home areas, which would be submerged by the waters of the Cahora Bassa dam shallow lake. While the role of the military and of the GPZ will be discussed in the next chapter, in the context of the war, we will start here by analysing the Government effort, after all the body which assumed responsibility for the "bulk" of the programme.

The villagisation process in Tete was developed between 1968 and 1974, and is considered here as divided into three main periods of little more than two years each, corresponding to different stages both of its organisation and implementation, and of the unfolding of the war. Thus, it will be argued that in the first period, running from 1968 to 1970, the *aldeamento* initiative remained almost entirely at the District level, and included the first theatres of operations, namely the *circunscrições* of Marávia and Bene and a small part of the *concelho* of Macanga (see Map 6.1). It was little more than an attempt by the District Government to cope with the war in so far as the involvement of local people was concerned, guided by some counter-insurgency principles and counting on the occasional support of the army. From 1970 to 1972 the plan was developed with much greater support from Lourenço Marques. A steering group was created in May 1970, directly subordinated to the Governor General and aiming at coordinating the *aldeamentos* at the central level. At this time Tete received its first budget for this purpose,¹ a budget which was, in fact, the largest of all if compared with the remaining districts of the war zone where *aldeamentos*

¹See the intervention of the Head of the District Services of Civil Administration in AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/SDAC, "Reunião do Governador Geral da Província, Eng.Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes das Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição" (23/06/72):5.

were being established,² its most critical situation in terms of security having been recognised. In the third and final period, from 1972 to 1974, the district created its own service of *aldeamentos*, attached to the District Governor's Office, one which developed a plan for 1972 that guided the establishment of the largest numbers of *aldeamentos* since the beginning of the programme. After that the process began to decline. Effectively, in 1973 new *aldeamentos* arose in Tete in much lesser numbers, in a process which had apparently reached a limit. Deadlock was, by then, the predominant characteristic. While for Frelimo Tete had become a transit corridor leading to the central region, the Portuguese authorities were now convinced of having practically included in the process all the "villagisable" people. For them it was, theoretically, a question of consolidating the already existing *aldeamentos* through the establishment of economic, social, political and administrative infrastructures, while practically, as a matter of fact, it was a question of a holding situation and resisting the guerrillas at all costs.

b) The State and the *Aldeamento* Programme

The idea of *aldeamento* was first discussed in Tete as early as 1966, when the war was, in that District, still a mere prospect. In April the District Governor Cecílio Gonçalves defined before the District Commissioners and Local Administrators the main characteristics of the villagisation plan to be designed and implemented in the District.³ The objective, according to him, was to act in anticipation, preparing the area to "receive" the guerrillas whose arrival was, by then, already considered as unavoidable. If strategically both the military and development aims conceded to the *aldeamentos* were to be met and assured, "technically" they should be established according to three vital principles informing the criteria for their location: the first was being near water sources; the second, availability of adequate lands for agriculture; and the third, to be easily accessible and defensible. The local administrative authorities thus left the 1966 general meeting in charge of identifying locations in which to establish *aldeamentos* in their areas of jurisdiction.⁴

²See budgets in Chapter 5, Table 5.11.

³See AHM, SE, 237: GDT/SDAC 1966.

⁴According to the District Governor, addressing the District Commissioners and Local Administrators, "...the people who escape from our control will fall under the control of the enemy, who is provided with special elements to guide and indoctrinate them. When the war reaches this stage we have to take the

However, massive and widespread establishment of *aldeamentos* simply did not follow. On the one hand, local administrations and even the District Government were not provided with a specific budget to support the costs of implementing new villages while, on the other hand, lacking the support of external services, Local Administrators and District Commissioners could not go any further besides using their own knowledge of the terrain and consulting the *régulos* in their areas and making small inquiries in order to have a basis for village location proposals. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1968 and 1969 the *circunscrições* of Marávia and Bene, and the *concelho* of Macanga, which is to say the areas where the war was already openly occurring,⁵ were the only ones where *aldeamentos* were established. In 1968 five *aldeamentos* were established in Marávia, approximately including 2,500 people, while in 1969 Marávia received three more *aldeamentos*, Bene another three, and Macanga four,⁶ totalling, for the two-year period of 1968-1969, 15 *aldeamentos* and around 15,000 to 17,000 people involved.

Macanga offers a good example of how the plan was being implemented. There, the District Commissioner, with the help of his Local Administrators, made a plan to establish 50 *aldeamentos* apparently based on the single criterion of assembling already existing villages in order to better control them. According to the plan each new *aldeamento* included an average of 3.5 of the already existing villages. The 178 already existing villages enrolled to be included in the *aldeamentos* had an average population of 368.9 persons each (some, in fact, with no more than a couple of dozen), while the average population of each one of the 50 *aldeamentos* included in the plan was of the order of 1313.3, or 3.5 times larger.⁷


initiative of keeping the people on our side and the only way to achieve that purpose is through establishing *aldeamentos* in which to concentrate and protect the people by means of our security forces. In the *aldeamentos* we assure a minimum of life and subsistence conditions, we guarantee all the possible sanitary and logistic support (...). Therefore, I would like you District Commissioners to find out the most appropriate locations in your areas, where the people could be concentrated, provided of course that traditional and family structures are preserved (...)" See AHM, SE, 237: GDT/SDAC 1966:27-28.

⁵See Borges Coelho 1989:Map 2 (theatre of war in 1968) and *passim*.

⁶The three areas had other *aldeamentos* being constructed, included in the list of the ones concluded in 1970.

⁷Calculation based in AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, ["Plano de Aldeamentos"] (10/01/70). The average of inhabitants per *aldeamento* was, in fact, higher if we consider that from the 50 *aldeamentos* planned for Macanga, only 29 had been established by 1974.

MAP 6.1: TETE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION IN 1974



CONCELHO OF TETE

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Rego, Matambo, Chipanda, Goba, Salgado, Marco Coutinho, Gandar, Marqueza
Changara	Chiguidene, Chihande, Temangau, Magaço, Carate, Nachinanga/Chinsoro, Zevêdo, Changara
Chilico	Chilico
Marara	Chiundiza, Domingos, Joia, Jaqueta

CONCELHO OF ANGÓNIA

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Gulumba, Mulirima, Manjanja
Dâmucê	Chida, Mulitene, Jale, Cubango
Metengobalame	Zidana, Campulussa, Gimo, Jeque, Mojaua
Tsangano	Chibune, Guemo, Augusto, Acutamba

CONCELHO OF MACANGA

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Gulumba, Mulirima, Manjanja
Casula	Canteza, Nuno, Chitise, Muchiza
Chiuta	Chimbaiangondo, Sachirire, Zangaia, Sabondo

CIRCUNSCRIÇÃO OF MÁGOÊ

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Boroma, Gossa, Mezingua
Mecumbura	Chissico, Buxo

CIRCUNSCRIÇÃO OF MARÁVIA

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Nhaluiro, Caverro, Cachombo
Chofombo	Chofombo, Caduco, Chimuzara
V. Vasco da Gama	Cangombe, Cantengo

CONCELHO OF MOATIZE

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Chaleca, Tundumula, Baroma, Raso, Picado, Sipanela, Chassaia,
Zóbucê	M'Boola, Zacarias, Catibus, Caimarizene, Mogunda, Cumbuembua
Cuidas Xavier	Chintamuenje

CONCELHO OF MUTARARA

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Munnda, Panduene
Anouaze	Chombe, Chicomba, Fortuna, Chitui
Chirre	Dovo, M'Panc, Mandua
Inhangoma	Chirembucê, Sucamiala, Cassamo, Comero, Moluissa

CIRCUNSCRIÇÃO OF BENE

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Bene
Cassucitiza	Cassacitiza
Vila Gamito	Mucipo, Cussarara

CIRCUNSCRIÇÃO OF CABORA-BASSA

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Songo, Metape
Chicda	Inhampunga, Charibuca, Churro, Tomo
Chipera	Chibueia, Chamanga

CIRCUNSCRIÇÃO OF ZUMBO

POSTO ADMINISTRATIVO	REGEDORIAS
Central Area	Chipera, Mutunda, Nhanchenge, Mascombe, Pangura, Doera
Zambucê	Nhacaroto, Murunguja
Messandaluz	Messandaluz, João, Mucungue, Malima

TABLE 6.1:
ALDEAMENTOS ESTABLISHED IN TETE IN 1968-1969

Area	1968		1969	
	<i>Aldeamento</i>	Population	<i>Aldeamento</i>	Population
MARÁVIA				
-Central Area	Fingoé	1,716		
	Cauero	502		
-Chofombo	Caduco	168	Gago Coutinho	508
			M'Peua	220
			Nhanseula	144
-V. Vasco da Gama	Cantengo	403		
	Tenese	821		
BENE				
-Central Area			Chale	302
			Tembué	712
			Cheridze	255
MACANGA				
-Central Area			Chazia	1,450
			Vuende	2,056
			Chicôco	3,344
			Zangaia	3,364

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga ["Plano de Aldeamentos"] (10/01/70).

The definition of the new locations could not follow the criteria established by the District Governor since there were no studies of soil fertility or water availability, so it had to be based on such criteria as the "experience" of the local administration, sometimes the opinion of African authorities and, certainly the most important of all, the advice of local army commands. Since these were villages settled in areas where the war was already occurring, persuasion in order to obtain voluntary adhesion, as prescribed by the District Governor as the most important single factor assuring the psychological function of the *aldeamentos*, tended to be put aside in favour of more compelling methods, even if violent coercion only took place some years later, when the war had escalated. Even so, Macanga authorities kept complaining, during these years, that the process was slow due to lack of means of transport to assure the relocation of the people and their belongings. In that area the authorities could only count on one military vehicle and two farm tractors to do the removal.

Pressed by the impending rainy season, their point was that unless more vehicles were made available, the only way to increase the pace was by leaving behind the population granaries and other belongings, transforming the whole effort into a counterproductive move.⁸ Moreover, other elements were causing trouble in this process, particularly people's unwillingness to leave their lands at the sowing season, occasional smallpox outbreaks causing alarm at a process which tended to concentrate people, etc. The result was, therefore, a process barely coordinated by the District Government, demanding a great effort from the Local Administration and incapable of providing the effect of prior preparation which would render it meaningful as a vital element in the counter-insurgency strategy.

The situation in 1970, at the opening of the second period of the programme, was, in a way, an extension of the former period. Effectively, and in spite of preparations being made in other areas such as Moatize, the programme remained based principally on the initiative of the local administration, only producing results in the same areas of Marávia, Bene and Macanga. However, by then the colonial state was well aware that a greater effort was needed in terms of coordination and placement of resources if the programme was to acquire its strategic meaning in the process of the war. In May 1970 a steering group (*Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador*) was created in Lourenço Marques, directed by the Governor General and formed by the Provincial Secretaries for Lands and Settlement, Education and Health, and by the Branch of Psychological Action (from the Commander-in-Chief's General Staff). Besides the clear effort to involve the authorities at the highest levels and to integrate both the civil and military authorities in the programme, the steering group's mandate was twofold, including, on the one hand, consolidation and improvement of living conditions in the *aldeamentos* of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, particularly in the latter, and on the other,

⁸AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, "Aldeamentos no Posto Administrativo da Chiúta" (12/11/69):2. "There are some cases as, for instance, Ponde, where a *berliet* [military truck] takes one whole day just to do one trip, being necessary two or three days to remove one single granary since some of them have great capacity. Within a short period 10,940 people will be removed with the help of just a few vehicles and at the end of the dry season, with the consequent lack of water and at a time in which the *machambas* are prepared for seeding. All these circumstances will bring difficult problems to these people. In order to attenuate these inconveniences there is, in my opinion, the need to accelerate the transferral of the people to the already defined locations, so that they can concentrate all their belongings at the place of their new residence, and initiate their new life inside the *aldeamento*. They still have to build their new houses, the rain is about to begin and time is short... In case this work is not hastened by availability of extra vehicles, unpleasant problems will be created for these people, who will be forced to lose part of their belongings..."

"intensification and extension of the villagisation works in Tete".⁹ In so far as Tete was concerned, the importance of this step was twofold: on the one hand the District was given, for the first time, a significant budget to develop the programme and, on the other, a general plan was set up, also for the first time, to guide that development. For 1970, the District of Tete was granted 3,600,000 *escudos* (2,960,000 by the *Junta Provincial de Povoamento* and 640,000 by the Treasury Department, the *Direcção dos Serviços da Fazenda*). In that same year an additional 10,000,000 *escudos* were assigned so that the pace of the programme could be increased, always in Marávia, Bene and Macanga. Later, still in 1970, two more amounts were assigned, 1,500,000 *escudos* for some expenses related to the implementation of the programme and 750,000 for a quick soil survey in the areas concerned, to be undertaken by the IIAM (*Instituto de Investigação Agronómica de Moçambique*, or Mozambique's Institute for Agronomic Research).¹⁰ Therefore, an initial 1970 budget of 3,600,000 was increased to 15,850,000, clearly testifying to the growing importance of the *aldeamento* programme in the view of the central authorities of the state, and as a result, at least in part, of the creation of the steering group. The next year of 1971 revealed the same trend. An initial amount of 8,200,000 *escudos* was added to the remains of the previous year.¹¹ Meanwhile, as soon as the year began the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief agreed to significantly augment the programme of *aldeamentos* in Tete, due to the military situation, a fact which led to acute budget increases for 1971 and 1972. In the former the budget reached the amount of 41,875,000 *escudos*, while in 1972, to the 7,000,000 *escudos* which had remained from the previous year were added 35,000,000, totalling 42,000,000.¹² These increases certainly paved the way for an intervention of a new kind by the District structures in this field.¹³

⁹AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador" (22/12/71):1.


¹⁰AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador" (22/12/71):3.

¹¹Money inputs would not, in themselves, increase the pace of the programme, since the state departments, at the District level, were not yet prepared to imprint tangible modifications. This was probably the reason behind the fact of the budget not being entirely spent in the respective year, part of it being transferred to the following one.

¹²AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador" (22/12/71):5, 8. See Chapter 5, Table 5.11 for a comparison with the budgets assigned to Cabo Delgado and Niassa in the same period.

¹³From then on the resources made available to the District "had no limit" in the words of the last coordinator of the programme in Tete, in 1973 and 1974 (Vasconcelos 1992:Interview). The Provincial Secretary for Lands and Settlement also said he "did not recall any activity being interrupted because of lack of resources" (Santareno 1992:Interview).

MAP 6.3: THE 1971 VILLAGISATION PLAN IN TETE



Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador" (22/12/71).

As to the plan establishing criteria and priorities, it had close connections with the unfolding of the war. Initially conceived by the Provincial Secretary for Lands and Settlement and later developed by him together with the Provincial Secretary for Health, the District Governor, the District Military Commander, the Provincial Director of the Services of Veterinary and a representative of the GPZ, the plan included the establishment of priority and planning zones, here presented in Map 6.3. At first, three main zones were defined: the Red top-priority Zone, corresponding to the area where the war was openly taking place, was to be submitted to immediate and coercive villagisation during 1970; in the Blue Zone, persuasive villagisation was to start in that same year; and the Yellow Zone, although considered in terms of planning, was to be left for later implementation, from 1971 on, once the tasks in the previous two zones were fulfilled. Subsequently, other zones were defined: a Green Zone (A1, A2 and A3), where villagisation was to follow the regular procedures prescribed, and where the District Government was to count on the support of the GPZ (for the three sub-zones 12, 13 and 29 *aldeamentos* were planned, including respectively 12,000, 13,000 and 29,000 people); finally, the Brown Zone which had particular characteristics. B1 was defined according to its fitness for cattle raising, and there the District Government was to count on the support of the Services of Veterinary, while the Brown B2 Zone, corresponding to the *concelho* of Angónia, was considered as "naturally villagised" due to the already existing large agglomerations of people, the question being, there, just to improve the self-defence systems with the support of the military.¹⁴

Following the guidance of this plan and benefitting from the sharp budget increases, the District Government was to raise the per-year numbers of *aldeamentos* from 12 in 1970 to an impressive 82 in 1971. If in 1970 the programme was still limited to the three priority areas mentioned above, in spite of having been completed in the case of Bene, in 1971 it was enlarged to include all the *concelhos* and *circunscrições* of the District, Angónia excluded, rendering it possible to conclude the resettlement in Marávia and Macanga. Strengthened by the support coming from outside the District, the District Government became capable of setting up coordination structures to pursue with the implementation of the plan, giving way to the third stage in the periodisation defined above, one in which the District structures had a more active role in the guidance of the process. Effectively, in 1972 the District Governor


¹⁴AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Secretário Provincial de Terras e Povoamento, "Criação de um Grupo de Trabalho Coordenador" (22/12/71):1-2, 5-7, and *passim*.

secured complete control of the process¹⁵ and a Commission for Studies and Planning (CEP, also designated as Governor Office) was created, attached to the District Governor in the city of Tete, with the objective of coordinating the plan, structure and administration of the *aldeamentos*. According to the new structure (see Map 6.4), in which the Head of Office came to be the main coordinator of the process, the Office directed the three important Departments of Population and *Aldeamento* control, Intelligence Centralisation and Coordination (the District branch of the SCCIM), and the Psychological Action. In parallel, the District Governor had direct control over the District Commissioners (who directed the *concelhos* and *circunscrições* and were responsible for the construction of the *aldeamentos* in their areas of jurisdiction); the Police (PSP) Command, in charge of placing guards in the *aldeamentos*; and the zonal branch of the OPVDC, in charge of placing militia in the *aldeamentos*. Also subordinated to the District Governor were the several district services, which had differentiated roles in the process. Thus, the Directorate of Education was to provide the new villages with school monitors and didactic materials; the Directorate of Health and Assistance was supposed to place nurses and to supply medicines; the Directorate of Finances was to do the accountancy of the *aldeamentos*; the Directorate of Economy was in charge of supplying the villages with consumer goods; the Directorate of Agriculture and Forestry was to conduct soil surveys, supply the *aldeamentos* with seeds and support them in machinery and agricultural implements; the Directorate of Geology and Mining was expected to do water probing and drill holes and wells; the Directorate of Veterinary, which was to support cattle breeding in the *aldeamentos*, was directly responsible for the villages to be established in the cattle areas of Marara and Tete; finally, the Warehouse was to provide the maintenance of the equipment.¹⁶ In parallel with these departments subordinated to the District Governor, the GPZ and the military command of the Tete Area of Operations (ZOT) were also to perform important roles in the process. While the former was in charge of the villagisation in the areas affected by the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, the latter had to both protect the convoys and provide the *aldeamentos* with military support.

¹⁵According to Vasconcelos 1992: Interview, from then on the Provincial Steering Group financed and provided technical advice, while the District Governor closely directed the entire process.

¹⁶AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT: "Organigrama do Gabinete do Governo do Distrito de Tete para o Plano de Aldeamentos" (1972).

FIGURE 6.4: STRUCTURE OF THE TETE GOVERNMENT AND ALDEAMENTOS (1972)



The first part of the mandate of the Commission for Studies and Planning - plan and structure - was translated into the effort of collecting the data related to the *aldeamentos* established in 1970 and 1971, and in the elaboration of the 1972 plan.¹⁷ The plan foresaw the establishment of 88 *aldeamentos* in the administrative areas of Tete, Mutarara, Moatize, Mágoè and Cahora Bassa, under the coordination of the following organisms: District Government, 58 *aldeamentos*; GPZ, 18; Military Engineering, 5; and CFM (Mozambique Railways), 7.¹⁸ Confronted with the priority areas formerly established by the Provincial Steering Group, it can be seen that the Red Zone (Bene, most of Marávia and an important part of Macanga) was entirely¹⁹ villagised by the beginning of 1972, the same happening with the Blue Zone. The issue, in these zones, was one of "consolidation", meaning to install in each *aldeamento* three pre-fabricated buildings, for school, sanitary post and social centre, to establish a rural shop, to strengthen self-defence and security mechanisms, and so forth. The Green A1 and A2 Zone had also been greatly villagised during 1971, the same happening, to a great extent, with Cahora Bassa, which since 1971 was being subjected to the intervention of the GPZ. As to Mágoè, and particularly Zumbo, they must be considered as specific cases. In fact, both had been excluded from the definition of priority areas made by the Provincial Steering Group, probably because they had not been considered as critical zones or areas likely to be crossed by Frelimo guerrillas on their way to Manica and Sofala. However, the programme was to be pursued there by the local authorities with some vigour

¹⁷See AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT, "Colaboração do Gabinete do GDT no Plano de Aldeamentos" (19/10/71).

¹⁸See AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT/Comissão de Estudos e Planeamento [hereafter CEP], "Aldeamentos Previstos para 1972 no Distrito de Tete" (n/d). While 88 villages appear in the detailed lists, the sub-totals per coordinating organism enumerate only 87. On the other hand, though the totals agree in both cases, there are slight differences between numbers presented in the plan and in Table 6.3., which is based on the collection of data from several sources. Thus, the plan presents 4 *aldeamentos* in Cahora Bassa, 7 in Mágoè, 22 in Moatize, 19 in Mutarara, and 35 in Tete, while Table 6.3 presents, respectively, the numbers of 4, 8, 20, 19 and 36. The reason must be different criteria to ascertain exactly when an *aldeamento* was considered as concluded. Consequently, in the absence of definitive and unified lists the determination of completely accurate numbers is at least problematic. As to the five *aldeamentos* included in table 6.3 for Angónia, they are not mentioned in the plan probably because, as considered in several documents, Angónia was considered as "naturally villagised" due to its large agglomerates, the criterion to consider them as *aldeamentos* being the existence or not of "self-defence structures". These were, in fact, created for these five *aldeamentos* in 1972.

¹⁹Of course absolute assertions must be taken cautiously. The population was not very stable throughout the period. Commonly people would run away from the *aldeamentos* or even be abducted by the nationalist forces, and conversely would be captured or come back to the villages, in accordance with a multitude of factors, particularly the relatively safe conditions offered. However, in the colonial terminology, an area was considered as entirely villagised when there was no need to plan further villagisation since the people who were to be captured or present themselves before the authorities would be integrated in the already existing *aldeamentos*.

as these areas increasingly became part of the war theatre and transit zones for Zimbabwean guerrillas, an issue to be discussed in the next chapter. The plan had, therefore, a particular focus on the Green A3 Zone, on the Red C3 Zone (established when Mutarara became considered as a favourite zone to be traversed by the guerrillas on their way to the centre of the country), and on the Brown B1 Zone, which is to say the administrative areas of Tete, Moatize and Mutarara, with respectively 36, 20 and 19 *aldeamentos*.

Population numbers give an indication of how vast the programme of *aldeamentos* was in Tete. Table 6.3 shows the total number of *aldeamentos* and the total number of people involved, both in 1972 and in 1974, the figures for the latter year corresponding to the final results achieved by the programme, on the eve of Mozambique's independence. While, with minor variation (see footnote 16) it has been possible to accurately calculate the total numbers of *aldeamentos* established by 1974, numbers concerning the population involved must be considered just as approximate for a number of reasons. Apparently, people's confinement in the *aldeamentos* would facilitate census operations. Everyone living in the *aldeamento* was to be registered and hold specially detailed identity cards, and the process of leaving or entering the *aldeamento* was subjected to a series of procedures aiming at controlling population movement.²⁰ However, the war exerted a countering impact on the control measures, provoking considerable population mobility and thus leading to continuous changes in the numbers of people in each *aldeamento*. Moreover, lack of information or conflicting data created some problems in this regard. The war context undoubtedly created great difficulties for the District Commissioners' and Local Administrators' work of gathering data related to their areas of jurisdiction.

²⁰See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.97: GDT, "Normas a Observar nos Aldeamentos - Identificação e Controle de Populações" (20/05/70); GDT/SDAC, no.408/A/2, "Instruções a Observar no Trânsito das Populações" (17/04/72); FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.24/Ald/6 (5/01/74). See context of such measures in the next chapter.

TABLE 6.2:
ALDEAMENTOS ESTABLISHED IN TETE (1968-1974)

AREA	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973/74	TOTAL
ANGÓNIA							18
-Central area						2	2
-Metengobalame						2	2
-Dómuè					5	7	12
-Tsangano						2	2
BENE							7
-Central area		3	3				6
-Vila Gamito			1				1
CAHORA BASSA							24
-Central area				9			9
-Chicoa				2	4	3	9
-Chipera			2	4			6
MACANGA							29
-Central area		1	2	8			11
-Chiúta		2		10			12
-Casula				6			6
MÁGOÈ							14
-Central area					8	3	11
-Mucumbura				3			3
MARÁVIA							14
-Central area	2		2	1			5
-Chofombo	1	3	1				5
-Vasco da Gama	2		1	1			4
MOATIZE							44
-Central area				14	15	6	35
-Caldas Xavier				3	1		4
-Zóbuè					4	1	5
MUTARARA							29
-Central area					14		14
-Ancuaze				10	5		15
TETE							62
-Central area					16	18	34
-Marara					14		14
-Chiôco					3	1	4
-Changara				6	3	1	10
ZUMBO							10
-Central area				2		5	7
-Zâmbue				2			2
-Messandaluz				1			1
TOTAL	5	9	12	82	92	51	251

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos" (1993).

TABLE 6.3:
ALDEAMENTOS AND VILLAGISED POPULATION IN TETE, IN 1972 AND 1973/74

AREA	1972		1973/74	
	No. of Ald.	Population	No. of Ald.	Population
ANGÓNIA	5	10,847	18	42,705
-Central Area			2	3,858
-Metengobalame	5	10,847	2	3,798
-Dómuè			12	32,708
-Tsangano			2	2,214
BENE	7	2,852	7	2,852
-Central Area	6	2,685	6	2,685
-Vila Gamito	1	167	1	167
CABORA-BASSA	21	19,532	24	24,060
-Central Area	9	6,793	9	7,603
-Chicoa	6	8,171	9	11,863
-Chipera	6	4,568	6	4,594
MACANGA	29	30,632	29	30,632
-Central Area	11	9,693	11	9,693
-Chiúta	12	10,309	12	10,309
-Casula	6	10,630	6	10,630
MÁGOÈ	11	8,596	14	10,656
-Central Area	8	8,251	11	10,311
-Mucumbura	3	345	3	345
MARÁVIA	14	10,069	14	8,253
-Central Area	5	3,889	5	3,876
-Chofombo	5	1,191	5	1,640
-Vasco da Gama	4	4,989	4	2,737
MOATIZE	37	40,933	44	46,933
-Central Area	29	33,892	35	39,292
-Caldas Xavier	4	2,941	4	2,941
-Zóbuè	4	3,700	5	4,700
MUTARARA	29	24,317	29	24,317
-Central Area	14	12,389	14	12,389
-Ancuaze	15	11,928	15	11,928
TETE C.	42	55,122	62	85,131
-Central Area	16	28,940	34	57,490
-Marara	14	14,934	14	14,934
-Chiôco	3	3,019	4	4,519
-Changara	9	8,229	10	8,188
ZUMBO	5	6,500	10	11,295
-Central Area	2	2,350	7	7,145
-Zâmbué	2	3,844	2	3,844
-Messandaluz	1	306	1	306
TOTALS	200	209,000	251	286,834

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos (1993).

The changes in the total numbers of people in each area, from 1972 to 1973/4, were due either to the establishment of new *aldeamentos* or to variation in the numbers of people in the *aldeamentos* already established. While figures related to the first factor could be gathered, the evolution in the numbers of people per *aldeamento*, from 1972 to 1973/4, could only be traced in the cases of Marávia, Cabora-Bassa and Zumbo. These cases reveal that it is hopeless to establish a pattern of evolution of numbers of people in each *aldeamento*, since the factors behind it are unpredictable. In some cases population increased because of such factors as military operations aiming at gathering people, as the appeal exerted by facilities established in the *aldeamento*, or even due to the safer conditions some *aldeamentos* could offer by contrast with the dangerous conditions of the errant life in the bush, avoiding the army's combat units. However, converse trends also occurred, people fleeing from those *aldeamentos* which were highly vulnerable to Frelimo attacks or where living conditions were particularly harsh. The factors causing the unexpected evolution in the numbers of people led us to consider, in those cases where data were not available, that the same 1972 numbers could be used for 1973/74, because changes were not very significant if taken in their totality. Finally, it has to be mentioned that in some cases it has been impossible to check in a satisfactory manner the correspondence between the 1972 plan and its actual implementation, in cases in which we tried to follow the trend in the area.

In order to conclude a quantified idea of the importance of this programme in the context of the District, the comparison between the estimated Tete population of 492,233 in 1970²¹ and the approximate total of villagised people in 1973/74, reveals that the *aldeamentos* confined more than 58% of the total Tete population. The percentage of rural people confined should have been much higher though, nearly 70%, if we consider a round figure of 30,000 for the total population living in the city of Tete and the small District towns,²² plus the great numbers of rural refugees in the neighbouring countries, particularly

²¹According to the last census, in AHM, SE, 98: Direcção dos Serviços de Planeamento e Integração Económica: *IV Plano de Fomento, Parte 1 - Diagnóstico da Situação Económica e Social*, 1971, p.23, where it is referred to that the census was based in the 1962, 1963 and 1964 administrative censuses due to the war, which was also considered as the cause for a slight decrease in the totals of population in Tete as in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, the three main war theatres.

²²According to the appended Map 3 of AHM, SE, 98: Direcção dos Serviços de Planeamento e Integração Económica: *IV Plano de Fomento, Parte 1 - Diagnóstico da Situação Económica e Social*, 1971, the city of Tete had 11,090 inhabitants in 1970, a number which might have increased with refugees from the rural areas as the war was developing, and to which should be added the unavailable numbers of remaining small district towns such as Furancungo, Fingoé, Moatize, Vila Coutinho, Dona Ana, Zumbo etc. The number of 30,000 is a mere conjecture.

in Malawi and Zambia, which are impossible to estimate. The at least 100,000 people remaining had presumably taken refuge in the neighbouring countries or were living in Frelimo's "people bases".

By the end of 1972, therefore, most of the *aldeamentos* were already established (approximately 80% of the total of *aldeamentos* and 73% of the total number of villagised people), the *concelho* of Tete being the only area where important work in constructing new villages was still required in 1973/74. The last two years of the war corresponded, therefore, to an effort of the central and District authorities towards "consolidating" the villages, particularly in so far as their administration was concerned. This new characteristic meant perhaps a transition to a new period, one which was abruptly interrupted in April 1974.

The programme of *aldeamentos* obviously affected, in a deep manner, the colonial local administration policies, guided by the 1961 legislation and based, in so far as the administration of African communities was concerned, on the *regedorias*, village groups and villages, headed by *régulos*, chiefs of groups of villages and village headmen, respectively. In removing and concentrating people from several villages, and even from different *regedorias*, this process went against local institutions already "accepted" to some degree, raising an extra factor of instability. The first concern of the colonial authorities in this regard was to restore the administrative chain of command inside the new villages: it was necessary, in their view, to consolidate local structures which would assure political and administrative stability, thus increasing the legitimacy of the new settlements. Moreover, these local structures were to meet the *aldeamento's* strategic principles since they would imprint in the villages the profile of something resulting from the people's efforts and not as a gift from the Government.²³

In 1971, when the programme was basically still relying on District initiative, the District Governor had already determined the creation of commissions for local improvement in each village, composed of a president, "the *régulo* or the most senior local authority, or by a presidential council in case there is more than one authority at the same level",²⁴ and

²³"(...) what we intend to do is, basically, to suppress the common idea according to which the *aldeamento* is a Government institution where people live against their will and where all the necessary work has to be done by the Government since people are not interested (...). AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.101/71 (25/05/71).

²⁴AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.101/71 (25/05/71).

by a varying number of deputies, depending on the needs and initiatives in each *aldeamento*. However, the commission was to be guided by the answerable person in the *aldeamento*, commonly some European representative of the administration or of the army, or even a white policeman directing the local militia. This effort of apparently giving local administrative autonomy with one hand, while taking it away with the other lay behind all the subsequent debate on the local structures. Soon afterwards, the 1972 CEP made contacts with the experience of Cabo Delgado to find if there were elements in it that could be usable in Tete, regarding *aldeamento* administration.²⁵

Two different types of problems were at stake, the first one being the African structures and the second the interface between them and the colonial state at the local level. As to the first set of problems, three main types of *aldeamentos* were defined on this respect. The first one, formed by the people and the area of a pre-existing *regedoria*, was the easiest to solve, since the existing structure could be simply transplanted into the *aldeamento*; the second one was formed in the area of a *regedoria* by people from more than one *regedoria*. Here, an agreement was to be reached between the different African authorities and, of course, the *régulo* of the *regedoria* where the *aldeamento* was settled was to secure some predominant position; the third main type of *aldeamento* was one which, formed in a *regedoria* other than the ones of the groups confined in it, presented less obstacles since it would be easier to reach a settlement between the representatives of the different groups.²⁶ The first and third types were the easiest ones to cope with, and therefore the most pursued solutions. As to the second, it was mostly avoided, only being adopted when pressure of circumstances did not permit other alternatives.²⁷ Table 6.5 shows that the colonial authorities achieved a relatively harmonious solution in the case of Marávia, where local authorities had come from the predominant people in the *aldeamento*.

²⁵Interestingly, this is the only reference specifically mentioning the exchange of experiences with the villagisation processes in Cabo Delgado and Niassa.


²⁶See AHM, FGG, Cx.598: AdConc Alegria Teixeira, "Sugestões para o Estabelecimento da Nova Orgânica dos Aldeamentos" (Fevereiro 1972).

²⁷As in the case of *aldeamento* Fingoé, in the town of the same name in Marávia, where two important *régulos* lived, Cachombo and Nhaluiro, protected from the nationalist forces.

MAP 6.5: ALDEAMENTOS ESTABELECIDOS EM TETE (1968-1974)

- | | | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|---------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Gago Coutinho | 49. Canchira | 94. Duza | 135. Inoque | 172. Chôa |
| 2. Caduco | 50. Panzo | 95. Missoche | 136. Chingola | 173. Mucanga |
| 3. Chimponda | 51. Calipo | 96. Chague | 137. Jairose | 174. Mígob-Novo |
| 4. M'peua | 52. Missau | 97. Sabo | 138. Chifomodzi | 175. Cachomba |
| 5. Nbanseula | 53. Moagem | 98. Luice II | 139. Bote | |
| 6. Chipera | 54. Mavuzi | 99. Sande | 140. Cabambe | |
| 7. Chibucia | 55. Faqueiro | 100. Chicumba | 141. Jale | |
| 8. Ferrão | 56. Matsasa | 101. Segomba | | |
| 9. Machesso | 57. Nhandipissa | 102. Camunho | | |
| 10. Chiringa | 58. Oitavadas | | | |
| 11. Faqueiro | 59. Ussalo | | | |
| 12. Cantengo | 60. Chitata | | | |
| 13. Tenesse | | | | |
| 14. Nhaluïro | | | | |
| 15. Fingoé | | | | |

- | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| 16. Mucanga | 61. Sipanela | 103. Senhampine | 142. Creva |
| 17. Cauero | 62. Chipanga | 104. Panducanc | 143. Chibazne |
| 18. Nhandaro | 63. Mitete | 105. Sancomango | 144. Acutemba |
| 19. Chizampeta | 64. Matambanhama | 106. Incar | 145. Chale |
| 20. Mulirima | 65. Quissemisse | 107. Nhadanga | 146. Tembué |
| 21. Furancungo | 66. Sungo | 108. Simbe | 147. Bene |
| 22. Miuanga | 67. Inhaondué | 109. M'cico | 148. Cheridze |
| 23. Calondo | 68. Chacala | 110. Camota-Jairoce | 149. Chifisse |
| 24. Baué | 69. Cachoeira | 111. M'chacha I | 150. Cangombe |
| 25. Vuende | 70. Calambo | 112. Chirambué | 151. Vila Gamito |
| 26. Chazia | 71. Cassanha | 113. Chueza | 152. Maroeira |
| 27. Manjanja | 72. Nhamhalusio | 114. Doa | 153. Bucha |
| 28. Malaite | 73. Benga/Macajo | 115. Zemira | 154. Metape |
| 29. Cuncere | 74. Patinho | 116. Quembo | 155. Parão |
| 30. Chidã | 75. Bambo | 117. Tomo | 156. Pastor |
| 31. Gulóí | 76. Matundo | 118. M'chacha II | 157. Chuva |
| 32. Zuze | 77. Condo | 119. Chapita | 158. Cussene |
| 33. Sachirire | 78. M'Pandue | 120. Salima | 159. Misseto |
| 34. Sabondo | 79. Mantinte | 121. Cungué | 160. Cavulãncia |
| 35. Cegulula | 80. Chingodzi | 122. Malima | 161. Taca |
| 36. Chicôco | 81. Necungus | 123. Tofó | 162. Inhaçapirire |
| 37. Zangãia | 82. Buluzio | 124. Mancacapoló | 163. Nhamexica |
| 38. Chicote | 83. Cateme | 125. Chitui | 164. Cnitalo |
| 39. Caunda | 84. Caldas Xavier | 126. Coro | 165. Chinhandã |
| 40. Biui | 85. M'Boola | 127. Siene | 166. Inhampunga |
| 41. Mesa | 86. Capirizange | 128. M'futsu | 167. Canzeu-Daque |
| 42. Canieza | 87. Zôbué | 129. Mulomba | 168. Chitema |
| 43. Calanze | 88. Viúva Henriques | 130. Caponda | 169. Gossa |
| 44. Mangaze | 89. Sabandar | 131. Mucipo | 170. Gerama |
| 45. Massamba | 90. Campata | 132. Morgado | 171. Caponda |
| 46. Matenge | 91. Luice I | 133. Chide | |
| 47. Soronhate | 92. Fortuna | 134. Palula | |
| 48. Chimiza | 93. Alfândega | | |



Lago Malombô

TABLE 6.4:
LOCAL COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED IN MARÁVIA'S ALDEAMENTOS IN 1973

ALDEAMENTOS*	LOCAL COMMITTEE	RANK	ORIGIN (REGED.)
Fingoé	B.Nhaluiro (president) S.Chalequele; A.Chale	<i>Régulo</i> Chiefs of Gr.of Villages	Nhaluiro Nhaluiro
Mucanga	U.Bzinsocua (president) C.Richadi; J.Amosse	Chief of Gr.of Villages Peasants	Cachombo Cachombo
Cauero	M.Cauero (president) B.Gomo; C.Cauero	<i>Régulo</i> Chief of Gr.of Villages; Peasant	Cauero Cauero
Nhantaro	N.Mponda (president) T.Chandalira; T.Canseve	Chief of Gr.of Villages Ch.and Dep.-Ch.of Gr.of Villages	Nhaluiro Nhaluiro
Gago Coutinho	L.Chirava (president) I.Chatua; J.Causo	Chief of Gr.of Villages Chiefs of Gr.of Villages	Chofombo Chofombo
Caduco	A.Ingrande (president) C.Sairote; T.Iorane	Chief of Gr.of Villages Counselors	Chofombo Chofombo
Chimponda	G.Chofombo (president) J.Chizimati; A.Manhone	<i>Régulo</i> Chiefs of Gr.of Villages	Chofombo Chofombo
M'peua	C.M'peua (president) S.M'cocué; E.Chinhangara	Chief of Gr.of Villages Counselors	Chofombo Chofombo
Nhanseula	M.Samanhanga (president) J.Mariquete; S.Mangane	Counselor Counselors	Chofombo Chofombo
Cantengo	Z.Cantengo (president) C.Chincunzo; M.Zailone	<i>Régulo</i> Chief of Gr.of Villages; Peasant	Cantengo Cantengo
Tenese	C.Chicanda (president) C.Cantengo; I.João	Chief of Gr.of Villages Peasant; Chief of Gr.of Villages	Cantengo Cantengo

*Data on the aldeamentos of Mucanha-Seco, Nhaluiro-Novo and Matipo not available.
Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos" (1993).

However, besides the types referred to, another one could also be found, consisting of the *aldeamentos* formally subjected to a non-resident *régulo*, where several of his chiefs of group of villages lived, one of them being responsible for the local structure. Table 6.5 shows the *aldeamentos* under indirect influence of Moatize Central Area's *régulos*, meaning where his former chiefs of group of villages now lived:

TABLE 6.5:
RÉGULOS AND ALDEAMENTOS UNDER THEIR INFLUENCE IN MOATIZE'S CENTRAL AREA

<i>Régulo</i>	<i>Aldeamentos</i> under his influence*
Tundumula	Chimiza, Panzo, Catipo, Missau, Moagem/Campo, Mavuzi Minas, Faqueiro, Matsatsa I, Inhaondué
Mantenga	Canchira, Nhantipissa, Mitondo
Sipanela	Oitavadas, Ussalo, Chitata, Sipanela/Chipanga
Boroma	Mitete, Matambanhama, Calambo
Chassaia	Quissemissa, Sungo
Chacala	Chacala/Nhagoma, Cachoeira
Razo	Cassanha, Nhambalualo
Macajo	Benga/Macajo, Patinho
Picado	Bambo, Matundo, Chingodzi
Chaleca	Chiguambo, Condo, M'Pandué, Mantinte

*Data not available for aldeamento Conduce.

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

Of course it was not in the interests of the colonial state to allow the *régulo's* influence to be exerted beyond his *aldeamento*. In case he joined the nationalist movement he could influence his people and subvert an entire area with several *aldeamentos* in it. That is why a strong current argued that "it would be most convenient that people in the *aldeamentos* established because of subversion should be withdrawn from traditional institutions as far as possible".²⁸ And that is why legislation on local authorities in the *aldeamentos* took so long to be adopted. Although everyone involved on this debate accepted that local African authorities, the most genuine as was possible, should be installed in the *aldeamentos*, the question remained the one of giving them full autonomy, in the alleged tradition of Portuguese municipalism, or of keeping the elected or appointed local authority under the close surveillance of the administrative authorities. Intendant Fernandes, for instance, argued that the *aldeamento* should be directed by the traditional *régulo* himself:

"Such a solution not being possible, [the paramount authority] should be elected by the villagised population and invested with official powers, as long as there is no objection from the administration. He will be assisted by a village council ("mwene" counselors are already a native tradition in the *regedorias*), formed by a representative from each ethnic group inside the *aldeamento* (...). The village councils are the origin

²⁸See AHM, FGG, Cx.598: AdConc Alegria Teixeira, "Sugestões para o Estabelecimento da Nova Orgânica dos Aldeamentos" (Terveiro de 1972).

However, more traditional views insisted on the subordination of local committees to a direct representative of the civil administration.³⁰ Consequently, the conclusions of the debate preceding the legislative diploma on the *aldeamentos* were a sort of compromise between both positions, evoking the Portuguese municipal tradition and the need for the administration to be gradually replaced by local elected forms of power. An apparent compromise though, since the somewhat cynical text, although recognising the advantages of local power, concluded by arguing for the need of investing "technically competent" authorities who could only be found amongst administration officials:

"The 15th article of the decree 45,521 issued on 31 December 1963, prescribes that the voters of the community assembly will elect, from their own ranks, its president, secretary and treasurer, consequently putting aside the possibility of the presidency being exerted by an administrative official. However, this is a disposition which hampers community development since it prevents the administration from placing competent professionals at the head of local commissions. The population nuclei being formed require direct intervention of administration technicians to foster their development in a way which is antagonistic with amateurism. This is why community assemblies are still merely an aspiration (...). In order to achieve universal municipalism, the administration has to be given the power to place a local administrator on the side of the *régulo* to direct the community assembly (...). And the people, under the expert guidance of the administrative authority, will be directly participating in the administration of local interests".³¹

Clearly, autonomy of community assemblies was thus postponed or prevented,³² in a process which determined the nature of the local commissions to be established. Nevertheless, these were established apparently on a large scale in 1973 and 1974.³³

²⁹AHM, FGG, Cx.598: Intendente Administrativo Francisco Fernandes, "Sugestões para a Organização dos Aldeamentos" (21/02/72).

³⁰AHM, FGG, Cx.598: AdConc Alegria Teixeira, "Sugestões para o Estabelecimento da Nova Orgânica dos Aldeamentos" (Fevereiro de 1972).

³¹AHM, FGG, Cx.598: "Conclusões Gerais [sobre o Debate sobre o Ante-projecto do Diploma-legal dos Aldeamentos]", unsigned and undated original.

³²This debate went on through the year of 1972. The pre-project of diploma on the structure of the *aldeamentos* stated, on its article 4, that "the circumstances do not permit traditional authorities to fully exert their power. The District Governor will designate a three-member commission, presided by the most qualified element and including prominent individuals, which will administer the population nucleus *under the guidance of the administrative authority*" [emphasis added]. See AHM, FGG, Cx.598, "Ante-projecto de Diploma-Legislativo sobre a Orgânica dos Aldeamentos" (Fevereiro de 1972); also Proposta no.19/72 (Outubro de 1972).

³³Although particular cases are documented, such as Marávia or Moatize, archival documentation is unfortunately unavailable, thus preventing conclusive ideas about the establishment of these commissions throughout the District.

THE ALDEAMENTOS AND THE WAR

a) Introduction

The present chapter will have a closer focus on the *aldeamentos* in the context of the nationalist war in Tete. The discussion of the military process which occurred between 1968 and 1974 aims at a two-fold objective: on the one hand, it will facilitate a better understanding of the linkage between villagisation and the unfolding of the war on the terrain, thus providing a basis for the assessment of such a programme as a pillar of the colonial counter-insurgency strategy; on the other hand, it will discuss the impact of the war on the shaping and life of the *aldeamentos* and their population, thus providing a first approach to be followed, in the next chapter, by the discussion of the process in so far as their concrete socio-economic outputs are concerned.

The detailed discussion of the military process is a hard exercise to tackle, due particularly to problems raised by the sources, or put in a better way, by the absence of sources. However, it is not our purpose to attempt a detailed and Tete-wide discussion of the military aspects of this seven year war. Besides being of relatively low value in so far as our argument is concerned, it would also risk obscuring it. Consequently, the discussion will be restricted to general tendencies and more representative aspects of the war throughout the territory, while more detail will be sought just in two cases from the southern and eastern parts of it. The first, the crossing of the Zambezi river and the spread out through the southern territories by the guerrilla forces, besides comprising much of the explanation for Frelimo's effort in Tete also reveals a classic example of the central role played by the people in the guerrillas' advance. The second, centred in the area of Moatize, besides emphasizing another move of major strategic importance for Frelimo, will also discuss Frelimo military organisation and how the people were approached by the nationalists in the course of the war, as well as defining grounds for the discussion of a case study from this region, which will be held in the next chapter. While the discussion of these two cases will reinforce the vital importance of villagisation in the core of the confrontation, the next step will examine how the guerrilla struggle directly interfered in the life of the villages already established, which will be based upon a typology of Frelimo operations against the *aldeamentos*. Finally, the militarisation of the *aldeamentos* will be considered as the most evident result of such process.

The war was initiated in Tete in March 1968 with a series of attacks near the colonial post of Gago Coutinho,¹ in the north and close to the Zambian border. The guerrilla forces had been preparing themselves for a large scale offensive in the previous months, which corresponded to the yearly rainy season. These preparations consisted mainly of political mobilisation and the settlement of guerrilla bases which would support the progression of the guerrilla forces. Such bases were placed on the territory in a sophisticated way and enabled the nationalist movement to penetrate deeply into it from north to south, along the Capoché river. While, during its first year, the open conflict was limited to this central corridor and to occasional operations on its sides, underground mobilisation of the people was being reported as far west as Zumbo and as far east as Zóbuè.

The Portuguese response to Frelimo's offensive was two-fold, based on military operations and on the hasty villagisation of the population on the strips delimiting the Capoché corridor both west, in Fingoé, and east, in Bene-Marávia. However, this was a process of population confinement corresponding to the first phase of villagisation as was discussed in Chapter 6, handled almost entirely by resourceless authorities at the local level, and in which army participation was limited to the seizure of people from dispersed homesteads and gathering them into the new villages, and to pressing these authorities to do more. But the fact was that Frelimo contacts with the peasants were occurring far beyond these belts. Consequently, the sharp success achieved by the Portuguese counter-offensive, from September 1968, one which pushed the guerrilla forces back to the northern border, was due more than to villagisation itself, to a particular type of military operations, involving airborne special troops, intelligence gathering and generally a great resource mobilisation.²

b) War and Villagisation on the South of the Zambezi

In early 1969 Frelimo resumed its offensive. Though its tactics remained essentially the same, strategy underwent important changes which consisted mainly in widening the rear-base on the northern border, and in establishing two simultaneous penetration corridors west and east of the Capoché. Along the years of 1969 and 1970, the guerrilla forces widened their action

¹Already referred to in Chapter 5, particularly in footnote 52.

²For a detailed discussion of Frelimo's 1968 offensive and the subsequent Portuguese counter-insurgency operations, see Borges Coelho 1989.

as to cover most of the areas of Macanga, Bene and Marávia. Heavy support from the people, a complex but efficient system of guerrilla bases and ambush tactics combined with road landmining, working powerfully to immobilise the Portuguese army inside its garrisons, all these were factors which contributed to such a rapid advance. By mid-1970 guerrilla activities were already felt in the areas close to the northern margin of the Zambezi.

The crossing of the Zambezi river and the following activation of Frelimo's 4th Sector in the south of Tete is a classical example of the movement's methods of progressing on the terrain. It had been proclaimed for a long time by Frelimo leaders, and expected by the colonial authorities, not only because of the general dynamics of guerrilla advance southwards but also by reason of the nationalists' declared intention to jeopardise the Cahora-Bassa scheme. In the first half of 1970, rumours of an impending attack on the Cahora Bassa site³ were rendered likely by the presence of guerrilla forces on the northern margin of the Zambezi opposite to Chicoa and near Cahora Bassa.⁴ Besides Marávia, Frelimo was also reaching the southernmost parts of Macanga, menacing Cahora Bassa from the northeast. But attacks from the other bank of the river, besides requiring heavy weaponry, would bring uncertain results and were definitely out of Frelimo's *style* of action, at least if one is deducing from what had been seen of Frelimo tactics so far. Once the Zambezi was reached, they started therefore moving laterally along its banks, seeking people's support in order to strengthen their position there. In September, reports were issued on strong guerrilla presence first in *regedorias* Malima and Nhaluiro⁵ and in *regedoria* Mezíngua (see Map 6.2 on Tete *regedorias*), fully supported by people from the area.⁶ A firmly established corridor coming from the north suddenly came to the attention of the Portuguese intelligence services, one through which important supplies of new weapons were arriving at the northern margin of the Zambezi and even crossing the river. In November 1970, Marávia's District

³AHM, FM, Cx.110: DGS/Tete, RI no.30/71 (11/04/70), DGS/Tete, Information [hereafter Info] no.34/Gab (14/04/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.16/70 (17/04/70); ComSec F, Sitrep no.21/70 (25/05/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.22/70 (29/05/70).

⁴Amongst several pieces of information on the presence of Frelimo south of Marávia and near the Zambesi, particularly in Chipera, see, for example, AHM, FM, Cx.110: ComSec F, Relatório de Notícia [hereafter RN] no.159/70 (6/08/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.32/70 (7/08/70); and GDT, Sitrep no.38/70 (18/09/70).

⁵AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.37/70 (11/09/70); GDT, Sitrep no.36/70 (4/09/70).

⁶AHM, FM, Cx.110: SCCIM/Tete, BI no.3/8/1 (24/09/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.39/70 (25/09/70).

Commissioner reported on such *discoveries* as follows:⁷

"Frelimo has a major deposit of weapons and ammunition near village Consequantanga, located between mountains Madsauge, Tchiguata and Tchacala and near river Lupica, to the south of mount Chacongolo, in the areas of *regedoria* Nhaluiro; it is thought that they keep more than 10 tons of equipment there, put together by supplies brought every week from a base on the Capoché river by porters who return immediately after the delivery... Frelimo has been receiving new firearms, two-footed machine guns provided with round cartridges and others with 100 to 250 ammunition cartridges, which led Totomoio and Cara Alegre Tembe, chiefs of the enemy groups in Nhaluiro, to distribute the old weapons to men in the area... Columns carrying Frelimo's military material are heading down to the Zambezi river, where a native called Chochola transports it across the river on his canoe, to the southern bank. The material is then kept at the Manherere mountains (3210.1540) [geographic coordinates], near village Canhambiro..."

There was little the authorities could do to control the situation in the short term. The army was scantily established in the region, with less than 600 men to cover Zumbo as well as most of Marávia and Mágoè.⁸ Regarding people's control, there was only one *aldeamento* being established in the three *regedorias* mentioned.⁹ The District Government requested, therefore, the *Gabinete do Plano do Zambeze* (Zambezi Plan Office, formed to carry out the works related with the Cahora Bassa dam and its shallow lake) or GPZ to urge the villagisation in the areas of its jurisdiction,¹⁰ while attempting to establish *aldeamentos* itself in areas such as Zumbo. Here people fled massively at the first villagisation attempts at least in the area of Zâmbué and in *regedoria* Malima,¹¹ delaying the process and keeping the authorities in a very weak position.

As early as June 1970, the Portuguese intelligence services were trying to trace a group of more than 100 guerrillas who, according to information, would come from

⁷AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdCirc/Marávia, BI no.31/70 (7/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.46/70 (13/11/70).

⁸A major re-arrangement of the army would only take place in the beginning of 1971, with the creation of the Tete Operational Zone (ZOT). See Estado-Maior do Exército, 1989(4):167-168 and Map 25.

⁹*Aldeamento* Nhaluiro, formed in 1970 but considered as completed by the District Government only in 1971.

¹⁰AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.36/70 (4/09/70).

¹¹AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.36/70 (4/09/70), for example, mentioned that all the people from the *Posto Administrativo* of Messandaluz to the western border were out of control, escaping to avoid being villagised. AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.37/70 (11/09/70) mentions the flight of all the people from *regedoria* Malima at the first villagisation attempts. *Regedoria* Malima provided western access to the regions under discussion, and its people was gradually retrieved towards the end of that year (AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.39/70 (25/09/70); GDT, Sitrep no.40/70 (9/10/70). The three riverine *aldeamentos* in the area (Melaúze, Mutunda and Nhanchenge) would only be established in 1971.

Nachingwea through Zambia, to penetrate into Tete. Cahora Bassa was their final objective.¹² The route from the Zambian border, through Marávia, down to the Zambezi river had certainly a dense network of guerrilla units and bases placed in its way. However, it is important to note the fact that the activation of Frelimo's 4th Sector was undertaken by a special task force, revealing perhaps the need of Frelimo commands to progress rapidly to the zone, menacing Cahora Bassa and the central territory of Mozambique.¹³ According to the transcription of the interrogation of a guerrilla fighter captured in Chinhanda some days later,¹⁴

"he was incorporated in a guerrilla company of 108 men headed by Zeca Caliate, who had Felix Mendes as his deputy; from there [Nachingwea, Tanzania?] they travelled to base Catete [Katete, in Zambia]¹⁵ on Frelimo trucks, where they stood for a day. Having received their weapons, they headed to the Mozambican border, waiting around two weeks in base Cassuende, also known as base Fronteira, from there they started the march to the Zambezi river, passing through the Provincial base where they were expected by commander Elias Sigauke.¹⁶ They stood there for two days. Afterwards, they went to base Fingoé where they rested for a week. From there they approached the Zambezi river, which they crossed under Sigauke's command..."


¹²AHM, FM, Cx.110: ComSec F, Sitrep no.22/70 (1/06/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.23/70 (5/06/70). A group of more than 300 according to DGS/Tete, RI no.113/DI/Gab (1/09/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.33/70 (11/09/70).

¹³AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: BCaÇ 2895/Furancungo, Relatório de Informações [hereafter RInfo] no.1/71 (1/05/71), mentions that in October 1970 José Moiane, Frelimo's Provincial Chief for Defence and Operations, was on the Zambian border, at Chadiza, waiting for F.Langa, who had been to Tanzania to bring three companies of combatants into Tete, in order to undertake the infiltration plans already schemed. One of these companies entered the territory in late October 1970, the remaining two following in November. The company referred to next was probably the first of the three mentioned here.

¹⁴AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Chicoa, Comunicação (8/12/70), DGS/Tete, "Auto de Perguntas", in GDT, Sitrep no.50/70 (11/12/70).

¹⁵According to AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: SCCIM/Tete, Pedido de Pesquisa [hereafter PP] no.2/72 (11/02/72), Katete, located at 35 km from the Tete border, had become a major Frelimo training camp. The Front thus avoided sending new recruits from this area to Nachingwea, in Tanzania, where its major training camp was located.

¹⁶Elias Sigauke is referred to as commander of Frelimo's 4th Sector in AHM, FM, Cx.110: DGS/Tete, RI no.147/DI/2/Gab (10/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.46/70 (13/11/70).



MAP 7.1: FRELIMO ADVANCE IN SOUTHERN TETE.

Preceded by smaller groups who had been to Mágoè in order to contact people and to do the reconnaissance of Portuguese military and civil facilities,¹⁷ the group who had the task of establishing the basis of Frelimo's 4th Sector crossed the Zambezi river in November 13, 1970, approximately at the point where the river Daque meets the Zambezi.¹⁸ The authorities managed to capture some members of the group, while the defection of others, who became an important source of information, enabled the tracing of the group's movements and intentions.¹⁹ Even so, the group broke through the surveillance of the authorities and was rapidly divided into four sections: the first one followed the Daque river valley southwards, heading to Mucumbura and the Rhodesian border, where its presence was already felt some days later;²⁰ the second went southwest to Mágoè; the third to Chicoo, along the Zambezi river and eastwards; and the fourth, after staying for a while in the region, went to the Chioco area²¹ (see Map 7.1). By the new year the group did not exist as such, transformed into small guerrilla units covering an area which included the four *regedorias* of Charibuca, Inhampunga, Gossa and Buxo, and approaching *regedorias* Boroma, Churro,

¹⁷Account of at least two of such groups in AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.120/A/8 (28/09/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.40/70 (2/10/70); and AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.32/70 (21/10/70), and DGS/Tete, "Auto de Perguntas" (20/10/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.43/70 (23/10/70). "A group of 15 armed guerrilla fighters have crossed the Zambezi river at night, progressed through near Mágoè airport and headed to Mucumbura, having said on their return they had been there just to get a better knowledge of the site. Before settling themselves on the southern bank of the Zambezi river they intend to win the support of the riverine people."

¹⁸The authorities in Mágoè, though knowing through several sources that a major guerrilla crossing of the river was on its way, only had confirmation of it one week later. See AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdCirc/Mágoè, BI no.12/70 (19/11/70), and GDT, Sitrep no.47/70 (20/11/70). The crossing of such great numbers of fighters and military equipment took around 20 canoe trips, according to AdCirc/Maravia, MR no.164/A/28 (1/12/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.49/70 (4/12/70). Confirmation of this by Aibaque F.Chicadza, who fought in Frelimo's 4th Sector and was part of this group, in Associação dos Antigos Combatentes de Tete [hereafter AAC/Tete] 1992:Interview.

¹⁹See among others, AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.50/70 (11/12/70); AdPa/Vasco da Gama, MR no.74/70, s/d, AdPa/Chicoo, MR s/n (8/12/70), DGS/Tete, "Auto de Perguntas", s/d, AdCirc/Maravia, BI no.41/70, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.50/70 (11/12/70); AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.45/70 (7/12/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.51/70 (18/12/70); AdPa/Mucumbura, MR no.54/70, s/d, and DGS/Tete, RI no.12/70, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.52/70 (25/12/70). According to AdPa/Chicoo Com (8/12/70), the group was reduced to 90 men, having lost 27 by that date, who had deserted or been captured.

²⁰This group, headed by Manuel Mendes, apparently included a great percentage of Zimbabwean fighters heading to Rhodesia. See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdCirc/Maravia, MR no.164/A/28 (1/12/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.49/70 (4/12/70).

²¹AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Chicoo, Com (8/12/70), and DGS/Tete, "Auto de Perguntas", s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.50/70 (11/12/70); AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.45/70 (7/12/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.51/70 (18/12/70); and particularly, DGS/Tete, RI no.189/DI/2/GAB (25/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.48/70 (27/11/70). This process, namely the split into four groups, also referred to by Aibaque F.Chicadza in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

The advance of the guerrilla units depended very much on the support of local people and their leaders. *Régulo* Inhampunga, unwilling to cooperate with the guerrilla forces, left his lands and sought for refuge in village Traquino.²³ In some regions local authorities would reveal conflicting attitudes: in *regedoria* Buxo, for example, on the route to Mucumbura, *fumo* Veremo supported the guerrilla force while his *régulo* tried to resist and to cooperate with the colonial authorities, protecting defectors of the group and informing on the combatant's movements. *Régulo* Buxo was killed in December.²⁴ But most of the local authorities, such as *régulos* Charibuca and Gossa, fully adhered to the guerrillas, at least six *fumos* of the latter, namely Cacui, Guanzeu, Chitengo, Chicongo, Gire and Gerema, playing an important role in facilitating the advance of the guerrilla force into the environs of Mágoè.²⁵

Following events from the last days of 1970, 1971 was a year in which nationalist influence rapidly spread to cover the whole territory of Tete south of the Zambezi river. This took place along some main penetration lines, as was referred to above. The central one, it seems, continued to be the one referred to by the Portuguese intelligence services as the "Daque river infiltration corridor" (*infiltrante do rio Daque*) not as much in that it headed to Mucumbura²⁶ as in that it assured that the principal route crossing the Zambezi and entering

²²The original contingent was reinforced by others in the following weeks. See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdCirc/Maravia, MR no.163/70 (24/11/70), and BI no.39/70 (24/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.48/70 (27/11/70).

²³AHM, FM, Cx.110: DGS/Tete, RI no.189/DI/2/Gab (25/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.48/78. The original group had split up at Inhampunga's lands.

²⁴AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Mucumbura, MR nos.49/70, 56/70 and 62/70, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.51/70 (18/12/70). The death of *régulo* Buxo is described by Aibaque F.Chicadza in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

²⁵For Charibuca, AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Chicoa, MR no.2/70, in GDT, Sitrep no.51/70 (18/12/70), which relates a meeting of the guerrilla force with local people, conducted by the *régulo*. For Gossa and his chiefs of group of villages, DGS/Tete, RI no.189/DI/2/Gab (25/11/70), and AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.37/70 (27/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.48/70 (27/11/70); AdCirc/Mágoè, MR no.46/70 (15/12/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.51/70 (18/12/70). *Fumo* Gerema, for instance, was arrested when it was found that a group of 50 guerrilla combatants was camping at his village.

²⁶The base of Mucumbura was established at the border with Rhodesia, already in Rhodesian territory. Apparently it played a secondary role at first, mainly concerned with supporting the infiltration of Zimbabwean guerrilla forces in Rhodesia. However, its importance was gradually increased and in the first months of 1972 it was considered as an important base, training new combatants and stockpiling weaponry.

the south was kept open. This demanded efforts both north and south of the river, apparently assured in the north by a system of bases coordinated by base Sangere.²⁷ In parallel, attempts were also made to advance eastwards, still north of the Zambezi river, in order to threaten Cahora Bassa from the north and to enlarge the area where the river could be crossed southwards. Base Canzi was established near Chipera and what came to be known as the "Mavuzi river infiltration corridor".²⁸

On the south of the Zambezi, the Daque river corridor was controlled by Security Base Manherere, apparently the most important of the system. It distributed weaponry to all subsequent infiltration lines and was the base for the "political work" with the population in *regedoria* Charibuca, one who massively supported the combatants.²⁹ From Manherere also started the route heading west, to Mágoè, which was approached either through Cachomba, near the Zambezi, or through a sub-route from Mucumbura's, through base Docomboio and the Impaka river. It also seems that at least from May 1971 new routes crossing the Zambezi were established, leading directly to Mágoè.³⁰ Meanwhile, the valley of the Daque river became a safe place for the nationalists, in the relative terms permitted by the war³¹. But during 1971 the nationalists were certainly more committed in the two lines which leaving Manherere headed east to Cahora Bassa, and southeast to Chioco. Apparently the route was the same until the region of Chinhanda-Nhancapiriri river, where it branched off. In the

See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.7/72 (8/03/72). Base Mucumbura also mentioned as a training base in PSP/Songo, RI no.21/72 (15/05/72).

²⁷AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: DGS/Fingoé, s/r (13/01/71), amongst others.

²⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.39/71 (8/07/71).

²⁹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.41/71 (17/07/71). In 1973, base Manherere still existed in the area, with the same important role, attesting the perennality of this system of bases. PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.1/73 (4/01/73). Apparently, the base was commanded by Bussemane Agida, who operated as far as Estima. PSP/Songo, RI no.21/72 (15/05/72).

³⁰AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RIs nos.3/71 (23/01/71) and 32/71 (28/05/71).

³¹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RIs no.10/71 (19/03/71) and 41/71 (17/07/71); AdPa/Chicoa, BI no.2/71 (28/02/71). "The tactics of the terrorists [acting in the area], who melt themselves with the population with whom they are identified, are really hard to cope with. The permanent presence of a strong authority is the only way through which we can retrieve these people, who we think have turned entirely [to the enemy]". The Manherere mountains were kept relatively secure by the nationalists in 1971. See, for instance, Frelimo's war communique no.3 from Tete, in Frelimo, *Voz da Revolução* no.4, Setembro de 1971, which describes how two Portuguese patrol boats approaching the area were destroyed. Aibaque F.Chicadza also noted that the scarce Portuguese troops were reluctant in leaving their garrisons to fight the enemy (AAC/Tete 1992:Interview).

common route were located bases Bangué and Mutopa, commanded by Bussemane Agida and supporting the approach to Chicó.³² Next were Chinhanda and Nhancapiriri, which simultaneously supported the pressure on Cahora Bassa, closing the circle, and the approach to the areas further east, near the city of Tete and southeast, directly leading to Manica and central Mozambique. Frelimo presence in Chinhanda was first noticed in March 1971, taking the authorities by surprise since this was an area considered as "much faithful" to them until then.³³ At *regedoria* Tomo, the last one before Cahora Bassa, important *fumos* such as Arvera, N'taca, Bero, Tchibué and Mourinho, were reported as supporting the guerrilla forces in the second half of 1971.³⁴ As early as July, meetings with local people were occurring in Chissua-Estima, the last important Portuguese site before Cahora Bassa.³⁵

The Frelimo advance eastwards, during 1971, led into a large region running from the Tchirodzi river in the north, to the environs of Chiôco in the south. From the Tchirodzi, Cataxa and the Tete-Songo road came within reach. In October, a land-mine was set up on this road for the first time.³⁶ From base Camanga, further south and the easternmost base established by the nationalists during 1971, the guerrilla forces could reach Marara and eventually the area around the city of Tete.³⁷ It is important to note that Frelimo presence in the area of Marara had been detected by the authorities some months earlier, revealing that guerrilla forces other than the ones we have been following were crossing the Zambezi into the region, backed by a different system of bases established in Chiúta, southern Macanga and north of the Zambezi.³⁸ Finally, also by the end of that year, guerrilla contingents were also

³²The "Chicó sub-system" was either established late in 1971 or, which seems more likely, was detected by colonial authorities only from October, when base Bangué was attacked and re-established again in the same area. On this and on the support of the people of the region to guerrilla activities see AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RIs nos.60/71 (10/10/71), 82/71 (17/12/71), and 83/71 (22/12/71).

³³AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdPa/Chicó, BI no.3/71 (16/03/71); PSP/Songo, RI no.9/71 (17/03/71).

³⁴AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RIs nos.46/71 (29/07/71) and 81/71 (16/12/71).

³⁵AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.43/71 (29/07/71).

³⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RIs nos.51/71 (6/09/71), 60/71 (7/10/71), and 63/71 (14/10/71). For the action of Frelimo in the villages of the region, PSP/Songo, RIs nos.49/71 (3/09/71), and 65/71 (18/10/71).

³⁷The location of base Camanga was discovered by the Portuguese authorities some months later. AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.5/72 (29/02/72).

³⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: SCCIM/Tete, RI no.17/71 (10/08/71); PSP/Songo, RI no.34/71 (3/06/71).

moving into the regions of Chiôco and Mufa, approaching the Luenha river.³⁹ As soon as the Luenha was crossed they would be in northern Manica, the District of Tete left behind.

It was often considered above that the intensification of the armed struggle in Tete was one and perhaps the most important strategic response to General Arriaga's offensive in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Interestingly, this is acknowledged by the Portuguese military sources themselves, when saying, much later, that "with the regression of the enemy's activity in the districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado occurred an increase in their operations in the area of Tete".⁴⁰ The decision of the Frelimo commanders to order a special task force to establish its 4th Sector must therefore be seen against this background: they were probably seeking efficiency and rapidity. Besides the general objective of enlarging their zones of influence, the nationalists aimed at approaching Cahora Bassa and the city of Tete from the south, as well as at opening a path into neighbouring Manica e Sofala, on the south of Tete. In parallel, the settlement of Frelimo's 4th Sector suited the Zimbabwean nationalists very much, providing them with bases and routes approaching them in the frontier zones of Mucumbura and Chiôco.⁴¹ Meanwhile, the rapid advance of the nationalist forces provoked extreme concern amongst the colonial authorities, and an attitude of near panic in some of them, as a Songo police report vividly illustrates:

"The IN [enemy] are undoubtedly using all means they have possible, as well as all their power, in order to affect the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam, disclosing the intention to attack it within a short period. Though we don't believe they can be successful in the short term, they will certainly end up achieving it due to the incomprehensible apathy which has characterised the defence of the Songo plateau. (...) It is most convenient to get the opinion of all institutions concerned (...) so that we can re-assess the defensive system of Cahora Bassa in time (...). Such re-assessment is most urgent if a situation is to be avoided in which Frelimo, relying just on porters, could allocate their heavy weaponry before we place ours, which would be an affront taken into account our much superior means, which include airborne transportation. Equally necessary is to avoid the IN achieving their intermediate objective, which is to take over control of land and people".⁴²


³⁹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.46/71 (25/08/71).

⁴⁰Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4):167.

⁴¹On infiltration routes of Zimbabwean guerrillas see Aibaque F.Chicadza, in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview. "They penetrated their territory through three places. Nkomo's men used Canhemba for heading to the area of Sinoia, in Zimbabwe. Mugabe's men used the Mucumbura route and the area of Chiôco, the latter for infiltrating to Mount Darwin (...)."

⁴²AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.42/71 (17/07/71). Also on this matter and on the same point of view there are several other PSP/Songo reports. Particularly on heavy weaponry brought by Frelimo into the site, during this period, PSP/Songo, RI no.74/71 (16/11/71).

MAP 7.2: THE PORTUGUESE ARMY IN TETE (1970-1971)



Source: Estado-Maior do Exército 1989(4)

The Portuguese strategic defence south of the Zambezi was based, as elsewhere in Tete, in two main pillars: reinforcement of military positions and operations, and confinement of people in *aldeamentos*. Concerning the former, the measures taken were framed in a major military re-arrangement implemented in 1971, which included, under the creation of the Tete Area of Operations (ZOT), the unification of the District Commands, the ZOT Commander becoming also District Governor,⁴³ and the creation of the post of Coordinator for the Internal and Immediate Defence of Cahora Bassa,⁴⁴ soon followed by the creation of the Operational Command for the Defence of Cahora Bassa (CODCB).⁴⁵ Also included in this re-arrangement was the more than doubling in the number of troops involved in the area south of the Zambezi.⁴⁶ Several other measures were imposed on the terrain, such as the institution of military convoys to protect road traffic,⁴⁷ the total ban of civil traffic on the Zambezi

⁴³Brigadier Rocha Simões, ZOT commander, was appointed Governor of Tete in July 26, 1971.

⁴⁴Involved in Cahora Bassa's defence were several units subordinated to different chains of command. Lieutenant-colonel Andrade e Silva was appointed as *Coordenador da Defesa Interna e Imediata de Cahora Bassa* to coordinate ZOT's forces and the ones obeying the District Governor. This measure had been first discussed in Songo on June 16, 1971, and was approved in a meeting in Beira on July 9, 1971, in which participated the Minister for the Overseas Territories, the Governor-General, and General Arriaga, the Commander-in-Chief of the Portuguese army in Mozambique. See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: ZOT/QG, no.522/C p.252 (3/11/71).

⁴⁵Reference to the CODCB, the territory of which corresponded almost entirely to the one of the former GCP Sub-sector of the G Sector, in *Estado-Maior do Exército* 1989(4):171-172.

⁴⁶ZOT covered the entire Tete territory and had two major types of troops: anchored troops attached to one particular territory, and intervention troops, called to act in a particular area for a period of time, during which they would obey the local command. ZOT was divided into three Sectors, F, G and H (see Map 6.3), their commands based respectively in Tete, Fingoé and Furancungo, and each one with their own Sub-sectors. The area on the south of the Zambezi was covered by two Sub-sectors of the G Sector and part of the contingent of the F Sector, as follows: Sub-sector GCC, of which Battalion 3837 was in charge, had its command based on Chicoa, and three anchored companies of hunters based on Chicoa, Mucumbura and Mágoè-Novo, all of them detaching platoons into the surrounding areas. Mágoè-Novo was also provided with a GE unit. This Sub-sector had two extra "commando" companies operating as intervention troops. Sub-sector GCP, under Battalion 3843, with its command at Chipera, had three anchored companies of hunters, two of which were based on Estima and one on Chiringa. It also had a company of hunters in intervention. Finally, Battalion 17 of Sector F had one company of hunters detached at Changara. This last area was also attended occasionally by two intervention companies of hunters, one "commando" company and one squadron of cavalry. The structure above permits the rough estimation of 2,000 Portuguese soldiers placed in the south of the Zambezi river, of whom at least 1,700 were directly involved in the fighting. In 1970 the number had been probably of 600, with around 500 involved in combat. See *Estado-Maior do Exército* 1989(4):155-156, 167-168, and maps 25 and 28.

⁴⁷For instance AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/ZOT, s/r (16/08/71), for the road Tete-Marara-Songo. The militia units protecting this road ceased to be subjected to the district command of the OPVDC and were integrated in the CODCB structure, an additional sign of the militarisation of the process. GDT/ZOT, s/r (24/08/71).

river between Cahora Bassa and Zumbo,⁴⁸ and the closing, in some areas, of rural shops, whose owners were either to move into the *aldeamentos* or do their business as itinerant traders, under military protection.⁴⁹ In fact, what was going on behind this major re-arrangement was the militarisation of the area and, under the cover of a more efficient defence, the clear supremacy of the army over the civil administration. Significantly, the villagisation programme came to be a privileged arena for this internal struggle between civil and military powers, just before the creation of ZOT and the unification of the colonial commands in Tete, as the following letter from the Tete DGS Sub-delegation to the director of DGS in Lourenço Marques clearly illustrates:

"I inform your excellency that amongst the military ranks in Tete, particularly in the Command of Sector F, a certain animosity is growing against the present District Governor, Colonel João Cecílio Gonçalves. The origin of such animosity lies in the fact that the military are insistently requesting, for a year now, the Governor to conduct the re-arrangement or villagisation of the people in the areas affected by violent subversion, so that the enemy would be deprived of the subsistence means which are now made available to them by these people (...). Such animosity was lately increased by the following: The Governor and the Sector F command agreed, at the end of the year, to request some trucks from the Truck Services of Beira Railways, for the transportation of materials to the works of re-arrangement of people. Beira Railways accomplished this request and recently presented the bill for their services, calculated at 164,000\$00. The District Governor declined paying this bill, which he sent to the Sector Command. The latter, on their turn, did not pay the bill either, considering that the District Governor was the one who should do it (...). Our sub-delegation abstains from commenting and will just say that the requests of the military are real, and if they are not being entirely met by the District Governor with the required speed it is certainly because he lacks the material means of doing so"⁵⁰

The true basis of this contradiction was the nature and pace of the villagisation programme. While some civil structures had still the point of view of the old psycho-social "school", considering that the people should be won through *aldeamentos* as a process which implied some level of socio-economic development, therefore requiring time and implying persuasion of people, the military were just concerned with villagising as quickly as possible,

⁴⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n:GDT/ZOT, s/r (16/08/71), where it is written: "Traffic of people and commodities is rigorously prohibited on the Zambesi up-stream Cahora Bassa to Zumbo, except on the following places, where it will be controlled by AADM [civil administration authorities] and NT ["our troops"]: Chicó, Cachomba and Zumbo (...). All *almadias* found in the section of the river defined above must be destroyed (...). Control of *almadias* down-stream Cahora Bassa will be controlled by orders to be issued later."

⁴⁹AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: Comissão Distrital de Defesa, no.2/72 (27/07/72).

⁵⁰AHM, FGG, Cx.919: DGS/Tete, no.71/70/DI/2-Gab (23/02/70). Colonel João Cecílio Gonçalves had come from the Police ranks.

irrespective of its social costs, so that its strategic meaning could be preserved.⁵¹ The creation of ZOT, accompanied by the replacement of the District Governor, resulted therefore from the ascendancy of the military, further revealed by the fact that in the *Concelho* of Tete, nearly 40 *aldeamentos* were established just in the year of 1972, through a process certainly not based in persuasion. However, this was a complex struggle. Most of the *aldeamentos* in the area, during 1971, were to be established by the GPZ, whose technocratic views concerning population resettlement related to the construction of Cahora Bassa, although taking into account security matters, did not entirely coincide with the military's.

The first phase of GPZ's activities, in 1969, had been granted to Zamco, a French/West-German/South-African consortium which was to undertake the river's temporary bypass, the construction of the dam and its southern bank underground power station, as well as to supply and assemble the system of power conversion and transport to the Republic of South Africa. The construction of approaching roads and of an urban centre on the site were also included.⁵² GPZ's concern with population resettlement had arisen from the need to displace an estimated 24,000 people from the area which would be submerged by the dam's shallow lake. Though Tete's southern areas were the most scarcely populated, the riverine ones were obviously the most densely populated. This resettlement was to be undertaken through a three-year plan (1971-1973) aiming,

"beyond the mere re-installation of people, at providing better living conditions in the new villages, particularly through crop stabilisation, improving of agricultural techniques and establishment of people agglomerates provided with basic socio-economic equipment. (...) [The new villages would range from] 600 to 1,200 people, located on selected areas in accordance with soil fitness and availability of water (...)"⁵³

Besides the resettlement activity, the GPZ was also involved in population re-arrangement works. The difference between re-settlement and re-arrangement, as stated by the GPZ itself, was in that the latter concerned dealing with people other than the ones removed from the area of what would be the shallow lake. This intervention of the GPZ, in

⁵¹The perspective of the former implied avoiding the use of force, since it would be counter-productive in the "psycho-social" view of "winning the hearts and minds". Governor Cecílio Gonçalves said later: "Let us say that villagisation in Tete had a first period in which people persuasion was the key note. (...) People should not be forced [to enter into *aldeamentos*] (...). This, of course, provoked a certain delay (...). I wanted the people to be persuaded, not forced". Gonçalves 1986: Interview.

⁵²AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1971):3.

⁵³AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1971):15.


the strict sense beyond its areas of jurisdiction, took place at the request of the Tete Government, which was struggling with lack of capabilities to re-settle people "everywhere", while the GPZ, on the contrary, was provided with what could be considered then as "luxury" facilities on the terrain. Concerning population re-arrangement, GPZ's involvement ranged from mere viability studies of several kinds to full involvement, in the last case being a true resettlement intervention not distinguished from its normal activity.⁵⁴ It could be said roughly, therefore, that while resettlement had to do with Cahora Bassa's works, re-arrangement corresponded to GPZ's intervention in order to meet the strategic needs of the authorities in Tete, even if both results did not diverge very much in most of the cases.

During the year of 1971, GPZ started resettling on the northern bank of the Zambezi. However, due to Frelimo activity in the area, namely in *regedorias* Nhaluiro, Mezingué and Chibueia, of the ten *aldeamentos* programmed only six were established: *aldeamentos* Nhaluiro-Novo, Chiboa-Mafigo, Mucangadzi, Chibueia, Chipera and Mucanha. This under-achievement enabled the GPZ to "re-arrange" seventeen extra *aldeamentos*, of which eleven in the area of Estima and six in the area of Changara. Clearly, in Estima it was a matter of defending the site of the dam from guerrillas approach through the confinement of people, while in Changara it was the one of creating a buffer area in order to prevent Frelimo's passage into Manica and Sofala. GPZ's hardships, in terms of security, were enormous:

"Subversion in Tete District, which from early 1970 took the form of armed actions close to the border with Zambia, began spreading southwards, aiming at hitting Cahora Bassa. Before the end of 1970, armed actions were already felt south of the Zambezi river, and during 1971 the situation got worse at a galloping rhythm, which was the cause for serious apprehension in this Office. These events considerably affected GPZ's working programme, particularly in the areas of people re-settlement by reason of Cahora-Bassa's shallow lake formation and in the areas surrounding the working site of the dam (...). Violent action fell upon the re-settlement area aiming, on the one hand, at bringing GPZ's activities to a halt, and on the other at intimidating the people so they would run away from our control. The enemy's objectives were partially achieved, as GPZ's activities suffered important limitation, forcing changes in the working schedule, of which the most salient were the cutback of activities in the area of Mucangadzi and the postponement of population re-settlement on the northern bank of the Zambezi (...). In order to isolate Cahora-Bassa, the IN undertook landmining and ambushing on roads and railways. Military convoys became unavoidable. The railway was hit from September 1971, which created serious problems particularly in the supplying of cement. A programme was set up aiming at rapidly building a defence system around Cahora-Bassa, as well as housing for security personnel. Protection of the new *aldeamentos* has become an essential matter, one which requires the involvement of the armed forces. The GPZ, which is placing its own security personnel there, is in terms of finances and staff reaching the edge of its capability"⁵⁵

⁵⁴AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1971):24-25.

⁵⁵AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1971):Confidential Appendix.



MAP 7.3: THE GPZ VILLAGISATION WORKS

In 1972 and 1973 the situation got worse, from the point of view of the authorities, and following the same trends of increased pressure on Cahora-Bassa and generally on southeastern Tete, approaching Tete and the Luenha river. Concerning the structure of bases, Mucumbura apparently became the main southern base in early 1972, commanded by Nampulula, alias Fernando Matavele, referred to as "the supreme Frelimo general in the area". Mucumbura supplied the two systems of base Chiôco and base Catoé, both in weapons and combatants,⁵⁶ the commander of the latter area being apparently Manuel Mendes.⁵⁷ Throughout 1972, the importance of the areas near Cahora Bassa, Chiôco and the surroundings of the city of Tete is attested by several indications. Nampulula apparently moved eastwards to command security base Matucuto, which became the main base in the area, supplying the others and coordinating local operations.⁵⁸ Based on this system, attacks were frequently held on the Tete-Songo road. Guerrilla military operations and contacts with local people became so frequent and generalised to the point of becoming unnecessary to document it particularly. Information on several new points at which the guerrilla were crossing the Zambezi were frequently gathered by Portuguese intelligence.⁵⁹ Important Portuguese centres suffered direct attacks, like the one which occurred in Chicoo:

"[On September 24, 1972], around 7.40 pm, the IN made a violent attack to the town of Chicoo. The IN fired from three different positions on the northern bank of the Zambezi, near the former village Pantota, from where Chicoo becomes an easy target. The three fronts were armed with 82 and 60mm mortars, cannons, machine-guns and automatic-rifles. They probably also had rocket-launchers. The attack started with the launching of a Very-light, after which came a true *rainstorm* of grenades and tracer bullets, which prevented the NT [our troops] from answering back straight away (our reaction came 8 minutes later); their first grenades hit the fuel deposit, setting the gasoline metal barrels on fire. This, besides making our reaction harder, offered the enemy an easy target since the explosions lightened up the town and the military garrison. (...) During the attack part of the population agglomerated in Chita (the only village which was hit) ran away".⁶⁰

⁵⁶AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.7/72 (8/03/72); PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.15/72 (25/05/72).

⁵⁷Portuguese intelligence on the matter became puzzling at this point. Apparently the area between Chioco and Estima was commanded by Bussemane Agida. The area Chiôco-Marara was commanded by Manuel Mendes leader of bases Catoé/Nhantondo and Nhantondo-Nova, in March. Base Chacole appeared as an advanced sub-base of Nhantondo-Nova, commanded by Biguane. Another commander of this system was Rosário Cantchocho, from base Muchamba. Among others, AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: ZOT, Relatório de Notícia [hereafter RN] no.19/B (11/04/72); PSP/Songo, Ripeco nos.7/72 (8/03/72), 9/72 (20/03/72), 10/72 (24/04/72), 15/72 (25/05/72), 21/72 (28/06/72), and 31/72 (27/09/72); PSP/Songo, RI no.3/72 (14/03/72).

⁵⁸AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.41/72 (27/11/72). Nampulula had been reported in the area much earlier but just for short visits. PSP/Songo, RI no.13/72 (13/04/72).

⁵⁹For example, AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: PSP/Songo, RI no.28/72 (8/06/72); PSP/Songo, Ripeco no.23/72 (30/07/72); PSP/Songo, RIs nos.37/72 (8/08/72) and 39/72 (28/08/72).

⁶⁰AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: AdPa/Chicoo, no.53/A/28 (26/09/72).

Despite the increased pressure of the war and of the military, the GPZ carried on with its programme and approach. In 1972 the re-settlement and re-arrangement plans included the establishment of three new villages in Changara, the "consolidation"⁶¹ of the ones established on the north of the Zambezi, "persuasive" and preliminary works⁶² in *regedorias* Daque, Cachomba, Mágoè-Velho, Chicoa, Charibuca and Chihanda, as well as several studies in Mutarara.⁶³ In 1973, besides the work of "consolidating" the *aldeamentos* formerly established, new ones were established in the southwestern areas: Daque, Inhancapiriri II, Chundiza, Sanângoé and Mágoè-Novo, including 5,700 people. Moreover, re-arrangement in the areas of Caia and Báruè, in the districts of Vila Pery and Beira, led to the formation of 24 *aldeamentos* and confinement of around 24,000 people.⁶⁴

But the contradiction between the approaches of GPZ and ZOT, referred to above, widened during this period. If villagisation in Changara had some strategic meaning in the eyes of Tete's authorities, re-settlement in the southwestern areas was not as important for them as in the surroundings of the city of Tete. With respect to the latter, the GPZ had included in its 1972 plan the elaboration of soil maps and water probing of the vital area along the Tete-Songo road,⁶⁵ as well as the re-arrangement of Mungari, on the confluence of rivers Zambezi and Luenha, already on the southern bank of the latter but near the city of Tete. As the GPZ was doing this work with its "technocratic pace", the Tete government informed it that villagisation in the Tete-Songo priority area was being undertaken anyway, as fast as possible, and that GPZ's studies would only be taken into account if completed in time. The fact of them being delayed would never be a reason for delaying the process.⁶⁶ Subsequently, in the *concelho* of Tete 36 *aldeamentos* were established in 1972 by the District authorities with the help of the military, and further 20 in 1973, a number which, in itself,

⁶¹By consolidation was meant mechanical land bush-clearing, construction of common buildings such as first-aid posts, schools, storehouses, etc.

⁶²By preliminary works was meant soil mapping, water probing and several other studies.

⁶³AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1972). Mutarara, considered as a strategically important area under all criteria, was included in GPZ's work as a "re-arrangement" area.

⁶⁴AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatório de Actividade" (1973).

⁶⁵Including *regedorias* Jaqueta, Jóia, Domingos, Chiundiza, Coutinho, Marqueza, Matambo and Rego, meaning the broad area between Cahora Bassa and the city of Tete.

⁶⁶See AHM, FGG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Reunião Sectorial da Comissão Coordenadora Provincial - Anexo da Secretaria Provincial de Terras e Povoamento" (12/04/72).

did not give much room for development and social concerns with the *aldeamentos*, let alone preliminary works and persuasion, as it will be seen in the next chapter.

c) The Struggle for Moatize

In the meantime, Frelimo's 2nd Sector, corresponding to the Portuguese areas of Bene, Macanga, Angónia and Moatize, developed a dynamics of guerrilla advance not very different from the one above. After the difficulties it went through together with Marávia in late 1968, guerrilla activities were resumed and rapidly spread to reach as far as the parallel of Chiúta in 1970, including the entire areas of Bene and Macanga, and a great part of Angónia. The key for this rapid and overwhelming advance lay in several factors: The already mentioned widening of the rear base, disposed along the northern border from the Capoché river to the Dzaranhama mountain range; a skilful tactics which combined cutting roads through land-mining and ambushing with hit-and-run operations; and above all, an improved internal organisation if compared to the one in 1968.

The Sector was sub-divided in detachments, each one having a commander and provided with a main base. However, territorial sub-division seems to have been rather fluid, and could not be otherwise if the hardships faced in terms of communications are considered. Each detachment, beyond a central coordination for the main strategic definitions, translated into the *missions* registered in Table 7.1, was to have had a great degree of autonomy. Beyond the main detachment base, many other bases coexisted within the territorial range of each detachment, with great differences in nature from each other. There were central bases, frontier bases, training bases, bases to stockpile equipment, hospital bases. There were people bases where lived the population who had run away from the areas under Portuguese control. And there were small operational bases of a couple of combatants with the mission, for instance, of land-mining a road or performing ambushes. Different co-related bases were included in one base system for which each base performed a specific role. One particular aspect of the bases was their mobility. Often, the seizure of a base and the capture of its people provided the colonial intelligence services with the knowledge of the entire base system, which provoked the relocation of its bases, though they frequently moved to a place nearby. However, small bases tended obviously to be much more mobile than large ones. Some important bases were so well defended, with small satellite bases forming a security

perimeter, that the Portuguese army could only reach them by air. Base Beira, for instance, which was located by the Portuguese as early as 1968, was still in the same region in 1972 and perhaps later.

All guerrilla activities within the sector were coordinated by the sector base which was, in turn, subordinated to the Provincial Base located in the 1st Sector. Commanded by Ernesto Campo,⁶⁷ the sector base was located at river Mepule, not far from the main supply line, which came from the border down along rivers Muangadzi and Luia, but also having the southern front within reach. It directed the implementation of the objectives defined by Frelimo for this zone, which were vital to the pursuit of the nationalist struggle in the Tete Front. Besides the broad one of widening guerrilla presence in the area,⁶⁸ it was to provide an alternative line leading to the environs of Cahora-Bassa and the city of Tete,⁶⁹ which was achieved particularly by detachments 3 and 12 (see Table 7.1 and Map 6.4). But above all, what the 2nd Sector was to achieve was the creation of conditions for the establishment of Tete's 3rd Sector, in Mutarara. In fact, the latter was meaningful in at least two main strategic senses. First of all, it would provide a corridor alternative to Changara, leading directly to Sofala and Zambézia, which if established would boost the struggle to unprecedented levels.⁷⁰ Secondly, the presence of guerrilla combatants in Mutarara would facilitate sabotaging the railway line which supplied the Cahora Bassa works. Table 7.1 provides a picture of Frelimo's operational structure in 1971, in its 2nd Sector.


⁶⁷AHM, FM, Cx.110: DGS/Tete, RI no.147/DI/2/Gab (10/11/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.46/70 (13/11/70), mentions the sectoral base in the 2nd sector as commanded by Rudolfo Mendes who had Ernesto Campo as his deputy. Both names probably corresponded to the same person.

⁶⁸One which included penetration in Angónia, an area of relatively dense European population and agricultural development.

⁶⁹We saw above how this was successfully achieved, with guerrilla units from the 2nd Sector probably arriving in the area of Marara, south of the Zambesi, some months before the ones coming from the river Daque penetration route.

⁷⁰It goes without saying that reaching an area such as Gorongosa, where a central base for the entire country could be established, was an old dream of Frelimo since at least 1966. See AHM, FM, Cx.102: SCCIM/Tete, RInfo no.1/66 (14/03/66). In fact, the Gorongosa mountain range seems to keep its strategic importance across the various historic periods, from the days of *prazo* landlord Gouveia through the nationalist struggle to the present day struggle of Renamo.

MAP 7.4: FRELIMO GUERRILLA SECTORS IN TETE: THE SECOND SECTOR



- GUERRILLA BASES
- ▨ SECTOR BORDERS
- 2 2ND SECTOR DETACHMENTS
- MAIN ROADS

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TABLE 7.1:
FRELIMO'S 2ND SECTOR

DETACHMENT	BASE AREA	COMMANDER	MEN	MISSION
Head of Sector	Mepule	E.Campo	63	Sector coord. Bene-Tembué road.
1st	Vila Gamito	I.Minga	60	Frontier security. V.Gamito roads.
2nd	Furancungo	A.Cambuco	51	Furancungo roads.
3rd	Mange	S.Chissale	49	Preparing to cross the Zambezi.
4th	Chiúta	R.Caliombe	25	Casula-Chiúta roads. Zambezi. Preparations in Moatize.
5th	Casula	A.Sambo	29	Casula-Chiúta-Tete roads.
6th	Angónia	Ricardo	34	Furancungo-Angónia-Zóbuè roads.
7th	Chintukula	Sambo		Frontier security. Chitucula road.
8th	Chale	Machava		Transport of material. Bene-Tembué road.
9th	Zóbuè	A.Caminho	15	Zóbuè-Tete road. Preparations for 4th Sector.
10th	Matope	A.Maccuro		Casula-Furancungo-Angónia roads.
11th	Ponde	C.Caphulica		Casula-Chiúta road.
12th	Zangaia	D.Deuja		Preparations near the city of Tete.
13th	M'tsizi	S.Gouvicia	9	Sectoral training base. Furancungo roads.
14th	Mavudzi			Moatize area. Railways sabotage.
15th	Maué			Tete-Casula, Moatize-Zóbuè roads.
Base Beira		F.Sande	20	Protection of sectorial base.
Screco		Romão Banda		Reconnaissance unit of sector.
Sabotage Sub-Sec.		H.L.Lipewa	25	Sabotage unit. Bridges, railways.
Health Sub-Section				Sectoral unit of health.
Ed/Cult.Sub-Sec.				Sectoral unit of education.
Prod.Sub-Section				Sectoral unit of production.

Source: AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: BCaç 2895/Furancungo, RI no.1/71 (1/05/71); AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

In Moatize, perhaps more than in the areas south of the Zambezi, Frelimo's need to get the support of local people and their authorities was very acute. With the exclusion of some northern parts of Zóbuè, Moatize was more densely populated, had more roads traversing its territory and a much higher European presence, meaning that the chances of

detecting guerrilla units was also much higher.⁷¹ Moreover, when they first arrived in the area, the combatants did not encounter a stabilised population, since the process of villagisation was underway, with people's disequilibrium resulting from it obviously affecting the support they could give to the guerrillas. But the first Frelimo reconnaissance units arriving in the *Concelho* of Moatize also encountered some favourable factors at the level of the *regedorias*. The area had some traditions of nationalist struggle revealed in the 1960s support to Banda's Malawi Congress Party, to Chagonga's UNAMI and to the first attempts of Frelimo to establish itself there. In addition, several displays of resistance to harsher forms of colonial exploitation, such as the forced cotton growing or the clearance of rural roads, had also occurred in a recent past.⁷²

The detachments of Frelimo's 2nd Sector concerned with implementing the guerrilla's advance into the area of Moatize were, in early 1971, the 4th and the 9th.⁷³ From Muchena, in eastern Casula, Macanga, the 4th detachment found direct access both to the northern *regedorias* of Moatize's central area and Zóbuè.⁷⁴ Frelimo's reconnaissance in Moatize was

⁷¹"(...) logically, the enemy's intentions are not the ones of hitting Marávia, or Bene, or Macanga, areas much less interesting economically, with fewer activities, and therefore serving as springboard for a much more meaningful action... Moatize is the vital centre of the District... Moatize will soon develop great activities, particularly mining, it has the railway line, the road leading to Malawi, etc." Intervention of Moatize's District Commissioner in AHM, SE, 237: GDT/SDAC, "Acta das Sessões da Reunião dos Administradores e do Intendente com o Governador do Distrito" (29/12/70):19.

⁷²Amongst other evidence, deportation of *régulo* Sipanela for 5 years, and suspension of *regulos* Chacala and Chaleca for propaganda meetings in favour of UNAMI, and detention of *régulo* Zacarias for supporting the Malawi Congress Party (AHM, FM, Cx.97, AdConc/Moatize, no.390/A/9 (8/11/62); resistance of *fumo* Buluaio, from *regedoria* Chintamuende, and *fumo* Beira, from *regedoria* Cambuêmbua, to forced cotton growing (AHM, FM, Cx.101: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, nos.3/A/9 (8/02/66) and 1/D/1 (1/03/64); Cx.102: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.4/66 (8/02/66); widespread resistance to road clearance, census and cotton growing in Mogunda, in spite of the local *régulo*, very unpopular, supporting the colonial authorities (AHM, FM, Cx.103: AdPa Zóbuè, BI no.36/66 (9/11/66), and Cx.107: AdPa/Zóbuè, no.44/A/18 (20/08/68)). Finally, for Frelimo's premature attempts to establish a network in the area see Borges Coelho 1984; Borges Coelho 1991:103-132.

⁷³Through the end of that year detachments 14 and 15 also started acting further south, particularly land-mining and ambushing the Tete-Zóbuè road and sabotaging the railway line. Of course this territorial attachment must be taken in relative terms due to the great flexibility which always characterized guerrilla activities. Detachment overlapping was frequent and sub-sections such as reconnaissance and sabotage acted in all the areas according to their specific missions.

⁷⁴Several sources describe these routes. For example, AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Casula, BI no.7/70, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.13/70 (27/03/70); AdPa/Casula, MR no.27/70 (23/05/70), and ComSec F, Sitrep no.21/70, in GDT, Sitrep no.22/70 (29/05/70); GDT, RI no.12/70, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.25/70 (19/06/70); and DGS, Rel.no.1973 (30/09/70), in GDT, Sitrep no.41/70 (9/10/70). The same routes were used by people running away from the villagisation process which was starting in Casula, seeking areas not yet villagised in Zóbuè, or out of "villagisation risk" in bordering Malawi. See, for example, SCCIM/Tete, no.147/A/21, s/d, in GDT, Sitrep no.31/70 (31/07/70).

first noticed in May 1970, when *régulo* Mantenga was visited by a guerrilla unit, apparently based in neighbouring *regedoria* Tundumula, in search of local information.⁷⁵ Some months later followed the first arrivals to Zóbuè, from Muchena and also from Chibaene, in the south of Angónia. In Zóbuè, the combatants found a diversified situation, in so far as the support from the *regulos* was concerned. *Régulo* Zacarias, with recognised contacts with the nationalists in the past, welcomed the combatants.⁷⁶ *Régulo* Mogunda, on the contrary, openly embraced the party of the authorities. It could not have been differently, according to the interesting picture of *regedoria* Mogunda given in a former note from Zóbuè:

"[According to *régulo* Mogunda], the authorities subordinated to him [chiefs of group of villages and chiefs of villages] do not follow his orders neither do they convey them to the people. Moreover, we verified that the rural road approaching the centre of the *regedoria*, which is almost impassable due to the rough characteristics of the area, had not been restored in spite of insistent recommendations from this Post. Customarily, local people are the ones doing this job (...). A similar situation had already occurred in 1965, when the *régulo*, on the verge of *drowning* from lack of authority and prestige, asked for the help of this Post. We appealed to Bissuasse Minjale, a famous sorcerer in the area, who supposedly gave the *régulo* the means to restore a certain balance in the loose grip of his traditional governance (...). The *régulo* had enjoyed a considerable prestige until 1965, due to the influence and popularity of his mother, who died in that year. (...) The *régulo* is perhaps suffering an old deep-seated hatred and resentment rooted in the forced cotton growing which he implemented (and which was the cause of flight of the majority of the population), and in the restrictions he imposed on certain traditional ceremonies (...)"⁷⁷

Curiously, the same "sorcerer" Bissuasse was the one who helped Frelimo combatants, through his influence (and also his canoe), to cross the Revubué river and enter into *regedoria* Mogunda. The *régulo* ended up being abducted and killed.⁷⁸ In *regedoria* M'Boola the situation was a little different. Here, the original *régulo* M'Boola had been arrested by PIDE and taken to the city of Tete, accused of having collaborated with former Frelimo attempts to enter the area. His son, trusted by the authorities, had been appointed as the new *régulo*. When Frelimo guerrillas entered the *regedoria*, in April or May 1971, they

⁷⁵Description of events in AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdConc/Moatize, BIs nos.5/70 (25/05/70) and 6/70 (29/05/70). Early reconnaissance activities of Frelimo in the area can be seen, for example in AHM, FM, Cx.110: ComSec F, Sitrep no.51/69 (22/12/69), in GDT, Sitrep no.3/70 (16/01/70), describing how a group left Zambia and progressed through the border between Angónia and Malawi down to Zóbuè.

⁷⁶AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.9/71 (22/04/71); Cx.109: DGS, no.180/71/DU2/Gab (24/06/71). At least one of Zacarias' *fumos* supported the authorities and was abducted by Frelimo when heading to village N'taca for collecting taxes. AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.15/71 (5/08/71).

⁷⁷AHM, FM, Cx.107: AdPa/Zóbuè, no.44/A/18 (20/08/68).

⁷⁸AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.8/71 (11/03/71). And Cx.109: SCCIM/Tete, MR no.5/71 (6/02/71), saying: "Reliable source informs that *regedor* Mogunda was killed by the terrorists, accused of being a PIDE agent."

faced an unequivocal opposition on the part not just of the *régulo* but also of a number of his *fumos*. A pattern of attack on "traditional" villages was then installed, with abductions and killings of some of these traditional authorities, who responded by denouncing guerrilla positions to the authorities. *Régulo* M'Boola himself was killed in October, in the course of events which resulted in massive population flights to Malawi.⁷⁹ The rest of Zóbuè's *regedorias*, namely Catábua, Cambuêmbua and Chimarizene, went through a process comparable to the one in Zacarias, with the most preeminent traditional authorities supporting the combatants,⁸⁰ which led the desperate District Commissioner to summarise the situation by saying that "in this *concelho*, *régulos* Mantenga, from the central area, and M'Boola, from Zóbuè, were victims of terrorism (...). *Régulo* Chacala vanished with all his people and we don't know if he is dead or alive (...). In Zóbuè, we don't know either where most of the *régulos* are (...)"⁸¹

In less than one year Frelimo was installed in the whole territory of Zóbuè and in some of the most important *regedorias* of Moatize's central area, which gave the guerrilla forces the possibility to do the first attacks on the Moatize-Malawi road, and to install themselves near the railway line. Tadeu Makhaza, who headed Frelimo's sub-sector of sabotage in this area recalls that

"We destroyed many trains [on the Beira-Moatize railway], particularly since we adopted a new tactics. At the beginning we would simply set up the landmines on the railway and leave. But their counter-sabotage, the engineering units, would come to remove them. This was a problem for us. But then we received new equipment. We placed the landmines connected with a wire and would stay there until the train arrived. We would then blow everything up. They had no time to dig the landmines out any more. We destroyed bridges and sabotaged the Zóbuè road."⁸²

⁷⁹AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BIs nos.10/71 (26/04/71), and 14/71 (26/04/71); Cx.109: OPVDC/Tete, Participação s/n (2/08/71); Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BIs nos.19/71 (6/09/71), 22/71 (13/10/71), and 24/71 (2/11/71). M'Boola villages which suffered attacks were at least Lavene, Canga, M'Boola, Lezia and Candié. Visits of Zóbuè's local administrator to Malawi, attempting to retrieve people who had escaped, in AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.23/71 (22/10/71).

⁸⁰For Catábua, AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.12/71 (8/06/71); AdConc/Moatize, no.145/B/I/3 (27/08/71). For Cambuêmbua, AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdConc/Moatize, BI no.7/71 (14/04/71). For Chimarizene, AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BI no.18/71 (30/08/71).

⁸¹AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, Mns. s/n (8/04/72).

⁸²Tadeu Makhaza in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview. In September several ambushes and landmining were undertaken in both the Zóbuè road and the Moatize railway line. See AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Zóbuè, BIs nos.19/71 (6/09/71), and 21/71 (16/09/71), amongst other references. According to AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdConc/Moatize, no.53/A/28 (23/04/71), the Malawi government exerted pressure on Frelimo in order to prevent these attacks. By doing them Frelimo was probably, in its turn, pressurising back Malawi in order to get permission to establish guerrilla bases at the border areas. On the first signs that the railway line, and

The colonial response to this advance was delayed by the difficulties they were experiencing with villagisation. This was a phase in which Tete had not a locally based villagisation programme, and Moatize, particularly, had several problems of land and water availability to locate the *aldeamentos*, as it will be seen in the next chapter. Consequently, the first reactions did not follow a pattern, the military responding furiously to the signs of popular support to the combatants. In September, near Moatize, for example, a platoon reacted to a guerrilla sabotage operation by arresting all men in village Cambué, killing some of them, burning all the houses and apprehending their food reserves. This event, which deserved protest from local civil authorities and which was behind the formation of *aldeamento* Ussalo, formed of people from Cambué and other nearby villages, illustrates the lack of coordination going on between civil and military authorities.⁸³ Meanwhile, these hardships imposed by the approaching war and the fierce military reaction, provoked massive population flights to neighbouring Malawi, in the frontier areas of which 15,000 Mozambicans were reported as living as early as September 1971.⁸⁴

The *aldeamentos* established in Moatize in 1971 were limited to two nuclei, one on the road to Chiúta-Macanga and the other in the environs of Moatize, plus three *aldeamentos* in Caldas Xavier. While the first group denoted that Frelimo's strong position in southern Macanga was *overflowing* into northern Tete, threatening the city of Tete itself, the second one revealed the authorities' worries in protecting Moatize, including the nearby road to Malawi and the railway line. As to the *aldeamentos* in Caldas Xavier, they were included in the attempt to protect the railway line and to close the corridor leading to Mutarara. In spite of these "sketches", the fact is that the response of the authorities was far from being an efficient counter-insurgency measure, since large tracts corresponding to the whole area of Zóbuè and parts of Caldas Xavier and the Central Area, if not abandoned to Frelimo's advance, were at least left to be coped with through erratic military punitive operations while the capacity to villagise was not yet assembled.

even the city of Moatize itself, were in danger, AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdConc/Moatize, no.108/A/28 (19/07/71).

⁸³AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdConc/Moatize, BI no.11/71 (1/10/71): "Yesterday, around 7 p.m., a large group of old men, women and children (...) from village Cambué, *fumo* Zuze, *regedoria* Chaleca, clearly alarmed and frightened, approached this administration seeking protection. (...) This situation was apparently provoked by the NT [our troops]. (...) The District Administrator contacted the military forces to find out..."

⁸⁴AHM, FM, Cx.108: SCCIM/Tete, no.163/D/16 (21/09/71), of which 1,000 from Caldas Xavier, according to AHM, FM, Cx.108: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.33/D/16 (8/10/71), and 4,000 from Zóbuè, according to a 1972 estimation in AHM, FM, Cx.110: SCCIM/Tete, no.56/A/15 (17/10/72).

MAP 7.5: THE WAR IN MOATIZE (1971)




Table 7.2 is an attempt to quantify the extent to which the counter-insurgency forces achieved the "anticipation factor" in villagisation, meaning at what point did the authorities managed to form strategic villages *before* the combatants were present at the particular areas. Of course, it is a table based on "slipping elements", such as the setting of a date for the starting of the guerrilla struggle, in the first place: Most of the times, if not always, guerrilla military operations were preceded by reconnaissance and "popular mobilization", which were, by definition, secretly undertaken and therefore inaccessible to Portuguese intelligence. Consequently, only very relatively can it be affirmed whether guerrilla warfare had began or not at a particular time and place. Guerrilla war is considered here as occurring in one place when guerrilla forces were firstly reported as being installed there through "disturbing" local people, setting up guerrilla bases and undertaking the first attacks on colonial targets. Next, it was assessed what level of reaction were the authorities capable of disclosing, in terms of preventing the people from contacting the guerrilla forces, which was translated into *aldeamentos* formed so far. Finally, confrontation of the number of *aldeamentos* already formed by then with the totals of *aldeamentos* established by the end of the war gave us the percentage of *aldeamentos* formed before the arrival of the guerrilla forces,⁸⁵ or the extent in which the counter-insurgency forces achieved the "anticipation factor" in each area. Perhaps the first indication standing out from Table 7.2 is the rapid expansion of the guerrilla struggle. In around four years it blanketed the whole territory of Tete. On the other hand, colonial response in the same period was a huge effort, involving all sectors of the state to pursue the villagisation programme, which came also to cover the entire territory. But clearly, the colonial state was always a step behind. As to the anticipation factor, its achievement was certainly increased towards the end of the period, which seems understandable if one takes into account not only the evolution of the state District structures described in Chapter 6, but also the fact that as the struggle developed, its aims and targets became more discernible to the authorities.

⁸⁵Generally, guerrilla struggle entered into the different areas "to stay". There only occurred once, in late 1968, the eradication of guerrilla combatants from certain areas, which happened for a short period. See Borges Coelho 1989:92-102.

TABLE 7.2:
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE "ANTICIPATION FACTOR" IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY'S
VILLAGISATION IN TETE

Area	Starting of Guerrilla	Ald. Formed by then	Total of Ald. (1968-1974)	"Anticipation Factor" (%)
MARÁVIA			14	13%
-Central Area	Oct 1968	2	5	40
-Chofombo	Mar 1968	0	5	0
-Vasco da Gama	Aug 1968	0	4	0
MACANGA			29	6%
-Central Area	Mar 1968	0	11	0
-Chiúta	Sep 1969	2	12	17
-Casula	Mar 1970	0	6	0
BENE			7	0%
-Central Area	Mar 1968	0	6	0
-Vila Gamito	Mar 1968	0	1	0
ANGÓNIA			18	0%
-Central Area	Mar 1970	0	2	0
-Metengobalame	May 1970	0	2	0
-Dómuè	Sep 1969	0	12	0
-Tsangano	Jul 1970	0	2	0
ZUMBO			10	0%
-Central Area	Feb 1970	0	7	0
-Zâmbué	Mar 1970	0	2	0
-Messandaluz	Oct 1969	0	1	0
MÁGOÈ			14	0%
-Central Area	Sep 1970	0	11	0
-Mucumbura	Nov 1970	0	3	0
CABORA-BASSA			24	33%
-Central Area	Jul 1971	9	9	100
-Chicoa	Nov 1970	0	9	0
-Chipera	Jul 1969	0	6	0
MOATIZE			44	38%
-Central Area	Apr 1971	14	35	40
-Zóbuè	Apr 1971	0	5	0
-Caldas Xavier	Dec 1971	3	4	75
TETE			62	15%
-Central Area	Aug 1971	0	34	0
-Marara	Jun 1971	0	14	0
-Chiôco	Nov 1970	0	4	0
-Changara	Sep 1971	6	10	60
MUTARARA			29	62%
-Central Area	May 1972	8	14	57
-Ancuaze	May 1972	10	15	67
Average (% of aldeamentos formed before arrival of guerrilla)				17%

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

The percentage of anticipation in the early stage almost equalled zero, the two *aldeamentos* formed in Marávia and Macanga being practically irrelevant. In extensive areas such as Bene, Angónia,⁸⁶ Zumbo and Mágoè, the confinement of population simply followed the arrival of the guerrilla forces. However, as the District's capability increased, with the 1971 Central Plan and particularly with the 1972 District Plan as we will discuss in the next chapter, so the achievement of the anticipation factor improved. Areas where the conflict was declared from 1971 on revealed more *aldeamentos* already established when the guerrilla forces first entered into it, as was the case of Cahora Bassa, Tete, Moatize and particularly Mutarara. Even so, the overall conclusion to be drawn from Table 7.2 is undoubtedly the very low percentage in the achievement of the anticipation factor.

d) Frelimo and the *Aldeamentos*

Frelimo's objectives in the struggle for the people in the *aldeamentos* were diametrically opposed to the colonial ones. If the authorities were vitally interested in confining the people within the *aldeamentos* and, if possible, in proving the benefits people could draw from being confined, Frelimo, on the contrary, did its best to render the development of the *aldeamentos* unviable by several means, ranging from military operations to infiltration and pressure upon its inhabitants. The objective of Frelimo's clandestine incursions⁸⁷ into the *aldeamentos* was to gather information on military and militia targets through an internal network of agents, to winning new recruits and to assure people's support of several kinds, including foodstuffs which played sometimes a vital role in maintaining the guerrilla forces. Despite the colonial attempts to control the people several sources witness how close contacts between Frelimo and the people within the *aldeamento* were in many cases, as revealed in a report on an attack to *aldeamento* Sungo, in August 29, 1973, at 3.00 am:

"The attack targeted the militia garrison and the IN group entered through the quarter of *fumo* Deca without the alarm being given by his people. Next, on *half-moon* position, they attacked the militia garrison with automatic weapons. The militia fired back for some time but had to disperse as they ran out of ammunition

⁸⁶In Angónia, it should be recalled, the relative negligence displayed by the colonial forces had its causes in the consideration of the area as "naturally villagised": They had assumed that the large agglomerates occurring in the area would be "defended" through traditional means such as simply the placement of police and militia. Though later, "normal" *aldeamentos* were also established there.

⁸⁷On these "clandestine incursions", for example, AHM, FM, Cx.111: BCaç no.3865, no.276/3 P.390.6 (16/01/73).

(...). 33 houses from *régulo* Chassaia and militia soldiers were put on fire. All medicines in the first-aid station were stolen. Food stocks in the houses of militia soldiers and *régulo* Chassaia were also taken away. (...) The 2,000 people from the *aldeamento* were reduced, after the attack, to 235 women and 65 men, children excluded (...). The *régulo* and part of the population wanted to abandon the *aldeamento* and a meeting was held to convince them to stay (...). The *GComb* [military combat group] searched the area of *fumo* Deca inside the *aldeamento*, having found it deserted and the houses locked. This led us to believe that this people knew the attack was going to take place (...)⁸⁸

From 1968 to 1970, the pattern of Frelimo operations was one of cutting the roads through land-mine planting and ambushing, in order to disrupt the Portuguese defensive system, making military movements harder and isolating the villages. This pattern was pursued as the *aldeamentos* were increasingly settled on the terrain, in parallel with operations directly targeting at them. Such operations aimed at the village as well as its surroundings. In order to discuss them with more detail we established a "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete", based on a weekly account of ZOT's 4th Section, covering the period between April 1972 and July 1974, and concerning operations targeting exclusively the people in the *aldeamentos*,⁸⁹ therefore excluding operations involving the army or even the militia as such, as well as operations of another kind such as ambushing of convoys, army operations, and so forth. Of course, the present record does not cover *all* the operations involving the people, each and every incident which occurred in each *aldeamento*. Possibilities of information being lost were numerous, from a not so high control on the *aldeamentos* and error or omission in transmitting the information, to problems of statistical registration. However, the fact of being based on *memoranda* issued on a weekly base, and of presenting all incidents of this nature which came to the knowledge of ZOT's information department confers on it some reliability and relevance. We classified the 706 operations registered during the last two years of the war into 6 major types, inside the *aldeamento* and on its surroundings, the former including attacks and *flagellations*⁹⁰ (31.5%), and the latter

⁸⁸AHM, FM, Cx.111: Oficial Enquadrante de Milícias, Relatório de Defesa de Aldeamentos com Milícias [hereafter RDAM] no.9/73, in BCaç 3865, no.3300/3 Po.300.5.003 (7/09/73). Significantly, the son of the *régulo* himself joined the guerrilla forces, coming back to the *aldeamentos* at intervals to take new people with him. See AHM, FM, Cx.110: BArt 6220, no.395/74-Anexo (18/04/74).

⁸⁹AHM, FM, Cx.111: ZOT/4a.Secção, *Memorandum*. This weekly issue covered two main aspects, namely, 1. Enemy's actions upon the population during the period; and 2. People presenting themselves to the authorities during the period. The Record we are working with here is based on the first item. For the complete Record see AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

⁹⁰The Portuguese authorities used the term *flagelação* (here translated into *flagellations* and also referred to as *whipping bursts* in some American literature) to report sudden and short attacks, by contrast with "proper" attacks in which the guerrilla forces revealed the intention of penetrating, occupying or winning a dispute.

landmines activated (17%), ambushes (6%), cattle stealing (16%), and food stealing and pillage (7%). Abductions (20%) occurred both at the *aldeamentos* and in its surroundings. Other types, such as selective killings or pasture poisoning and devastation, were not included due to their minor incidence. Table 7.3 shows the evolution of such operations throughout the period.

TABLE 7.3:
REGISTERED FRELIMO OPERATIONS AGAINST THE *ALDEAMENTOS*, APRIL 1972-JUNE 1974

Year	Period	Attacks and <i>Flagellations</i>	Abductions	Landmines	Ambushes	Cattle Stealing	Food Stealing
1972	Apr-Jun	12	10	2	1	0	2
	Jul-Sep	27	16	11	2	0	0
	Oct-Dec	28	18	35	4	2	1
1973	Jan-Mar	21	17	13	3	4	4
	Apr-Jun	24	11	11	5	16	3
	Jul-Sep	38	14	16	8	26	6
	Oct-Dec	30	20	12	6	43	6
1974	Jan-Mar	17	18	7	9	23	15
	Apr-Jun	26	10	12	5	4	17
TOTALS		223	134	119	43	118	54

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo operations against the *aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

Military operations directly targeting the *aldeamentos* were considered as *flagellations* when attacks did not include the intention of penetrating into the *aldeamentos* but just of firing artillery or lighter weaponry from a distance aiming at damaging the village or disturbing its life. In the category of *attacks and flagellations* the latter occurred with much lower incidence. As to attacks, they were, in the early days, launched by a relatively small number of combatants, from 5 to 15, but from late 1973 they tended, if not to increase in frequency, to improve the level of threat to the *aldeamento*. The occurrence of attacks held by larger units, from 30 to 100 combatants or even more, became more frequent. In parallel, significant improvements in the weaponry rendered attacks much more serious. Common weaponry employed in attacks on *aldeamentos* were *Simonov* semi-automatic rifles and *Shpagin* (PPsh) M41 automatic rifles, gradually replaced by AKM and AK Kalashnikov automatic rifles in the early 1970s; *Degtyarev* DP and RDP light machine guns; *Dagtyarev-Shpagin* machine-guns; RPG-2 and P-27 grenade launchers; 60 and 82mm mortars; cannons and the most

feared by the Portuguese authorities, the 122mm rockets, introduced towards the end of 1972.⁹¹ The following excerpt describes what could be considered a typical attack on an *aldeamento*, in this case Caldas Xavier:

"Yesterday, around 20.30 pm, this village came under intense fire from mortars, *bazookas* and automatic weapons, for about 45 minutes. The army forces and the civil defence [Militia unit] answered back and hit the hill from where the assailants were firing. They managed to get into the village and in the Nyungwe and Sena *aldeamentos* [wards inside the *aldeamento*], from where they fired at the Battalion's headquarters and the Militia's garrison. However, they ended up being expelled. During the attack they shouted phrases like "we are not here for civilians, just for the military", "go away, this is our land", "if you want war you're going to get it", and "the ones who consider themselves as our brothers must come with us". The people from the *aldeamentos* sought protection in the bush and it was morning already when they started returning"⁹²

Notwithstanding the dramatic aspects involved in these attacks, they were not so *productive* as one could be led to conclude. In fact, the average number of dead and wounded in each attack is well below ten, and if there were some cases of attacks leading to the temporary abandonment of the *aldeamento* by its people, or to its severe damaging, these were relatively rare indeed.⁹³ Moreover, and in spite of the isolation of great numbers of *aldeamentos*, cases of them being occupied following an attack did not occur.⁹⁴ But it has to be said that the high percentage of attacks from the general record of operations in the period contradicts in part some readings according to which Frelimo's war was a mere war

⁹¹On the introduction and use of the 122mm rockets, referred to amongst the nationalist combatants as "B11 heavy weapons", see AAC/Tete 1992: Interview. These weapons were used for the first time during a major attack to the Chingodzi airport, on the environs of the city of Tete, described by Tadeu Makhaza. The second was an also major attack on the military garrison of Gago Coutinho, in Marávia, described by Evenia Seven. See, for Portuguese references on this issue, AHM, FM, Cx.110: SCCIM/Tete, no.3/72 (2/08/72); SCCIM, Mens. no.146/SI/74 (11/07/74); and Cx.111: SCCIM/Tete, Mens. no.13/73 (20/01/73).

⁹²AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, BI no.1/74 (26/06/74).

⁹³The most serious cases were the following: in September 23, 1973, *aldeamento* Fortuna was almost completely demolished during an attack which, however, produced only 4 dead and 1 wounded; in November 16, 1973, *aldeamento* Cachege suffered a severe attack launched by a group of 50 combatants, which in spite of causing only 2 deaths, almost destroyed the entire village and led its inhabitants to seek temporary refuge in neighbouring *aldeamentos* Pacassa and Goba; in January 6, 1974, occurred perhaps the most deadly attack of all, launched by a group of 60 men against *aldeamento* Nhacambo and causing 17 dead, 25 wounded, as well as the demolition of "80%" of the village; finally, in February 27, 1974, a heavily armed group destroyed 143 huts during an attack on *aldeamento* Chiponda, which caused 3 dead and 2 wounded. See AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

⁹⁴If we obviously except the episodes which occurred after the *coup* of the 25th of April 1974, which gave way to a period of turmoil and confusion which lasted for a couple of months, and during which at least one *aldeamento* was effectively occupied after an attack, *aldeamento* Nachinanga, in June 7, 1974. See AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

of land-mines and hit-and-run ambushes. The attacks on the *aldeamentos* revealed a hard commitment in fighting for the land and people, and in rendering life in the *aldeamentos* virtually unbearable.

Much more deadly and consuming in the long run were guerrilla operations against the surroundings of the *aldeamentos*, mostly the fields left for people growing their crops. There occurred the overwhelming majority of abduction and landmine incidents, which together represented almost 40 percent of the operations recorded. In part, many confrontations in the *machambas* occurred because of the presence of militia soldiers who were there supposedly to protect the peasants and engaged in combat with the guerrilla units: A great part of the ambushing operations reported had the *machambas* as scenario. However, landmine planting targeted more than just militia soldiers and, as the "dirty" part of the war, aimed at preventing the subsistence in the *aldeamentos* at any cost, rendering the mere act of producing an everyday risk. Anti-personal landmines were planted on the paths usually used by the population to collect water,⁹⁵ on the *machambas* themselves or on the access roads, producing a growing number of amputated people in the *aldeamentos*. Table 7.4 reports the losses inflicted by the operations we have been discussing on the people in the *aldeamentos*, according to ZOT's records, and revealing an unquestionable tendency to increase:

TABLE 7.4:
POPULATION LOSSES IN THE *ALDEAMENTOS* DUE TO FRELIMO ATTACKS
ACCORDING TO PORTUGUESE MILITARY SOURCES

Year	Period	Dead	Wounded	Abducted
1972 ^a	April-June	2	22	44
	July-September	9	44	85
	October-December	22	72	74
1973	January-March	9	27	84
	April-June	10	40	38
	July-September	71	97	68
	October-December	18	52	184
1974	January-March	39	56	111
	April-June	37	63	124

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

⁹⁵*Aldeamento* Soronhate, in October 27, 1972; *aldeamento* Mangaze in November 24 of the same year, for instance. See AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

There also occurred on the *machambas* and environs in general, some more rare operations such as alleged crop devastation and pasture poisoning, and particularly most of the reported abductions. ZOT's criteria, classifying these abductions and implying a distinction from mere breakouts, which cannot securely be made, are rather unclear. The reason why abductions were included here is twofold: on the one hand, they allegedly represented an important part of the guerrilla operations against the *aldeamentos*, and on the other, when compared to data on population presentations in the *aldeamentos* they are likely to produce some light in the understanding of population movements between the *aldeamentos* and the people bases controlled by Frelimo. However, a great part of these abductions were perhaps genuine, forming part of the guerrilla pressure to force the people to leave the *aldeamentos*.

A peculiar type of operation was the stealing of cattle from the *aldeamentos*, which apparently began occurring by late 1972 and was ceaselessly increased towards the end of the war, particularly in the traditional cattle breeding areas of the southeast and northeast. Even considering that a part of the cattle stolen was to feed the combatants and people under their control, numbers involved suggest that this was an extra way of attacking the economy of the *aldeamentos*. *Aldeamento* Mufa, for example, located in an area particularly suitable for cattle breeding northwest of the city of Tete and close to the Zambezi river, suffered 14 such operations during the one year period between February 1973 and January 1974, having lost at least 706 cows and 70 goats, of which all goats and only 16 cows were reportedly retrieved by militia pursuit operations.⁹⁶ Table 7.5 shows this type of operation in numbers, still according to ZOT's records.

Finally, ZOT's records registered that 149 out of Tete's 250 *aldeamentos* suffered at least one of the operations referred to above.⁹⁷ Interestingly, almost half of the operations recorded were directed against 10% of the *aldeamentos*, which raises the question of the reason for such an incidence, taking the example of at least some of the villages included in that group. *Aldeamento* Zambeze, the most targeted one, was part of a small complex of three

⁹⁶See AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993). Numbers should have been higher since one and two of the 14 operations referred to, respectively, "several" and "a few" cows, therefore not being integrated in the total number.

⁹⁷The breakdown is the following: 35 *aldeamentos* suffered 1 operation; 17 suffered 2; 24 suffered 3; 12 suffered 4; 11 suffered 5; 13 suffered 6; 5 suffered 7; 7 suffered 8; 5 suffered 9; 5 suffered 10; 4 suffered 11; 3 suffered 12; 1 suffered 13; 1 suffered 14; 2 suffered 15; 3 suffered 16; and 1 suffered 17.

isolated *aldeamentos* close to Mucumbura, on the extremity of the Daque corridor, referred to above, on the way of the main route to Rhodesia and near the main guerrilla base of the 4th sector.

TABLE 7.5:
CATTLE MISSING IN TETE *ALDEAMENTOS* DUE TO GUERRILLA ACTION⁹⁸

Year	Quarter Period	No. of Reported Operations	Cows	Goats
1972	April-June	-	-	-
	July-September	-	-	-
	October-December	2	61	-
1973	January-March	4	78	-
	April-June	16	606	223
	July-September	26	1,696	372
	October-December	43	1,952	850
1974	January-March	23	1,554	124
	April-June	4	86	12

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

Aldeamentos Gola and Temangau were a result of GPZ's re-arrangement programme in Changara, with the objective of acting as a barrier against the progressing of the guerrilla forces into Manica. Consequently, Frelimo never ceased to disturb them. *Aldeamento* Sachiriri was located near Chiúta, on the 2nd sector's corridor to the Zambezi, which had to be kept open. Finally, *aldeamentos* Soronhate and Mucanga, near Muchena, were obstructing the main route chosen by the 2nd sector to penetrate into Moatize and Mutarara.

e) The Militarisation in the *Aldeamentos*

Important consequences of low colonial anticipation, in terms of villagisation, were population movement and flights, the formation of erratic but numerous Frelimo "people bases", harsher military retaliations against the people and the imprint of specific characteristics on the

⁹⁸Of which 1,161 cows and 229 goats were reported as having been retrieved following militia pursuit operations.

aldeamentos. As to these characteristics, the fact is that low anticipation put an end to the colonial purposes of creating empty corridors and lines of regionally protected *aldeamentos*. In Mutarara, for example, where a relatively "higher" anticipation was achieved, such corridors and lines were made possible, at least in part. As a consequence of the general trend, the *aldeamentos*, scattered throughout the territory, became like "tiny islands in the stormy guerrilla sea". This factor undoubtedly determined a level of militarisation higher than was expected in the first place, to the detriment of developmental aspects.

Throughout the period, several measures were implemented in order to assure defence and control of the *aldeamentos*, starting with the control of population movements. In May 1970, the District Governor issued the first regulation for a common procedure concerning this matter, trying to put an end to the differentiated practices being adopted locally. All the inhabitants in the *aldeamento* were to be registered, and everybody from ten years of age was to hold a special identity card issued by the Local Administration or, alternatively, by the military. Roads and houses inside the *aldeamento* were to be named and numbered. Population movements from the village to their *machambas* or to other *aldeamentos* were to be strictly controlled, in the first case through militia "protection" and in the second through several measures ranging from identity control to regular radio contacts with other *aldeamentos* for checking arrivals, time spent in the journey, etc.⁹⁹ However, this set of measures was very complex and bureaucratic to the point of being followed only partially and in varying degrees from place to place, with a very relative success.¹⁰⁰ On the contrary, other measures concerning physical systems of defence in the *aldeamento* seem to have been generally adopted. These included the establishment of "external security perimeters", barbed wire fences often in parallel with strips of planted landmines.¹⁰¹ Watch towers and searchlights were also common. From 1972, the digging of family shelters was also recommended.¹⁰² But the most outstanding aspect in this militarisation process was

⁹⁹AHM, FM, Cx.97: GDT, "Normas a observar nos aldeamentos - Identificação e controle de populações" (20/05/70); GDT/SDAC, no.408/A/2, "Instruções a Observar no Trânsito das Populações" (17/04/72); FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.24/Ald/6 (5/10/74).

¹⁰⁰As late as January 1974, the authorities were still struggling to impose it. See AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Circ.no.24/Ald/6 (5/01/74).

¹⁰¹Although it is not possible to document such systems for all *aldeamentos* in Tete, it is known that all *aldeamentos* in Marávia, for example, were provided with barbed wire fences.

¹⁰²See, for instance, AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: BCaç 2915, no.445/72/C (4/03/72).

undoubtedly the formation of local militia troops.¹⁰³ The Militia Corps had been formed in late 1961 and re-organised in 1965¹⁰⁴ as a militarised force controlled by the civil administration at its several levels, as shown in Table 7.6.

TABLE 7.6:
MILITIA CORPS AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE TROOP

Administration Level	Militia Level	Command
District	Zone	District Governor
<i>Concelho</i> or <i>Circunscrição</i>	Sector	District Commissioner
<i>Posto Administrativo</i>	Sub-Sector	Local Administrator
<i>Regedoria</i>	Company or Platoon	<i>Régulo</i>
Group of Villages	Section	Chief of Group of Villages
Village	Nucleus	Chief of Village

Source: Portaria no.18,631, BO no.17(I) (24/04/65).

However, if it ever was implemented, this decentralised design did not last for long since the approach of war dictated several re-arrangements. As early as 1966, the militia's operations in Tete came to be coordinated by the Office of Operations of the Governor's Staff, allegedly to harmonise their movements on the terrain with those of the army.¹⁰⁵ The development of the war furthered such re-arrangements of the Militia Corps in several ways. Gradually their strategic locations throughout the territory shifted from the main administrative settings and some villages of *régulos* into the *aldeamentos*, as the latter were being established. Since villagisation was essentially the transformation of great numbers of scattered villages into lesser numbers of larger villages, the formation of *aldeamentos* as implying higher numbers of militia in higher numbers of places could seem paradoxical.

¹⁰³Several militarised troops acted in Tete, namely PSP guards (police), PSP auxiliary guards, frontier guards at the border areas, frontier auxiliary guards, militia and auxiliary guards of the administration. With perhaps the exception of the frontier guards, villagisation was undertaken with militia units commanded by PSP guards, while the other militarised troops tended to gradually disappear.

¹⁰⁴See AHM, FGG, Cx.855: Diploma-Legislativo Ministerial no.17 (17/10/61) for its creation. Regulations in Portaria no.18,631, in BO 17(I) (24/04/65).

¹⁰⁵Patrolling centralisation at the Operations Office aims at a better assignment of militia troops in patrolling, thus avoiding sending them to places where the army is already patrolling (...) [and a situation in which] the latter could come upon people armed with "*canhangulos*" [rudimentary rifles] or other such weaponry, including traditional arms, without knowing if they were people from ours or from the other side (...). AHM, SE, 237: GDT/SDAC, "Acta das Sessões da Reunião dos Administradores e do Intendente com o Governador do Distrito, nos termos do art.377 da RAU" (19/04/66):49-50.

However, the fact was that *régulo* protection, though commended at first, never came to be fully implemented, and that the growth and dispersal of the militia resulted from the need to protect ever growing numbers of *aldeamentos*. Moatize, for example, which in June 1970 had six locations protected by administrative forces, including only ten militia soldiers, had these numbers increased to 23 locations and 304 militia soldiers three years later.¹⁰⁶ The permanent request for more militia troops by the local authorities fostered an increase in their numbers to an extent of which Table 7.7 gives an idea. Such increases were made possible through successive recruit training courses held at the Militia Headquarters in the city of Tete. Between November 1971 and June 1973, six such courses took place, involving the training of more than 2,000 men, plus at least one course, in early 1974, for Rural Guards, the new name of the Militia Corps adopted by then.¹⁰⁷

Once formed, men were to return to their home areas and integrate the militia units which varied from 6 to 30 men according to the importance of the site they were supposed to protect, to how critical was the war situation there and also to availability of militia troops. African militia units were commanded by an *enquadrante* (controller), at first usually a European PSP officer. However, as the war became critical and the whole process became increasingly militarised, militia *enquadrantes* tended more and more to be non-commissioned soldiers from the army ranks. The controllers in one area were, in their turn, commanded by an army officer, the *oficial enquadrante de milícias*. He was in charge of controlling the militia units in his area, which he was to inspect at least once a month. He was to provide periodical instruction, prepare a scheme for a defence plan for each *aldeamento*, and assure

¹⁰⁶According to AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.23/70 (5/06/70), these locations were, in June 1970, the following: Moatize (the administrative capital of the area), Companhia Carbonífera and Mavuzi (mining sites), Matundo (at the Zambesi bank opposite to the city of Tete), Caldas Xavier and Zóbuè. According to AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdConc/Moatize, no.7311/7/26 (28/06/73), the 304 militia elements were distributed to *aldeamentos* Chimiza, Canchira, Catipo, Matsatsa, Panzo, Condo, Cassanha, Benga, Chimbonde, Mantinte, Sungo, Quissemissa, Mitete, Matambanhama, Ussalo, Chitata, Sipanela, Calambo, Caldas Xavier, N'cungas, Zóbuè and Capirizange, and to Chimambe.

¹⁰⁷The first course, had its conclusion foreseen to November 7, 1971, forming 650 men; the second, was to be concluded in July 1972 (AHM, FM, Cx.108: GDT, no.203/D/29 (25/10/71); GDT, no.231/D/29 (8/11/71); AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT, "Acta da Reunião do Governador-Geral Eng. Pimentel dos Santos com os Secretários Provinciais, Distritais e Administradores do Distrito de Tete" (23/06/72)). No evidence could be found on the third and fourth courses. The fifth course was to be concluded in November 16, 1972, forming 751 men, according to AHM, FM, Cx.109: Corpo de Milícias/Tete, no.907/72/SP/Po.1340 (1/11/72). The sixth course, to be concluded in March 1973, was referred to as forming more than 500 men in AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.235/73-9.00 (March 1973). On the change to *Guardas Rurais* in the designation of the Militia Corps, see AHM, FM, Cx.112: GDT, no.3749/A/28/3, (17/11/73). Finally, reference to the assembly of more than 500 men for the first course of Rural Guards, to begin on February 15, 1974, in AHM, FM, Cx.112: SCCIM/Tete, Msg.no.22/74 (2/02/74).

the liaison with local civil and military authorities, activities which he was periodically to report to the Militia Corps Command in Tete.¹⁰⁸

TABLE 7.7:
NUMBERS OF MILITIA TROOPS IN TETE¹⁰⁹

Area	Dec.1969	Oct.1970	Mar.1973
Marávia	262	444	211
Macanga	218	508	800
Bene	148	123	281
Angónia	22	89	373
Zumbo	96	87	257
Mágoè	68	314	---
Cabora Bassa	---	---	297
Tete	191	345	559
Moatize	---	51	304
Mutarara	15	12	433
Reserve			379
TOTALS	1,020	1,973	3,894

Sources: AHM, FM, Cx.107: GDT, Sitrep no.44/69 (5/12/69);
Cx.110: GDT, Sitrep no.45/70 (6/10/70); Cx.111: GDT,
no.235/73-9.00, s/d [Mar.1973].

Pressure of events brought the steep increase in the numbers of militia troops and a decline in their combative preparation as a result of shorter and hastier courses. In parallel, militia units which had concluded their commission tended to remain in their posts, though little motivated. This led the ZOT commanders to launch a campaign for reducing the

¹⁰⁸On the role of the *oficial enquadrante de milícias*, see AHM, FM, Cx.110: ZOT, no.812/C, Po.620, "Alferes enquadrantes dos milícias nas Circunscrições e Concelhos do GDT - Instruções" (1/06/72); Cx.109: GDT/ZOT, Despacho, "Atribuições dos oficiais que prestam serviço no Corpo de Milícias de Tete enquadrando aquelas forças nos Concelhos e/ou Circunscrições. Normas provisórias de execução permanente" (24/01/74).

¹⁰⁹Absence of militia units in Mágoè in 1973, in Cahora Bassa in 1969 and 1970, and in Moatize in 1969, was probably due to the proximity of regular army garrisons. No reserve troops are mentioned for 1969 and 1970.

numbers of militia, under the *motto* "*Poucos mas Bons*" (Fewer but Better).¹¹⁰

The militia soldiers lived within the *aldeamento* as common people, even if commonly placed in the peripheral plots in order to more rapidly resume combat in case of a guerrilla attack. There they often had their wives and children, and shared many common problems with the villagers, even if frequently taking advantage of their particular status in case of conflicts or seeking privileges. Their main task was defending the village from Frelimo attacks and patrolling the environs, frequently in coordination and under the command of military forces attached to the region. But Frelimo fought very much a war of nerves, taking into account the mentioned tactics of landmining and ambushing the approaching roads, or of making hit-and-run raids. This implied a growing social tension within the *aldeamento*, a life under the pressure of permanent expectation of attacks, as the situation got worse. Understandably, the militia was the more vulnerable group to such pressure, even more vulnerable as the increasing number of combats was accompanied by their hastier training, referred to above. Militia slackening was felt inside the *aldeamento* both in terms of conflicts with the people and of military discipline. As to the former, the daily relationship between militia and villagers tended to be tense, frequently violent, according to several sources, such as the following extract from *aldeamento* Sungo:

"It was confirmed they [the militia] don't fulfill their duties: They spend most of the day drinking *pombe* [home brewed beer] and going around, leaving their weapons at home (...). They threatened the *régulo*, who was forced to take *machambas* ready to be harvested from the civilians to give them to the militia. In conclusion, the militia unit is not helping the people in Sungo. On the contrary, they are causing serious problems between the *régulo* and the people (...)"¹¹¹

Concerning lack of military discipline, a clear example can be drawn in the report of an inspection visit to some *aldeamentos* in the Central Area of Moatize in 1972, during which it was verified that all units lacked uniforms and boots, and that drunkenness was common. When the inspection arrived at *aldeamento* Panzo it was found that all militia had left their

¹¹⁰AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.235/73-9.00, s/d [Mar.1973]. "(...) in many *aldeamentos* most of the militia have remained on duty in spite of having concluded their 18 months commission, just because it is necessary to keep the numbers, even if only half of the force is operative (...). It would be most convenient for the Sector commanders and controlling officers to remove the old militia, gradually filling the vacant posts with new ones. This is the only way to create an elite capable of pursuing their mission: To defend the *aldeamentos* and critical sites, under the *motto* - 'Fewer but Better'."

¹¹¹AHM, FM, Cx.111: Command of Sector FCX, no.15/2, Po.GE (2/06/73), citing an operational activity report from May 5, 1973. Gun fighting between militia soldiers inside *aldeamento* Caldas Xavier, for instance, in AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.42/G/2 (31/05/72).

weapons in Panzo and gone to neighbouring *aldeamento* Missau for a drinking session. Cases of militia rebellion against the *enquadrante*, beating him or pointing guns at him, were also mentioned.¹¹² As late as January 1974, a militia inspection in nine *aldeamentos* in Moatize reported that only two units were provided with *enquadrantes*, the remaining seven acting on their own:

TABLE 7.8:
PROFILE OF SOME MILITIA DETACHMENTS IN THE AREA OF MOATIZE

Detachment	Rural Guards	<i>Enquadrantes</i>	Weaponry
Caldas Xavier	1 corporal, 4 soldiers	Vacant	5 Mauser
N'cungas	16 soldiers	1 corporal	1 G3, 16 Mauser
Capirizange	1 corporal, 18 soldiers	Vacant	2 G3, 17 Mauser
Zóbuè	1 corporal, 11 soldiers	Vacant	1 G3, 11 Mauser
Matambanhama	10 soldiers	Vacant	10 Mauser
Quissemissa	1 corporal, 7 soldiers	Vacant	1 G3, 7 Mauser
Sungó	1 corporal, 12 soldiers	1 corporal	3 G3, 11 Mauser
Cassanha	12 soldiers	Vacant	1 G3, 11 Mauser
Sipanela	1 corporal, 16 soldiers	Vacant	17 Mauser

Source: AHM, FM, Cx.112: Oficial Enquadrante de Guardas Rurais/Moatize, Rel.no.2/74 (7/01/74).

Added to the low operativeness were the poor quality of the weaponry¹¹³ and the occurrence of desertions,¹¹⁴ which urged the authorities to change things. Apparently, the reduction in militia numbers which took place from mid-1973,¹¹⁵ from 4,365 to 3,500 men, was a first step to transform them into a better trained and controlled troop and, perhaps, to gradually replace them by more operative GEs, the special troops mentioned in the previous chapter. In late October 1973, a 4 months course was about to begin in Dondo, Sofala, to

¹¹²AHM, FM, Cx.110: Oficial de Aldeamentos/Moatize, Relatório no.4/72 (7/03/72). The *aldeamentos* included in this inspection were Catipo, Matsatsa, Moagem, Faqueiro, Chimiza, Panzo, Missau, Canchira, Nhaondué and Nhandipissa. They all presented this sort of problem.

¹¹³Basically Mauser 7.7 rifles disposed of as obsolete by the army.

¹¹⁴For example, from the first militia detachment placed at Zóbuè in late 1971, 12 militia deserted taking their weapons with them. Only the corporal and two soldiers remained on duty. AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, no.1636/1/7/26, (7/12/71).

¹¹⁵AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.235/73-9.00, s/d [Mar.1973].

train seven GE units, with volunteers from the home areas who would return in February 1974 to *aldeamentos* Chiôco, Chinchanda, N'cungas, Caunda, Soronhate, Vuende and Mucumbura.¹¹⁶

The Militia Corps was a hybrid institution, referring both the institution itself and its men. As to the institution, it started as subordinated to the civil administration, but with its soldiers included in the OPVDC's pay-roll.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, controllers, if police officers, responded to the district PSP command, or to the local military command in case of being military.¹¹⁸ As to the "hybridism" of local militia soldiers, the best way of characterising it is perhaps calling forth extracts of a letter sent by a Frelimo local commander to the corporal of the militia unit in *aldeamento* Cassanha, in August 1974:

"To OPV corporal António Luís:

We very much hope this letter will be understood by you and your OPV subordinates (...). Firstly, we want to inform you about ourselves. We are the ones bringing freedom to the people. We are known throughout the World as Frelimo, the sole organisation representing the Mozambican people. And you, OPV, with your seven-seven [Mauser 7.7] in your hand, you don't know why you are fighting. You are fighting your brother who is struggling to free yourself from the colonial burden. At present, you fight with the colonial weapon so that colonialists can keep on stealing Mozambique's resources into Portugal. It is important to dare to pick up the gun and fight. But fighting to defend whose interests? The ones of the Mozambican people or the Portuguese settler's? Look at the life you live, you OPV! What do you have at home? We know your house, we know where you sleep. We think your house is worse than a pigsty. You don't have a bed or a table, your house is still as in the old days of slavery, you don't have a car, not even a bicycle. You fight to defend the interests of people you don't even know. You shed your blood over the Portuguese flag. But you must know that the Portuguese flag represents the Portuguese and you are not Portuguese. If you are considered as Portuguese it is because you fought hard to buy an identity card with money from your poor salary. So that the Portuguese could make you a black skinned Portuguese! You still have time to join Frelimo. Don't wait for the war to be over because the colonialists will end up running away to Portugal and you are not going with them. They will leave you right there where you are. Frelimo will then find you and think about what will happen to you then. You, OPVs, you don't live correctly with the people in the *aldeamento*, you beat them for no motive, you replace the Portuguese colonialists whipping people. But you had better know we live by your side in the *aldeamento*. We sleep near you. We know everything you do and we don't kill you because we know you're doing that because you still don't understand. Killing you would be like killing a part of our innocent people. (...) Our military technique is advanced. We are well trained. We are not like you militia and OPVs, who drink *cabanga* and *pombe* (...). Until the next opportunity,

The commander of the People's Liberation Forces
Dânaso Martins.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdConc/Moatize, no.305/A/28 (21/09/73).

¹¹⁷See AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT, no.1360/A/28/4 (20/04/72), on this respect. From January 1971, militia's salaries were paid by civil administrations. AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT, no.149/70 (14/12/70); OPVDC/Tete, no.47/71 (4/02/71).

¹¹⁸Difficulties in making clear that the militia units were submitted to military commands in operations were permanent throughout the period. See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, no.241/Ald/7/2 (11/04/73).

¹¹⁹Transcribed in AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdConc/Moatize, no.164/A/28 (5/08/74).

Since the war was the main reason and came to be practically the sole reason for the programme of *aldeamentos*, the life of their inhabitants became heavily shaped by this factor. Confinement, social tensions, increased hardships in subsistence production and daily life risks were the rule. The next chapter will discuss the socio-economic aspects of the *aldeamentos* in Tete.

Chapter 8:

THE ALDEAMENTOS: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY

a) Introduction

Chapter 7 discussed the connection between villagisation and war, one which imprinted the most fundamental characteristic of life in Tete *aldeamentos*, i.e. their militarisation. The present chapter will attempt to further the discussion of life inside the *aldeamentos*, for which it will be organised in two sections. The first one will include the issues raised by the transfer of people from their villages in the *regedorias* into the new villages. Here, the focus will be on the impact caused by the changes involved in this transfer on the community's economy, particularly on agriculture, the main economic activity, but also on facilities such as water supply, health and schools. The second section, based on the perspectives raised in these last chapters, will assess the impact of the villagisation process on one community confined in one *aldeamento*.

b) Dispersed Versus Confined Life in a War Context

Life in the *aldeamentos* was marked, from the outset, by the way people were transferred from their original villages into them, and by the balance between what people were about to lose, in their view, and what would they achieve with such a transfer. We discussed above several aspects of the main characteristics of the rural villages in Tete, particularly north of the Zambezi, namely the few average inhabitants of each community, how kinship ties had a role in organising productive activities, and the impact of shifting agriculture and of the pattern of migrant labour then occurring. A set of reports issued by the Service for Psychological Action (*Serviço de Acção Psicológica*, SAP) in the first half of the 1960s, covering an extensive area north of the Zambezi,¹ which enables us to define a profile of a

¹AHM, FGT, Cx.43: SAP/Tete (Brigadas Móveis 6 e 13), "Boletins de Acampamento" covering the period between 22/07/63 and 11/06/65. 26 villages were surveyed, in 14 *regedorias* of Macanga, Bene (at the time integrated in Macanga) and Marávia, namely: Mucipo, Cussarara, Mulirima, Muchiza, Nuno, Cassacatiza, Zangaia, Sabondo, Chofombo, Cantengo, Cangombe, Chimuara, Caduco and Nhaluiro (See

community village in the area, on the eve of the villagisation process. Of the 26 villages visited, 23 were hardly accessible due to poorly passable roads, the overwhelming majority becoming completely inaccessible during the rainy season; 7 such villages were even unreached during the whole year. Maize, peanuts, beans, potatoes, rice, *sorghum* and millet were the main products grown and only three villages were considered as living exclusively from subsistence agriculture. Tobacco was widely produced, particularly in the northern Macanga areas, as well as cotton, although in lesser quantities and clearly with lesser voluntary adherence. The economy was supplemented by migrant labour in the neighbouring countries (70 percent of the cases), and by wage labour in "internal attraction centres" such as Tete, Moatize and others (40 percent). Almost 60 percent of the villages were reported as having close commercial contacts with the neighbouring countries² and 70 percent complained to the brigade about the lack of Portuguese rural shops and the unfavourable terms of trade dictated by the existing ones. Finally, half of the villages visited disclosed, according to the SAP brigade, an hostile attitude towards the Portuguese, revealed in several ways: support for Zambia and Malawi nationalist propaganda, flight of community authorities, and men in general, at the brigade's arrival, generalised speaking of English as a second language, as well as circulation of foreign currency in many cases, etc.

The SAP survey makes it possible to form a view of these northern villages as enjoying relative prosperity based in close contacts with neighbouring recently independent countries, and almost out of reach of the Portuguese influence and economy. This factor was to play an important role when Frelimo started its struggle in Tete, exactly from this area, where it counted on the support of many *régulos* and community members. It was also a factor that urged the colonial authorities to start the villagisation programme from here.

When the villagisation process was launched, in 1968-1969, communities, and particularly community leaders, could not but face the prospect of moving elsewhere with deep reservations. It implied abandoning their ancestors' lands and the places where they had been buried, abandoning the *machambas* sometimes before harvest, and leaving behind most

Map 6.2 of *regedorias*). Bene was separated from Macanga by the official diploma no.20818, in BO 4(I) (27/01/68).

²This percentage becomes more significant if we consider that a great number of villages surveyed were located at long distances from the border, which prevented commercial contacts beyond it.

of their belongings.³ This could be the reason for dramatic occurrences, as the words of the District Commissioner of Moatize clearly demonstrate:

"... a great number of small *machambas* with good agricultural suitability, where several families presently live an easy life, will have to be abandoned by them on their way to the *aldeamentos*, where they will certainly suffer many hardships. I could mention many cases in which chiefs and families ask me to visit them in order to see how good is life in their home villages. Their expressions reveal great grief of leaving sites where the family group has lived for a long time, where everything is ordered, from the water well and the roomy houses to the corrals, poultry yards and fruit trees... This is the panorama of the people we will submit to villagisation [in *regedorias* Tundumula and Mantenga]"⁴

Besides not viewing with favour the fact of leaving the lands which assured their subsistence, several other economic aspects played against this massive removal, in the communities' view. War was a phenomenon they could cope with, if some traditional authorities known as collaborators with the Portuguese were excluded, while concentration in the *aldeamentos* would render migrant labour more difficult or even impossible. Moreover, the northern Macanga tobacco growers, used to seeing their requests for local markets refused by Portuguese authorities, could probably only see life in the *aldeamentos* as a direct threat against them selling their tobacco in the foreign markets.

In addition, community and family leaders could foresee that this process, being a process of concentration, would mean the destruction of family ties and strategies, as well as a deep re-arrangement of political organisation. We have mentioned above that in Macanga the first villagisation plan implied the appearance of settlements with 3.5 times more population than the former ones. In Moatize, as in the remaining areas of Tete, the trend was the same. In the Central Area of Moatize, which had, by 1968, 11 *regedorias* and 33 chiefs of group of villages, the District Commissioner enumerated 109 important villages and a total of 26,485 people, which gave an average 243 people per village. By 1974, the same area, with a total population of around 35,000, had 35 *aldeamentos* or an average 1,000 people per *aldeamento*.⁵ This means that by 1974 there was one *aldeamento* for each of three former

³See, for instance, AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, "Relatório" (21/07/70): "More people were invited to go by helicopter and look at the area [chosen by the authorities to locate the *aldeamento*] or to suggest a better one, but they said they would rather stay in their home-area because it was there where their ancestors lived and it was there that they, themselves, have spent all their lives".

⁴AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, "Relatório relativo à execução de Aldeamentos nas Regedorias Tundumula e Mantenga deste Concelho" (28/07/70).

⁵See AHM, FM, Cx.107: AdConc/Moatize, s/n (8/08/68). See also Appendix: "Evolution of Village Settlements in the Central Area of Moatize (1968-1982)".

villages and that an average *aldeamento* had four times more people than an average former village.

This process of concentration had necessarily an important impact on the political structure. The local administrative authorities were quite aware of the problem and avoided the installation of more than one important traditional authority in each *aldeamento*. Certainly, by 1974 there were in Moatize's central area enough *aldeamentos* even for the 33 chiefs of group of villages. However this was not always the case. Zumbo, for instance, had by 1974, 10 *aldeamentos* for 12 *régulos*.⁶ But more than that, it became common in 1971 and 1972, when the villagisation process became more intense, for there to be the installation of two *régulos* or three or more chiefs of group of villages per *aldeamento*. This often happened for circumstantial reasons. In Marávia, for instance, *régulos* Cachombo and Nhaluiro were installed in the *aldeamento* of Fingoé, located in the surroundings of the city of Fingoé, the capital of the *circunscrição*, where they could benefit from a more efficient protection. The same *aldeamento* of Fingoé had also five chiefs of group of villages (Chale, Simoco, Tentene, Mussinga and Pondane), the same happening, for instance, in Cahora Bassa's *aldeamento* of Chipera (M'fuca, Chatala, Chatonda, Alface and Chifuca). This occurred particularly when more than one ethnic group coexisted in the same *aldeamento*, as was the case of the two mentioned above. Fingoé had Pimbés, Tauaras, Nhungués and Sengas, while Chipera had Pimbés (80%), Azimbas (19%) and Tauaras (1%).⁷

Finally, political mobilisation exerted by Frelimo was undoubtedly a great factor in people's unwillingness to enter into the *aldeamentos*, particularly when they were settled in areas where the war was already occurring, the important anticipatory factor of the Portuguese strategy being already lost. In 1970, during a meeting of the District Governor with the District Commissioners, Marávia's District Commissioner described the situation in his area of jurisdiction as follows:

"The situation has evolved negatively in the central area. The entire area of *regedoria* Nhaluiro is totally subverted, its people are not villagised yet and there are no prospects of villagising them. When the army (or whoever) arrives they run away immediately; therefore, I think there is no other way but force if

⁶Compare Map 6.2 of *regedorias* with Map 6.4 of *aldeamentos*.

⁷Although not generalised, the solution of settling together different *régulos* with their people in the same *aldeamento* was sometimes "unavoidable". See reservations towards such solution in Vasconcelos 1992:Interview.

villagisation is to be accomplished".⁸

Macanga again, particularly its central area, and the *posto administrativo* of Chiúta, provide vivid examples of the problems the administrative authorities were facing. Data furnished by its District Commissioner⁹ enabled the following table to be constructed, concerning the *aldeamentos* established by then, in its Central Area:

TABLE 8.1:
POPULATION MOVEMENT IN MACANGA'S CENTRAL AREA *ALDEAMENTOS* (1971)

<i>Aldeamento</i>	No. of People expected	No. of People settled	No. of People missing ¹⁰	% of People missing
Vuende	2,956	1,556	1,400	47.3
Cuncere	1,071	659	412	38.4
Manjanja	1,508	882	626	41.5

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Concelho da Macanga" (5/03/71).

Also expressive is the case of Macanga's sub-division of Chiúta during the same year of 1971, as revealed by its Local Administrator,¹¹ at a time when the bulk of its *aldeamentos* were being settled, and conceding other causes for the missing of people besides the action of the nationalist guerrillas (Table 8.2).

A closer look at the reasons for population flights during their transfer to the Chiúta new villages, as referred to by Table 8.2, is perhaps enlightening. In *aldeamento* Zuze chief of village group Canhama fled with all his people on the very same day (28 October 1970)

⁸AHM, SE, 237: GDT/SDAC, "Acta das Sessões da Reunião dos Administradores e do Intendente com o Governador do Distrito" (29/12/70):10.

⁹AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Concelho da Macanga" (5/03/71).

¹⁰People missing is guessed by the District Commissioner as having been "abducted by the enemy" (Vuende), or being "under the control of the enemy" (Cuncere and Manjanja).

¹¹See AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos da área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta- Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71); Encarregado do Aldeamento, "Relatórios sobre os Trabalhos nos Aldeamentos de Zuze, Sachirire, Chiúta and Gulói (Março de 1971). Three *aldeamentos* are missing in the list of the following table (Sabondo, Cagulula and Mesa) because at the time they were being supervised by a commission other than the one directed by Chiúta's Local Administrator.

when the *aldeamento* was formally being started.¹² The reasons for people missing in *aldeamento* Caunda were vividly explained by the Local Administrator when reporting that Caunda

"has currently 1,450 people under the authority of the traditional chiefs Caunda, Cuio and Chirene, the majority being from *fumo* [chief of village group] Cuio. Such dissimilarity from the expected numbers is not due just to the action of the enemy, but also to the permanent resistance of the people to being villagised, which led great numbers to flee to the bush even before starting to build their huts. Since the beginning of the *aldeamento* two major flights have occurred: the first in early October [1970], when chief of group of villages Caunda fled, taking with him part of his people (this chief of group of villages was later located in Zóbuè and sent back to this *aldeamento*, where he lives now); the reasons they gave for their flight are inconsistent - they said it had been because of famine - which is impossible since nobody was then complaining of this and they were still living in their home-villages while building their huts in the *aldeamento*. The action of the enemy, although already being felt in the area, was not the sole reason either. Most probably they had felt aggrieved by the arrival of groups of natives from other areas, having fled in reprisal. As to the second flight, of the Chirene people: the reason they gave was that the government had promised to till their *machambas*, and as the sowing season was approaching and no tillage had been done so far, they fled leaving behind their huts already built. In order to prevent additional flights we kept *fumo* Chirene under surveillance but we still strongly suspect he will end up escaping".¹³

TABLE 8.2:
POPULATION MOVEMENT IN MACANGA'S CHIÚTA SUB-DIVISION *ALDEAMENTOS* (1971)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People expected	No. of People settled	No. of People missing
Zuze	1,092	730	362 (or 57 families)
Sachirire	1,882	1,004	878 (or 60 families)
Chiúta		394	85 (or 17 families)
Gulói	1,658	1,150	508 (or 55 families)
Caunda	2,826	1,450	1,376
Chicóco	1,000	500	500
Biui	2,100	850	1,250
Zangaia		900	
Chicote	955	400	555

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta-Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71); Encarregado do Aldeamento, "Quatro Relatórios sobre os Trabalhos nos Aldeamentos de Zuze, Sachirire, Chiúta e Gulói (Março 1971); AdConc/Macanga, "Relatório: Aldeamentos no Posto Administrativo da Chiúta" (12/11/69); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos" (1993).

¹²According to AHM, FMA, Cx.107: Encarregado do Aldeamento, "Relatório: Aldeamento do Zuze" (2/03/71).

¹³AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta -Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71).

As to the people who remained in *aldeamento* Chicôco, they were, "in their majority, the old men, the disabled and children, since the younger people left the area or went to join the terrorists".¹⁴ Finally, the people from *aldeamento* Biui resisted being villagised from the outset of the works. "As soon as the construction of this *aldeamento* began, *régulo* Biui fled with all, or almost all his population, and it is commonly said that he joined the enemy".¹⁵ This is probably the reason why this *aldeamento* had its name changed from Biui to Cauio.

Besides being related to leaving their home areas, the concern of the population had also to do with the conditions in the new settlements. People used to living in sites surrounded by their *machambas* were suddenly brought to a sort of urban environment, in six-hundred square meter parcels where an average 8 member family had often as neighbours unknown people from distant regions or even different ethnic groups.¹⁶

But land availability for agriculture and water supply were perhaps the people's most important reasons for concern. During the first phase, administrative authorities faced additional problems due to lack of appropriate studies and surveys in this field. In the areas where such studies had been undertaken, it was often the case that the previously chosen sites were not adequate. A Provincial Settlement Group's brigade for agronomic studies wrote in its report, referring to the *aldeamentos* of the *posto administrativo* of Chiúta that

"These *aldeamentos* were not observed [*in loco*], since the [military] situation does not permit any field work in this area. However, based in aerophoto studies we can assert that none of the sites chosen have the minimum conditions for agriculture".¹⁷

Moatize authorities were also facing the same problem. Following inquiries and consultations in order to propose the location of *aldeamentos* in *regedorias* Tundumula and

¹⁴AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta- Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71).

¹⁵AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os Aldeamentos previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta- Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71).

¹⁶Average conditions according to AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "Normas Gerais para Implantação de Aldeamentos" (10/02/72). In its section 5.2 is written that "In each 600 m² plot will be installed a married man together with his one or two wives and sons, in order to keep polygamist couples in the same parcel. For the sake of his second wife, the man will receive an extra half parcel (300 m²). The single male will receive 300m²".

¹⁷AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, s/n (21/07/71).

Mantenga of the Central Area, the District Commissioner wrote that

"Studying the matter *in loco*, we verified that, more than tradition, it is absolute necessity which determines the fact of people living in a dispersed manner, since the area is formed of deeply eroded mountains, agriculture only being possible in small scattered valleys along the rivers where occasional layers of arable land can be found. I have even collected elements which permitted the location of ancient agglomerates of people, called *mezimbas*, where a couple of hundreds of people used to live together. These were the cases of Catipo, Panzo and Canchira. However, given the rudimentary agricultural methods of the natives, who keep on practising shifting agriculture, and given the poor soils and scarcity of arable lands, even these agglomerations had to split up".¹⁸

The study subsequently undertaken in the same area by the IIAM, the Institute for Agronomic Research (*Instituto de Investigação Agronómica de Moçambique*), reached eloquent conclusions:

TABLE 8.3:
LAND AVAILABILITY FOR ALDEAMENTO SETTLEMENT IN MOATIZE'S REGEDORIAS
TUNDUMULA AND MANTENGA ACCORDING TO A IIAM AGRONOMIC STUDY


<i>Aldeamentos</i> planned for <i>regedorias</i> Tundumula and Mantenga in Moatize's Central Area	No. of people expected in accordance with the plan	No. of people who could be settled in accordance with land availability ¹⁹	No. of people who could not be settled in accordance with land availability
Chimiza	1,100	600	500
Panzo	1,100	600	500
Matsatsa	1,100	-	1,100
Matema	1,000	-	1,000
Chimambe	1,000	-	1,000
Catipo	1,000	-	1,000
Chimole	1,000	-	1,000
Canchira	1,000	1,000	-
Nhantipissa	1,000	600	400
Mitondo	1,000	-	1,000

Source: AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, "Relatório relativo à execução de Aldeamentos nas Regedorias Tundumula e Mantenga deste Concelho" (28/07/70).

¹⁸AHM, FM, Cx.109: AdConc/Moatize, "Relatório relativo à execução de Aldeamentos nas Regedorias Tundumula e Mantenga deste Concelho" (28/07/70).

¹⁹Arable land available at Chimiza, besides being insufficient was 10 km from the *aldeamento* and therefore not usable by its inhabitants. Arable land was insufficient in Panzo. In Matsatsa, Matema and Nhantipissa arable land available only allowed small scattered agglomerates. Chimambe, Catipo and Mitondo could be considered as possible if transferred to other areas. Chimole was not considered in the study because of total arable land unavailability. Canchira was the only *aldeamento* considered as capable of receiving the numbers of people foreseen in the plan.

MAP 8.1: STANDARD PLAN FOR TETE ALDEAMENTOS



1. Building 1; 2. Building 2; 3. Well and Washing Tank; 4. 8 People Family Parcel (20 X 30 m); 5. Access; 6. Cattle Pond; 7. Security Perimeter.

Source: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT, "Normas Gerais para Implantação de Aldeamentos" (10/02/72).

In the face of this situation, the District Commissioner concluded that under these circumstances the process of villagisation would bring many negative effects and no advantages at all.²⁰ In spite of all these problems and, in many instances, of the reserve expressed by the administrative authorities themselves in some areas, pressure exerted by upper levels of decision making, particularly military, kept the process going during the first years, guided by District Commissioners and Local Administrators and supported by local military detachments and garrisons. In the second, and particularly in the third period, from 1972, the initiative began to shift from local administration to the Office of the District Governor, as was referred to above. The coordination effort of the latter included the establishment of the general profile of the *aldeamento*. Certainly, there was a wide range of *aldeamentos*, from Chizampeta, with around 100 people, to Canteza, with more than 3,000, both settled in 1971 in Macanga and formed by Chewa people. Some arose from the fusion of several small scattered villages, as in the case of Cauza,²¹ while in Angónia most of the *aldeamentos* were already settled as "natural concentrations" of great numbers of people. Some were planned to develop their economies based on cattle breeding, while a few were even formed of wage workers in the surroundings of an industrial setting as was the case of Moagem, in Moatize, close to a mining company. Some were relatively prosperous while others were extremely poor. By issuing various regulations, what the CEP aimed at was establishing general principles, methods and rules which, instituting a sort of general model to be followed, would simultaneously diminish the extent to which the *aldeamentos* depended on the criteria of local administrations. One immediate tendency revealed in CEP's intervention was towards strengthening the concentration process. While local administrations, aware of the unavailability of extensive fertile lands and dealing on a daily basis with people in their villages, tended to propose smaller settlements in greater numbers, the CEP, on the contrary, was interested in larger settlements in smaller numbers, thus minimising the coordination and defence problems. A clear expression of this wish is the document on "General Rules for the Establishment of *Aldeamentos*", issued by the CEP in February 1972,

²⁰In the same document the District Commissioner concluded that, since there was no room for all the population, "to villagise part of them and leave the rest dispersed does not meet the principles [of villagisation] proclaimed. That is why we believe that the work to be done in *regedorias* Tundumula and Mantenga will be counterproductive and, more than that, will create a dissatisfaction which can be at the origin of the dissemination of subversion in the area of Moatize. Effectively, it is just to follow an order that this administration will do what is possible to settle *aldeamentos* in *regedorias* Tundumula and Mantenga, since we believe that villagisation in this region will not meet, almost certainly, the foreseen objectives".

²¹The result from the fusion of 17 villages: Cauza Velho, Bissuace, Chizuma, Matombozi, Cuzinda, Cacomo, Chirica, Eressane, Bibone, Dona, Cuateza, Cauza Novo, Chide, Cagomo, Chidale, Cansequir (Maqui), and Mossize. AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdConc/Macanga, s/n (3112/69).

in which the model strongly proposed, although admitting local adaptation, was based on the settlement of 2,624 people.²²

Problems in the *aldeamento* site location, due to priority of military criteria, lack of studies and concentration of great numbers of people, were behind the numerous problems with water supply. The state, particularly from 1972, planned coordinated water works in every area, consisting in the construction of wells, water holes, fountains and reservoirs, as well as in the installation of some water-pumps and cattle ponds.²³ The following table gives a general picture of the water supply situation in Tete *aldeamentos* in 1973/74, when, therefore, the results of the 1972 plan implementation were supposedly being felt:

TABLE 8.4:
WATER SUPPLY IN TETE ALDEAMENTOS

Areas	No. of Ald.	Ald. with rivers/springs	Ald. which benefitted from water works	Ald. short of water supply
Angónia ^a	18	n/a	0	5
Bene	7	7	4	0
Cahora Bassa	24	10	18	3
Macanga	29	15	29	21
Mágoè ^b	14	n/a	0	n/a
Marávia	14	10	8	7
Moatize	44	28	22	12
Mutarara ^c	29	17	10	0
Tete ^d	62	10	22	32
Zumbo	10	6	5	4

^aIn Angónia, state's non-involvement was probably due to the fact that 'natural concentrations' already existed; ^bAbsence of state water works and even of statistics in Mágoè was probably due to late villagisation; ^cMutarara, due to specific military reasons was villagised along the Zambezi river or the railway line, a reason perhaps behind the fact of water shortages not being felt or, at least, reported; ^dFigures from Tete area are probably incomplete, for reasons similar to Magoé's; n/a = not available. Sources: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos" (1993).

²²AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "Normas Gerais para Implementação de Aldeamentos" (10/02/72). Number of people based on the standard plan appended.

²³AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/SDAC, "Reunião do Governador Geral da Província, Engenheiro Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes das Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição" (23/06/72):5-6.

As a general policy concerning agriculture, it was the objective of colonial authorities, through an effort coordinated by the District Services of Agriculture and Forestry, first to ensure the subsistence of the villagised population and then to foster cash crop production in order to "win the people's hearts and minds" through social and economic development.²⁴ Lack of arable lands in the vicinity of the *aldeamentos* was obviously the first problem, as was already referred to. The 1972 plan was therefore quite explicit when affirming the objective of assuring a demarcated agricultural area per family in the *aldeamentos* to be settled, while trying to normalise things in this regard in the ones previously established. But the war factor was overwhelming: according to the "General Rules"²⁵ issued in 1972, agricultural fields should not be more than 4 km distant from the *aldeamento*, which, added to the other factors mentioned above, dramatically reduced land availability.

As an extra element to mobilise the people into the *aldeamentos*, the District Government, through the District Services of Agriculture and Forestry, was to do the clearing of half a hectare per family at the installation process, the area of arable land per family varying according to land availability. In order to facilitate the clearing works, agricultural fields were to be organised around the *aldeamento*. Marávia and Cahora Bassa (Central Area) provide examples of actual access to agricultural lands in its *aldeamentos*, with the low average of 1 hectare of arable land per family (Tables 8.5 and 8.6).

Related to the factors which determined difficult access to land and behind this global villagisation strategy was the vital need to anchor shifting agriculture, which could only be achieved by profound state intervention, through agricultural extension services and the provision of agricultural inputs. Unfortunately, statistics and data on this matter are scarce, but occasional references suggest low numbers of agricultural monitors, as well as tractors and other inputs in the *aldeamentos*. The fourteen Marávia *aldeamentos*, for instance, were assisted in 1972-73 by only two farm monitors, in Fingoé and Gago Coutinho, each one provided with one tractor and two ploughs. The extension services were also to include seed

²⁴According to the text of the 1972 plan, the District Services of Agriculture should "materialise the transformation from a backward rural economy into a development economy, or from a subsistence economy into a market economy (a mixture of self-consumption and cash crop productions)". See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/SDAC: "Reunião do Governador Geral da Província, Engenheiro Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes das Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição" (23/06/72):5-6.

²⁵AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "Normas Gerais para Implantação de Aldeamentos" (10/02/72).

distribution. Data were available for seed distribution during the 1973/74 agricultural campaign, in some Cahora Bassa and Mágoè *aldeamentos* (Table 8.7).

TABLE 8.5:
ARABLE LAND AVAILABILITY (HECTARES PER FAMILY)
IN MARÁVIA *ALDEAMENTOS* (1972-1973)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of Families ^a	Cleared Fields (Ha) ^c	Ha per Family
CENTRAL AREA			
Fingoé	538	510	0.9
Mucanga	156	96	0.6
Cauero	198	416	2.1
Nhantaro	258	270	1.0
Mucanha-Seco	33 ^b	58	1.7
CHOFOMBO			
Gago Coutinho	259 ^b	250	1.0
Caduco	80	180	2.3
Chimponda	150	160	1.0
M'Peua	55	55	1.0
Nhanseula	38	60	1.6
VASCO DA GAMA			
Cantengo	126	90	0.7
Tenesse	572	205	0.4
Nhaluiro-Novo	276 ^b	900	3.2
Matipo	n/a	n/a	n/a
AVERAGE	210	250	1.2

^aSome important discrepancies were found between numbers of people and numbers of families, the resulting average of 3 people per family seeming very low; ^bEstimated; ^cCleared of timber, not cultivated.

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

TABLE 8.6:
AGRICULTURAL AREAS IN CAHORA BASSA'S CENTRAL AREA *ALDEAMENTOS* (1972-1974)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People	Cleared Area (Ha) 1972	Sown Area (Ha) 1972/73	Sown Area (Ha) 1973/74
Maroeira	652	186	186	282
Bucha	1,115	166	134	166
Metape/Candôdo	1,176	256	304	313
Patrão	951	206	206	260
Pastor	471	128	168	152
Chuva/Massecha	1,080	232	270	232
Cussene/Cahô	857	191	225	201
Misseto/Chissua	493	130	153	150
Cavulância	808	200	190	220
AVERAGE	845	188	204	220

Source: AHM, GG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatórios de Actividades" (1971, 1972, 1973).
AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

TABLE 8.7:
SEED DISTRIBUTION DURING THE 1973/74 AGRICULTURAL CAMPAIGN IN SOME
CAHORA BASSA AND MÁGOË *ALDEAMENTOS* (Kgs)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People	Maize	Pulses	Groundnuts	Sorghum
Canzeu/Daque	1,405	2,100	150	675	135
Sanângoé	1,706	4,000	350	1,560	312
Chundiza	713	2,800	-	180	900
Mágoè-Novo	722	1,400	100	450	90

Sources: AHM, GG, Cx.860: GPZ, "Relatórios de Actividades"
(1971, 1972, 1973)

Besides, in order to foster cash crop production, the District Services of Agriculture and Forestry were ordered to study "sound" price policies concerning the main *aldeamento* cash crops,²⁶ and to set up a market system which was to include almost 80 percent of the *aldeamentos*, as shown in Table 8.8. Commerce was supposed to be based on such a structure.

²⁶Mentioned in AHM, FM, Cx.110: Delegação Regional dos Serviços de Comércio de Tete, 19/p's 1.5 e 1.6/6 (Maio 1972).

TABLE 8.8:
TETE ALDEAMENTO MARKET-SYSTEM IN 1971-1972

Areas	Markets	Within Range of Market	Planned to be Included	Outside Range of Market	% of Villages Involved ^a
Mutarara	5	20	4	-	100
Macanga	6	16	4	3	90
Bene	3	4	-	-	100
Cahora Bassa ^b	3	11	-	1	93
Zumbo ^d	3	4	3	-	200
Marávia ^b	6	12	2	-	100
Angónia ^d	3	13	1	-	340
Mágoè	4	7	-	-	100
Tete	5	20	-	17	60 ^c
Moatize ^d	9	34	-	-	110
TOTALS	47	141	14	21	129

^aPercentage estimated in accordance with totals of *aldeamentos* in late 1972 provided by GDT/CEP, mentioned as source; ^bSix *aldeamentos* from Chipera would later be included from Marávia in Cahora Bassa; ^cLow percentage in Tete area probably because great numbers of *aldeamentos* were still being settled; ^dIncluded in the market network are villages (sometimes referred to as 'natural concentrations') which would only be considered as *aldeamentos* in 1973/74. Another reason for this situation is that *aldeamentos* included were still on plan.

Sources: AHM, FM, Cx.110: Delegação Regional dos Serviços de Comércio de Tete, 19/p's 1.5 e 1.6/6, (Maio 1972); AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

Before this period, the sparse and feeble trade network had been supported by small rural shops, the *cantinas*, complemented by commerce with the neighbouring countries, in the northeastern frontier areas with Malawi and Zambia, and in the southwestern frontier areas with Southern Rhodesia. The process of villagisation, in conjunction with war itself, had a broad impact on this system. Theoretically, the process of concentration of people which accompanied villagisation should have increased trade conducted by *cantinas*, since it brought more customers nearer them, easing such problems as narrow shop range or chronic long distances between shops and African villages. However, it frequently occurred that location of an *aldeamento* did not coincide with where a *cantina* was formerly placed, and in some cases the new villages were not even within range of shops. In the list of priority criteria which determined the location of the *aldeamento*, the previous existence of a shop as a criterion, although being taken into account, was preceded by several other factors such as military strategy, water and arable land availability, vicinity to important or passable roads,

and others.²⁷ Although the general rule was that the former *cantina* kept on supplying the new settlement and buying from it, it also occurred that the confinement of people caused the closure of a shop out of range from the *aldeamento*. In addition to such factors, war obviously exerted great and direct influence in the closure of isolated *cantinas*, which the army could not afford to protect. During the nationalist war in Tete, roads and railways were always privileged guerrilla targets. Therefore, even those *cantineiros* who profited from the confinement of people became highly vulnerable due to hazardous circulation. If a *cantineiro* was wealthy enough to possess his own trucks, as Fidélis de Sousa in Macanga's *aldeamento* of Massamba or José Duarte Gonçalves in *aldeamento* Soronhate of the same area,²⁸ the outlet of locally bought products or the supplying of local shops had to be carried out in military convoys, always risking being blown up or ambushed. In small businesses one occurrence of this kind could be ruinous. The decline of agricultural production was also a negative factor. Although general statistics are not available on this matter, occasional figures and the description of sectoral processes suggest that scarcity of fertile lands and abundant water, which accompanied the concentration process, undoubtedly caused a general decline in agricultural production levels, thus affecting commerce. In spite of figures not being available, regarding trade contacts with neighbouring countries after the *aldeamentos* were settled, some decline or, at least, increasing hardships can be assumed. Chizampeta, the northernmost *aldeamento* of Macanga, is the only one in the area reported as trading with Malawi's frontier shops. On the other hand, from the Bene-Macanga's zone of traditional tobacco growers, and traditional traders in this product with Malawi as well, only Casula's *aldeamentos* of Canteza, Calanze, Mangaze and Massamba are mentioned as growing varying quantities of tobacco.²⁹

It took some time before the issue of trade was seriously considered by state authorities, probably because this was an area traditionally concerning private interests. Significantly, the second statistical map issued by the Commission for Studies and Planning (CEP) in May 1972, a detailed record working simultaneously as an inquiry to be up-dated by District Commissioners and Local Administrators, did not even include information on

²⁷Even if some of these factors were common to the location of both the *cantina* and the *aldeamento*, such as road vicinity or densely populated areas.

²⁸AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

²⁹AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

trade.³⁰ However, population concentration, greater difficulties of access to farm lands and increased trade obstacles, all these factors augmented people's vulnerability and contributed to reduced food reserves in the *aldeamentos*.

TABLE 8.9:
RURAL SHOPS IN MACANGA'S *ALDEAMENTOS*

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	Rural Shops	<i>Aldeamentos</i>	Rural Shops	<i>Aldeamentos</i>	Rural Shops
CENTRAL AREA		CHIÚTA		CASULA	
Chizampeta	- ^a	Chiúta	-	Canteza	4 ^d
Mulirima	1	Gulói ^b	-	Calanze	-
Furancungo	4 ^d	Zuze	1 ^c	Mangaze	1 ^c
Miuanga	-	Sachirire	1	Massamba	1
Catondo	1 ^c	Sabondo	-	Matenge	-
Baué	1	Cagulula	-	Soronhate	1
Vuende	3 ^d	Chicôco	-		
Chazia	-	Zangaia	1 ^c		
Manjanja	1	Chicote	- ^e		
Malaite	- ^b	Caúnda	2		
Cuncere	1	Biui	- ^{bc}		
		Meza	-		

^aTrade with Malawian shops; ^bFormer shops closed under the influence of the war; ^c"Hut-shops"; ^d*Aldeamentos* located in the vicinity of relatively important Portuguese administrative settlements, where the shops listed were actually located; ^e*Aldeamentos* which traded in Caúnda's 2 shops at an average distance of 15 km.

Sources: AHM, FMA, Cx.107: AdPa/Chiúta, "Relatório sobre todos os *Aldeamentos* previstos, em construção e concluídos na área do Posto Administrativo da Chiúta-Concelho da Macanga" (19/03/71); Encarregado do *Aldeamento*, Quatro Relatórios sobre os Trabalhos nos *Aldeamentos* de Zuze, Sachirire, Chiúta and Gulói (Março 1971); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

The fragile and unstable balance ended abruptly when, due to major droughts, famine occurred in various areas north of the Zambezi in 1972, worsening in 1973. Nearly 50 percent of Marávia's *aldeamentos* were reported as being completely deprived of food

³⁰AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre *Aldeamentos*" (27/05/72). Unfortunately, this is the only one of a series of statistical maps on Tete *aldeamentos* which came to our knowledge. The items it covered were the following, for each *aldeamento*: name; population (actual or foreseen); water supply (wells, water-holes, rivers, springs); school; health post; social centre; warehouse; power supply; technical and security staff (school trainers, nurses, farming monitors, militia; police); landing strip; farmed area; location (geographical coordinates); accountable entity for the settlement; and comments. However, many questions remained unanswered.

reserves, while Macanga, generally a traditional fertile area, was equally deprived of food reserves in one third of its *aldeamentos*. Four of the six Casula's *aldeamentos* suffered important and calamitous famines in 1972 and 1973, respectively, the same occurring in three of the central area's eleven *aldeamentos*.³¹ The District Governor had been trying, since 1971, to set up a strategy to counter this problem by instructing the District Direction of Economy to mount a system of "emergency" food reserves in collaboration with the ICM or Institute of Cereals (*Instituto dos Cereais de Moçambique*) capable of, according to his words, "preventing, as far as possible, the aggravation of the [famine] situation following the resettlement of populations displaced into *aldeamentos* or concentrated during emergency actions".³² A system was then designed, particularly through inquiring District Commissioners, Local Administrators and military authorities, to determine food needs and surpluses per area. In parallel, special funds were allotted for food purchase, routes were defined, and vehicles of the Tete Government and ZOT mobilised to assure the transportation of food aid. Although the military were already involved in meeting some of the *aldeamento*'s transportation needs, they resisted greater involvement, alleging that their vehicles were primarily concerned with meeting military needs, which led the Government to plan the mobilisation even of the *cantineiros*' trucks. Local surpluses and food aid was thus to be concentrated in the locations determined by the District Services of Agriculture as market-places (see Table 8.8 above).

The *concelho* of Moatize provides an example of one of the areas where the situation was least dramatic, since it benefitted from a railway line, a main road and the most important industrial settings in the District. Moreover, one of its areas, Zóbuè's highlands, was composed of traditionally fertile lands, in the vicinity of Angónia's *plateau*. However, its food situation was highly negative as shown in the following table:

³¹AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

³²See AHM, FM, Cx.110: Delegação Regional dos Serviços de Comércio de Tete, 19/p's 1.5 e 1.6/6 (Maio 1972). See also FGT, Cx.s/n: Delegação Regional dos Serviços de Economia de Tete, 2/GT/CACM/71-Extra (2311/71).

TABLE 8.10:
FOOD SITUATION IN MOATIZE'S *ALDEAMENTOS* (1972)

Markets	No. of <i>Aldeamentos</i> Within Range of Market	Food Surplus (tons)		Food Needs (tons)	
		Maize	Pulses	Maize	Pulses
CENTRAL AREA					
Conduce	5	-	-	30	5
Chingodzi	8	-	-	75	10
Oitavadas	7	-	-	45	5
Catipo	11	35	-	-	-
Sungu	2	15	-	-	-
ZÓBUÈ					
Ponte do Condézi	4	7	-	-	-
Viúva Henriques		150*	-	-	-
CALDAS-XAVIER					
Caldas Xavier	3	-	-	113	15
Sub-Totals	40	207	-	263	35
TOTAL OF NEEDS: 56 tons of maize and 35 tons of beans					

*Population not yet villagised in 1972.

Sources: AHM, FM, Cx.110: Delegação Regional dos Serviços de Comércio de Tete, 19/p's 1.5 e 1.6/6 (Maio 1972); AdConc/Moatize, no.99/D/6 (19/06/72); AdPa/Zóbuè, no.5/D/6 (26/05/72); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no. 41/D/6 (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos* (1993).

Tete did not cease being a traditionally cattle breeding district during this period, particularly its southern zones but also, to a great extent, the areas freed of tse-tse fly in Marávia, Angónia and Macanga. Cattle therefore ought to have been an extra resource to cope with famines and the plan established by the Provincial Steering Group in 1971 foresaw the development of *aldeamentos* particularly concerned with cattle breeding, fostered by the District Veterinary Services.³³ Table 8.11 below reveals the cattle numbers per *aldeamento* in Cahora Bassa's central area.

³³AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT/CEP, "Aldeamentos Previstos para 1972 no Distrito de Tete".

TABLE 8.11:
CATTLE BREEDING IN CAHORA BASSA'S CENTRAL AREA *ALDEAMENTOS* (1972-1973)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	People	1972			1973		
		Cattle	Goats	Pigs	Cattle	Goats	Pigs
Maroeira	652	372	259	116	392	404	33
Bucha	1,115	114	136	106	212	9	118
Metape	1,176	554	479	97	96	142	21
Patrão	951	334	251	96	n/a	n/a	n/a
Pastor	471	463	201	67	356	172	17
Chuva	1,080	442	247	115	459	359	15
Cussene	857	748	491	64	702	291	8
Misseto	493	423	297	90	260	125	8
Cavulância	808	592	155	97	51	31	3
Averages	845	449	280	94	316	192	28

N/a = not available.

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos* (1993).

However, besides cattle not being just a food resource but also an important element of symbolic wealth and food reserve in these societies, numbers in the table suggest a general decline probably due to three main causes. The first was the limited access to pastures in the *aldeamentos*. If one takes into account the serious problems of gaining access to agricultural lands in the *aldeamentos*, referred to above, then these must have been much worse due to the large tracts of land required for grazing. Moreover, although some documents suggest the state concern with reserving larger areas per family in the cattle breeding areas, no particular measures were referred to on this subject in the "rules to be followed in the establishment of *aldeamentos*" issued by the office of the District Governor in February 1972, besides the recommendation for the veterinary services to assist such *aldeamentos*.³⁴ The second reason must have been the droughts which ravaged the District in 1972 and 1973, in association with people's lack of mobility to pursue the remaining water sources. Last but not least, Frelimo's action to counter the villagisation programme had a strong component of stealing cattle from the *aldeamentos*, both to feed the guerrillas and particularly to discourage people from living there, as was argued in Chapter 7, particularly in its section d). Table 7.5 gave an indication of how this became a pattern in guerrilla action in 1973.

³⁴AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "Normas Gerais para Implantação de Aldeamentos" (10/02/72).

Weak food reserves had obviously a direct influence on the nutritional state of the population in the *aldeamentos*. Half of Marávia *aldeamentos* were reported in 1973/74 to be deprived of food reserves and suffering from very serious malnutrition.³⁵ This situation could only be ameliorated with increased production and trade levels and required health assistance. As to the latter, the establishment of health infrastructures only took place seriously by the end of 1971 and, particularly, in 1972/73, as a result of the effort of the Commission for Studies and Planning. Until then, health assistance to the *aldeamentos* had been provided by health facilities previously existing in the scarce Portuguese small rural towns and by the military. The following table gives some information on the health assistance to the *aldeamentos*:

TABLE 8.12:
FIRST AID STATIONS AND MONITORS IN TETE ALDEAMENTOS

AREA	No. of <i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People	No. of First Aid Stations	No. of First Aid Monitors
Angónia	18	42,705	6	3
Bene	7	2,852	6	7
Cahora Bassa	24	24,060	20	17
Macanga	29	30,632	16	5
Mágoè	14	10,656	0	0
Marávia	14	8,253	12	9
Moatize	44	46,933	29	32
Mutarara	29	24,317	22	22
Tete	62	85,131	30	31
Zumbo	10	11,295	5	5
TOTALS	251	286,834	146	131

Sources: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

The health system was designed in such a way that first-aid could be assured at the *aldeamento* level.³⁶ However, first-aid stations only covered 58 percent of the *aldeamentos*

³⁵AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

³⁶See AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/SDAC, "Reunião do Governador Geral da Província, Eng. Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes das Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição" (23/06/72):5-6.

by 1974, and according to occasional descriptions lack of facilities, medicines and skills were routine. Local assistance was also provided by the medical services of the army when the *aldeamento* had a military garrison nearby. Beyond first-aid stations, health care varied from area to area. The coverage assured by the 10 rural hospitals was of the order of one to 25 *aldeamentos*. Angónia was assisted by the rural hospital of Vila Coutinho, Macanga's central area and part of Bene by the rural hospital of Furancungo, Marávia by the rural hospital of Fingoé, etc.³⁷ Considering the lack of passable roads and the effect of the war, isolating most of the *aldeamentos*, the range of the rural hospitals must have been very small. In order to compensate for these limitations, an aeroplane medical service run by Dr Paz, who became famous in the entire District, provided support with medical care and medicines to an area as wide as to include Cahora Bassa's central area and Chicó sub-division, Macanga's Chiúta sub-division, the entire areas of Zumbo and of the *concelho* of Tete, and part of Moatize. In Chiúta, for instance, he visited *aldeamentos* Zangaia, Sabondo and Zuze on Fridays, where he assisted people from these and other nearby *aldeamentos*. Particularly in the last year of the war, military helicopters increasingly provided transportation of sick and wounded people to the hospital of Tete,³⁸ a process somewhat related to the programme of psychological action.

In parallel with the establishment of first-aid facilities, education was included in the services the state was to assure in the *aldeamentos*. Education was not only to improve the picture in the *aldeamentos* but, most importantly, to create the grounds for the programme of psychological action. Designed on the same lines as health assistance, this component was fostered by the 1972 programme, which targeted the construction of one school per *aldeamento*, together with a school monitor and equipment, to be provided by the District Services of Education.³⁹ Table 8.13 gives the results of this activity by 1973/74:

³⁷AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

³⁸See AHM, FM, Cx.111: ZOT (4a.Secção), "Acções do Inimigo sobre a População e Apresentação de Populações" (1/05/72 to 14/07/74).

³⁹Intervention of the head of the SDAC, in AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n: GDT/SDAC, "Reunião do Governador Geral da Província, Eng.Pimentel dos Santos, com os Secretários Provinciais, Chefes das Repartições Distritais e Administradores de Concelho e Circunscrição" (23/06/72):5-6.

TABLE 8.13:
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL MONITORS IN TETE ALDEAMENTOS

Area	No. of <i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People	No. of Schools	No. of School Monitors
Angónia	18	42,705	6	3
Bene	7	2,852	6	8
Cahora Bassa	24	24,060	24	27
Macanga	29	30,632	23	47
Mágoè	14	10,656	1	2
Marávia	14	8,253	12	18
Moatize	44	46,933	33	34
Mutarara	29	24,317	22	22
Tete	62	85,131	38	47
Zumbo	10	11,295	5	9
TOTALS	251	286,834	170	217

Sources: AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete Aldeamentos" (1993).

Data available for Marávia reveal that, although not achieving the level of 19 percent of the population aimed at by the 1972 Plan and considered by it as the lowest internationally accepted percentage, educational activity witnessed some development, even if conditions were very rudimentary.

Social Centres were also to be established by the state in the *aldeamentos*, together with the school, the first-aid station and water works. In the colonial view this was a fundamental infrastructure: located in the centre of the village, it assured the "formal" place where the psychological programme would be implemented, through panels with texts, posters, photographs and so forth,⁴⁰ while providing a place for the community assembly meetings and for the popular meetings of the administration representatives with the people. Data on the social centres do not cover the entire District and suggest their very unequal implementation. Only 4 of the 14 Marávia *aldeamentos* were reported as having Social Centres, for instance, while Mutarara, on the contrary, had 22 of its 29 *aldeamentos* provided

⁴⁰See Chapter 5, Section c), in this respect.

with them.⁴¹

TABLE 8.14:
SCHOOLS IN MARÁVIA ALDEAMENTOS (1973)

<i>Aldeamentos</i>	No. of People	Schools ^a	School Monitors	Pupils			% ^b
				Males	Females	Total	
CENTRAL-AREA							
Fingoé	1,804	1	3	187	88	275	15.2
Mucanga	341	1	1	42	29	71	20.8
Cauero	544	1	2	66	41	107	19.6
Nhantaro	1,092	1	2	86	10	96	8.7
Mucanha-Seco	95	0	1	-	-	-	0.0
CHOFOMBO							
Gago Coutinho	776	1	2	61	21	82	10.5
Caduco	211	1	1	23	14	37	17.5
Chimponda	324	1	1	25	12	37	11.4
M'Peua	197	1	1	14	25	39	19.7
Nhanseula	132	1	1	12	17	29	21.9
VASCO DA GAMA							
Cantengo	579	1	3	80	22	102	17.6
Tenese	646	1	1	57	37	94	14.5
Nhaluiro-Novo	828	1	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Matipo	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
AVERAGE	562	1	1	54	26	80	14.5

^aAll schools were pre-fabricated buildings with 2 classrooms each, with the exception of Tenese's, where the school was referred as a "provisional hut";

^b% of Pupils from *aldeamento* population.

Source: AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

The irregular implementation of such an important component of the *aldeamento* strategy reveals, on the one hand, the difficulties the state was facing in fostering the programme, and, on the other, discloses a lot on the nature of these buildings, certainly viewed by the villagised people as a Government initiative much more than as one of their own, a detail mirroring perhaps what was happening with the entire programme.

⁴¹AHM, FMA, Cx.97: GDT/CEP, "2º Mapa Estatístico sobre Aldeamentos" (27/05/72); AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

c) N'cungas: The History of an *Aldeamento*, 1972-1974


After having examined the general impact of the counter-insurgency strategy on Tete *aldeamentos* we will, in this section, briefly discuss the development of *aldeamento* N'cungas, aiming at revealing, through a case study, the constraints imposed on a particular local community, as well as at assessing the level of effort exerted by the colonial state and the results achieved by the villagisation strategy in the war scenario of a specific area.

N'cungas was not very different from the remaining Tete *aldeamentos* in the sense it developed, as they did, general and particular characteristics.⁴² N'cungas shared with most of them the fact of being a 'late' *aldeamento*, included in the 1972 plan of the Governor's Office, which permits one to establish a somewhat clearer connection between villagisation and war. As in most of the strategic villages, the formation of N'cungas had also to counter people's resistance, due in part to the unavailability of nearby agricultural lands and shortage of water supply. As to the particular characteristics of the *aldeamentos* in the area which included N'cungas, the most important were undoubtedly the fact that they were located in the area of Tete which was provided with more communication facilities (the only railway line, connecting the District to Mozambique's central areas, and the most important road, running from Tete to Malawi). Unlike the rest of Tete, this meant that all the *aldeamentos* in the area were easily reachable by the authorities; in addition, N'cungas was part of a minority of frontier *aldeamentos*, and also unlike most of the rest it was settled not by the District Government directly but by the railway company instead, the CFM.

N'cungas was located in Caldas Xavier, one of the three territorial subdivisions of the area of Moatize, bordering Malawi on the east and the area of Mutarara on the south. In 1971, the Provincial Steering Group for the *aldeamentos* had included Caldas Xavier in its Green A3 Zone (see Map 6.3), one which was due to go through regular villagisation conducted by the Office of the Zambezi Plan, the GPZ, since it had been considered as an area which would be affected by the Zambezi river scheme. However, some factors developing throughout the year of 1971 dictated structural re-arrangements, namely the transferral of the area from the GPZ's to the CFM's jurisdiction, in so far as the *aldeamentos* were concerned, as well as the acceleration in the process of villagising the area.

⁴²It has to be mentioned that the above average availability of documentary sources on N'cungas was an important reason why this *aldeamento* was selected to be discussed in this section.

MAP 8.2: ALDEAMENTOS ESTABLISHED IN MOATIZE'S AREA OF CALDAS XAVIER



The most important of these factors was undoubtedly Frelimo's rapid progress southwards. In the first months of 1971, the Portuguese intelligence services reported Frelimo's intentions to progress along the Moatize-Mutarara 'axis' and the railway line, in order to reach the neighbouring districts of Zambezia and Manica e Sofala,⁴³ eventually threatening the railway line itself, the one which was to carry all the equipment and supplies for the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam. The colonial military strategy to keep the situation under control in Tete's southeastern area was based to a great extent on the villagisation of the local people along the left bank of the Zambezi river, the right side of the railway line, and both sides of the Tete-Malawi road except where it ran close to the border with Malawi.⁴⁴ From the military point of view the aim with this move was, as already mentioned, to create large corridors devoid of people where the army could shoot down the guerrillas at sight.

Map 8.2 shows the establishment of Caldas Xavier's *aldeamentos* in close connection with the war situation: one of the four, Buluaio, was placed on the road which, running from Caldas Xavier, joined the Tete-Malawi road,⁴⁵ while the remaining three, Cateme, Caldas Xavier and N'cungas, were located along the railway line and close to previously existing railway stops, from which they borrowed their names. N'cungas, as the area's southernmost *aldeamento*, was considered by the authorities as the point where Frelimo's progression southwards, to Mutarara should be halted, and was thus selected as a priority *aldeamento*.⁴⁶

However, no important steps seem to have been taken during the year of 1971, and by the beginning of 1972 the "anticipation factor" had been lost to a great extent. In January 1972 the guerrilla forces made their first ambush on a train on the Beira-Moatize railway

⁴³SCCIM, Relatório da Situação [hereafter RS] no.2/71 (16 to 31/01/71).

⁴⁴See AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaÇ 3865, no.3027/S/72 (15/09/72); Cx.111: BCaÇ 3865, no.3268/C/72 Po.390.6 (27/12/72).

⁴⁵The Tete-Malawi road was the first one to suffer Frelimo's repeated attacks in the area. Buluaio was the last *aldeamento* to be established in the area, in late 1972, probably because it did not concern the CFM directly. In fact, this was the only *aldeamento* relatively far from the railway line. For the attacks see AAC/Tete 1992: Interview.

⁴⁶See AHM, FM, Cx.110: Oficial de Aldeamentos, Relatório no.6/72 (24/03/72).

line,⁴⁷ while increasing pressure on the road leading from Tete to Malawi. Frelimo guerrillas were now approaching Moatize and clearly targeting the main communication lines in the area, creating, from the authorities' point of view, the need for the urgent villagisation of the area.

Considering the GPZ's chronic slowness in villagising the areas under its jurisdiction, discussed above, as well as the incapacity of the District Government to undertake the immediate villagisation of the area,⁴⁸ it was not surprising that the CFM took hold of the villagisation process in Caldas Xavier, provided with a private military force and directly concerned with defending the railway line and equipment as they were. Moreover, besides being concerned with the agglomeration of local people in order to leave room for free military action, the CFM were also facing the need to settle their staff along the railway line. This dictated the fact that the *aldeamentos* in the area were formed of two main groups of people: a majority of local Nyungwe people from the *regedoria* Chintamuende, the only one in the area of Caldas Xavier, and a minority of external railway workers employed by the CFM, mostly of Sena extraction.⁴⁹

The evolution of the situation at the beginning of 1972 provoked different responses on the part of the population. If, on the one hand, some people tended to move voluntarily to the existing colonial agglomerations (the railway stops) as the war was approaching, on the other increasing flights of people to neighbouring Malawi were certainly occurring even if not always reported.⁵⁰ People settled in Malawi's frontier zones, even if not immediately

⁴⁷SCCIM, Relatório Anual de Informações, 1972. The railway line had been landmined for some time but this one was the first direct attack. For descriptions of attacks on the railway line see Tadeu Makhaza in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

⁴⁸In AHM, FM, Cx.110: RMM/ZOT, no.691/C Po.602 (12/05/72), the Tete Governor and ZOT Commander explained in a clear and detailed manner the reasons why the District Government could not assure the villagisation of the area of Caldas Xavier, absorbed as it was in villagising other areas. He even mentioned, on the same occasion, that the process agglomeration of people which preceded the *aldeamentos* in the area had been initiated without his prior knowledge and consent.

⁴⁹On this pattern of Nyungwe-Sena composition in Caldas Xavier's *aldeamentos* see AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier (2/04/74).

⁵⁰While traditional authorities in *aldeamento* Caldas Xavier were the former counsellors since the chiefs of group of villages had run away to Malawi, in Cateme the chief of the *aldeamento* was a railway worker for the same reason. AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

adhering to Frelimo, could provide the guerrilla movement with a frontier logistical support in the long term.

Pressed by the above factors, the CFM and the civil and military authorities held a series of meetings to programme the steps to be taken.⁵¹ Since they seemed not capable of establishing all the *aldeamentos* programmed for the area, meaning villages provided with a defence system, nearby fields for agriculture, building materials, water supply, social facilities such as schools and first-aid stations, they started, as in many other cases in Tete, with the pre-villagisation stage, the agglomeration of people in the sites of the would be *aldeamentos*. The process of gathering dispersed people in the region started in January 1972 and was conducted particularly by GE 602 for N'cungas, a military unit of Special Groups settled in the region. Pursued throughout the whole year,⁵² it was later summarised by the authorities in the following way:

"[N'cungas] is the *aldeamento* which has had more problems from the start, since its people were brought from their home villages into the agglomeration without prior notice, leaving behind their belongings and harvests, which ended up being lost because of the hardships in transporting them through impassable and landmined tracks".⁵³

The military services, together with N'cungas's local militia, were in principle the ones responsible for the transportation of people's belongings, using the only military vehicle available in the area. This slow process became increasingly difficult to undertake. An extended rainy season and the landmining of the vehicle brought the process to a halt. The two or three vehicles the CFM had promised to make available could not be brought into the area due to lack of military escorts.⁵⁴ Since this was a process the authorities could not afford to interrupt, these increased difficulties could only have meant that people were being brought into the agglomeration even if leaving behind all their belongings.


⁵¹See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.111: BCaç 3865, no.63 Po.AP (3/04/72); ZOT (3a.Secção), no.535/C Po.602 (20/04/72); Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.23/A/2 (24/03/72), transcribing BCaç 3865, no.46 Po.AP (22/03/72).

⁵²AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, Msg.no.110/C/72 (18/01/72).

⁵³AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2 "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier (2/04/74).

⁵⁴AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdConc/Moatize, no.143/A/2 "Relatório" (4/08/72).

MAP 8.3: ALDEAMENTO N' CUNGAS



The hardships faced by the local families in building their new huts in the "protected" area can be guessed, particularly if it is taken into account that they were not bringing with them their building materials, contrary to assurances given in principle. In March, the joint commission for the villagisation of the area submitted a proposition to their superiors: CFM workers should be provided with houses built by the company, the same happening for people coercively brought into the village. Only people voluntarily joining the agglomeration⁵⁵ should be obliged to build their own houses.⁵⁶ However, pressure exerted by events was obliging the state to assume a harsh stand: the answer of the District Governor and ZOT commander was that both *apresentados* and people coercively displaced into the agglomeration should be obliged to build their houses counting on no one but themselves.⁵⁷

But more serious than this was the fact that population displacement into N'cungas was undertaken at a time when their crops were still growing on the fields, which had important consequences. On the one hand, it created conditions for increased starvation and raised serious dissatisfaction amongst the population whose crops, left behind, were to a great extent destroyed and eaten by monkeys and wild boars. On the other hand, with people having lost their food resources, the colonial authorities were forced to keep on supplying the agglomeration with food. In January, and following a direct order issued by the District Governor, 56 sacks of maize (approximately 5 tons) were delivered free of cost to the 800 people living in the pre-*aldeamento*, which were consumed in the following twenty days. By mid-February, and in spite of the distribution of ten extra sacks, famine and dissatisfaction were spreading in a worrying way.⁵⁸ In desperation, the Local Administrator got permission from the District Governor to make periodic requests for maize at the *Instituto dos Cereais*, the only local institution which had maize available.⁵⁹ However, this was a very limited and provisional measure.

⁵⁵These people, called *apresentados* or the ones "presenting themselves", were mostly the ones who had run away to Malawi's frontier zones, later returning because of the hardships faced there.

⁵⁶AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.46 Po.AP (22/03/72); Cx.111: BCaç 3865, no.63 Po.AP (3/04/72).

⁵⁷AHM, FM, Cx.111: ZOT (3a. Secção), no.535/C Po.602 (20/04/72).

⁵⁸AHM, FM, Cx.111: GE 602, no.15/72 (16/03/72).

⁵⁹AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.18/A/2 (20/03/72); AdConc/Moatize, no.143/A/2 "Relatório" (4/08/72).

Incapable of securing food supplies, local authorities were thus forced to allow the villagised people to periodically go back and work on their former *machambas*. In principle, these visits were to be made in military convoys so that protection could be assured, or, more probably, so that contacts with guerrilla forces could be prevented. However, since former villages were dispersed and tracks leading to them virtually impassable in many cases, soon the military were forced to admit their incapacity to escort every group of villagers in these travels.⁶⁰ This situation was obviously putting at risk the first principle of the villagisation strategy: the one of assuring that guerrilla forces would be prevented from contacting local people.

Consequently, the authorities were urged by every possible reason to plan land distribution for agriculture on the environs of the agglomeration, even if it was known from the start that there was not enough room for all the families.⁶¹ N'cungas being a CFM *aldeamento*, it is not surprising that Sena CFM workers were the first ones to receive not only plots in the *aldeamento* but also fields for agriculture next to the GE 602 headquarters and close to the *aldeamento*. As to local Nyungwe people, most of them were given fields on the only area with agricultural suitability which had been left, on the Minjova river valley some 6 kms from the *aldeamento*, which implied that agricultural works could only be carried out under military surveillance.⁶² If, on the one hand, it seems probable that ethnic conflicts between Sena and Nyungwe people emerged in connection with different conditions of access to land, on the other Frelimo's continued pressure imparted permanent instability to this process,⁶³ described by military authorities as follows:

⁶⁰See AHM, FM, Cx.110: GE 602, no.15/72 (16/03/72). In spite of not being capable of fully covering these visits to the former cultivation fields, the GE 602 commander requested permission for authorising them due to the desperate situation of the villagers.

⁶¹Fearing the continuous influx of people, either voluntarily or captured in their home areas by the army, the local commission for the *aldeamentos* in Caldas Xavier proposed the quick survey of other areas where new *aldeamentos* could be established. See, in this regard, AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.46 Po.AP (22/03/72).

⁶²See AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.128 Po.AP (10/07/72); AdConc/Moatize, no.142/A/2 (4/08/72); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.58/A/28/4 (21/08/72).

⁶³In July an urgent cable-message besides requesting for extra maize supplies so that a gap in the local food supply could be avoided, asked for immediate military operations on the area in order to alleviate the pressure exerted by Frelimo. See AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, Msg.no.1263/C/72 (13/07/72). In August, Caldas Xavier's Local Administrator, considering that GE 602 and local militia forces were not enough to assure the protection of the *machambas*, requested permission to send extra conscripts to Tete where they were to undergo militia training. AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.58/A/28/4 (21/08/72).

"Fields conceded to people for *machambas*, besides being far from the *aldeamento*, are divided into plots apart one from another, which not only hampers the protection exercised by militia and local defence forces but also favours the action of the enemy in alluring scattered groups of people working on the fields".⁶⁴

In late 1973, immediately after the first harvests, the Minjova river valley *machambas* were eventually abandoned and people brought to cultivate much poorer lands in the environs of the *aldeamento*.⁶⁵ But the problems faced by the villagers were not limited to land availability. Effectively, clearance of lands, which in principle should have been provided by the state, had to be done manually by the villagers themselves in two consecutive agricultural campaigns, on the Minjova river valley in 1972 and on the outskirts of N'cungas in 1973.⁶⁶ In addition, standard agricultural inputs which according to the 1972 villagisation plan should have been routinely made available in all *aldeamentos* were missing in N'cungas. Seed supplies were short or eaten by starving villagers.⁶⁷ While N'cungas waited in vain until 1974 for the arrival of an agricultural extension worker, there is no evidence of distribution of agricultural implements.⁶⁸

⁶⁴AHM, FM, Cx.111: BCaÇ 3865/OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.4/72" (13/12/72), included in BCaÇ 3865, no.719/3 Po.370.9 (26/02/73).

⁶⁵On the process of transferral, AHM, FM, Cx.111: BCaÇ 3865/OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.7/73" (1/07/73), included in BCaÇ 3865, no.2784/3 Po.300.5.003 (27/07/73): "In *aldeamento* N'cungas, as soon as the harvests were concluded we established new *machambas* around the *aldeamento* in order to achieve better protection and control over the population". On people's reaction, AHM, FM, AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74): "Arguing on the grounds that it had become impossible to provide daily escorts so that people could go to work on their former *machambas*, we managed, although at a great cost, to convince the people to abandon their *machambas* and to start cultivating much nearer lands. At a great cost since the former *machambas* were located on the best lands available in the area. In fact, this was an unavoidable step to be taken since the former *machambas* were scattered and located at more than 5 kms from the *aldeamento*". Finally, on the new and much poorer *machambas*, located at an average 1.5 kms from the *aldeamento*, see AHM, FM, Cx.111: Operador Psicológico [hereafter OPSic], "Relatório" (27/09/73).

⁶⁶AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁶⁷According to AHM, FM, Cx.109: Repartição Distrital de Agricultura e Florestas, "Instruções para distribuição de sementes nos aldeamentos do Distrito de Tete" (14/11/70), each family in the *aldeamento* was to be given 12.3 kg of seeds of maize and also accorded quantities of seeds of groundnuts and beans. The seeds furnished by the state were to be returned at the end of the agricultural campaign. According to AHM, FM, Cx.109: GDT, Msg.no.107/ALD/3 (24/05/72), and GDT, Msg.s/n (12/06/72), virtually no seeds had been returned so far, due to poor harvests.

⁶⁸AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2 "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

The result of this two year development was thus widespread poverty. In his attempt to put an end to the continuous delivery of foodstuffs by the authorities, the Local Administrator tried to get permission from the District Commissioner to compel the villagers to work either at the railway works or at the N'cungas timber works. According to him, some people could also be enlisted at the militia unit.⁶⁹ He hoped to solve the problem by providing every man with waged work. However, besides the fact that only a small part of the population could be given waged work, the point was not earning money but much more basic food availability which was desperately short in the area.

N'cungas was provided with two rural shops and one mill,⁷⁰ all run by the state. However, following the general trend occurring in most areas of Tete, shops increasingly turned themselves into stations for food distribution. In spite of wage labour having occurred here more than in the common *aldeamento*, generating some money, the fact was that the shops were out of supplies most of the time, due to transportation problems and to lack of one investing *cantineiro*. If in 1973 a couple of families could still sell some surpluses to the local shops,⁷¹ by 1974 the Local Administrator wrote quite clearly that "there are no cash crops at all in the area".⁷² Meanwhile, all sorts of expediciencies were used by the resourceless villagers. According to the testimony of a villager, in September 1973,

"land is not suitable for agriculture in this area; therefore, we buy maize and with its bran we produce *cabanga* [a strong alcoholic beverage] which we sell mostly to the CFM wage workers, the ones holding money. With the money earned again we buy maize to produce more *cabanga*. This is how we live here in N'cungas(...)".⁷³

The water supply in N'cungas was also inadequate and the village experienced the same incapacity of the state to improve the situation. The small railway stop had not been prepared to support great numbers of people since the early stages of pre-villagisation, in so

⁶⁹AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.18/A/2 (20/03/72); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.2/A/2 (8/01/73).

⁷⁰See AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdConc/Moatize, no.47/D/6, "Relação das localidades dotadas com estabelecimentos comerciais ou industriais com interesse económico" (31/01/73); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁷¹AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73).

⁷²AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁷³AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73).

far as water was concerned. Soon the small tank connected to a well which refreshed the railway engines, located at 500 m from the *aldeamento*, was not enough and people had to turn to a well in GE 602's headquarters, at 2 kms from the site.⁷⁴ Since the District Government had clearly expressed its unavailability to help the local authorities on this matter,⁷⁵ the Local Administrator of Caldas Xavier, counting on a stable situation in N'cungas until June, when scarcity of rains would be felt more seriously, was waiting for the arrival of a water probing company, *Geotécnica e Minas Lda.*, which was working in *aldeamento* Cateme.⁷⁶ However, probably because of delays provoked by the war, by June the situation was already serious and no water works had been undertaken. In the same month the GE 602 unit requested, apparently with no answer, for the water exploration team which was working in Caldas Xavier's headquarters to come to N'cungas as soon as the work was finished there.⁷⁷ In July the situation was reported as getting desperate.⁷⁸ The water problem in N'cungas would eventually be lessened only one year later, when the CFM established a new well and connected it to an electric pump, even if it had only one tap and if it took an average two hours per person to get a 10 litre can of water.⁷⁹

Shortage of foodstuffs and water supply resulted obviously in extremely poor health conditions throughout the life of *aldeamento* N'cungas. The early days of the agglomeration were vividly described by medical reports as follows:

"The people contacted by us revealed clear signs of malnutrition, with the typical look of people lacking proteins, fat and vitamins, since their nourishment was almost exclusively based on flour, and even this in insufficient quantities(...). Sanitary and housing conditions were at the poorest levels, below a tolerable minimum for survival(...). People were depressed and disinterested in the evolution of their situation".⁸⁰

⁷⁴AHM, FM, Cx.110: GE 602, no.15/72 (16/03/72).

⁷⁵AHM, FM, Cx.110: ZOT, no.691/C Po.612 (12/05/72). The District Government had contracted Sosomoc, a water engineering company said to be employing all its resources, at least until late 1972, in Moatize's Central Area and in Tete's area of Marara.

⁷⁶AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.46 Po.AP (22/03/72).

⁷⁷AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.1016/C/72 Po.AP (4/06/72).

⁷⁸AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.128 Po.AP (10/07/72).

⁷⁹AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁸⁰Medical reports from 23 and 28 February 1972, in AHM, FM, Cx.111: Oficial de Aldeamentos, "Relatório" no.6/72 (24/03/72).

In those days, widespread measles and other pestilences were the cause of death of great numbers of people, which prompted the authorities to establish health facilities in N'cungas.⁸¹ Following the indications included in the 1972 CEP Plan, N'cungas was provided with a first-aid station and a nurse in the second half of that year. However, since the District Government had no budget to supply N'cungas with medicines,⁸² there was little the poorly trained nurse could do. In spite of the intense requests of the villagers, visits of doctors only occurred once a year.⁸³ In 1974 the health condition was still reported as very poor and difficult, lacking medicines in quantity and quality to cope with the frequent outbreaks of several sicknesses, including cholera, and with the several people wounded in attacks on the railway line.⁸⁴

Schooling facilities were also to be furnished by the state. This took place very late in N'cungas and resulted largely from CFM's intervention. Effectively, the 1972 CEP Plan of *aldeamentos* foresaw the construction of 60 schools in Tete's *aldeamentos*, of which 18 were to be in the area of Moatize. However, Caldas Xavier's *aldeamentos* were excluded perhaps because they had been considered as CFM *aldeamentos*.⁸⁵ Consequently, N'cungas was given its school only in 1973, a "house" built of cement with two classrooms.⁸⁶ But with its only monitor from December 1971 having been transferred to Caldas Xavier, N'cungas schooling activities had to wait long months before being resumed.⁸⁷ Notwithstanding these constraints, in 1974 this sector was relatively developed and in April N'cungas had three school monitors and nearly 30 percent of the population undergoing

⁸¹AHM, FM, Cx.110: GE 602, no.15/72 (16/03/72). Although the two visits of doctors reportedly managed to bring the situation under control, the fact is that occasional measles outbreaks continued to occur until 1974.

⁸²According to AHM, FM, Cx.110: ZOT, no.691/C Po.612 (12/05/72).

⁸³See AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73).

⁸⁴AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁸⁵See AHM, FM, Cx.110: ZOT, no.691/C Po.612 (12/05/72); AdConc/Moatize, no.1193/A/2 (8/10/74).

⁸⁶AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdConc/Moatize, no.1193/A/2 (8/10/74).

⁸⁷AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73): "[N'cungas has a school] but has no monitor. The one who had been working in there was transferred to Caldas Xavier. The [District] education department did not send a new one and the children have been waiting since then. School equipment is in poor condition as there is no one to take care of it".

training activities, a much higher percentage than the average *aldeamento*.⁸⁸ However, Table 8.15 suggests that the percentage above could be misleading since numbers are only meaningful in the case of the early levels. The feeble state intervention was concluded with the construction of a house for the *régulo*,⁸⁹ and a panel for propaganda under the programme for psychological action.⁹⁰

TABLE 8.15:
SCHOOL POPULATION IN N'CUNGAS IN 1974

Level	Males	Females	Total
Pre-school	50	39	89
1st year	35	32	67
2nd year	11	1	12
3rd year	5	-	5
4th year	1	-	1
Totals	102	72	174

Source: AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

Finally, defence was a relatively stable issue throughout the short history of N'cungas, if its key strategic role is considered and if compared to most of Tete's *aldeamentos*. Possibly because of being a 'late' *aldeamento*, facing a number of hardships and still developing when the process was interrupted in 1974, N'cungas never had what was called a security perimeter (fences of barbed wire, searchlights, a surrounding strip planted with landmines, etc.), contrary to most of the *aldeamentos*. Its defence works were limited, in September 1973, to family shelters in some plots and to the construction of three watch towers.⁹¹

⁸⁸According to AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74), there were 174 students for a total population of 602.

⁸⁹According to AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74), it was "(...) a house of masonry with a lounge, 2 rooms, a veranda and a bathroom with a concrete cesspit", a rare luxury in the area. This effort was included in the programme to win over the "traditional authorities" as a means to mobilise the people against the guerrilla forces. However, the house was still unoccupied in April 1974 because the water plumbing had not been connected yet. Consequently, if the *régulo* ever lived in it, it was for a very short period.

⁹⁰AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73).

⁹¹AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (27/09/73); OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.11/73", included in BCaç 3865, no.4051/3 Po.300.5.003 (8/11/73).

Counter-insurgent forces in N'cungas were formed of the GE 602 unit,⁹² billeted next to the *aldeamento*, a detachment of 16 militia headed by an element of the regular army,⁹³ and a so-called self-defence group which included 11 villagers by 1974.⁹⁴ Excluding the G3 automatic rifles (the standard weapon of the Portuguese army) held by the militia headman and by the GE unit, the defence forces in N'cungas were armed with old Mauser rifles handed over to them by the army.⁹⁵ Whilst the militia were recruited locally and underwent a training course in Tete, villagers of the self-defence group were locally recruited and trained.⁹⁶ N'cungas was, in the area, the only *aldeamento* with a self-defence unit, the villagers of which were certainly seduced to join it with food, money and housing. In August 1973, special houses were referred to as being built for militia and villagers.⁹⁷

Contacts between villagers and the guerrilla movement were of course hampered by this defence system and are very difficult to assess because even the Portuguese authorities never had more than mere suspicions in this respect. During the life of N'cungas, the trend was to reinforce measures aiming at controlling the movements of its inhabitants.⁹⁸ The transferral of *machambas* from the Minjova river valley into the environs of the *aldeamento*,

⁹²Although the GE 602 unit issued several documents on N'cungas, information specifically concerning the unit is scarce in AHM, FM. Like other GE units, GE 602 should have been formed of some 25 'special soldiers', probably recruited locally.

⁹³Militia troops were headed by a soldier of the regular army at least from November 1972. In March 1973 the soldier left, to be replaced in June 1973 by a corporal of the army. See AHM, FM, Cx.111: OEM, "Relatórios de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias" nos.4/72 (13/11/72), 3/73 (8/03/73) e 6/73 (1/06/73). The militia were 16 at least from the same initial date. See the reports above, and AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁹⁴AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

⁹⁵In the several "Relatórios de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias" reported by the OEM between November 1972 and January 1974, in AHM, FM, Cx.111.

⁹⁶Local training activities were held under the direction of the army soldier, who was responsible for all the village forces, GE 602 naturally excepted. AHM, FM, Cx.111: OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.4/72" (13/11/72), included in BCaç 3865, no.719/3 Po.370.9 (26/02/73).

⁹⁷AHM, FM, Cx.111: OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.8/73" (1/08/73), included in BCaç 3865, no.3137/3 Po.300.5.003 (29/08/73). N'cungas referred to as the only *aldeamento* in the area provided with a self-defence structure in AHM, FM, Cx.111: OEM, "Relatório de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias no.4/73" (30/03/73), included in BCaç 3865, no.1554/3 Po.300.5.003 (24/04/73).

⁹⁸General measures for population control in the *aldeamentos* were already documented, particularly in Chapter 7, footnote 100; Specific measures for population control in N'cungas in AHM, FM, Cx.110: BCaç 3865, no.1133/C/72 Po.390.6 (20/06/72).

for example, referred to above, which occurred in late 1973, was included in this trend and, in part, was pressed for by PIDE/DGS because of suspected contacts between the villagers and Frelimo fighters:

"In spite of no concrete evidence having been found so far, DGS still believes in the existence of contacts between the IN [enemy] and the people villagised in N'cungas, occurring when the latter go to work on their *machambas* escorted by the militia in charge of defending the *aldeamento*. In the opinion of DGS, such contacts are rendered possible because of the scattered location of the *machambas*, at an average distance of 5 kms from the *aldeamento*, which makes the surveillance to be exerted by the militia forces over the population a very difficult task (...)".⁹⁹

Further evidence of people's reluctance to live in the *aldeamento* can be deduced from data on the evolution of N'cungas population, even if it has not always been a reluctance connected to a sympathetic attitude towards the guerrilla movement, but resulted from the hardships faced there instead, as was often the case. Flights occurred during the early days of the agglomeration and continued to be reported throughout the period. The villagers of the *aldeamento*, estimated as 800 in the early days and 900 in late 1973,¹⁰⁰ were reduced to 600 in 1974.¹⁰¹ However, the authorities managed to counter Frelimo's action in the *aldeamentos* of the area, assuring a stable situation regarding their security, to which the fact of keeping the support of the "traditional authorities" greatly contributed. Although a great part of village headmen and chiefs of group of villages escaped to Malawi during the pre-villagisation process, the most important ones joined the area's *aldeamentos*. In N'cungas lived Domingos Bibi Chintamuende, *régulo* of *regedoria* Chintamuende, the only one in the area of Caldas Xavier. There he was assisted by important authorities such as chief of group of villages Chimbize and village headmen Alguiar Blaunde, Loce Lemedi and Novo Chalamba.¹⁰²

⁹⁹AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdConc/Moatize, no.19/A/2 (29/03/73).

¹⁰⁰AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (29/09/73).

¹⁰¹AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74).

¹⁰²AHM, FM, Cx.111: OPsic, "Relatório" (29/09/73); AdPa/Caldas Xavier, no.14/A/2, "Relatório: Aldeamentos situados na área do Posto Administrativo de Caldas Xavier" (2/04/74). On the 22nd of April 1974, three days before the military *coup* in Portugal, the *régulo* was the president of N'cungas's local committee, assisted by Limbicane Lampião and Sualha Chintamuende. See AdConc/Moatize, no.110/A/2 (22/04/74).

If the colonial policies towards winning over the "traditional authorities", particularly successful in the area of Caldas Xavier, played a key role in securing the situation, one must also take into account the means of communication which permitted the authorities to easily gain access to all the *aldeamentos* in the region whenever it was necessary, contrary to most of Tete's *aldeamentos*, which, being isolated had to count on just their own defence forces for long periods. Consequently, although Frelimo placed great pressure on *aldeamentos* such as Capirizanje and Sungo,¹⁰³ respectively located in Zóbuè and Moatize's Central Area, and even the railway line across Caldas Xavier, it never managed to attack the *aldeamentos* in this area. While there is no evidence of attacks on the remaining *aldeamentos*, N'cungas was only attacked once and lightly in July 1974,¹⁰⁴ after the military *coup* which marked the end of Portuguese fascism.

The Portuguese villagisation strategy in the area of Caldas Xavier, and particularly in N'cungas, was a successful one if defence is regarded as its only criterion. Measures such as the transferral of *machambas* into the environs of the *aldeamento* seem to have hampered the "leaks" through which Frelimo could influence events in N'cungas. However, the District Government and the CFM were far from being capable of developing the village in accordance with the standards defined by the 1972 CEP villagisation plan itself. Previous conditions of subsistence production were seriously constrained, cash crop production was never seriously fostered and trade was virtually nonexistent. Wage labour seems to have existed just in so far it answered to the CFM's local needs. If very timid attempts took place on the field of education, the health services were, again, virtually nonexistent. The converse of the apparent strategic military success achieved by the colonial authorities in N'cungas was, by 1974, a village of diseased and malnourished people, deprived of their basic means of subsistence and almost entirely dependent on external food aid.

¹⁰³For descriptions of attacks on Capirizanje and Sungo see, AHM, FM, Cx.111: OEM, "Relatórios de defesa de aldeamentos com milícias" no.3/73 (8/03/73) no.9/73, included in BCaç 3865, no.3300/3 Po.300.5.003 (7/09/73). For descriptions of Frelimo operations in this area see Tadeu Makhaza in AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

¹⁰⁴AHM, FM, Cx.111: AdPa/Caldas Xavier, BI no.2/74 (2/07/74): "Yesterday around 8 pm, N'cungas was attacked during half an hour by a group of guerrillas using mortars and heavy weaponry against the [GE 602] headquarters. People were not affected and there were no damages".

PART III

DEVELOPMENT AND RURAL SETTLEMENT IN TETE, 1975-1982: THE
ALDEIAS COMUNAIS

Chapter 9:

MOZAMBIQUE'S POST-INDEPENDENCE AGRARIAN POLICIES: THE STATE AND THE COMMUNAL VILLAGES

a) Introduction and Periodisation

The military *coup* of 25 April 1974 eventually brought a sudden change in the role played by all social actors in Mozambique, and, after a short transition period, an equally radical change in the nature of the state, particularly after June 1975, when the nationalist movement which had been struggling for independence finally came to power. Part III covers the period from that date to 1982/1983. Chapter 9 will seek to understand the political and socio-economic context in which the strategies and policies pursued by the state towards the rural areas were developed. It will also establish a general view which can provide a background for analysing the impact of such strategies and policies on the concrete case of rural Tete, particularly in so far as the transformation of its rural settlement pattern is concerned. Such impact will be dealt with in Chapter 10, which will cover the period from Independence to the end of 1982, considered as a time from when the programme of *aldeias comunais* started declining, giving way to an environment of turmoil in rural Tete, one which has lasted for the last ten years. Finally, Chapter 11 will draw some conclusions from the two major resettlement experiences endured by rural Tete, namely the *aldeamentos* and the *aldeias comunais*. Focused on what is the main argument of our thesis, it will raise the question of common interests of such different structures as the colonial and the independent state, in fostering resettlement schemes. From this comparative approach indications will appear which may illuminate present day policies of the state towards rural stabilisation and development.

The ways the existing literature analyse this period vary, of course, according to the diverse criteria, approaches and focuses. Their proposed periodisation also differs. Egerö analyses this period in four main stages, concerning *internal* developments:¹ 1) from September 1974, when the Transitional Government was empowered, to independence day, in June 25, 1975, in which "main guidelines for the future" were formulated; 2) from

¹Egerö 1987:83-86. On page 84, Egerö also develops, in parallel, a periodisation of *external* events accountable for the course of Mozambique development.

independence to the late 1977, a period ended by Frelimo's Third Congress, which essentially represented "a ratification of all the measures already started, and their subsumption under a coherent economic and political strategy for the creation of a socialist society"; 3) from early 1978 to late 1981, when such policies were fully implemented. Particularly relevant at this time is the installation of the new party and profound reshaping of the state, permitting the application of such policies; and 4) from early 1982 to 1984, the upper limit chosen by the author to conclude his study, a period of rapid economic degradation due to environmental factors and to guerrilla destabilisation conducted by Renamo, supported by South Africa. Another author, Almeida Serra,² based his work on a more simple two period structure, the first one running from April 1974 to the Third Frelimo Congress and the second from here to the Fourth Frelimo Congress, defined by him as the period "between congresses".

The interpretations of the authors referred to above consider the Third Congress as being at a central point in early post-colonial events. We share this view and agree with Egerö when he considers the Congress not as a break with previous developments, but on the contrary as a culmination of previous trends. In any case, as it will be argued later, this event separates two periods: the first one, in which the main policies were constructed, and the second in which they were mainly implemented. For this reason, and since the focus will be sought not on the entire process but just on rural development and state policies of rural settlement, Almeida Serra's two period approach seems appropriate.

As is considered below, the first period runs from the transition to the Third Frelimo Congress and it is included in a dynamic process in which the newly independent state, guided by the nationalist front, sought to establish new concepts, strategies and policies of gradual centralisation, aiming at conferring on Frelimo and the independent state political and administrative control of Mozambican territory as a whole. Concerning the countryside, economic and social steps taken during this period were part of a defensive policy which sought to fill the gaps left behind by the withdrawal of Portuguese colonialism and in which the resettlement initiative was oriented by political guidelines of Frelimo and rested with regional and local authorities.

As to the second period, it started with the Third Congress, which transformed the front into a party formally according to the classical marxist-leninist definition, approved a

²Almeida Serra 1991:284-286.

set of measures giving the party and the state a strong direction in the process of transition to socialism, and established a strategy to accomplish this goal. This second period witnessed the implementation of such a strategy through a set of policies inspired in a dual understanding of economy which conferred on the state and its modernisation a central and leading role in the transformation of economy and society. Notwithstanding the fact that a marginal role was consequently left for the peasant sector in the countryside, strong measures for its integration were set forth, coupled with a clearer definition of the resettlement scheme already under way, one which included its implementation all over the country. The period covers this process, from its formal definition and development to the first signs of its serious degeneration, one which was accompanied by the return of a pattern of violence and war to the Mozambican rural areas. This period is considered as concluded by late 1982, at a time when Renamo's widespread and violent attacks on the communal villages, more than contributing to the review of such a pattern by Frelimo and the state, gradually prevented the continuation of the general strategy in concrete terms, giving way, in the rural areas, to a period of disintegration which in some aspects can be considered as lasting until today.³

b) Communal Villages in the Transition to a New Era: 1974-1977

During the months which followed the military *coup* of the Portuguese army, disintegration is perhaps the key word to understand a process characterised by the absence of political authority⁴ and, behind the euphoria of most of the people in experiencing a new environment of political freedom, by a highly unstable climate created by some settler sectors with their last minute attempts to take over the political process, followed by widespread acts of sabotaging the economy as the former goal was gradually revealed as impossible. In this climate, the fear of revenge or of the "unknown", the spreading of false rumours and several other factors combined to provoke a massive exodus of white Portuguese out of the colony. Although accurate numbers are hard to define, it is estimated that by 1975 some 80,000 of

³In spite of the Programme of Economic Rehabilitation (PRE), but of course excluding the uncertain developments begun with the Rome Agreement to end the war and to seek a political settlement between the Government and Renamo, in October 1992, when these words were written. In addition, it has to be said that the early impact of Renamo action varied according to the different regions. The end of 1982, chosen as the end for our study, coincides with widespread Renamo action in Tete.

⁴A "Provisional Government" took charge, one not acknowledged by Frelimo. Politically, this situation only began to change in September when, after the Lusaka Agreement between the Portuguese authorities and the nationalist movement, a "Transition Government" headed by Frelimo was empowered.

the 120,000 white Portuguese had already left, and that by mid-July only 10,000 remained.⁵

Considering the role of the settler farm sector in the global structure of Mozambique's agricultural production on the eve of independence, shown in percentage in Table 9.1, the impact of this massive exodus can be clearly supposed. Moreover, the exodus was accompanied by the sabotage of infrastructure and killing of cattle, by the removal of trucks, tractors and cattle to neighbouring countries, illegal exports and so forth. But far from affecting solely the settler farm sector, the settlers' retreat had important effects on the remaining sectors of Mozambique's agriculture. While the plantation sector was affected to the extent that it had been managed, administered and technically supported chiefly by white settlers, the peasant sector was perhaps the one which suffered the most dramatic impact. In fact, the settler's retreat led to an acute collapse of the rural trade network, one which had been assured chiefly by white shopkeepers who supplied the countryside with production factors and market incentives, thus affecting peasant commercial production and the life of the peasantry in general.

TABLE 9.1:
GLOBAL STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
IN MOZAMBIQUE BY 1970 (%)

Agricultural Production		100%
a) For own consumption		55%
b) Marketed	peasantry	15%
	plantations	15%
	settler farms	15%

Source: Wuyts 1978:8.

To the disruption of the rural trade network and transport system as a general factor of instability in the countryside was added the crisis of administration, which included not only the District level but also the local one, assured in part, until then, by the *régulo*

⁵According to Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:18. Other estimates exist, for instance in Wuyts 1989:40-41, who considered that 40,000 had left between 1971 and 1973, at least more 100,000 between April 1974 and independence, and another 100,000 during the first year of independence. According to Middlemass 1978:101, 103, 105, 106, an initial number of 250,000 whites was reduced to 80,000 by July 1975, and to 25,000 a little later. "An accurate figure for those remaining early in 1977 was difficult to obtain, but estimates ranged from 12,000 to 20,000, of whom probably three quarters were expatriates in contract."

structure now openly contested by Frelimo. The northern areas, coming out from a fierce and lasting war, were a disarticulated miscellany of people formerly confined in *aldeamentos*, people from areas under Frelimo control, and war refugees flowing in from Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi and generally heading towards their home areas. In the southern areas the settler departure gave way to people's attempts to move into better lands left vacant. The fertile irrigated lands of the Chokwe scheme, for example, which included 2,600 Mozambican peasants by late 1974, had these numbers increased to 3,175 in 1975, and to around 6,000 in 1976.⁶ Added to these factors of population movement, the southern areas were affected by sharp cuts in the numbers of migrant workers in South Africa, a fundamental component of southern Mozambique's rural economy, which further increased population movements and pressure on the land. Table 9.2 reveals the impact of these early developments on the global structure of the agricultural production, characterised by general, even if unequal, decreases in production levels. As to the relative increase in peasant production for own consumption, this was due, perhaps more than to Frelimo appeals to increased production or to the end of the war in the northern areas, to the collapse of the rural trade network which increasingly hampered peasant commercial production.

TABLE 9.2:
VARIATION IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BETWEEN
1973 AND 1975 ACCORDING TO 1973 PRICES (%)

a) Own Consumption		+12%
b) Marketed	Peasantry	-60%
	Plantations	-16%
	Settler Farms	-54%

Source: Wuyts 1978:30.

As it came out from the war, Frelimo had meagre resources to cope with the situation by reversing the above trends. Short staffed, the movement had no means to transform and to put rapidly into operation for the benefit of the new policy the formerly strong, centralised and bureaucratised state apparatus. This was perhaps the sector the most affected by the early political and socio-economic crisis, since it had been the true core of the colonial ideology. The new regime relied on its vast popularity and sought popular solutions and mechanisms to cope with the situation. Dynamising Groups (*Grupos Dinamizadores* or simply GDs), were

⁶Bowen 1990:15. The best source for understanding this localised process is Hermele 1986.

fostered by Frelimo and created in every sector of economic and social life, from the countryside to the factory, from the ward to the administrative and commercial services. Mobilised around general goals such as the struggle "against exploitation of man by man" and "against nakedness and famine", they took care of a wide number of tasks ranging from political mobilisation to replacing the administrative functions of the state whenever these were felt to be absent, regulating social conflicts and hampering acts of sabotage.

Meanwhile, as the settlers were leaving, the state was forced to take over enterprises and companies which had been abandoned or suspected of being mismanaged for the purpose of sabotage. Increasingly, decreases in production and consumption, as well as job losses, were seen as depending on a process which could only be reversed by the state, the sector which concentrated more resources and permitted more immediate answers to these problems. When the contraction of the other sectors began threatening the flow of foodstuffs into the cities and industries, the state sector was brought more and more into the production of crops formerly grown by settler farms or the peasant sector. In parallel, as the settler retreat was causing irreversible damage to the rural trade network, the state was urged to establish an alternative and tightly controlled system of rural distribution and surplus acquisition. It has to be said that this particular trend was furthered by the often crude forms of peasant exploitation which had been developed by the rural shops during the colonial era, and by the self-confidence of the new state in its capacity to replace the socio-economic role of the *cantinas*, as testified by the radical recommendations issued by the First National Seminar of Agriculture, held in Marrupa, Niassa, in May 1975:

- "a) The state shall guarantee the buying of surpluses of the peasants collectively organised; therefore, it is advisable that the state should also take care of wholesale trade.
- b) Consequently, bank credits to trade intermediaries such as shop keepers, companies or industrial agents will be restrained if not ended.
- c) The state will be the only body accountable for supplying industry. The processed products shall be returned to the state which, in turn, will supply the trade networks, including the People's shops".⁷

This process was obviously accompanied by institutional re-arrangements which included, as early as 1976, the creation of Provincial Directorates for Agriculture and a National Directorate for the Organisation of Collective Production (DINOPROC), the latter

⁷MA.GODCA.G/391: Frelimo, "Comunicado Final e Recomendações do Primeiro Seminário Nacional de Agricultura", Marrupa (29/05-4/06/75):11.

having as its main role that of fostering the creation of state farms.⁸ In parallel, the first measures were taken to replace the settler's shops. People's Shops (*Lojas do Povo*), which had been working since late 1974, were legally created as state enterprises by the decree no.24/76, in June 17, 1976, and their numbers extended to include provincial capitals and some small district towns.⁹

Regarding the peasant sector, the new regime based the set of immediate measures to be adopted on what was called "the experience brought from the liberated areas", in a reference to how peasant agriculture and life was organised in the areas formerly controlled by the nationalist movement. That experience came to be codified in the discourse of the new state as composed by some general principles. People escaping from colonial control into the areas controlled by Frelimo had been organised in villages of a new type, where the traditional and colonial rules no longer held, but were replaced by Frelimo's political organisation. The new villages had been based on the coexistence of collective production with traditional household farming.¹⁰ While the latter had assured family self-sustenance, the former had partially fed the combatants, and based a process of social accumulation, provided commercial products which had been traded by Frelimo in neighbouring countries for products these villages were in need of, such as fabrics, matches, fuel, soap and others.

If some elements concerning political organisation and some aspects of collective production effectively seem to have been brought from the "experience of the liberated areas" into the post-independence views of the new regime, others, particularly the idea of resettling and clustering people together into larger nuclei in order to foster the development of some of these elements, seem to have been engendered elsewhere. Romão Tembo, who fought the liberation war and later became Provincial Director of Communal Villages in Tete, illuminated this aspect, revealing that the idea of broad population resettlement in the "liberated areas" must be taken with reservations:

"The population had their own areas where they produced in a free way. They were organised. Well, they did not live in 'aligned' houses but in vast areas we considered as *círculos* ["circles" or scattered but

⁸Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:21.

⁹See Brito 1991:229-232.

¹⁰And some indigenous capitalist farming in areas such as Cabo Delgado. Littlejohn 1993: Personal Communication.

politically organised neighbourhoods]. Because of the war, they could not stay together, in larger nuclei. One house here, another one there. But they submitted themselves to the same organisation. (...) They lived apart from the guerrilla base some times three to five kilometres (...). They fed the base in a staggered manner. A feminine militia went from house to house collecting the contribution owed by each family. It was a valid organisation. The situation was quite different from the present villages but the level of organisation was excellent".¹¹

Particular influence on the post-independence idea of villagisation must have been exerted by the villagisation experiences developed in neighbouring Tanzania. In fact, this country, which provided Frelimo's most important support during the nationalist struggle and with whose political direction Frelimo was always very close, had been developing its Ujamaa Villages since 1967, a project of voluntary peasants based on communal agriculture. In 1969, starting with *Operation Rufiji*, this project was transformed by the state into a huge resettlement programme of *planned villages*, which gradually de-emphasised communal cultivation and which included, by the end of 1976, 13 million people living in 7,684 villages.¹² Contemporaneously, communal villages were appearing in Mozambique. Just as President Nyerere had considered villagisation in Tanzania as a condition without which "we shall not be able to provide schools for the children; we shall not be able to build hospitals or have clean drinking water",¹³ so the first references to such programme in Mozambique, made in Mocuba as early as February 1975, at the National Meeting of the District Committees, mentioned the nucleation of scattered people in order for them to be assisted effectively by the Government in the fields of health, education and clean drinking water.¹⁴

Soon afterwards, in the First National Seminar of Agriculture, held in Marrupa, Niassa, in late May 1975, further steps were given towards the definition of such a project. The seminar, which counted on the guidance of Frelimo President Samora Machel, recommended the creation of *popular villages* where people should be "installed", or *communal societies*, suggested by the experience of the "liberated areas" during the struggle for independence, directed by *dynamising groups* and creating collective farms. Frelimo was to be the sole entity mobilising and directing the peasants in agricultural production under the new conditions, through the *dynamising groups* and the structures of the liberation army.

¹¹Tembo 1992: Interview.

¹²Coulson 1977:2, 21-33.

¹³Quoted in Coulson 1977:21.

¹⁴*Tempo*:25 June 1975.

These were to foster what was defined (but not very well clarified yet) as collective forms of production and cooperatives.¹⁵ While the designation of *communal villages* appeared for the first time in the proclamation of independence, on 25 June, their more precise definition was made in the course of the 8th Session of Frelimo's Central Committee.¹⁶

In parallel with the gradual definition of the communal village and of its integration in the global definition of the development strategy, which would be concluded only at the Third Congress of Frelimo, in 1977, new villages began appearing all over the country depending not only on the definitions being made, and subsequently transformed into political guidelines, but also, and principally, on factors such as the pressure of a rural population with great expectations regarding the changes promised by Frelimo, the resources the regional and local authorities had at their disposal, and the way they interpreted these definitions. Following the general recommendations issued by Marrupa's Seminar, and developed by the 8th Session of Frelimo's Central Committee in February 1976, according to which the new perspective of rural development was to be based on collective life in villages of a new type, several villages were formed in the northern areas. Here, the local Frelimo leaders and state officials faced pressures such as the one of the "returnees", who had fled from the war into the neighbouring countries in the 1970s and were now, massively returning, and the problem of the *aldeamentos*. These, which had been located mainly according to war criteria, were overcrowded and frequently deprived of lands, food and water, and above all were inhabited by traumatised people who had been submitted for years to war-related psychological and physical brutality. Also present were the *aldeamento*'s "counterparts", the people from the settlements in the former "liberated areas". The local authorities understood very well the importance and need for an early political integration under the new structures, one which could not wait for further orientations and more detailed definitions.

The search for political stability and control on the part of the regional and local authorities, the expectations of the people mobilised by the promise of benefits which would be conceded by the state as soon as they were gathered together and at the reach of the several services, fostered a process which led to the emergence of quite a few villages, with

¹⁵MA.GODCA.G/391: Frelimo, "Comunicado Final e Recomendações do Primeiro Seminário Nacional de Agricultura", Marrupa (29/05-4/06/75):6, 8.

¹⁶Frelimo 1976.

particular incidence in Cabo Delgado.¹⁷ The experience of agglomerations based on the transformation of former *aldeamentos*, on communities of the former liberated areas, and on returnees from the neighbouring countries, was soon expanded to the entire country. In 1976 and 1977, important floods obliging great numbers of people to leave their scattered homesteads were behind the formation of communal villages in Sofala, Gaza and Maputo. Throughout the country, several new villages appeared as a result of political mobilisation of the peasantry and as a consequence of the effort displayed by regional authorities.

Soon the state was urged to back up and develop the far-reaching rural transformation politically initiated by Frelimo. Although all the state departments were supposed to be involved in their respective spheres of activity, two ministries, those of Agriculture and of Public Works and Housing, became the leading ones in this respect during this first phase. The Ministry of Agriculture was to coordinate the overall process, since agriculture was the basis of the economy of almost all the villages.¹⁸ As to the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (MOPH), decree 1/75 had considered the communal villages as the structures through which the MOPH would reorientate its activities in the countryside. Its department of studies led a process which, between 1975 and 1977, included besides projects of standard houses, stores and first-aid stations for the villages, support to 26 villages in Gaza, in consequence of the 1977 Limpopo river floods, and smaller supporting actions in the provinces of Niassa and Maputo.¹⁹ International entities, particularly FAO and UNICEF, also participated in some early programmes in coordination with several state departments. The number of "planned", "being formed" or "concluded" communal villages all over the country was, by early 1977, nearly 600. Table 9.3 provides an estimate of the communal villages established by this time.

However, according to the results revealed in the first reviews, the initial expectations of the communal villages as a scheme improving life conditions in the countryside in general, were far from being achieved. Success had been prevented by several sorts of problems.

¹⁷On the process involving the creation of communal villages in Cabo Delgado see CEA 1986.

¹⁸MA.CNAC.AC/13: Presidência da República, "Proposta para a Criação de um Secretariado Nacional das Aldeias Comunais" (Janeiro 1978):6.

¹⁹MA.CNAC.AC/25: Ministério das Obras Públicas e Habitação [hereafter MOPH], Informação s/r (3/05/1978).

TABLE 9.3:
THE COMMUNAL VILLAGE PROGRAMME IN 1977

Communal Villages Provinces	Planned	Being Formed	"Concluded"	Total
Cabo Delgado ^a		2	1	3
Niassa	18	21	2	41
Tete		7		7
Nampula		18	14	32
Zambézia	3	2	2	7
Sofala	14	4	5	23
Manica	11	24		35
Inhambane	9	7		16
Gaza	6	20	6	32
Maputo ^b				
Totals	61	105	30	196

^aNot included the former *aldeamentos* transformed into communal villages, which would raise the total to nearly 400; ^bData on Maputo missing.

Source: MA.CNAC.AC/169: Ministério da Saúde, "Dados sobre Aldeias Comunais colhidos em todas as Províncias, excepto Maputo, por elementos do Gabinete de Estudos" (3/07/1977).

The first problems were the related lack of studies and of popular participation in the location of the villages, a process which at this early stage seem to have been led by provincial authorities. This had several implications: the average distance from the villages to the regional roads was 14 kilometres, with almost half of the villages separated from a regional road by 10 kilometres, and that distance being of 120 kilometres in one case.²⁰ In many cases, the villages ran the risk of becoming isolated by floods. The problems were also related in part to poor location as to the availability of water, agricultural lands, building materials and fuelwood. With regard to water, the average distance of the water sources from the villages was of 1.3 kilometres, with maximum cases of 10 kilometres. Besides, the majority of the villages were in need of water-holes and wells. Good lands for agriculture were also scarce or distant. In Gaza, the average distance from the villages to the *machambas* was 5 kilometres, with distances of 15 and 20 kilometres respectively in the cases of 3 de

²⁰MA.CNAC.AC/188: MOPH/Direcção Nacional de Habitação [hereafter DNH], "Aldeias Comunais. Relatório da Situação a Nível Nacional" (Dezembro 1977).

Fevereiro and *Conhane*.²¹ The availability of trees and grass for house building and fuelwood was also problematic, with an average distance from the villages to the sources of about 13.5 kilometres, extended to 20 kilometres in 20 percent of the cases, and to a maximum of 200 kilometres in one case.²²

The pattern of organisation of production in the communal village had not developed as expected either. Collective production, although privileged if compared with the "traditional" forms, was still conducted at an average distance of 3.6 kilometres between the village and the farms, which was extended up to 30 kilometres in some cases. Although expected to form the base of the economy of the new villages, collective production was still little more than demarcated lands with an average area of less than a sixth part of the family lands, the latter remaining as the ones really feeding the villagers. Besides mobilising only a minority of villagers, collective production was immersed in a series of problems ranging from the definition of its organisational forms to machinery, crop diversification and planning, seed supply, storage and commercialisation. Reality showed that cooperative production as developing out of the initial undetermined forms of collective production, was far from being achieved. In Cabo Delgado, for instance, from the 300 villages with collective *machambas*, only 13 had evolved into organised cooperatives by this time.

A third series of problems was related to the villages' physical setting, starting with the size of the population grouping. The "guideline" established in February 1976 by the 8th Session of Frelimo's Central Committee had been the residential quarter of 250 families (or around 1,250 people) as the ideal in order to justify investment from the state. Each of these quarters was to be provided with social services such as a political and cultural centre, police and army services, a centre for administering and production control (planning and archives), a *Loja do Povo* or cooperative shop with warehouse, a school, a first-aid station, a kindergarten, wood and fuel deposits and a centre for small industries and handicraft.²³ However, if 250 families was the size of almost half the number of villages, 27 percent had around 500 families, 11 percent had 750 families, and 9 percent between 1,000 and 2,000

²¹MA.CNAC.AC/13: Howard Wilson, "Relatório da Viagem às Aldeias Comuns do Vale do Limpopo, de 17 de Julho a 1 de Agosto de 1977" (Agosto 1977).

²²MA.CNAC.AC/188: MOPH/DNH, "Aldeias Comuns. Relatório da Situação a Nível Nacional" (Dezembro 1977):6.

²³Frelimo 1976.

families.²⁴ In some cases in Gaza, for instance, the population of a communal village could exceed the 2,000 families, amounting to between 15,000 and 20,000 people.²⁵ The social infrastructures had not been established in accordance with each quarter but for the entire village, and even so they were rarely in place. Of the villages investigated by the national study of the DNH, the National Directorate for Housing, only 16 percent had a first-aid station and although nearly half had a school, lessons were in many cases given under the trees. The situation was not very different concerning village shop facilities. Although some villages already had shops, the vast majority had to walk an average distance of 5.2 kilometres to the nearest shop and 27 percent of the villages had a shop only at more than 10 kilometres from the village. Finally, general lack of means of transportation worsened these problems in an acute manner, affecting literally every sector of life in the communal village.²⁶

In general, the first measures taken in the countryside did not reverse the trend towards global production decreases.²⁷ Table 9.4 discloses some trends resulting from these early developments, between 1975 and 1977/1978. Taking some important agricultural products as reference, a rapid decrease can be verified in the private sector, mostly identified with the former settler sector and related with an equally rapid increase of the role performed by the state. On the other hand, while the peasant sector managed to maintain an important share, even if mostly limited to production for own consumption, in spite of the added hardships it had to face in the context of the socio-economic change, the "collective" sector, as yet very rudimentary, was slow in disclosing the potential which it had been thought to possess.

²⁴The largest villages found at the time were 17 in Cabo Delgado, 11 in Gaza and one in Niassa. MA.CNAC.AC/188: MOPH/DNH, "Aldeias Comunas. Relatório da Situação a Nível Nacional" (Dezembro 1977):3.

²⁵MA.CNAC.AC/13: Howard Wilson, "Relatório da Viagem às Aldeias Comunas do Vale do Limpopo, de 17 de Julho a 1 de Agosto de 1977" (Agosto 1977).

²⁶This is considered as the main problem in 63.8 percent of the cases in MA.CNAC.AC/188: MOPH/DNH, "Aldeias Comunas. Relatório da Situação a Nível Nacional" (Dezembro 1977).

²⁷According to Wuyts 1989:44, production at all levels fell about 25-35 percent. In fact, regain of the 1973 production levels remained as a target for quite some time.

TABLE 9.4:
PARTICIPATION OF THE VARIOUS SECTORS IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION (%)

	1975-1976				1976-1977				1977-1978			
	S	C	F	P	S	C	F	P	S	C	F	P
Rice	0.8	0.2	6.0	93.0	36.1	1.5	6.1	56.3	82.0	6.0	7.4	4.6
Maize	4.7	0.5	59.2	35.6	29.8	1.8	53.6	14.8	35.1	3.2	59.1	2.6
Beans	0.9	-	99.1	-	8.7	2.9	92.3	-	22.5	7.0	70.5	-
Groundnut	-	-	100.0	-	-	0.3	98.7	-	-	0.2	98.8	-
Sunflower	1.4	-	12.3	86.3	25.9	1.7	20.7	51.7	38.6	14.6	35.1	11.7
Potatoes	35.0	2.5	2.5	60.0	76.0	6.0	2.0	16.0	90.9	5.4	1.4	2.3
Cotton	0.6	0.3	61.1	38.0	10.8	0.9	56.3	31.9	21.6	3.0	58.6	16.8

Sectors: S = State; C = Collective; F = Peasant; P = Private.

Source: Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:25.

c) Towards a Villagisation Strategy

The Third Congress of Frelimo, held in February 1977, was perhaps the first moment of analysis of the global policies which had been developed since independence and, simultaneously, the moment of adoption of a political model and an economic strategy for the years to come. Since the villagisation process is our focus, the global changes in it and official definitions affecting it will be dealt with very briefly, to the extent that they involved or carried implications for that process.

Politically, the Congress meant the adoption of a socialism on the Marxist-Leninist model, based on the worker-peasant alliance, while the economic strategy derived in part from that option and in part from how the country's economy had evolved since independence. As to the latter, the three essential sources of accumulation in Mozambique's colonial economy, namely migrant labour to South Africa, the port and railways system and agriculture, had suffered deep transformations during the transition period. The marked reductions in the contribution of the first two left agriculture, though weakened by several factors, as the major and almost only sector capable of financing the development strategy. On the other hand, the fact of the support from the socialist countries being less than expected, further contributed to the centrality of agriculture. This was rationalised in the

principle for the development strategy established at the Congress: "Agriculture as the basis, industry as the dynamising factor and heavy industry as the decisive factor".

The need to assure the "material, technical and scientific basis for the transition to socialism", deriving from the political option, required rapid accumulation, one which, as it was viewed, could only be achieved through a process of modernisation of agriculture led by the state sector. In the view established by the Congress, the socialist transition was to result from the rapid development of the productive forces which would end by engendering the transformation of the relations of production. The two main implications of the above were, firstly, that the state was no longer taking over the farms left by the settlers in order to minimise production decreases, but multiplying the farms under its control in order to foster that modernisation. Secondly, the state should extend and strengthen its means of leading that process through the improvement of its planning system, with the development of mechanisms for centralisation, coordination and control. The state was to become both dominant and determinant.²⁸ This context indirectly determined a particular place for the communal villages, seen not as a main mechanism for altering the prevalent economic condition of the country, but as a means "to reach, in a relatively short period, food security and the satisfaction of needs in terms of health, education and culture, the main immediate objectives of each communal village".²⁹

This obviously influenced both the analysis of the problems appearing in the villages fostered at the Provincial level, and the consequent design of the villagisation strategy. Particular attention must be paid, therefore, to how this view informed the set of policies which were followed, including the accommodation of the state to the party demands through the creation of new structures, particularly focusing on the organisation of the productive base of the villages. Since problems detected so far were blamed, to a great extent, on the lack of state coordinated support to the villages, in the months following the Congress efforts were made towards creating a new state department which would take care of the coordination of state support to the villages, to be carried out particularly by the ministries of Public Works and Housing, and Agriculture. The proposal which prevailed was of a central structure with the role of coordinating the sectors of the several ministries concerned with the communal

²⁸Frelimo 1977a:118.

²⁹Frelimo 1977a:124.

villages and including also a strong executive body. This central structure was to create provincial departments under both its authority and that of the Provincial Governor, and also district sub-departments.³⁰ In January 1978, a document for debate issued by the Presidency of the Republic repeated with few alterations the proposal for the creation of a National Secretariat or Institute for the Communal Villages.³¹ Two months later, in March 2, the presidential decree no.1/78 created the National Commission for Communal Villages (*Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunsais*, CNAC), under the direct authority of the President of the Republic. From now on the villagisation process was to be closely directed by a centralised state department:

"The experience we gathered so far, enabled the detection of mistakes and *insufficiencies*, namely dispersion and duplication of efforts, lack of structures at the various levels, indefinite competencies, lack of an instrument capable of ensuring a centralised direction of the entire process. The Social and Economic guidelines issued by Frelimo's Third Congress reaffirmed the communal villages as the 'backbone of rural development', and in face of those *insufficiencies*, defined as necessary the creation of a national structure for coordinating and planning their development"³²

The analysis developed by CNAC, soon after its creation, considered three major contradictions undermining the villagisation process so far: lack of a system of supply and commercialisation, which was increasingly felt as the programme was developing; a prevailing slash and burn agriculture not adjusted to the permanent and crowded new settlements;³³ a high level of political mobilisation in the villages contrasting with the poor support provided by the state. Further long term contradictions would be, essentially, low carrying capacity of the sites chosen and other location problems.³⁴ In the work of

³⁰MA.CNAC.AC/13: Ministério da Agricultura, "Contribuições ao Documento sobre Aldeias Comunsais", s/d [1977]; Ministério da Agricultura/MOPH, "Proposta para a criação de uma estrutura para Aldeias Comunsais" (31/08/77).

³¹Both designations were used in the proposal. MA.CNAC.AC/13: Presidência da República, "Proposta para a Criação de um Secretariado Nacional das Aldeias Comunsais" (Janeiro 1978).

³²Presidential Decree no.1/78, March 2. This "centralised approach" is quite clear in the words of President Machel in the ceremony of the creation of CNAC: "We are going to the bush to transform the individual hamlet into a communal village (...). We have just created the instrument which will enable the organisation of life in the rural areas, the planning, dynamising and coordination of communal villages' development". MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "Coordenar e planificar o desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunsais" (11/06/79).

³³This central and often neglected aspect was also referred to as a major obstacle in MA.CNAC.AC/13: Ministério da Agricultura, "Contribuições ao Documento sobre Aldeias Comunsais", s/d [1977]: "If we gather the population together without transforming the agricultural techniques, yields will decrease as itinerant agriculture will not have a future under the new conditions. A result will also be soil impoverishment."

³⁴CNAC 1978a:16-17.

transforming analysis into a strategy composed of specific programmes and projects, CNAC sought assessment from foreign technical expertise, namely from FAO, through the Ministry of Agriculture. What came to be known as the "Lazarev Team"³⁵ worked in Mozambique in October 1978,³⁶ following three main lines: the first discussed the village economic and social basis, proposing a general polyvalent cooperative which required a high level of organisation on the part of its inhabitants and would end up running the village economy in all its aspects; the second dealt with the relationship and coordination between the several production systems, particularly household agriculture, and the state and cooperative sectors; the third concerned the planning of economic development in the whole country based on the priority conceded to agriculture. In spite of some disagreement with its conclusions on the part of CNAC, the "Lazarev Report" developed an approach not essentially challenging the view of the government itself, of agriculture playing a "starting" role in a process which would transcend it, of a gradual evolution to collective forms of organisation in the village, of a central state dynamising the process. According to its own words,

"The question is to find concrete ways of implementing the economic and social orientations issued at the Third Congress. Since agriculture is the basis of the economy, it is necessary to design a development strategy from such a basis. Since industry must become the dynamising factor, it is necessary to develop it so as to contribute to fostering production and productivity increases in agriculture"³⁷

A consensus appeared in the definition of a strategy which included immediate and long term action. On the immediate term, new villages were not to be created before the existing ones were consolidated. By consolidation was meant the establishment of a supply and commercialisation system, including more and better inputs; the improvement of water

³⁵After the name of Grigori Lazarev, the team leader. The mission also included S.M.Codron (rural works, infrastructures), O.Henao (training, organisation), M.Ollivier (planning), I.Ribeiro (economy), and also G.Lacomblez (agronomy). The final report was signed by Lazarev and Ollivier (Lazarev & Ollivier 1978).

³⁶MA.CNAC.AC/120: CNAC, "Proposta de acção nos Distritos Prioritários e análise crítica ao Relatório da Equipa Lazarev" (4/06/79). According to MA.CNAC.AC/1: UNDP/FAO, Project MOZ/78/006/A, "Programming Assistance to the National Commission for Communal Villages": "the requested multidisciplinary mission will assist the Director of CNAC and his team in defining a programme of work leading to short and medium-term actions for communal village development. The mission will in particular delineate a one or two year programme and identify the technical assistance required to: establish a regional master plan to serve as a framework for the communal village location; identify priority development areas; carry on selected resources surveys (in particular soil and water) in the priority areas; prepare, up to the prefeasibility level, projects for communal villages and rural development in priority areas; implement short-term actions preparatory to larger-scale projects, such as farmer training, experimental agricultural schemes, and pilot actions to identify appropriate technologies".

³⁷Lazarev & Ollivier 1978:171.

works and village facilities; the strengthening of the gradual transition from household to collective organisation of production. In one phrase, as it was put by the Director of CNAC, the question was "to adjust the pace of creation of communal villages to the state capacity for organising and supporting them".³⁸ The long term action aimed at how the process should be pursued, with particular focus on regional planning and village location. Central was the concept of "Economic District" as the intermediate or regional level connecting the village with the planning of the national territory.

"The rural development programme based on communal villages should be defined in accordance with a set of national priorities, particularly with the national territory plan. The development plan will be based on a regional planning unit, the 'Economic District'. (...) The territorial division into economic districts will imply re-defining the limits of the present administrative districts in accordance with economic imperatives"³⁹

It is interesting to note that another important experience with foreign expertise in designing a strategy for the rural areas took place while the above was developing, with Prof. John Friedman, working for the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (UNCHS)⁴⁰ in assessing the National Housing Directorate which was being reorganised into a National Physical Planning Institute. Although agreeing with the FAO/CNAC strategy of a moratorium of 4 to 5 years in the creation of new communal villages, during which the process of consolidation would take place, Friedman questioned the basic principles of the strategy, considering that above all what was wrong in the villagisation process was the timing, since there were no conditions for massive relocation and integration of people into cooperatives, conditions which might not exist for some time. He based his alternative view of the process on the coexistence of the communal village programme with a strategy based on the concept of *territorial approach*, characterised as follows:

"The territorial approach proceeds on the assumption that access to the bases of social power can be increased for the mass of the rural population, that this is a gradual process, paced by the evolving capacity of the state to create the basic conditions for a self-reliant development in the rural areas, and that there is a substantial margin for raising agricultural productivity (per unit of land) *within the constraints of the existing pattern of dispersed settlement*. The basic idea of the territorial approach is to accept the administrative district as the basic unit of development and to build up the district capital as a service centre for the corresponding area".⁴¹

³⁸MA.CNAC.AC/125: CNAC, "8a Reunião do Conselho Coordenador das Aldeias Comunas" (29/06/78):7. Also CNAC 1978a:18.

³⁹CNAC 1978a:22, 25.

⁴⁰MA.CNAC.AC/223: Tekle A. Tomlinson (Senior UN/WFP Liaison Officer), TE 322/1 MOZAM 189-9 (5/06/80) to H.El-Hage, WFP/Italy.

⁴¹Friedman 1980:106 (his italics).

Clearly, the opposition was between, on the one hand, a process centred in the population, their farming techniques and organisation, and a gradual and necessarily slower pace of development depending on the adjustment revealed by the various actors to the process; on the other hand, the central role of the state and macro-economic targets which implied radical transformations in farming and its social relations. Resettlement through *nucleation* and "economic districts" was thus opposed to *attraction* as seen in the "territorial approach".

d) State Policies and Communal Villages, 1977-1982


The "state alternative" was obviously the one which prevailed, and consequently CNAC, as the coordinator of the state effort, was placed under great pressure from the start, in the sense of having to create the conditions to control the process. But in spite of having formed its Coordination Council⁴² almost immediately after its creation, CNAC never managed to assemble all its members in one meeting, at least during its first year of operation. Allegedly, the problem was the "lack of importance" attributed by the relevant state departments to the council and to CNAC in general, revealed in the two common attitudes of missing the meetings or sending under-ranked and unrepresentative personnel. To the argument of *implicitness* presented by some structures, according to which their work with the communal villages was direct, not being necessarily mediated by CNAC, and was *implicit* in the popular objectives established in their line of work, CNAC countered that the problems in the villages themselves, as well as the nonexistence of specific departments in the ministries addressing the issue clearly revealed ministerial non-commitment and the need for a coordination of the kind CNAC was supposed to perform. By mid-1978, the Ministry of Education, for instance, recognised that

"in so far as education is concerned, concrete activity has not been developed, nor have action programmes been focused on the communal villages. We have not yet held collective discussions aiming at defining such programmes".⁴³

⁴²The first meeting of the council, which created it and announced its composition, was held in 18 April 1978.

⁴³MA.CNAC.AC/169: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, "Informação sobre as actividades da Educação e Cultura junto às Aldeias Comunais" (8/05/78):1.

FIGURE 9.1: STATE CHANNELS FOR ACTION ON THE COMMUNAL VILLAGES



However, the ministries' allegation also had a point in the sense that the overall structure (see Figure 9.1) did not facilitate the process. While through their Provincial Directorates the ministries could reach the communal villages in a relatively direct way (even if these Provincial Directorates were also subordinated to the Provincial Government), CNAC's mediation implied the intervention of the structure subordinated to the latter at the Provincial level, and consequently an overly complicated connection. More than just being another intermediate structure, the Provincial Commissions for Communal Villages (*Comissões Provinciais das Aldeias Comunais* or CPACs) also revealed great weaknesses in terms of staff, plans, resources and investment of the state in general, and perhaps never reached the level of a provincial directorate in terms of influence and institutional weight.

Apparently, this was a problem for which a solution was never found. Two years later, in March 1980, the First National Meeting on Communal Villages recommended the creation of departments particularly concerned with the communal villages in each ministry, which seems to have been simply ignored.⁴⁴ In April 1981 the inoperative status of the Coordination Council was again mentioned: from the 21 expected representatives to its second general meeting, only 10 were present, who nevertheless had not developed the work they were in charge of. The common justification was lack of support from their respective ministries.⁴⁵ Finally, in late 1982 CNAC questioned before Frelimo's Central Committee the pertinence of maintaining its "horizontal" structure, proposing as an alternative "suggested by objective reality" the transformation of CNAC into a "vertical" structure, strengthened by new human, technical and material means.⁴⁶ However events which followed pointed in a different direction and shortly afterwards CNAC, which never reached a preeminent leading position in the process, was gradually to fade away. Because of these developments, the achievement of an improved and globally coordinated state action was not felt as rapidly as was expected at the beginning. During the Coordination Council's first year of activity problems of the kind referred to above were manifest. On 27 July 1978, its 10th meeting, following the strategy defined, created three work groups, respectively on Commercialisation, Water Works and Production. The following sessions, at least until October, kept complaining

⁴⁴MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo" (Confidencial) (14/12/82):6.

⁴⁵MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "2a Reunião do Conselho Coordenador da CNAC" (10/04/81).

⁴⁶MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo" (Confidencial) (14/12/82):15.

about the delay which particularly the first and third group were having in starting the task which had been assigned to them.⁴⁷ Consequently, the impact of the new effort could only be slow and tenuous.

However, the creation of new villages did not slow down. The first indication appearing in Table 9.5 is that the communal village programme grew continuously along the years, in numbers of villages as well as in numbers of population. Such growth was of about 28 and 24 percent respectively for the first and second biennia in terms of numbers of villages, and about 12.5 and 14.5 percent for the same periods in terms of people clustered together.

TABLE 9.5:
THE COMMUNAL VILLAGE PROGRAMME IN MOZAMBIQUE (1978-1982)

PROVINCE	1978			1980			1982		
	No. of Vil.	People	% of Total*	No. of Vil.	People	% of Total*	No. of Vil.	People	% of Total*
C. Delgado	586	800,000	88.0	578	791,811	85.9	543	815,551	87.3
Niassa	40	72,000	16.2	53	59,408	13.2	63	63,215	14.0
Tete	16	27,437	3.9	35	62,164	8.3	39	86,804	10.8
Nampula	80	50,000	2.6	207	91,680	4.4	260	154,186	7.0
Zambézia	13	10,000	0.5	29	36,325	1.6	39	49,220	2.0
Sofala	13	10,000	1.3	39	63,871	7.9	88	106,139	12.6
Manica	9	4,500	0.9	20	32,594	6.1	111	143,541	25.4
Inhambane	5	2,500	0.3	16	4,695	0.4	47	73,352	7.0
Gaza	80	180,000	20.4	98	332,746	35.1	123	298,812	29.6
Maputo	5	4,000	0.8	16	7,919	1.5	22	17,873	3.2
TOTALS	847	1,160,437	13.3	1,091	1,483,213	16.4	1,360	1,808,693	19.8

*% of total rural population, who grew at an yearly rate of 2.8 percent.

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comuns (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (31/05/82); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82); Araújo 1988.

Even if the increases shown above indicate that the new villages tended to be "smaller" in terms of population, therefore revealing a greater awareness of the global problems engendered by the villagisation process, the moratorium on new villages referred

⁴⁷See the meetings of CNAC's Coordination Council in MA.CNAC.AC/125.

to above seems not to have been followed, in spite of the difficulties experienced by the state in providing a coordinated support. The reasons for such a "jump forward" were certainly connected with the need to institutionalise and extend the forms of local power and of political control by Frelimo and the post-independence state,⁴⁸ on the one hand, and resulted, on the other, from the development strategy which had been defined and from the centrally planned way of implementing it.

In so far as the village political and administrative organs were concerned, this second period of the villagisation programme was started in a context of diverse situations from village to village. The phase of locally fostered villages had produced a situation in which the villages were provided with only one or two of the organs which had been prescribed since the 8th session of Frelimo's Central Committee, namely a party organ, a People's Assembly with its Executive Council, security organs and mass organisations. What existed in most of the villages was a Dynamising Group which had directed the process of village creation, or a combination of organs, some of them with an ambiguous role as the one of the chief of village.⁴⁹ Consequently, the new period from Frelimo's Third Congress provoked profound transformations in this respect, seeking to standardise the situations under a line perhaps globally designed for the first time at the First National Meeting of Communal Villages, in March 1980. According to it, the Dynamising Group had its sphere of action narrowed to the management of social questions at the neighbourhood level, as it was being replaced by party organs in terms of political leadership - simple cells or, in the case of villages with more than one cell and more than 250 families, provided that certain conditions had been fulfilled, party committees.⁵⁰ As to state organs, each village was to elect its People's Assembly which, in turn, was supposed to nominate an Executive Council to direct the village between the Assembly sessions. Table 9.6 reveals an impressive increase in the number of the main village institutions. As to the party committees, they grew almost 400 percent within the short period of two years in part as a result of the strong party campaign held in 1980-1981. The local

⁴⁸On this respect see Casal 1987:682; de Brito 1991:246.

⁴⁹CNAC 1981c:2. The position of the village chief or president was described by CEA 1986:13, referring to the case of communal village Ngapa, in Cabo Delgado, as follows: "The elders, mostly illiterate, were left out of the selection process for leading the villages despite the responsibilities they held during the armed struggle. The new village chiefs were mostly people in charge of writing notes and issuing travel permits. They could read or write in Portuguese and Makonde, therefore being able to perform administrative and bureaucratic tasks. The village chiefs were appointed by District authorities and could be moved to other posts as any other state official, in spite of not earning a salary".

⁵⁰CNAC 1980b:8-9.

assemblies went also through an impressive growth of more than 700 percent, particularly in the aftermath of the 1980 local elections.

TABLE 9.6:
POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANS IN THE COMMUNAL VILLAGES (1980-1982)

PROVINCE	Party Committees		People's Assemblies		Executive Councils		Popular Courts	
	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982
Cabo Delgado	-	189	-	319	-	319	-	76
Niassa	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	11
Tete	19	28	19	24	-	24	1	21
Nampula	17	168	10	59	-	133	16	26
Zambézia	15	17	-	4	-	6	-	-
Sofala	17	14	5	7	-	-	-	7
Manica	-	17	-	7	-	51	-	-
Inhambane	4	16	1	16	-	6	5	14
Gaza	43	43	24	24	-	76	10	21
Maputo	5	5	5	2	-	2	-	-
TOTALS	129	515	64	462	-	617	32	176

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunas (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (31/05/82); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82).

Established to institutionalise "popular power", these institutions certainly had room for local participation of the villagers, who in fact were the ones staffing their ranks, even if such participation took place in the context of a certain level of social differentiation within the village, as will be discussed in the case of Tete, below. But simultaneously they aimed at installing at the village level mechanisms of central authority and, most importantly, capable of following the guidelines issued by a central planning corps, both politically and administratively. The Assembly's Executive Council was in charge of four main domains, namely the political-organisational, the economic and financial, the socio-cultural, and the one of security. Where the polyvalent cooperative had been created and formed the basis of the village economy, its president was to be the member of the Executive Council accountable for the economic and financial matters. On the other hand, the president of the executive council and the president of the local assembly were to be the same person. Finally and most importantly, the party secretary was to be that person.⁵¹

⁵¹CNAC 1980b:9.

However, this mechanism of centralisation, aiming at conferring ultimate power and control to the party committee, was not implemented without facing severe difficulties and setbacks, which resulted from the interaction of several factors. The most general was, perhaps, the fact that the institutions of revolutionary power were built over the disavowal of the "traditional" ones. This issue, very complex to assess, has to be taken into account not only from the perspective of the *régulos* and other authorities in the defence of their status, but also in that such institutions had to do with organising household production and social life in general. It can be presumed that except for the people living in the liberated areas and therefore sharing the experience of the new local administration (which was not exempt from contradictions notwithstanding), for most people, particularly the ones living in the *aldeamentos*, the liberation had been associated with resuming their previous way of life, their institutions included at least in part. Moreover, late colonial attempts to reorganise the village institutions in the *aldeamentos*, manipulating local authorities and conferring them a limited power, have to be recalled here as creating some reservations of sectors of the population towards the uncompromising new policies. The general adhesion of most of the population to the prospects brought by the post-independence revolution, of liberation from the colonial oppressor, must not overshadow the fact that Frelimo's uncompromising attitude towards the previous institutions had some deterrent effect in the new context.

Later, further difficulties continued to confront the evolution of the process. The impact of the "transferral" of political authority from the dynamising groups to the party cells and committees as a means to imprint a more clear political leadership on the process (the dynamising groups had included all sorts of people not necessarily entirely committed to Frelimo's principles and goals) was attenuated by the fact that most of the GD members, by reason of ambition or simply because of belonging to the narrow literate group, moved up to the new political institutions. On the other hand, the efforts to bring the party and state interventions closer led to the acute difficulty of the local authorities in putting their political roles into perspective.⁵²

⁵²Frelimo faced these problems less effectively in the rural areas than in the urban ones, amongst the workers or the "upper levels". See for instance Egerö 1987:112-115. On the other hand, such a level of centralisation necessarily resulted in modest performance of specific tasks. The president of communal village Ngapa in Cabo Delgado, for instance, was, in 1983, simultaneously president of the Executive Council, first-secretary of the Party, president of the People's Assembly, member of the Executive Council of the *localidade* (set of villages), member of several commissions, and member of the District committee of the Party (CEA 1986:15).

In spite of causing important setbacks in the evolution of the programme, these issues provoked delays more than seriously undermining it. Where the development of the programme was truly at stake was in the village economic basis, in which immediate results had to be forthcoming if village cohesion was to be created, maintained and strengthened. In the villages of the "first generation" household production had coexisted with several collective initiatives, from *machambas do povo* or collective *machambas* to pre-cooperatives and cooperatives.⁵³ Here, again, the perspective which emerged after the Third Congress was one of standardising the structures assuring production under new social relations in order to guarantee that its principles were followed and that central planning and control could be exerted. The Second Agrarian Council of the Ministry of Agriculture, in May 1977, went as far as claiming that cooperative development could only be achieved if its labour organisation was directed by state structures, and that cooperative rules, though deserving to be discussed amongst the peasants, should not be proposed by them as they were not prepared yet.⁵⁴

Behind the cooperative strategy, formulated at the First National Seminar on Cooperatives, in October 1976, had been the assumption according to which the household peasantry could not increase and improve production levels, and cooperative organisation under a socialist orientation would bring control to popular hands, assuring "increased political, economic and social standards of the people".⁵⁵ However, cooperative development had revealed, since then, serious problems both in itself and as a factor inhibiting household production. This latter aspect⁵⁶ was of vital importance to the survival of the new villages since the initial optimistic perspectives of a "cooperative alternative" to household production soon proved to be far from reality. This aspect, to which we will return in the next chapter when discussing the impact of state policies on Tete, resulted from several factors here briefly summarised: the clustering of people meant, in itself, increased land scarcity because of village location problems, of more candidates to the available lands, of the disorganisation of household production relations, of greater distances between the village and the lands;

⁵³CEA 1979:14 listed the following: collective farms; cooperatives which organise commercialisation; pre-cooperatives which plough communally; cooperatives of non-farming activities; cooperatives of an early stage with rudimentary accountancy; cooperatives with proper accountancy and careful input registration; cooperatives employing wage labour; cooperatives acting like small capitalist organisations.

⁵⁴See CEA 1979:8.

⁵⁵Ministério da Agricultura 1976:2.

⁵⁶Taken properly into account by just a few scholars. Important work in this domain is Casal 1987 and Casal 1988.

cooperative lands tended to be privileged and household lands, consequently, to be marginalised; people were pressed, even if not necessarily by force, to dedicate an important part of their time to cooperative works; commercialisation, which was going through dramatic decreases, reduced its role in stimulating cash crop production and production increases in general, both in so far as production and consumption inputs were concerned; last but not least, and due to inefficient state support, the "anchoring" of peasant shifting agriculture was not accompanied by new production techniques to maintain soil fertility and to increase productivity levels, provoking, on the contrary, rapid soil degradation in the areas surrounding the communal villages. From 1978, the recognition of these factors began playing a part in the unfolding of state policies:

"This is a crucial issue: we forgot about the role played by household production, which is still the most important in our country. Our concern has been exclusively directed towards cooperative and collective production. Our imports equal our neglect of household production".⁵⁷

This was a time, from early 1978, when a momentary "state cautiousness" seems to have prevailed. The need to increase coordination led to the creation of CNAC which defined its strategy of village consolidation and of a moratorium in furthering the plan, as was referred to above, leading to a decrease in the creation of new ones, at least at the pace which had prevailed until then. The overall consolidation included an increase in the low percentage of villages provided with cooperatives, the recognition that the process varied according to local conditions, and of the need to render gradual the transition from household to cooperative organisation through the implementation of the "block theory", explained as follows:

"Family production in blocks takes place at the same site. This means that according to the ecological potential of a specific area, a block is formed in which each family has its own plot of farming land, which varies in accordance with the size of the family. This process will enable the improvement of assistance to family production, which is now hampered by a context of dispersion. Family production in blocks encloses collective aspects in itself. Such is the case, for instance, of clearing the lands where the blocks are intended to be created. This work requires chain-saws and other instruments which people do not possess. Only collectively, therefore, will they be able to acquire such instruments. This is where family production in blocks engenders collectivism".⁵⁸

⁵⁷Intervention of the director of the President's staff in MA.CNAC.AC/169: Presidência da República, "Reunião de Sua Excelência o Presidente da República com a Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunitárias" (23/06/78):2.

⁵⁸Intervention of the Director of CNAC in MA.CNAC.AC/125: CNAC, "8ª Reunião do Conselho Coordenador das Aldeias Comunitárias" (29/06/78):9.

In parallel, several national fora developed this new attitude towards household production, one which was accompanied by a strong criticism of the orientation impressed on the process by the Ministry of Agriculture. The Fourth Session of Frelimo's Central Committee, in August 1978, gave the direction, reasserting the economic importance of household agriculture and of the need to stimulate it through appropriate state channels, while preparing its transition to collective forms, and stressed the importance of popular and local solutions to popular and local problems. This process culminated with the Ministry of Agriculture being accused of, in the economic sphere, "wrong interpretation of the reality of our country by ignoring the importance of the family sector in agricultural production", in the political sphere, "neglecting the party line, ignoring that man and not the machine, is the decisive factor", and in the ideological sphere, "petty-bourgeois and social-democrat orientation based on a *developmentalist* conception which placed technical processes instead of politics as the leading factor and resulted in the rejection of the strategy of rural development based on the communal villages".⁵⁹ However, this "new attitude" towards household production, even if translated into some practical effort and if associated with a perspective of cooperative consolidation before extending the programme, did not really affect the emergence of new cooperatives, perhaps only producing a slight delaying of the process. To assess this in numbers is very difficult because of poor statistical work and conceptual uncertainty surrounding the several stages preceding cooperative organisation, before it attained official status as such. Table 9.7 presents some variations in the available numbers.

TABLE 9.7:
THE FARMING COOPERATIVES ACCORDING TO VARIOUS SOURCES

Sources	1978/1979		
	Cooperatives	Members	Area (ha)
CNAC*	104		
Mín.Agricultura 1978b	145		18,039
Lazarev & Ollivier 1978	147	12,982	17,372
Min.Agricultura 1978a	160		18,000
Araújo 1988	300	30,000	

*MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (31/05/82); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82).

⁵⁹MA.CNAC.AC/169: Presidência da República, "Reunião do Presidente da República com os Quadros da Agricultura" (7/11/78):4-5. As to the ministry's working methods, "excess of centralism" was strongly denounced.

In spite of the differences, which are considerable in some cases, sources agree on an impressive growth in the number of farming cooperatives from 1977/1978 to 1978/1979, of 40 percent and 66 percent,⁶⁰ which is perhaps explained in part by the low percentage of communal villages with cooperatives (21 percent in 1977/1978, according to the more optimistic estimate)⁶¹ and the consequent attempt to bring both numbers closer, as part of the consolidation effort. As was referred to, a strong economic basis, meaning a consolidated cooperative, was considered as the main factor assuring village development.

TABLE 9.8:
THE FARMING COOPERATIVE PROGRAMME⁶²

Provinces	1977-1978			1981-1982		
	No. of Villages	No. of Co-operatives	No. of Members	No. of Villages	No. of Co-operatives	No. of Members
Cabo Delgado	586	13	287	543	28	948
Niassa	40	18	915	63	44	1,715
Tete	16	14	733	39	31	1,202
Nampula	80	12	300	260	29	3,544
Zambézia	13	27	1,385	39	64	3,288
Sofala	13	14	800	88	25	10,000
Manica	9	8	689	111	6	280
Inhambane	5	-	-	47	16	1,906
Gaza	80	21	6,697	123	36	7,630
Maputo	5	20	1,176	22	70	2,941
Totals	847	147	12,982	1,360	349	33,454

Sources: Lazarev 1978:98; Casal 1987:687; Table 9.5.

⁶⁰MA.GODCA.G/109: GODCA [Statistics on Cooperatives 1982], and Araújo 1988, respectively. However, the opposite trend was found for some local cases in the same period, such as Moamba, in the southern Maputo province (CEA 1979:15).

⁶¹Araújo 1988:360.

⁶²Table 9.8 is based, for 1977/1978, on Lazarev 1978, considered the most reliable source since it was undertaken in collaboration with CNAC and therefore with full access to CNAC's files at the time. Numbers for 1981/1982 are based on Casal 1987 who, in turn, used GODCA (the state department in charge of the cooperatives) material to which we did not have access, and information provided by Santos 1984. Other versions did not diverge significantly. Araújo 1988 and Almeida Serra 1991 also used Santos 1984.

Unlike household production, where some well conceived incentive policies could bring significant results, cooperative organisation demanded a much stronger state involvement in organising work procedures and accountancy, in providing technical support, assuring commercialisation and training cooperative members in several fields of operation. Following the centralised conception and in order to strengthen the state's ability to foster and coordinate the cooperative programme, the Service of Cooperatives⁶³ was transformed into a specific department created in March 1979, within the Ministry of Agriculture, the *Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas Agrárias* (Department for the Organisation and Development of Agrarian Cooperatives, GODCA).⁶⁴ Again, GODCA followed the basic design of similar state structures, namely a central direction integrated in the Ministry of Agriculture controlling provincial departments within the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, which was also subordinated to the Provincial Government.

In parallel, further steps were taken towards defining the village economic basis, all pointing to higher and more complex levels of local organisation and centralisation, as well as at more authoritarian means of institutionalising the cooperative within the village. In June 1979 the fourth session of the Popular Assembly issued a resolution on agriculture and communal villages which considered

"the village cooperative as the organ which integrates all collective economic activities of the villagers. The cooperative, therefore, shall be polyvalent, including agrarian production, commerce, construction, and handicraft or industrial production".⁶⁵

Some months later, the First National Meeting on Communal Villages detailed these aspects, namely previewing the integration of consumption cooperatives and every activity not restricted to the narrow household world in the polyvalent cooperative, while determining that where the latter already existed, its president should be the same person as the head of economic and financial matters at the village executive council.⁶⁶ Simultaneously, further pressure was exerted on the peasants. If they intended to move into the communal village they

⁶³On the Service of Cooperatives see Dolny & Senna 1978:15-16.

⁶⁴Ministerial Diploma no.41/79 (31/03/79).

⁶⁵Assembleia Popular 1979:#5.1.

⁶⁶CNAC 1980a:4-5.

were obligatorily to join its cooperative.⁶⁷ Even if forced integration in the communal villages seems not to have been generalised, several forms of pressure were increasingly exerted, indicating stronger and stronger state voluntarism in provoking socio-economic changes, a voluntarism which was accompanied by a decreased capacity of independent analysis. While these measures were being adopted, two sorts of serious problems were already manifest, related to the cooperatives themselves and to the support provided by the state. They were closely connected with each other and revealed what perhaps was the ultimate question to pose: who controlled the cooperatives, the cooperativists or the state?

As recognised by GODCA itself, this organ and the Provincial Directorates of Agriculture tended to replace the untrained and illiterate cooperativists in the elaboration of their production plans, often even without informing them about the decisions made and goals established.⁶⁸ Similarly, Local Administrators, District Commissioners and staff from the Provincial Directorates in general often represented the cooperative in discussions with service firms for acquiring several support services, or for obtaining loans from the bank. Often, production factors were assigned (sold) to the cooperatives according to central distribution plans which were more related to central reasoning than to what the cooperatives effectively needed or wanted to buy. Finally, cooperative production, when reaching the commercialisation circuits, was taken without immediate payment and product classification. Clearly, then, the main decisions affecting the life of the cooperative were taken by people other than the cooperativists, who in spite of some efforts by CNAC, GODCA and other state departments in undertaking training activities, were not prepared to claim from the state the control of such a complex process, a situation which was getting more difficult as more and more complex structures, such as the polyvalent cooperative including commercialisation and supply services, were being proposed for adoption.⁶⁹ The result could only have been that the peasants participating in such activities often considered the cooperatives as state undertakings where they merely performed the role of wage labourers, and a situation was created that could not be further from Frelimo's principle of self reliance. In August 1980, GODCA's Second Consultive Meeting complained that

⁶⁷CNAC 1980a:3.

⁶⁸See, in this regard, GODCA 1980:7.

⁶⁹CNAC 1980a:4-12.

"(...) [cooperative] lands are not tilled because people keep waiting for machines while the cooperatives possess the means to do the job; for harvesting a small crop area people request a combine harvester while harvesting could perfectly be done manually; as people keep waiting for machines, agricultural operations are undertaken after the proper season, which causes yield decreases (...)"⁷⁰

On the other hand, such troublesome development prospects of the cooperatives themselves were far from being dealt with by clear state sectoral policies. Besides the coordination problems already mentioned, particularly serious were the problems concerning policies of credits, input supplies, commercialisation and service support. Credits took too long to be granted because, according to the defenders of the cooperative programme, the bank was bureaucratised, worked under excessive centralisation, did not have services particularly directed to the cooperatives, demanded high interest rates, etc. The unspoken version of the bank would obviously be a great reservation in lending money to projects with few possibilities of succeeding, in using credit not as a means for its own viability and growth but as a "political weapon for fostering the fundamental task which is rural socialisation".⁷¹

As to supplies and commercialisation, the situation was not any easier throughout the period. A National Directorate for Commercialisation (Dineca) had been working since 1976, aiming at capturing production from the household and cooperative sectors and at supplying them with production factors. Dineca was supposed to establish fixed and itinerant trading posts all over the country. However, its narrow scope had brought the *Lojas do Povo* (People Stores), a state firm, also into the process, though they had been conceived, initially, as acting only in the urban areas.⁷² In spite of such measures, basic products were generally missing in the villages, and lack of transport and of passable roads affected frequent contact with them. In addition, the *Lojas do Povo* were far from presenting an alternative to the private rural shops: besides being empty most of the time, they had no experience of rural trade, thus making available unimportant and poor quality products at higher prices, ones which incorporated the costs of their inefficiency and difficulties in placing the products.⁷³ In order to solve these problems, the structure of the People's Shops was decentralised in July 1978,

⁷⁰GODCA 1980:3-4.

⁷¹GODCA 1980:8-9.

⁷²Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:38-40.

⁷³MA.CNAC.AC/25: CNAC, "Relatório da viagem do Director da Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunitárias às Províncias de Niassa, Tete e Zambézia" (Setembro 1978).

and a firm for trading agricultural products, Agricom, set up in June 1979.⁷⁴ At the same time, the establishment of consumption co-operatives was fostered at the local level. Table 9.9 refers to this programme, indicating a low percentage of communal villages provided with such structures in 1980, in addition to its highly irregular provincial distribution. Clearly, the programme was poorer in the northern provinces, more difficult to reach by the centralised distribution system. Moreover, and in spite of subsequent efforts, the increase between 1980 and 1982 in the percentage of villages provided with consumption cooperatives is almost irrelevant, cooperatives generally being referred to as deprived of trained staff and lacking basic means such as scales. As a result, great numbers of village consumption cooperatives kept having empty shelves and villagers were consequently obliged to walk several miles in search of supplied shops, mostly private.

TABLE 9.9:
CONSUMPTION COOPERATIVES IN THE COMMUNAL VILLAGES

Provinces	1980			1982		
	No. of Villages	No. of Consumption Co-operatives	% of Villages with Co-operatives	No. of Villages	No. of Consumption Co-operatives	% of Villages with Co-operatives
Cabo Delgado	578	51	8.8	543	85	15.6
Niassa	53	5	9.4	63	3	4.7
Tete	35	-	-	39	16	41.0
Nampula	207	126	60.8	260	191	73.4
Zambézia	29	3	10.3	39	6	15.3
Sofala	39	10	25.6	88	25	28.4
Manica	20	9	45.0	111	26	23.4
Inhambane	16	10	62.5	47	13	27.6
Gaza	98	47	47.9	123	68	55.2
Maputo	16	4	25.0	22	4	18.1
Totals	1,091	265	29.5	1,360	437	30.2

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comuns (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (31/05/82); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82).

Included in the services which the state was supposed to supply to the farming cooperatives was also support in machinery for agricultural operations. This increasingly became central in the view of the national authorities, concerned with the accomplishment of

⁷⁴Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:40.

centrally defined plans, and also in the eyes of the cooperativists for reasons already discussed. Mecanagro, the state firm which was to provide and coordinate these services, struggled not only with severe difficulties in maintaining its heavy equipment, but also in assuring good quality work at the sites, at the proper time. The result for the cooperatives was rather poor throughout the period, to judge from a report made by GODCA in 1980:

"We found serious *insufficiencies* in the services provided by Mecanagro, translated as: poor behaviour and corruption of its drivers, who demand free food and alcoholic beverages in order to perform their work properly; encashment of services not provided to the cooperative; poor quality of the work done; delay in undertaking the agricultural operations resulting in yield decreases; incomplete work provided, as for instance tillage not being followed by harrowing, while the payment for the useless tillage undertaken is notwithstanding demanded from the cooperative; encashment demanded on the basis of hour/machine instead of processed area; rental of machines not supplied with fuel which is demanded from the cooperative where it is obviously not available; cooperativists not previously informed of the prices for renting the machines"⁷⁵

Finally, training of local staff capable of running the economy at the village level was also undertaken as a major support activity to be performed by the state. Several activities were undertaken in this field, from institutional ones to projects and isolated actions. In 1976 a Department for Staff Training was created at the Ministry of Agriculture, which in association with the Ministry of Education coordinated several training courses in the fields of agriculture and livestock, natural resources and mechanics. From 1977, following the guidelines issued at Frelimo's Third Congress, such activities were extended and deepened through a multitude of activities. Institutionally, a new dimension was given to three training centres: of Agrarian Technicians; of Nature Conservationists, in collaboration with the national university; and of Mechanics and Operation of Agricultural Equipment. Several schools were also created at the provincial level, from Zambezia (stock raising) to Maputo (topography).⁷⁶ Some actions were directed at the village as a whole: Unicef developed an information programme with the Ministry of Information, and a staff training programme with the Ministry of Education. The national university undertook a training course for communal villagers in 1977, besides the periodical involvement of its students in rural actions. CNAC also undertook several projects, in association with international, foreign and non-governmental organisations, some of them aiming more particularly at the training of

⁷⁵GODCA 1980:10.

⁷⁶Ministério da Agricultura 1978b:40-43.

cooperativists.⁷⁷ Finally and more generally, a wide National Literacy Campaign was started in July 1978. However, this multitude of activities, either because of lack of coordination, of a narrow scope in the case of institutional training courses, or of contradictory approaches with the prevalent policies and realities in the case of several local projects, did not alter a general picture of a resourceless and contradictory state incapable of supplying the support demanded by the political targets.

In spite of such problems, in cooperative development as well as in the state support, Table 9.8 reveals, as already mentioned, a continuous increase in the number of cooperatives and cooperativists throughout the period, undoubtedly more as a result of an effort to meet targets than of the triumph of the cooperative model as an alternative for the village economic and social basis. The reason for this apparent paradox, particularly if the policy of "extending with previous consolidation" is considered, must also be found at the key Third Congress and its strategy of a strongly centralised development for Mozambique, and of course in close connection with the villagisation programme.

In 1978, another commission, besides CNAC, appeared as directly answerable to the President of the Republic: the National Planning Commission or simply CNP, which was to direct the state planning process and coordinate the work of the economic ministries. The central planning commission institutionalised the dominant conception of a state centred accumulation, of a dualist economy based on a supposedly modern state sector, which was itself to be more and more based on mechanisation. According to this conception, the communal villages were to play the marginal role of supplying the seasonal labour needs of the state rural undertakings, while having to develop themselves based on self accumulation: during the period and concerning investment in agriculture, estimates of Frelimo itself refer to 90 percent in the state sector, two percent in the cooperative sector and zero in the household sector, despite the reassurances of support to the household economy, referred to above.⁷⁸ Illustrative of the scale of this strategy is the following passage:

"(...) in the four years after the [Third] Congress 3,000 tractors and 300 combine harvesters were imported

⁷⁷See, in this regard, MA.CNAC.AC/188: MOPH/DNH, "Aldeias Comunais. Relatório da situação a nível nacional" (Dezembro 1977); and particularly MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82), where a list of such projects is given.

⁷⁸See Wuyts 1989:60. The 4th Frelimo Congress later tried to alter this situation. See Saul 1985:121.

along with other agricultural machinery. To a large extent, these imports merely offset the depletion of stock due to wear and tear and to sabotage, although the degree of mechanisation was definitely stepped up. However, during the same period not a single hoe was imported and the domestic production of hoes had fallen by more than half".⁷⁹

Another characteristic of such dynamics was that annual plans became obligatory and a precise term was defined for this transition from underdevelopment to socialist development. If in 1978/1979 planning as an exercise was restricted to the state sector, from 1980 it was extended to the overall economy. In parallel, an Indicative Perspective Plan (PPI) was conceived to phase in this transition, one which in the countryside would lead to the socialisation of the rural economy in the short period of ten years. As the methodology was conceived and in spite of several warnings, decision-making was top-down, final targets were established before intermediate ones, and room for "feedbacks from reality" was dramatically decreased. The period under our review here did not see the implementation of the PPI, and in fact the PPI was not implemented at all, hampered by war and, particularly, by the growing distance between the targets established and the actual conditions. These factors were undoubtedly behind the major political shift assumed by Frelimo's Fourth Congress.

The context described above obviously had a profound impact on the cooperatives. The main aspects characterising this impact were a continuous increase in the numbers of cooperatives and cooperativists, accompanied by a stagnation of the overall harvested area and by sharp production decreases (from 11,217 tons in 1979 to 6,451 tons in 1981) and much lower productivity levels (production per cooperativist was lowered from 374 to 187 kilograms during the same period, and production per hectare from 852 to 488 kilograms).⁸⁰ Increased numbers of cooperativists working in the same areas could only mean a less important individual performance, higher labour rotation and increased difficulties in organising cooperative work,⁸¹ a trend also favoured by increased mechanisation. By that time the production ratio person/hectare of the household sector, in spite of all the hardships it had to face, was three to four times that of the cooperative sector. The interface of these negative trends with the growth rhythms which the central planning bodies were trying to imprint could only result in a situation as described in Table 9.10 for the 1981-1982 agricultural campaign, in which only 33.9 percent of the plan was actually achieved.

⁷⁹Wuyts 1989:60.

⁸⁰Numbers in Araújo 1988:367.

⁸¹Casal 1987:688.

TABLE 9.10:
THE FARMING COOPERATIVES AND THE
CENTRAL PRODUCTION PLAN (1981-1982)

Province	Planned Area (ha)	Farmed Area (ha)	% of Achievement
Cabo Delgado	1,133	521	45.9
Niassa	2,124	941	46.6
Tete	2,404	926	38.5
Nampula	3,121	1,117	35.7
Zambézia	5,779	1,059	18.3
Sofala	2,751	246	8.9
Manica	977	378	38.6
Inhambane	818	563	68.8
Gaza	5,564	1,134	20.3
Maputo	3,603	659	18.2
	28,274	7,544	33.9

Source: MA.GODCA.G/109: GODCA, [Statistics on Cooperatives 1982].

One can conclude, therefore, that by 1982 a central planning system ruled the development process in Mozambique, based on a strategy of modernisation of the state sector, on development as quantitative accumulation and on the consequent marginalisation of the cooperative and household sectors existing in the communal villages. Localised political attempts at readjustment such as the Fourth Session of Frelimo's Central Committee seem not to have been strong enough to prevent the state from developing an unsound resettlement experience and trying to extend it to the entire country. The successive and generalised signs of failure of such an experience did not work as a deterrent since the official discourse, on the contrary, kept defending the same path and establishing goals which were more and more unrealistic. The initial principle of not expanding the communal village programme without previous consolidation was now completely subverted, as can be seen in Table 9.11, predicting an accelerated plan which should end, by 1990, with the villagisation of more than 10 million peasants.⁸²

⁸²Governo de Moçambique 1980:5.

TABLE 9.11:
CNAC's VILLAGISATION FORECAST FOR 1983-1985

Provinces	1983		1984		1985	
	No. of Villages	Population Villagised	No. of Villages	Population Villagised	No. of Villages	Population Villagised
C. Delgado	551	855,551	560	895,551	568	935,551
Niassa	78	132,643	93	203,071	108	273,499
Tete	63	206,085	87	325,366	111	444,647
Nampula	335	527,439	410	900,692	485	1,273,945
Zambézia	124	474,220	209	899,220	294	1,324,220
Sofala	119	259,684	150	413,229	181	566,774
Manica	125	212,915	139	282,289	153	351,663
Inhambane	78	225,391	109	377,430	140	529,469
Gaza	141	386,361	159	473,910	177	561,459
Maputo	39	99,626	56	181,379	73	263,132
Totals	1,653	3,379,915	1,972	4,952,137	2,290	6,524,359

Sources: Table 9.5; MA.CNAC.AC/92: CNAC, "Dados que vamos fornecer ao Diário de Moçambique (Confidencial)" (4/11/82).

Notwithstanding the problems referred to above, a genuine effort can be found on the part of some sectors, one which included forms of bilateral coordination, towards improving village conditions concerned with their fields of activity. The policy developed by the Ministry of Health, of rural sanitation focused on the communal villages, included several programmes coordinated by the national directorates of Preventive Health and Medical Assistance: combating means of transmission of pestilences, cemetery demarcation, waste handling, animal stabling and others. In coordination with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, programmes were developed to establish provincial centres for producing cement slabs for latrines, and to provide support for the construction of wells and other facilities to improve village drinkable water supply. An inoculation programme was also undertaken and, above all, a policy of providing each village with a health post with a nurse was also undertaken. This implied the massive training of APEs (the acronym for *Agentes Polivalentes*

Elementares or Basic Polyvalent Health Agents).⁸³ Similarly, the Ministry of Education took the village school as the centre for fostering its policy. The school, headed by the school monitor, was to hold cultural activities, literacy campaigns, sports and so forth.⁸⁴ Table 9.12 reveals an impressive growth (in fact a doubling in the short period of two years) in the sectors we have been referring to.

TABLE 9.12:
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WATER SUPPLY WORKS IN THE COMMUNAL VILLAGES

Province	Health Posts		Nurses (APEs)		Schools		Water Works*	
	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982
Cabo Delgado	132	132	132	132	8	152	507	507
Niassa	10	29	10	10	51	63	31	31
Tete	5	19	5	21	37	44	-	19
Nampula	31	129	5	131	69	199	8	20
Zambézia	9	21	12	14	17	31	11	32
Sofala	10	24	13	18	32	33	3	4
Manica	5	38	2	69	5	154	6	17
Inhambane	4	25	7	24	8	37	6	63
Gaza	41	34	29	38	121	139	91	163
Maputo	5	6	6	8	16	22	1	6
TOTALS	252	457	220	465	364	874	664	862

*Including locally made wells.

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comuns (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (31/05/82); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82); MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Ante-projecto do Plano Estatal Central para 1982, de realização na Província de Tete (Confidencial)" (27/05/1981).

By 1982, more than 60 percent of the communal villages had benefited from water works and were provided with schools, while more than 30 percent had health posts and APEs. Certainly it could be argued that many of these schools had their classes working in improper buildings or in the open air; that the teachers were poorly trained, as were the

⁸³MA.CNAC.AC/169: Ministério da Saúde, "Actividades desenvolvidas ou a desenvolver em 1978 pelo Ministério da Saúde com o objectivo de melhorar as condições de vida da população das Aldeias Comuns" (3/07/78).

⁸⁴MA.CNAC.AC/169: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, "Informação sobre as actividades da Educação e Cultura junto às Aldeias Comuns" (8/05/78).

APEs; that most of the health posts lacked elementary conditions and medicines; or that the numbers reported with installed water facilities did not mean that the water problem had been solved in the villages. However, even if true, these observations do not overshadow the fact of a great effort in the establishment of such facilities, of a great dynamic in their growth, and particularly that these were perhaps, beyond political mobilisation, the most important arguments capable of attracting people into the villages, presenting concrete benefits. The reasons for such "success" were explained by Wuyts with the following conclusion:

"Interestingly, although health (and education) were centrally planned, these sectors were much more popularly based and innovative, and in the early years shifted resources out to the population much more effectively than economic planning would ever do. They were more open to local initiative and developed closer links to production in some areas. Health in particular was developed using local financing and support, in that the cost of health workers was partly decentralized within the rural communities".⁸⁵

The facts of important efforts in establishing cooperatives, in seeking state coordination for supporting the new villages, of a relatively successful policy of providing the villages with basic social services such as health and education, though meaningful, could not hide a serious setback of the strategy in its own terms: the cooperative sector was far from being the economic basis of the new villages. On the other hand, poor cooperative performance, associated with severe household production constraints, resulted in acute impoverishment of peasant life conditions, thus affecting political cohesion of the peasantry around the popular prospects of the post-independence regime. According to Roesch,

"The failure of government policy to give communal villages a viable collective base and to address the deepening reproductive crisis facing the peasantry, led to a steady decline in the levels of popular mobilization. Continued popular identification with collectivization could not be sustained in the face of the failure of collective practice to satisfy basic material needs and expectations. Political mobilization and "moral" incentives by themselves could not sustain high levels of voluntarism indefinitely (...)"⁸⁶

By early 1980s, peasant Mozambique was therefore entering in a profound crisis, in our view mostly caused by this huge resettlement scheme. But what the reality of the programme's inner contradictions did not achieve was achieved in the worst manner by the fierce war initiated by Renamo: the beginning of a rapid degradation of the communal village programme. In the next chapter we will try both to assess the impact of the villagisation programme in Tete and its connection with such war.

⁸⁵Wuyts 1989:49.

⁸⁶Roesch 1986:234.

Chapter 10:

THE IMPACT OF THE COMMUNAL VILLAGE PROGRAMME ON TETE

a) Introduction: 1974-1977, a Transition Period

The previous chapter discussed the post-independence development strategy for Mozambique's rural areas, particularly the aspects concerned with the peasantry, namely a country-wide villagisation programme run by the state and based on two main pillars: population resettlement and transformation of production relations. The discussion was oriented towards the general development of the programme, and focused on both the reasons behind the adoption of policies included in that strategy and the ways found by the state to develop and adapt its apparatuses in order to accomplish what was defined as its role. This chapter assesses the impact of such policies on the Province of Tete, examining the extent to which they were capable of bringing the peasantry out of the deep crisis which had been fostered by colonial underdevelopment in general, and the *aldeamento* programme in particular.

The present chapter will begin by dealing generally with the transition period between 1974 and 1977, seeking a better understanding of the provincial context enveloping the passage from the supposed disintegration of the *aldeamentos* to the implementation of the new settlement policies. The next section will pursue the general discussion, aiming at assessing the extent to which the *aldeamento* pattern was effectively replaced by the new one. The third section will deal with the implementation of the programme until late 1982, including several aspects related with the new life in the villages. Because of their importance and complexity, questions related to village economic activity, including agricultural production and commercialisation, although intimately linked to the former, will deserve a particular treatment in the fourth section. Finally, the last section looks at how the way the programme affected the rural economy was connected with the ruthless war carried out by Renamo and with rural disintegration.

The months which followed the military *coup* of April 1974 were times of great confusion not only politically and militarily: they also gave rise to a massive and incoherent population movement before a general trend was established. The impact of the nationalist

war had not favoured the vertical distinctions amongst the Tete rural population, "levelling" the vast majority in a state of extreme poverty (merchants were scarce and *régulos* did not have, during the war, much room on which to base their ascendance). The distinctions to be drawn were much more of a "geographic" character, determined by a status deriving from where had people been living at the end of the nationalist war.

After the *coup*, Frelimo combatants carried on pressing the authorities, at least until late 1974, and trying to unbalance the colonial order, particularly through attacking the *aldeamentos*. During the period from late April to early July, amongst other military operations at least 26 attacks against *aldeamentos*, some of them damaging ones, were reported as having been carried out by Frelimo.¹ The reaction of the Portuguese forces to these operations became rather confused as they evolved to a state of near collapse. While the GE units seem to have been withdrawn because they were out of control and developed difficult relations with the population,² the intelligence services were affected by circumstances such as the extinction of the DGS.³ And, above all, many local military units, tired of fighting and influenced by the "spirit of the 25th of April", refused to engage in combat and openly supported Frelimo propaganda. In Zóbuè, for example, an officer of the army representing the revolutionary movement of the Portuguese armed forces, addressing the people of the village in a meeting, considered the nationalist combatants as "the people who have taken up arms against colonial oppression", and ended his passionate intervention by hailing Frelimo, which according to the Local Administrator, installed a state of near panic amongst the population.⁴ However, attempts were also made by the Portuguese authorities to keep hold of the population through a strong psychological campaign focused on the *aldeamentos* and directed by the District Department for Psychological Action (GDAP). The authorities were presented as a sort of a "third force" distinct both from the former "fascist

¹AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Frelimo Operations Against the *Aldeamentos* in Tete" (1993).

²See, for instance, AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Zóbuè, s/r (1/07/74) for Zóbuè; AHM, FGT, Cx.s/n.: CCaç 3569, Msg.518/B/74 (24/07/74) reporting conflicts between people from *aldeamento* Canchira and Rural Guards (former GEs).

³Following an order issued by the "Junta for National Salvation" appointed in the aftermath of the *coup* in Portugal, the Governor-General of Mozambique and the Commander-in-Chief, through the joint confidential order no.415/GR-Proc.RP.16.01 (15/05/74), extinguished the DGS and ordered the integration of some of its services in the military intelligence services. See AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, Circ.no.315/A/16 (11/06/74). For the integration of roles formerly performed by DGS in other services see AHM, FM, Cx.110: GDT, no.383/A/28/2 (7/09/74).

⁴AHM, FM, Cx.110: AdPa/Zóbuè, s/r (13/07/74).

authorities" and from the "bush terrorists".⁵

As a result from such efforts people from the *aldeamentos* endured both late psychological pressures exerted by the colonial authorities and a deep mistrust on the part of the nationalist movement, emerging as perhaps the sector of the population the most traumatised by the war. Globally it can be said, however, that they faced Frelimo as "the enemy of the *aldeamentos*" and, consequently, the entity which would free the people from their life under confinement. Towards the end of 1974, as the pressure began easing, great numbers of people tended therefore to leave the *aldeamentos*, heading to their home areas or simply seeking better lands nearby.⁶

Besides the *aldeamento* population, another major sector of Tete peasantry was formed by people who had been living under Frelimo protection during the war. Particularly after the Lusaka Agreement, in 7 September 1974, which brought the cease-fire, Frelimo combatants headed to the main towns and administrative centres in great numbers, where the movement was to handle a very delicate and complex political situation. This move occurred in the entire Tete territory⁷ and, due to the relative shortage of staff, provoked a pronounced slackness of the structures which had been controlling the *liberated areas*. As late as 1978, CNAC's deputy-director, referring to extensive areas he was visiting in the former first sector, wrote that

⁵See AHM, FM, Cx.111: GDT, Circ.no.315/ALD/4 (31/05/74). On the no.7 of its appendix on "necessary conditions for the stabilisation of a new Mozambique", it is written that "we hope the war will end soon, since the enemy's external sources of support might well not be as wide as he claims. As to his internal support, this will only be measured as terrorism emerges in daylight, in the form of political parties; meanwhile, the national [Portuguese] forces will keep their position as defenders of the law, the only true stronghold of freedom and self-determination". The above circular-letter also mentions the strong pressure exerted by all parties on the *aldeamento* population.

⁶MA.CNAC.AC/190: CNAC, "Relatório da visita do Director da Comissão Nacional das Aldeias Comunais à Província de Tete" (27/08/79).

⁷Though with some regional variations. In the first detachment of Frelimo's First Sector in Tete, broadly corresponding to the southwestern part of the territory, the combatants remained in post for some time, both because Rhodesian troops were still moving in the area and because of difficult communications. According to Aibaque F.Chicadza, chief of sabotage in the sub-sector: "We remained in the area for six months after the war was over (...). Our brothers were already here in town [Tete] while we remained fighting the *Boers* [the Rhodesian troops]. We received a letter from Zumbo [the district capital] saying that *your brothers, brother Bosco and the others, arrived here at Zumbo. You must end the fighting*. But it was difficult for us to leave the area while the *Boers* were still around. We kept waiting. These were hard times". AAC/Tete 1992:Interview.

"In all these *circles* [Frelimo local administration units] the people expressed their joy and enthusiasm in receiving a comrade who had worked with them during the struggle for national liberation. As they said, they thought Frelimo had already forgotten they existed. They had never received basic supplies or even seen a Frelimo soldier since 1975".⁸

Naturally, an indirect result of such slackness was the gradual dispersion of people from these former settlements, a trend which was hard to follow up on the part of the new authorities because these areas were distant from the few existing roads. In just a few years there were scarcely any the signs left by the former people's bases of the nationalists, replaced by the old scattered way of occupying the territory.

Finally, a third sector of the peasantry in Tete was formed by the former war refugees who were now returning from Zambia and Malawi. Crossing back over poorly controlled frontiers, they had a natural tendency to head to their home areas and re-install the type of settlement they had lived in before escaping from the war.

Of course, the situation of the peasantry - the overwhelming majority of the population - as it was developing, did not hold out for the new Government any prospects of political, social and economic stability. Scattered homesteads, associated with the severe lack of communications (the few existing roads were still landmined to a great extent) and the poor structures of Frelimo and the new Government, could only mean that the new regime was prevented from establishing its structures for controlling the people and the territory. Several other factors increased this negative perspective. As it was viewed at the time, the peasant sector produced almost exclusively for self-consumption in barren lands and through out-dated agricultural techniques. The use of draught animals in agriculture was very restricted in spite of the province being a traditional cattle breeder, not only because of the widespread occurrence of tse-tse flies but also because of the war and of poor herd management. An idea of how serious cattle losses had been during the war can be drawn from the fact that from the more than 62,000 cows existing in Marara by 1970, only 1,350 could be found in 1975.⁹ Independence had not brought an immediate reversal of this situation: the 122,982 cows counted in 1975 for Tete Province as a whole had further decreased to 107,659 according to

⁸MA.CNAC.AC/190: CNAC, "Síntese da visita de trabalho [do Director-Adjunto da CNAC] aos Distritos de Fingoé e Zumbo" (27/12/78).

⁹MA.GODCA.G/391: Direcção Provincial de Agricultura de Tete [hereafter DPA/Tete], "Relatório da Delegação de Tete à 1a Reunião Nacional do Ministério de Agricultura a levar a efeito na cidade da Beira de 18 a 21 de Setembro de 1975" (15/09/75).

the 1977 enrolment.¹⁰ Structures for input supply and commercialisation were almost absent. Since almost every private rural shop had been destroyed or removed by the war, there were only two permanent posts for buying peasant crop surpluses, in Angónia (Vila Coutinho) and Moatize (Caldas Xavier). Seed and implement supplies, not to mention consumption goods, were also scarce and only available through the two posts above plus some posts of the Mozambican Institute of Cotton and the extension services of the GPZ, all of them rapidly collapsing.¹¹

Tete, unlike from some of the other provinces, did not have any prospects of agricultural development outside the peasant sector. In fact, the war had left a very fragile private sector, reduced to SAZA (*Sociedade Algodoeira do Zambeze*, or Cotton Society of the Zambezi) in Mutarara, and to some private farmers in Angónia, who were expected to assure cash crop production, particularly of maize and potatoes. Sabotage, withdrawal from farms and shortage of production factors such as fertilisers, pesticides, seeds and spare parts for agricultural machinery had further reduced this sector to almost irrelevant proportions by 1977.¹² Besides, this sector was regarded with growing mistrust by the provincial state structures, because of its uncooperative attitude, of lack of statistics regarding its productive activity by the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, and also probably because of the state-centred view of the economy gradually installed amongst the new authorities.

As to the state sector, it was established for the first time through state intervention in a private farm in 1976, the *Casa Agrícola da Angónia*, which had been accused of economic sabotage. Subsequently, neighbouring private farms were incorporated in it to form the *Unidade de Produção da Angónia*, the first and only state farm of the entire province. The U.P. Angónia, or CAIA (after *Complexo Agro-Industrial da Angónia*) was organised in several dispersed farms located at Tsangano (Monaquera and Chitembe), Metengobalame (Bifolo, Matiassa and Mulanguene), and Dómuè (Dómuè). The U.P. Angónia kept growing

¹⁰MA.GODCA.G/391: DPA/Tete, "Relatório da Delegação de Tete à 1a Reunião Nacional do Ministério de Agricultura a levar a efeito na cidade da Beira de 18 a 21 de Setembro de 1975" (15/09/75); MA.CNAC.AC/190: DPA/Tete, "Relatório a apresentar por ocasião do III Conselho Agrário Nacional" s/d [1978].

¹¹MA.GODCA.G/391: DPA/Tete, "Relatório da Delegação de Tete à 1a Reunião Nacional do Ministério de Agricultura a levar a efeito na cidade da Beira de 18 a 21 de Setembro de 1975" (15/09/75).

¹²MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979).

in size in the following years through the incorporation of settler farms, becoming an immense state complex with serious problems of production planning and organisation, access to agricultural factors and productivity. Several conflicts also emerged between surrounding household and cooperative farmers on the question of lands.¹³

Consequently, in spite of being a sector central to the socio-economic transformation from the official Frelimo perspective, the peasantry was not monitored either politically or economically by the new authorities, in the short term. In fact, Tete's villagisation programme, if it could be considered as such, was very modest in the first couple of years, particularly if compared with Cabo Delgado and Niassa, the other northern provinces which had experienced the nationalist struggle. While by the end of 1977 Cabo Delgado had established almost all its communal villages and Niassa more than half, Tete, in 1977, had only three embryonic communal villages to show to the central authorities:¹⁴ M'condezi, in Moatize, formed out of the political mobilisation and agglomeration of leper communities; Capirizange, also in Moatize (sometimes referred to as O.U.A., after the Portuguese acronym for the Organisation of African Unity), both resulting from the transformation of former *aldeamentos*, and Cadzindira, in Mágoè, where some communities formerly in Frelimo bases had been brought together. But the dispersion and the high instability and movement of the population, as well as the gradual disintegration of the rural economy, were not the only reasons for such a "delay". Added to this were other reasons such as the extreme weakness of the state structures at the provincial level: the programme was to be directed by Frelimo and to integrate the several provincial directorates. However, while Frelimo lacked a department directly oriented to this issue, fundamental state departments such as the provincial directorates of Public Works and Housing, of Commerce and of Transports, were simply not collaborating.¹⁵

Finally, the security conditions of the Province were also a major deterrent to the

¹³MA.CNAC.AC/190: DPA/Tete, "Relatório a apresentar por ocasião do III Conselho Agrário Nacional" s/d [1978]; MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979). For the creation of CAIA, see CEA 1983:14, 19-22.

¹⁴MA.CNAC.AC/3: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Aldeias Comunais" (15/11/77).

¹⁵MA.CNAC.AC/3: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Aldeias Comunais" (15/11/77). As much as the orientations issued by Frelimo's 3rd Congress, this situation, which also applied to other Provinces, was behind the major rearrangement of state structures in this area, in late 1977 and 1978.

programme. Unlike most Mozambican provinces, Tete, together with the western provinces of Manica and Gaza, became the setting of a new war almost immediately after independence. Rhodesia, reacting to the alignment of Mozambique with the international community against white settler rule, escalated its military operations, from alleged "search and destroy" incursions into the Zimbabwean sanctuaries in Mozambique and Zambia, to open military expeditions in Mozambique, seeking the revengeful destruction of all sorts of targets, including economic targets and human settlements. Tete was perhaps the most affected victim of this new war.¹⁶ Sometimes these operations assumed the cover of Mozambican resistance against the new regime. As mentioned above, the last year of colonial rule witnessed the attempt of Rhodesia's CIO and Mozambique's DGS to launch black pseudo-guerrilla units of *Flechas* in the war areas. Caught by the sudden end of the war in Mozambique, CIO sought the quick conversion of these units into pseudo-guerrilla groups of resistance to the new government. Most probably, they also integrated former demobilised GEs harassed by Frelimo, and former members of the numerous small nationalist groups which had been evolving in Tete, particularly Coremo. This process is an important element behind the creation of Renamo, the anti-Frelimo movement which became notorious in the following decade.¹⁷ The movement, acting in scattered small groups, penetrated as deep as Tete's hinterland of Marávia, on the north of the Zambezi, trying to imprint a political character to their action. According to one report from Nhaluiro, during the attacks they sought the destruction of infrastructures and the killing of local authorities while shouting slogans such as "Long live resistance!" and "Down with Machel!"¹⁸ The reaction of the new security forces, seriously understaffed, used to guerrilla methods and not to pursuit operations, lacking roads and transport vehicles as well as radio communications, could be nothing but poor. In the case reported, the attack came to their knowledge two days later and the first soldiers arrived at the site only one week after the incident. In parallel, the Rhodesian forces escalated more conventional operations against the area. The results were clearly assessed in the following UN report:

"(...) at the beginning the attacks were restricted to short rides of 50 men at the most, directed against refugees from Zimbabwe and others. Subsequently, these attacks were intensified and multiplied, becoming large scale operations directed not only against the civil population but also trying to hit basic economic and

¹⁶By late 1977, according to UN estimates, this war had affected 25,000 people in Tete, 15,000 in Gaza and 10,000 in Manica. MA.CNAC.AC/57: UN Report A/32/268. S/12413 (20/10/77):14-17.[French copy].

¹⁷Vines 1991:15-17; Martin & Johnson (eds.) 1986:Chapt.1.

¹⁸DPA.GPZ.Cx/s/n: Governo Provincial de Tete, "no.17/A/26/4/GT (Confidencial)" (7/02/77). Unfortunately, this process is very poorly documented in the available sources.

social infrastructures. The weaponry used in these attacks was steadily improved. Besides armoured vehicles and aeroplanes, artillery and napalm bombs became increasingly used. From May 1977, the Rhodesian forces used Mirage jet-fighters and 500 kilogram fragmentation bombs. (...) the destruction, in Chioco [a small town of 7,800 people in Tete's southern district of Mágoè], of power generators, shops, a hospital, a school, residential and administrative buildings, warehouses and milling-houses, created a particularly difficult situation in the region. Harvests were destroyed. Even supplying the region through porters or animal convoys became impossible due to the landmining of tracks. Access from the capital to this wealthy [?] and densely populated area became dangerous and difficult. (...) All the road traffic from or heading to the province of Tete, including the heavy traffic to the Cabora Bassa dam, came to a halt. The destruction of boats on the Cabora Bassa shallow-lake deprived the province of Tete of its most important means of transportation in the east-west direction, stopping the commercialisation of agricultural products (...).¹⁹

b) Communal Village Programme and Settlement Pattern

As was argued in the previous chapter for the entire country, in Tete, from 1977 on, the communal villages were no longer a result of local and regional commitment but more and more of efforts by the state at its national and provincial levels. From the subject of a local *movement* inspired by political guidelines, the communal villages became the focus of a state *programme*, implying institutional efforts and coordination, standards to be established and targets to be reached. The creation of CNAC, soon followed by the establishment of CPAC as a coordination structure at the province level, marked the beginning of such a programme, which would soon consider the villagisation of the entire Tete population as its objective, as happened in other provinces.

The programme, it has to be said from the outset, is very difficult to assess in quantitative terms for two sorts of reasons. Firstly, because the criteria which formed the basis of the definition of a communal village varied between the several institutions concerned. Far from being a mere question of detail, divergences in such criteria were maintained and even deepened throughout the period, as the following words of Maravia's District Administrator clearly suggest, as late as May 1982:

"Our conceptual approaches are contradictory. While we affirm that there are no communal villages in our District, CPAC can find them there. What exists, in our view, is a set of settlements whose inhabitants are forced to walk great distances in order to cultivate their *machambas*. However, these very same inhabitants decline to walk equal distances for doing cooperative work".²⁰

¹⁹MA.CNAC.AC/57: UN Report A/32/268. S/12413 (20/10/77):14-17.[French copy].

²⁰MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "II Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (Maio 1982):16.

Secondly, in part under the influence of the previous reason but resulting also from problems such as poor staff training to record the progression as well as lack of institutional coordination, the lists of programme achievements present substantial differences if not serious contradictions. Consequently, and in spite of the cross-checking undertaken, the quantitative data supporting the discussion, for which information produced by provincial sources was crucial, must be considered as approximate.

Theoretically, a human settlement was considered as a communal village when satisfying the following conditions: collective or cooperative production being the basis of its economy, if not exclusively at least tending to become so; a properly planned physical setting whose main differentiation from "traditional" villages was the separation between residential and productive areas; and established institutions of local administration to run village development and life in general. On the other hand, a communal village could be reported by the sources as included in three different stages, namely the ones being planned (and therefore not established yet), the ones effectively fully existing, and the "embryonic" ones or the ones which had partially fulfilled the above conditions. Frequently, particularly from 1980 on, the will to report great achievements to the higher levels of the state, or simply a confusion between plan and reality by intermediate authorities, led to the inclusion of villages still being planned as real ones, and therefore to over-estimated enrolments. If these are relatively easy to discern, the differentiation between the several intermediate stages which the "embryonic" villages went through before reaching the ultimate stage as communal village is, on the contrary, rather complex, and certainly caused much of the divergences in criteria referred to above. In Tete this issue was further complicated by the existence of former *aldeamentos*, some of them being transformed into communal villages, and therefore running through some level of the "embryonic stage" during the period under study.

The limited state capacity to foster the programme, added to the requirements needed for a human settlement to be enrolled as a communal village, produced a situation of slow advances and great complexity which is better assessed if considered, on the one hand, as a process of delayed transition, and on the other as a process of integration of human settlements with various origins. From this perspective, the previous settlements are obviously the point of departure.

TABLE 10.1:
THE TETE COMMUNAL VILLAGE PROGRAMME (1978-1982)

District	1978			1980			1982		
	No. Vil.	Population in Villages	% of Total	No. Vil.	Population in Villages	% of Total	No. Vil.	Population in Villages	% of Total
Zumbo	0	0	0	4	2,271	7.0	6	6,156	18.1
Marávia	3	2,179	6.8	4	2,179	6.4	4	2,517	7.0
Chiúta	1	578	1.4	2	3,070	7.4	2	3,070	7.0
Macanga	2	3,638	6.3	3	10,567	17.3	3	10,567	16.4
Angónia	2	2,997	1.4	5	5,335	2.4	5	5,495	2.4
Moatize	2	3,160	3.6	3	4,607	5.0	3	2,905	3.0
Mutarara	4	5,135	4.0	9	24,385	18.0	9	43,767	30.6
Mágoè	1	1,250	12.8	1	1,250	12.0	1	3,143	28.7
C.Bassa	1	5,000	14.2	2	5,000	13.4	3	7,199	18.3
Changara	1	3,500	4.2	2	3,500	4.0	3	1,985	2.1
	17	27,437	5.4	35	62,164	9.2	39	86,804	13.3

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/3: CPAC/Tete, "Relatório" (29/07/78); MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Relatório à 5a Sessão da Assembleia Provincial de Tete" (Dezembro 1979); MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, no.36/CPAC/80 "Relação das Aldeias Comunais existentes na Província por Distritos, especificando a sua origem e número de habitantes" (8/02/80); MA.CNAC.AC/259: WFP, "Draft of project proposal" [1981]; MA.CNAC.AC/256: CNAC, "Relação nominal das Aldeias Comunais existentes a nível nacional com os respectivos números de habitantes" (31/10/81); MA.CNAC.AC/215: CNAC, "Aldeias Comunais existentes a nível nacional" (Maio 1982); MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (Maio 1982); MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82); Araújo 1988.

Usually, both state departments and scholars classify the communal villages in accordance with a frame which has in consideration the three main peasant sectors mentioned above: people from former *aldeamentos*, people from former Frelimo bases and "returnees" from neighbouring countries, to which was added the category of villages formed as a consequence of "political mobilisation".²¹ Araújo²² developed this classification, introducing new categories, such as the ones of villages formed as a consequence of natural disasters and

²¹For instance, MA.CNAC.AC/13: Presidência da República, "Proposta para a criação do Secretariado Nacional das Aldeias Comunais" (Janeiro 1978):5; CNAC 1978a:12-16; Araújo 1988.

²²Araújo 1988:187-194. According to him, Tete communal villages had the following origins, in percentage: 13.0% formed in the "liberated areas" during the armed struggle; 0.7% formed on the basis of peasant mobilisation; 26.7% formed as a consequence of natural disasters; 46.6% formed from the transformation of former *aldeamentos*; and 13.0% formed by "returnees".

villages formed on the basis of collective forms of production as distinct from peasant mobilisation.

However, this "traditional" typology, which closely follows the process as viewed by the state, needs some criticism. Firstly, because it fails to distinguish between *de facto* human settlements and origin of population settled. A communal village established in the physical setting of a former *aldeamento* is different from a communal village formed by people from a former *aldeamento* but established in a new area. In Tete, this question seems of crucial importance for reasons some of which will be discussed later. Secondly, because it does not seem legitimate to consider "villages formed during the armed struggle" for two main reasons, the first one being, simply, that there were no communal villages during that period, in the sense of confined human settlement developed after independence, as was argued in the previous chapter, and the second because the communal villages apparently with this origin were preceded by a process of population dispersal before villagisation was again undertaken. Rather than being a "technicality", this approach opens the possibility of the communal village being, in some cases, a physical continuity of the colonial *aldeamento*, and refuses to treat the communal village as a formal continuity of previous successful experiences held in the liberated areas. From such a view, the communal village would be a new experience even to the people who were formerly living in the liberated areas. Moreover, concerning another category of the "traditional" typology, in the case of Tete it seems irrelevant to distinguish between villages resulting from popular mobilisation and villages formed on the basis of collective production, these categories being effectively identical and practically non-existent. Besides, collective production was pursued, although in varying degrees of success, in all villages irrespectively of their origins. Last but not least, it seems fundamental to take into account that in spite of geographic constraints having caused a relative separation according to origins, the fact is that many villages were formed by people from two or more origins. Table 10.2 results from the attempt to integrate criteria both of people's origin and type of settlement. The table suggests some clear indications. The first one is perhaps that most of the people integrated in the communal villages came from the *aldeamentos* (almost 60 percent of the total by 1982), and correspondingly lesser attention, in terms of villagisation, was paid to the people from the *liberated areas*, who had provided the bulk of Frelimo's support during the struggle for independence, and to the former war refugees in the neighbouring countries. Secondly, it also seems important that a great part of the communal villages were *established* in the same location as the former *aldeamentos* (almost half of total), which poses

a series of important questions. One of them is the fact that, even if suitable soils and abundant water were the cause for such a *continuity*, the permanence of important human settlements, frequently of more than 1,000 people, associated with the prevalent slash and burn agricultural techniques, were undoubtedly creating a situation of serious soil degradation, even if this is difficult to assess in quantitative terms. State ability to foster profound transformations concerning these and other aspects of social and economic life in the villages was therefore of vital importance to change the people's view of the *aldeamento* which they had been forced to endure, and to keep their trust in a movement which had promised to them liberation from these "concentration camps". We will return to this question later.

TABLE 10.2:
TETE COMMUNAL VILLAGES IN 1982: ORIGINS OF PEOPLE AND SETTLEMENT

PEOPLE ORIGIN	TYPE OF SETTLEMENT		TOTAL
	Former <i>Aldeamento</i>	New Village	
<i>Aldeamento</i>	18	6	24
Frelimo Area	-	2	2
"Returnees"	-	3	3
Frelimo Area + "Returnees"	-	2	2
<i>Aldeamento</i> + "Returnees"	2	4	6
<i>Aldeamento</i> + Frelimo Area + "Returnees"	2	-	2
TOTAL	22	17	39

Sources: MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, no.36/CPAC/80 "Relação das Aldeias Comuns existentes na Província por Distritos, especificando a sua origem e número de habitantes" (8/02/80); Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

Finally, one last important issue is the extent to which the communal village programme was capable of consummating, in general terms, the proposed transformation of rural settlement, imprinting a new pattern. Certainly, the state perspectives were very ambitious throughout the period: the creation of fourteen villages and corresponding villagisation of 5,000 people per year, reaching a total of 111 new villages and almost 450,000 people by 1985, and eventually the villagisation of the entire Tete population by 1990.²³ However, reality showed a much more modest increase, which inevitably brings the

²³See Table 9.11. MA.CNAC.AC/92: CNAC, "Dados que vamos fornecer ao Diário de Moçambique (Confidencial)" (4/11/82).

question of the destiny of the remaining population during all the years concerned. If a total of Tete population of 783,893 is considered for 1982,²⁴ and a total of aggregated people of 86,804 for the same period,²⁵ then almost 90 percent of the Tete population remained out of the communal villages. Certainly, even though it is impossible to measure, a great part of these populations were dispersed throughout the territory, illustrating the trends referred to above. But, on the other hand, a significant part of them remained in the former *aldeamentos*. Table 10.3 seeks, therefore, to assess the "destiny" of the *aldeamentos* after Mozambique's independence.²⁶ Though it is not possible to estimate the extent of "erosion" in the *aldeamentos* which persisted, in terms of population leaving, they certainly had significant reductions in their population. Those who left were returning to their home areas, searching for better agricultural lands, and fleeing the misery, oppression and violence the *aldeamentos* had imprinted on their lives. As to the ones who remained, they felt perhaps satisfied with their lands (where these had not been impoverished by continued use), with some of the facilities left by the colonial scheme, or even remained under the shadow authority of their *régulos* or chiefs of a group of villages. Just to take the example of Marávia, *aldeamentos* where important *régulos* had their residences during the war, such as Fingoé (*régulo* Cachombo), Cauero (Cauero), Chibueia (Chibueia) or Cantengo (Cantengo), were reported as having persisted as "informal" villages in the period under study.

²⁴Estimate based on the census of 1980 and considering a population growth rate of 2.8 percent annually as proposed by Araújo 1988:310. However, Araújo's figures are slightly different (796,531, if deduced from table 43 in p.208). The somewhat higher and round figure of 831,000 is considered in MA.CNAC.AC/259: WFP, "Draft of project proposal" [1981], and MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (Maio 1982).

²⁵Araújo's numbers are higher (137,800 in Araújo 1988:208), but referred to 1982/1983. On the contrary, MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Resumo da situação do desenvolvimento das Aldeias Comunais (até 31 de Maio de 1982) na República Popular de Moçambique" (Maio 1982), considers a total of villagised population of 84,558.

²⁶Of course the numbers in the table must be taken as approximate. They were found in the course of an interview with the chief and the head of the technical sector of the Tete Provincial Department for Physical Planning (Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview). During the interview, several members of the staff were called to be questioned on their home areas or areas they were or had been working in. In this way, information on the still existing former *aldeamentos* was gathered for Marávia, Chiúta, Angónia and Moatize. Mwanza gave details on Mutarara and Zumbo (the latter being his home area), while Coutinho spoke of the area south of the Zambesi. Map 6.5, of the *aldeamentos*, was used as a basis.

TABLE 10.3:
PERSISTENCE OF THE *ALDEAMENTO* PATTERN OF NUCLEATION IN TETE
AFTER INDEPENDENCE

DISTRICTS	No. of <i>Aldeamentos</i> (1974)	<i>Aldeamentos</i> Transformed in Communal Villages (1982)	<i>Aldeamentos</i> Remained as "Informal" Villages (1982)	<i>Aldeamentos</i> "Disappeared" (1982)
Zumbo	9 ^a	4	5	-
Marávia	14	2	9	3
Chiúta	12	-	7	5
Macanga	24 ^b	1	17	6
Angónia	18	-	12	6
Moatize	44	2	29	13
Mutarara	29	3	12	14
Mágoè	15 ^a	1	8	6
Cahora Bassa	28 ^c	3	14	11
Changara	57 ^d	2	36	19
TOTALS	250	18	149	83

^aThe Zumbo territory south of the Zambezi was administratively integrated in Mágoè; ^bIncluding former Bene (later renamed Chifunde) and excluding Chiúta; ^cChiôco was integrated in Cahora Bassa; ^dIncluding Marara and former Tete Central Area.

Sources: Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview; AHM, Borges Coelho, "Record of Tete *Aldeamentos*" (1993).

Again, the question of these "informal" villages seems much more than a mere "technicality" since, amongst other reasons, what was at stake was whether they were entitled to benefit from state support or not. However, deducing from the poor sources available, the discussion of these issues within state departments seems to have taken place quite rarely and clearly revealed the trend of directing the envisaged forms of state support towards the villages "formally" considered as communal villages, in order to avoid the dispersion of the scarce state capacities through an "endless" number of villages.²⁷ José Forjaz, then director of the National Directorate for Housing, expressed his apprehensions about such trends when saying that

²⁷MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "Acta da 3a Reunião Preparatória da 1a Reunião Nacional das Aldeias Comunas" (23/02/80):10.

"sometimes it seems that the villages only matter from the point when they have reached the communal stage. In the meantime, what is our attitude? (...) A village exists already as a human settlement with determined characteristics, but it is not a communal village yet. What is it then? What is our responsibility as a state, as government, as executive departments, towards such human settlement which is not defined yet as a communal village but has already a real existence?"²⁸

Such apprehensions were also shared (and responded, in part) by Oscar Monteiro, then Minister of State Administration:

"The communal village is an objective. Meaning that all communal villages are just mere villages at the start (...) and our perspectives of *communalisation* have to be gradual (...). As state leading officers we cannot abandon the remaining villages. It is not a crime living in a village which is not a communal village. The state must be concerned with the entire population of our country"²⁹

Consequently, it seems that grounds exist to conclude that far from establishing a new settlement pattern, the communal villages in Tete, after independence, were but one element of a wider and complex settlement pattern which also included what we have called "informal" villages, and also scattered homesteads. How the state managed to develop the communal villages while integrating the remaining settlements of such a complex pattern will be approached in the next sections.

c) The State and the Development of the Programme, 1977-1982

It was affirmed above that one of the main conclusions of the Third Frelimo Congress concerning the communal villages was perhaps the need to improve the support provided by the state to the development of the programme, namely through a better coordination of its several departments. The task was assigned to CNAC which, together with the provincial governments, was to foster the creation of structures in its image at the provincial level. The CPACs appeared therefore with the objective of coordinating the several provincial directorates in the work of fostering the formation and development of communal villages. CPAC/Tete was created in April 1978 in a context, not different from that prevailing in other provinces, of great difficulties confronting the state in the implementation of coordinated action in the field. To the prevailing view of the provincial directorates, of the communal

²⁸MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "Acta da 3a Reunião Preparatória da 1a Reunião Nacional das Aldeias Comunais" (23/02/80):7-8.

²⁹MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "Acta da 3a Reunião Preparatória da 1a Reunião Nacional das Aldeias Comunais" (23/02/80):13.

villages as a second priority, was added the low authority of the newly created commission,³⁰ with still unknown importance and directed by second rank staff. According to Romão Tembo, the first director of CPAC/Tete,

"everyone resisted collaborating. They missed the [coordination] meetings or sent people without enough importance to act as real representatives. We had problems. We felt abandoned in those days!"³¹

But this situation, far from characterising just the beginning of CPAC's work, persisted throughout the period. In the image of CNAC, CPAC was also to be guided by the recommendations of a Coordinating Council formed by relevant provincial state departments. However, also sharing the same problems, CPAC/Tete's Coordination Council rarely managed to assemble all its members in meetings. During the preparatory process for the important First National Meeting on Communal Villages, held in March 1980, for example, CPAC/Tete was forced to rely on its own executive structure to organise the provincial procedures, all state departments, including all members of the Coordinating Council and District Commissioners missing the preparatory meeting with the occasional exception of the provincial departments of Public Works and Housing, and Cooperatives.³²

At the time when CPAC/Tete was being created, in March 1978, severe floods occurred in the Zambezi river. Considered the biggest in the region in the 20th century, they affected four out of the ten Mozambican provinces. Caused by pouring rains in Zambia, they were aggravated by sudden discharges of the up-stream Kariba dam which, in its turn, obliged the Cahora Bassa dam to open eight of its ten floodgates.³³ Tete was undoubtedly the most affected province. The capital city had its vital bridge over the Zambezi seriously damaged, and its water supply motor and the broadcasting transmitter submerged, amongst other major

³⁰And consequently, persisting problems of lack of staff. For a severe critics of the work developed by CPAC/Tete as a consequence of these problems, see MA.CNAC.AC/259: CNAC, "Relatório da visita de trabalho ao Distrito da Marávia (Fingoé)" (14/07/80), where CPAC/Tete is accused of working without a properly designed plan, often in contradiction with the District's priority scales.

³¹Tembo 1992: Interview.

³²MA.CNAC.AC/105: CNAC, "Acta da 3a Reunião Preparatória da 1a Reunião Nacional das Aldeias Comunais" (23/02/80).

³³This possibility, theoretically expected to occur only every 100 years, came true three years after the dam was operative. MA.CNAC.AC/9: CNAC, "Relatório sobre as cheias do rio Zambeze" s/d [1978].

losses.³⁴ Mutarara was the most affected district in the province with, officially, 31 dead, 89,568 displaced, 23,114 hectares of crops lost and more than 50 schools destroyed or damaged.³⁵ In Mutarara, particularly affected was Inhangoma island, a fertile and densely populated area delimited by the rivers Zambezi, Shire and Ziu-Ziu.

TABLE 10.4:
LOSSES CAUSED BY THE 1978 ZAMBEZI FLOODS

Losses	Tete	Manica	Zambézia	Sofala	Total
Dead	31	3	2	9	45
Displaced	89,568	22,000	30,000	77,420	218,988
Crops Lost (Ha)	25,114	9,500	9,000	17,880	61,494
Schools Destroyed	53	14	20	68	155
Shops Destroyed	-	3	5	-	8

Source: MA.CNAC.AC/9: CNAC, "Relatório sobre as cheias do rio Zambeze" s/d [1978].

In the aftermath of the disaster, the Government empowered an Inter-Provincial Commission of Natural Disasters and Communal Villages (*Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais*) to coordinate the emergency relief operations. The strategy to be adopted by the commission was clearly expressed in its name: the connection of the relief operations with a resettlement scheme. Further indication of this connection could be found in the appointment of CNAC as commission coordinator and of Lopes Tembe, CNAC's deputy-director, to lead it.³⁶

After the first emergency measures, which consisted in transferring people to more secure places, the commission focused its activity for the rest of that year on Mutarara, particularly at Inhangoma. Its view of the activity to be developed coincided with the Tete Governor's, of resettling the people from the lower and floodable areas in new communal

³⁴MA.CNAC.AC/9: Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Naturais [hereafter CIPCAC], "Acta da 1ª Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (12/04/78):4.

³⁵MA.CNAC.AC/9: CNAC, "Relatório sobre as cheias do rio Zambeze" s/d [1978].

³⁶MA.CNAC.AC/3: MOPH/DNH, "Proposta para a constituição de uma equipa de apoio às novas aldeias no vale do Zambeze" (24/04/78); MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCAC, "Relatório da visita às Províncias de Tete, Sofala, Zambézia e Manica, pelos camaradas Lopes Tembe e Lourenço Mutaca, na qualidade de responsável e responsável-adjunto da Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (8/05/78).

villages on more elevated areas. Even if the new agricultural areas remained by the river margins, people's permanent residences were to be definitely placed in new sites out of the reach of the waters. Political commissars were appointed to orient the process on the field, some of them with experience gathered on a similar process developed in the aftermath of the Limpopo river floods, some months earlier.³⁷ In parallel, the study of elements on which to base the location of the new villages was assigned to the National Housing Directorate, in Maputo.³⁸ In July, after elements were gathered in Maputo on land and its recommended use, on forest potential and underground waters, the location of villages was defined on the map and a team was dispatched to the area, composed of two DNH experts, and one Soviet expert unit on soils, working with the Ministry of Agriculture, and local supporting staff. The criteria which formed the basis of village demarcation were relative protection from the waters, land and water availability and proximity to the railway line. In a couple of days, seven future communal villages were demarcated in Mutarara. Soon two more villages followed.

Apparently, however, the Maputo-based study did not include the views of the local communities, even if some formal consultations had been undertaken, and all the new villages faced resistance on the part of the local population, which the authorities explained as being principally the result of negative and undercover influence exerted by former *régulos* and religious leaders.³⁹ However, the reasons behind such reservations were much more complex and tangible. First of all, the experience of the *aldeamentos*, which Mutarara had been the last district to endure less than five years earlier, was still vivid in the memory of the people: the authorities themselves recognised it when writing that "the people in Inhangoma (...) are not mobilised [to join the communal villages] because they consider them as new *aldeamentos*

³⁷Contemporary activities of these commissars were causing problems in Cahora Bassa, another disaster area, though not so serious, where they relocated villages already started under the alleged grounds that they should be near the main road. Most of the population, whose houses went down for this reason, refused to build new ones and the area became "very difficult to villagise" in the words of the district authorities. MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCAC, "Acta da 1a Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comuns" (12/04/78):21.

³⁸MA.CNAC.AC/3: MOPH/DNH, "Proposta para a constituição de uma equipa de apoio às novas aldeias no vale do Zambeze" (24/04/78).

³⁹Although other aspects were mentioned, this was the most common explanation, followed by the "influence still exerted by the spirit of the former colonial *aldeamentos*". See, for instance, for the cases of communal villages Cumbiamuana, Io de Maio (Traquino), Missuassua and Sinjal, MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCAC, "Acta da 6a Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comuns" (6/12/78):6.

where they will carry on enduring exploitation".⁴⁰

But besides the recent traumas caused by the violence associated with the *aldeamento* process or by the floods, the main reason for community reluctance lay clearly in the fact of leaving the fertile and irrigated lowlands of the margins of rivers Zambezi, Shire and Ziu-Ziu (even if occasionally hit by floods), in exchange for new places they knew in advance were less productive. In a report from Inhangoma, the DNH team stated that

"the people's choice is the one of living in the island and not in communal villages. They were informed they would leave the island for higher areas but their experience tells them that on the island they always have had foodstuffs, while away from it the land is not productive enough. They say they thank the Government for the help it gave to them but insist in remaining in the island".⁴¹

An equivocal situation was therefore created, in which people tended to leave the emergency camps, heading back to their former areas, by the river, as soon as the waters were lowering, while the authorities, on the contrary, wanted to transform these camps into communal villages of permanent residence or to remove the people to third sites. The local communities could not afford openly to oppose the authorities, and, as had happened some years before, part of the population fled to Malawi⁴² while others covertly resisted by avoiding the authorities. A team of the emergency commission visiting Missuassua to discuss the communal village's development bitterly complained that from the hundreds of people who knew about their arrival and were supposed to be waiting for them there, only six or seven had remained, including obviously the political secretary.⁴³ Such situations were repeated, as the one in Zemira, where a peasant, addressing the DNH team referred to above, said that "the only alternative for me is to live down there [outside the communal village and by the river]. There I can grow everything, beans, maize, whatever. I am glad about the

⁴⁰MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCNAC, "Acta da 4a Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (18/07/78):7. Also MOPH/DNH, "Relatório sobre a viagem efectuada ao Distrito da Mutarara para apoiar a implantação das Aldeias Comunais" (Julho 1978):10, on this subject.

⁴¹MA.CNAC.AC/9: MOPH/DNH, "Relatório sobre a viagem efectuada ao Distrito da Mutarara para apoiar a implantação das Aldeias Comunais" (Julho 1978):18.

⁴²These runaways are difficult to quantify. MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCNAC, "Relatório da 4a Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (17/07/78):1.

⁴³MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCNAC, "Acta da 6a Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (6/12/78):6. This situation of people avoiding meetings with the authorities was very common. See also MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCNAC, "Relatório da visita às Províncias de Tete, Sofala, Zambézia e Manica, pelos camaradas Lopes Tembe e Lourenço Mutaca, na qualidade de responsável e responsável-adjunto da Comissão Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunais" (8/05/78):2.

revolution but I would rather live down there".⁴⁴

As to the authorities, they could not afford an open confrontation with the people either, by forcing them to move into the highlands. They used, therefore, what was considered as "aggressive political mobilisation" mixed up with policies such as the one of delivering emergency aid just in the context of the communal villages. In Charre, during a mobilising meeting and questioning the connection of the emergency aid with villagisation, one peasant stood up to disagree with the attitude of the authorities of distributing emergency donations just to the people who lived in the communal villages, alleging that "during the 1958 flood the distribution of donations included everyone with no exception":⁴⁵ clearly, the new authorities were being compared with the former colonial ones, as an entity keen to villagise the people against the community's will.

From such a process resulted the creation of almost one fourth of the total communal villages of Tete, one which was exclusively based on central initiative, and some immediate inferences can be drawn. On the one hand, even if fulfilling the criteria defined as correct to establish a communal village, the central view was not necessarily the one of local people who, if not participating in the process, could covertly or openly resist, imprinting on it a negative aspect from the outset. On the other hand, exclusive central initiative could hardly help institutional strengthening at the provincial level, which was absolutely necessary in order to plan and implement future villages. Furthermore, clear indications can be drawn from subsequent events showing that even the criteria established centrally were not entirely followed on the terrain, as compromises with local implementation difficulties seem to have prevailed. One example of the above was the communal village settled at Vila Nova da Fronteira, which grew continuously to become one of the largest of the Province and even of the entire country, with almost 7,000 people by 1981. In spite of being a centrally defined basic criterion, availability of drinkable water was far from being achieved. According to one participant in this process,

"Vila Nova da Fronteira is a very dry area. Even presently [July 1992], at the moment we are talking to each other, water is seriously missing there. Formerly water would be brought from Sena. Every day the train from Beira would bring a water tank for supplying Vila Nova da Fronteira. Though some water could

⁴⁴MA.CNAC.AC/9: MOPH/DNH, "Relatório sobre a viagem efectuada ao Distrito da Mutarara para apoiar a implantação das Aldeias Comunitárias" (Julho 1978):21.

⁴⁵MA.CNAC.AC/9: CIPCAC, "Acta da 6ª Reunião Inter-Provincial das Calamidades Naturais e Aldeias Comunitárias" (6/12/78):7.

be found in the area, it was brackish water. In all that area, corresponding to the border strip, proper water could only be found at the Ziu-Ziu river. (...) [Even so] all the people in the area went to Vila Nova da Fronteira (...)"⁴⁶

From the above, two important distinctions from the general pattern described in the previous chapter can be drawn. One was that in Tete the establishment of communal villages occurred somewhat later than the national average, with practically no communal villages being established in the period before Frelimo's Third Congress. The other is that the first villages resulted from central not local initiative, as was seen above. However, soon after this process resulting from "emergency procedures" held by central authorities, the provincial ones started establishing other communal villages elsewhere in the province. Once created, CPAC prioritised the gathering of information through visits to the districts and the preparation of provincial and district seminars. At the village level, on the top of the activities to be developed was the building of model houses particularly at Capirizange and M'condezi, in Moatize. The need to present quick results led the institution to give priority to the building of physical infrastructures instead of starting from the economic and productive base of the villages and their social organisation.⁴⁷

Table 10.5 shows the communal villages established in Tete, excluding 25 "embryonic nucleations" (referred to as developing into communal villages by 1982 but still deprived of the major defining characteristics).⁴⁸ It shows that during the two years following the events in Mutarara 90 percent of Tete's communal villages were concluded. Some were fostered by CPAC and most by local authorities following political orientation but frequently far from state access. While most of the villages from this latter group were located far from the provincial capital, deprived of passable roads and therefore practically not benefiting from any form of state support besides occasional assistance, the former group, particularly Moatize villages, experienced a much different situation. Political enthusiasm and a view that the delay in the beginning of the programme would be overcome by a greater commitment of the state

⁴⁶Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

⁴⁷MA.CNAC.AC/3: CPAC/Tete, "Plano de Actividades para 1978" (30/06/78). Significantly, "dynamising of agricultural, production and craft cooperatives as well as household production" appears as a seventh priority in its first yearly plan.

⁴⁸These nucleations were Mazamba, in Zumbo; Cassuende, Mango, Chizame and Virinhama in Marávia; Chifunde and Chacala in Chiúta; Muchena in Macanga; N'cungas, Djenje, Cateme, N'thudzi, Canchira and Catipo in Moatize; Chimuala in Angónia; Cambototo in Mágoè; Cancune, Múduè and Samora Machel in Cahora Bassa; and Mitete, Gola, Cangololo, Nhapende, Nhacamba and Carate in Changara. Most of them, particularly in Moatize and Changara, had been former *aldeamentos*, while the ones in Zumbo, Marávia, Macanga and Mágoè had been former *círculos* in Frelimo liberated areas.

led CPAC's first director to consider, much latter, that the main problem had been, in this case, an *excessive* state support:

"I think the crisis [of the communal villages near the city of Tete] was due to excessive state support (...). We used to send [from the city] groups of one or two hundred people to build the communal village. To cut down stakes and build houses. Afterwards, we would say to the villagers: 'Everything is ready now. Here you have your houses. Let us distribute them'. (...) We sent groups to do the work. Sometimes six buses and trucks left here, with teachers, pupils, people in general, controlled by the dynamising groups, to work at Capirizange. The villagers would only watch. Everything was supposed to be done by the state".⁴⁹


TABLE 10.5:
COMMUNAL VILLAGES ESTABLISHED IN TETE

DISTRICT	1977/1978	1979	1980	1981
Zumbo		Eduardo Mondlane Josina Machel Melaúze	M'Pangula	Puato Cassuende
Marávia	Nhimbe Molwera Uncanha (Piri-Piri)		Nhenda	
Chiúta	N'Sadzo		Kariramo	
Macanga	Gandale Namadende		Chidzolomondo	
Angónia	Lido Chiumbune	N'Katué	M'Pandula Chinvano	
Moatize	Capirizange (OUA) M'Condezi		Samôa	
Mutarara	Sinjal Nhamayabwe 1 de Maio Missuassua	Zimira Charre Baué Cumbianuana V.N.Fronteira		
Mágoè		Cadzindira		
Cahora Bassa	Chipera		Chissua	Nhancapiriri
Changara	Temangau		Capimbi	Chicompende

Source: MA.CNAC.AC/144: Ministério da Saúde, "Dados sobre Aldeias Comunais colhidos em todas as Províncias, excepto Maputo, por elementos do Gabinete de Estudos" (Julho 1977); MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Relação das Aldeias Comunais existentes na Província por Distritos, especificando a sua origem e número de habitantes" (8/02/80); MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Anexo do Relatório à 5a Sessão da Assembleia Provincial" (1980); MA.CNAC.AC/256: CNAC, "Relação nominal das Aldeias Comunais existentes a nível nacional com os respectivos números de habitantes" (31/12/81); MA.CNAC.AC/215: CNAC, "Aldeias Comunais existentes a nível nacional" (Maio 1982).

⁴⁹Tembo 1992: Interview.

MAP 10.1: COMMUNAL VILLAGES AND FORMER ALDEAMENTOS IN TETE (1982)



But, in fact, the question of the absence or excess of state support in determining village development was preceded by the formulation of people's participation. Two main factors seem appropriate here: the first is related to an absence of people's protagonism in the previous *aldeamento* process, which in spite of the radically different environment experienced after independence might not have altered the general view by the people of the nucleations as basically state undertakings; the second is that these nucleations, like the previous ones, remained opposed to the people's experience and beliefs concerning how to organise their lives. Political guidelines which referred to people's participation in village location and development in general seemed to have been hampered by the state's need to urge the programme, and the tone given by the process in Mutarara, in which discussions with the people were superficial or simply absent, was expanded to the entire Province. By late 1979, when more than half of the villages were already concluded and the rest on the way to being established, the Provincial Meeting on the Communal Villages clearly concluded that "the location of the habitation sites in most of the villages of the Province was defined by district or provincial authorities without popular participation".⁵⁰

Besides affecting such vital aspects of the village as land availability or access roads, the location problems also affected the space within the village and the effort developed by the state. Water availability remained as a major problem since northern Tete is characterised by a multitude of small rivers often out of water during the dry season, while the southern region is regularly hit by major droughts, both cases not favouring large human agglomerations. Table 9.12, in the previous chapter, revealed that state action in supporting the villages in this field started late, after 1980, the eleven wells reported as existing in communal villages by that year having been a legacy from the *aldeamento* period.⁵¹ This was due to a series of reasons, starting from the chronic state weakness in Tete, particularly CPAC, to the difficult communications and to village location. Existence of relatively important facilities left by the *aldeamentos*, referred to above, might have also played a role in "permitting" the postponement of new works. Though statistics cannot be found, serious water problems were reported for many villages, and situations formerly described for the *aldeamentos* were here repeated. In so far as water supply is concerned, the two more frequent situations were villages depending on a river, as was the case of Cassuende (Luangua

⁵⁰MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Relatório da Reunião Provincial das Aldeias Comunsais" (7/11/79).

⁵¹MA.CNAC.AC/126: CPAC/Tete, "Informação" s/r (22/09/80).

river), or the mere lack of water sources as in the case of Estima, a late communal village established in 1982 to settle people displaced from the surroundings of the Cahora Bassa dam for security reasons. While in the former case serious health problems were provoked by the poor quality of the river waters, in the latter

"There is only one well... this is an appalling situation! People, particularly women, spend the entire day around the well trying frequently without success to get a can of water. (...) A CPAC official affirmed that the DPOPH [Provincial Directorate for Public Works and Housing] resists sending experts to dig the wells while the villagers refuse to participate in such works alleging that the government dragged them out of a good area to resettle them in a new one without the minimum conditions".⁵²

In spite of this situation, as late as 1981 the provincial plan for state action in this field was very modest, foreseeing capacity of the Provincial Directorate of Public Works and Housing, in terms of human resources, to dig only 20 new wells in the Province. Furthermore, unavailability of "material means" such as a low budget, lack of pipes, spare parts for pumps, etc., was recognised as a major difficulty for the plan.⁵³

Generally, villagers tended to be more receptive and willing to participate in the state health and education programmes. As was considered above, this was largely because these might have appeared as more tangible in their eyes, but also due to the way the programmes were conceived. In Chapter 9 we discussed them in general terms, to which we will add now some difficulties they faced in Tete. The main deterrent factor was undoubtedly state inability to reach the villages under the difficult conditions of communication, translated into a general lack of supplies in terms of medicines and medical and school equipment. Although schools could be found in every communal village, they frequently corresponded either to schools built in the *aldeamentos* under the old 1972 school programme, or to classes attended under the trees, in the open air. The problem with health posts was partially the same, reaching much lower numbers by 1982 because, in part, of the greater demands in terms of quality of buildings for such purposes. Furthermore, other characteristics rendered the health programme somewhat more difficult to implement if compared with education. Firstly, this was because of the official attitude of great disavowal towards "traditional" values in these

⁵²MA.CNAC.AC/86: CNAC, "Relatório" (18/08/82). Villagers' reluctance to participate in these works, considered as a state "obligation", seems to have been common. See, for instance, MA.CNAC.AC/151: CNAC, "Relatório da visita de trabalho efectuada pelo Excelentíssimo Senhor Director-Adjunto às Províncias de Sofala e Tete" (22/04/82): 10, for Marávia communal villages, where at least in Virinhama and Cassuende the villagers demanded state remuneration to participate in digging wells.

⁵³CNAC 1981a:6.

fields. Though some vague references were made to some positive social effects of these practices, a general attitude of great rejection was quite clear in the instructions issued by CPAC:

"As to healers, who seed *divergence* amongst families, we must conduct a relentless combat against them. Consequently, if they are detected inside the communal village they must go through severe reeducation⁵⁴ and the instruments they use to cheat the people, as well as the garments they wear in the ceremonies, must be apprehended and sent to the provincial structures"⁵⁵

Unlike the case of teachers or school monitors, the health monitors (APEs) did not earn salaries from the state. During their first year on duty in the village they, as well as their families, were to be fed, dressed and housed by the villagers, through collective participation. Supposedly, this would give them time to build their own houses and clear their own *machambas*, supported by the villagers in time-consuming tasks such as seeding and weeding. Although benefiting from the results of cooperative production, the APEs should be exempt from cooperative work. However, since this form of production was neither generalised nor bringing tangible results, most of the times the APEs stood in the uneasy position of having to depend on the good will of the villagers to subsist. The awkward definition of their status in the village led many APEs, relatively skilled and educated, to leave the communal villages in search of a better life⁵⁶ and this obviously hampered the solutions for the problems in this area.

The conclusion that the results from state intervention in the communal villages, not only in the social fields described above but particularly at the production level, were modest was soon reached both at central and provincial levels. State coordination was much below that demanded by the orientations of the Third Congress strategy to foster the programme and to mobilise the peasants. Development, however, much more than from political and ideological mobilisation, could only result from concrete and tangible socio-economic improvements.

⁵⁴Meaning their confinement in limited spaces where they would go through several forms of political education for a length of time which could last several years.

⁵⁵MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Relatório da Reunião Provincial das Aldeias Comunais" (7/11/79).

⁵⁶MA.CNAC.AC/190: CPAC/Tete, "Relatório da Reunião Provincial das Aldeias Comunais" (7/11/79); CNAC 1981a:11.

TABLE 10.6:
THE HEALTH AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES IN TETE COMMUNAL VILLAGES

DISTRICTS	COMMUNAL VILLAGES	HEALTH POSTS	APEs	SCHOOLS
Zumbo	6	2	2	6
Marávia	4	4	3	3
Chiúta	2	-	-	-
Macanga	3	1	1	2
Angónia	5	-	-	-
Moatize	3	1	5	2
Mutarara	9	4	8	10
Mágoè	1	1	1	2
Cahora Bassa	3	2	2	2
Changara	3	-	-	1
TOTALS	39	15	22	28

Source: MA.CNAC.AC/9: CPAC/Tete, s/r (25/11/78); MA.CNAC.A/242: MOPH/DNH, Relatório (19/05/78); Table 9.12; Table 10.1.

By 1979, new measures were introduced in an attempt to reverse these general trends by concentrating the state effort in order to improve results. The reasoning for this move was the following, according to Felix Amane, then Governor of Tete:

"(...) our experience in supporting the districts, since independence, has been characterised by dispersion. This means that provincial level structures act on the several districts without planning and coordinating with each other. That is why results are hardly noticeable. The provincial structures tend systematically to cover the districts already provided with some infrastructures and to forget the ones which carry on a daily struggle against very serious problems, hence needing much support, either material or human and moral. In order to overcome these deficiencies, the Party structures saw the need to create a Pilot District in each Province".⁵⁷

Interestingly, this type of option was not new either, since some parallels can be found in similar experiences with colonial Tanganyika, for example, where from the 1950s the policy of the "Focal Point Approach", renamed the "Improvement Approach" after independence, was adopted and explained as follows:

⁵⁷MA.CNAC.AC/190: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Directiva no.1/79 de Sua Excelência o Governador da Província" (25/06/1979).

"Agricultural extension work in Africa frequently finds itself up against a brick wall of peasant conservatism, sometimes strengthened by political misconceptions... It becomes necessary to withdraw the effort from some portions and to concentrate on small selected points, a procedure which has come to be known as the 'focal point approach'. Under this method, limited areas or progressive individuals are chosen for the initial attack... Once success has been achieved and appreciated at these points, it is then a comparatively simple matter to spread outwards from them".⁵⁸

Of course, the differences were also important, starting from the distinction that if in Tanganyika the purpose was to support the rural "progressive sectors" in order to rapidly show tangible results to the remaining sectors, the Mozambican "Pilot Approach" was based on geographical criteria and primarily aimed at "attacking" the most backward areas in order to foster an homogeneous development of the districts. Under this context, Marávia was selected as Tete's Pilot-District because of the important role played by its population in supporting Frelimo during the struggle for independence, and also because it was considered as a district which had been "forgotten" by the state since independence. The selection meant that from then on the Party Provincial Committee and the Provincial Assembly would "directly control" state action in Marávia.⁵⁹ In parallel, pilot communal villages and cooperatives were selected in each district. In spite of some adjustments throughout the period, the following became pilot communal villages: Chimuala (Angónia), Sinjal (Mutarara), Samôa (Moatize), Chacala (Chiúta), Piri-Piri (Marávia), Namadende (Macanga), Capimbi (Changara), Cambototo (Mágoè), Eduardo Mondlane (Zumbo), and Samora Machel (Cahora Bassa). Almost half of these villages, namely Chimuala, Chacala, Capimbi and Samora Machel, were still "embryonic" at the time they were selected, the objective being the one of fostering their "conclusion".⁶⁰

The appointment of Marávia as a Pilot-District was also made in coordination with the central authorities, namely CNAC,⁶¹ even if such coordination can hardly be traceable, and was soon followed by continuous visits of "central" teams for field assessment and research. Subsequent events, in fact, revealed an unbalanced coordination of central and provincial authorities in this respect: on the part of the latter, lack of skills and means to act

⁵⁸Coulson 1977:8, quoting the colonial Department of Agriculture.

⁵⁹MA.CNAC.AC/190: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Directiva no.1/79 de Sua Excelência o Governador da Província" (25/06/1979).

⁶⁰MA.CNAC.AC/128: CNAC, "Lista nominal das Aldeias Comunais Piloto" (25/08/83).

⁶¹CNAC had selected as priority districts Marávia (Tete), Sanga and Mavago (Niassa), and Mueda (Cabo Delgado). The total pilot communal villages selected for the country was of 43.

on the district was a good reason to appeal to the former, which kept referring to the rudimentary organisation of provincial departments such as CPAC. The subsequent development of this "Pilot Approach" led CNAC to elaborate a "Director Plan for the Integral Development of Fingoé/Marávia", to solicit from FAO an expert "Evaluation of Natural and Agricultural Resources for Agricultural Development of 'Aldeias Comunais' in Marávia District", and to repeatedly visit the area.⁶² However, no tangible results seem to have emerged from this approach, at least different from those in the remaining districts, because even if more coordination was needed on the part of the state, the answer did not depend on "more state" but perhaps on "better state" and more peasant involvement, which could only be achieved through a clearer definition and closer identification with local interests, implying the review of the villagisation strategy in the last instance. On the other hand, the "Pilot Approach" clearly revealed the lack of provincial means, including material ones, skills and coordination, to develop such views, whose implementation heavily depended, therefore, on direct central action, even if the latter was still modest.

d) Household versus Cooperative Agriculture

As was argued above, cooperatives were included in the strategy of the communal villages determined by the new government as the main form of organisation orienting their production activities and being the basis of their economy. This meant that where no articulation could be found between communal villages and state farms (in which case the villagers would tend to integrate themselves as wage labourers), household agriculture tended to *develop* into cooperative farming. Tete, where no state sector could be found besides very localised undertakings as U.P. Angónia and Moatize's coal industry, was therefore almost entirely included in this pattern even if developments varied from district to district. The impact of such a strategy will be assessed along two main lines, namely the extent to which cooperative production was capable of establishing itself as the dominant economy of the communal villages, and also how such development affected household agriculture which characterised most of the peasant economy so far.

⁶²MA.CNAC.AC/123: CNAC, "Proposta de plano director de desenvolvimento integral de Fingoé" (23/04/80); MA.CNAC.AC/259: CNAC, "Relatório da visita de trabalho ao Distrito da Marávia (Fingoé)" (14/07/80); FAO 1980; MA.CNAC.AC/123: CNAC, "Sugestões/recomendações por parte da CNAC (Planificação) a incluir num programa de desenvolvimento do Distrito, tomando em consideração as recomendações da Missão FAO" (4/09/80).

Besides the farming, other cooperatives were created in Tete communal villages, such as the ones for fishing in the Cahora Bassa shallow lake (mainly located at Zumbo). However, both because of its modest expression (by 1982 all Tete fishing cooperatives were considered as "not working") and of the fact that the success of the communal village programme depended on the evolution of farming and consumer cooperatives, these will be the focus of the following discussion. Table 10.7, below, refers to farming cooperatives established in Tete communal villages in the 1981-1982 agricultural campaign and requires some comment. First, for reasons identical to those mentioned in the case of the statistics of communal villages, numbers must be considered as approximate. The recording done by the various institutions were often contradictory because of poor statistical work and the blurred distinction between mere collective *machambas* and effective cooperatives. In order to exclude most of the imprecise forms and principally because the village is our main focus, cooperatives referred to as existing outside communal villages are not included in the table. This particularly affects the District of Angónia, where 10 cooperatives were reported as existing from the early period of 1977-1978, though they were not mentioned from 1980.⁶³ In spite of the above, data on area and members is missing for some cooperatives, in which case the table mentions non available data (n/a). This occurred either because cooperatives were of recent formation (the cases of Namadende and Baué) or because they were not yet considered as properly established cooperatives (the case of the ones mentioned at Zumbo where, in fact, the communal villages themselves were reported as still being formed as late as 1982). The table indicates that in spite of their late creation, the farming cooperatives experienced a pronounced growth in their early period (9 by 1979), which corresponded to the great increase in the numbers of communal villages and certainly were a deferred result of central measures such as the creation of GODCA, among others, discussed in the previous chapter. The trend to maintain a relatively high yearly level of increase in the numbers of cooperatives, witnessed in the years which followed (7 per year, approximately),⁶⁴ was related to the attempt to consolidate the already established communal villages, and seems to have resulted from the delayed impact of central planning action fostered particularly from

⁶³These were *7 de Setembro, 3 de Fevereiro, 25 de Junho, Eduardo Mondlane, 7 de Abril, Abaixo a Exploração, Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere, 1 de Maio* and *24 de Julho*, with a total area of 397 hectares and 140 members. Besides the ones above, one cooperative was reported as existing outside a communal village, namely Muchena, in the district of Macanga, with an area of 22 hectares and 15 members. MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "Relatório ao Conselho Consultivo Alargado do GODCA" (2/08/80).

⁶⁴In fact, the number of new cooperatives created in communal villages in 1982 was raised to 8 with the inclusion of cooperatives *Unidade* and *Maputo*, from Changara's communal village of Gola-Caomba, a former *aldeamento* being "transformed" in a communal village by that date.

1980. As to the former, these attempts led to a situation in which 74% of Tete's communal villages were developing pre-cooperatives and cooperatives by 1982. Besides being included in the general communal village programme, cooperative consolidation was attempted through such measures as the pilot-approach, referred to above, and more particularly through two projects promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture, namely Projects CO-1 (CADECO) and CO-2 (CRED).

TABLE 10.7:
FARMING COOPERATIVES IN TETE COMMUNAL VILLAGES IN 1982

DISTRICT	C.VILLAGE	COOPERATIVE	CREATION	AREA (ha)	MEMBERS
Zumbo	E.Mondlane	<i>E.Mondlane</i>	1981	n/a	n/a
	J.Machel	<i>J.Machel</i>	1981	n/a	n/a
	Melaúze	<i>Melaúze</i>	1981	n/a	n/a
	Cassuende	<i>Cassuende</i>	1982	n/a	n/a
Marávia	Nhimbe	<i>Nhimbe</i>	1981	30	170
	Molwera	<i>Molwera</i>	1981	30	55
	Piri-Piri	<i>E.Mondlane</i>	1982	60	150
Macanga	Gandale	<i>Gandale</i>	1980	83	67
	Namadende	<i>Namadende</i>	1982	n/a	n/a
	Chidzolomondo	<i>Chidzolomondo</i>	1982	89	21
Angónia	Lido	<i>M.Ngouabi</i>	1979	14	12
	Chiumbune	<i>Mkanjula Base</i>	1979	52	129
	N'Katué	<i>N'Katué</i>	1980	77	52
	M'Pandula	<i>III Congresso</i>	1979	12	9
	Chinvano	<i>J.Machel</i>	1979	8	7
Moatize	Capirizange	<i>25 Setembro</i>	1979	206	60
	M'Condezi	<i>M'Condezi</i>	1981	40	291
	Samôa	<i>S.Machel</i>	1980	59	57
Mutarara	Nhamayabwé	<i>Nhamayabwé</i>	1981	n/a	n/a
	1 de Maio	<i>7 de Abril</i>	1980	55	12
	Missuassua	<i>J.Machel</i>	1980	65	60
	Baué	<i>Baué</i>	1982	n/a	n/a
	Cumbiamuana	<i>24 de Julho</i>	1980	32	32
Mágoè	Cadzindira	<i>Cazindira</i>	1981	n/a	n/a
Cahora Bassa	Chissua	<i>3 Fevereiro</i>	1979	29	54
Changara	Capimbi	<i>III Congresso</i>	1979	85	55
		<i>E.Mondlane</i>	1979	85	55
	Chicompende	<i>M.Wiriamu</i>	1979	73	28
TOTALS	39	29		1,184	1,376

Source: MA.GODCA.G/134: GODCA, "Situação das Cooperativas de Produção Agrícola na Campanha 1978/1979 em Tete" [1978]; DPA/Tete, "Relatório ao Conselho Consultivo Alargado do GODCA" (2/08/80); MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Lista Nominal das Cooperativas Existentes nas Aldeias Comunas" (12/02/82).

Project CO-1 CADECO (after *Centro de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo*, or Centre for Supporting Cooperative Development) was fostered by GODCA and financed by the nordic countries (Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark, through MONAP - Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Programme), and aimed at establishing centres at the provincial level. The first was established in Namaacha, covering Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane, the second in Nampula (Mutuali), and the third in Tete, in the District of Changara (Temangau), from August 1981, and was supposed to cover the Provinces of Tete, Manica and Sofala. In so far Tete was concerned, CO-1 had in two working fronts, in Changara (cooperatives *Eduardo Mondlane*, *Terceiro Congresso*, *Unidade*, *Maputo* and *Massacre de Wiriamu*),⁶⁵ and in Moatize (cooperatives *Samora Machel* and *25 de Setembro*). Briefly, CO-1 assisted the cooperatives in introducing new techniques for harrowing, seeding (maize, cotton, sunflower, sesame, beans) and weeding, financed the acquisition and trained animals for draught power, and introduced new irrigation techniques.⁶⁶

In its turn, Project CO-2 CRED (after *Centro Regional de Experimentação e Desenvolvimento*, or Regional Centre for Experiment and Development) was coordinated by INIA, the Institute for Agronomic Research. Besides the cooperatives, Project CO-2 was to assist the household sector and the communal villages in general. CO-2 acted in the District of Angónia under a Coordination Council headed by the District Administrator and integrating CRED itself and the district structures of Frelimo, Agriculture, Agricom, Mecanagro, BPD (*Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento* or Popular Bank for Development) and CAIA, and by early 1982 was planning to integrate in a near future the district structures of Health and Education. CO-2 CRED, which was based in Mtengomodzi, started its activity in Angónia in January 1982, assisting local cooperatives in animal breeding for draught power, production planning and organisation in general.⁶⁷

⁶⁵As mentioned in the previous footnote, cooperatives *Unidade* and *Maputo*, though created for some time, were located in village Gola-Caomba, which was being transformed from *aldeamento* into communal village by 1982. Their characteristics were much the ones of pre-cooperatives and both are reasons why they were not registered in Table 10.7. See MA.GODCA.G/249: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Relatório síntese sobre os trabalhos realizados com cooperativistas e aldeãos de Changara" (25/10/83).

⁶⁶MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):21-22.

⁶⁷MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):23-24.

Table 10.8 presents some indicators of Tete cooperatives by 1982, permitting a first general evaluation of the results of the cooperative movement. It reveals that in spite of the short period of activity of the two projects above, some regional distinctions were already emerging, ones which could be, at least in part, put down to their influence, though to regional characteristics also. In general, areas where specific action was being undertaken presented greater villager integration in the cooperative, and in the case of the areas under the influence of CO-1 and CO-2, all villages had cooperatives. Also clear is the fact that CO-1 and CO-2 avoided remote areas, either because the ones chosen could be reached by better communication systems (Moatize and Changara) or because they had historically assured better agricultural performances and thus had better chances of success (Angónia). Moreover, some differences can be also drawn within the areas submitted to specific action, particularly between the ones under CO-1 and CO-2, which showed a more "technical attitude", and Marávia, subjected to the "Pilot Approach", where assistance was supposedly provided by all state departments, which had a more political and administrative profile and required a high level of coordination. Cooperatives created under this environment, resulting mainly from political mobilisation, aggregated much larger numbers of cooperativists per cooperative (125 in average) and presented a much smaller area per cooperativist (0.3 hectares in average). But even if such differences were considered, results achieved through specific actions were modest, not contrasting very clearly with an overall picture of low membership, modest productivity and poor organisation, the reasons for which have to be discussed in historical perspective.

TABLE 10.8:
SOME INDICATORS OF TETE FARMING COOPERATIVES IN 1982

Area	Specific Action	People in Villages	% of Villages With Coops.	Coop. Members	% of Families in Coops.*	Average no. of Members per Coop.	Average Area per Coop. Member (ha)
Changara and Moatize	CO-1	4,890	100	546	56	91	1
Angónia	CO-2	5,495	100	207	19	42	0.7
Marávia	Pilot District	2,517	75	375	74	125	0.3
Tete Province		86,804	74	1,376	8	47	0.8

*Considering the average of 5 people per family and 1 cooperativist per family.
Source: MA.GODCA.G/249, CADECO (Projecto CO-1); same as in Table 11.7.

As already mentioned, in general the new villages were formed primarily through the nucleation of people, and consequently the *momentum* of building physical infrastructures preceded the one of organisation of the village economic base. Since Tete was a province where the communal village programme was launched later than the average, and considering the above, cooperatives began emerging in this Province during the second period of the general periodisation defined at the beginning of the previous chapter, i.e. after the Third Congress and in a period when decisions taken centrally were becoming dominant. On the other hand, what existed as collective production in the new villages during the early phase were collective *machambas* and pre-cooperatives, designations for what were nearly symbolic activities undertaken by the politically mobilised villagers under the guidance of the dynamising groups or the village political authorities. This was the starting point from which central and provincial authorities intended to create a standardised and effective economic base for the villages.

Comprehensively, the villages close to the main roads and particularly near the city of Tete were the ones first experiencing pressure from the authorities to foster the importance of collective production in the context of the village. Popular enthusiasm was the "fuel" which kept this activity under way during this period, as was happening with the building of the village infrastructures. Arguing on the same lines as Romão Tembo, the first director of CPAC/Tete, the District Administrator of Angónia summarised the "spirit" of this early stage:

"At the beginning, when the cooperatives were created, the tactic we used was wrong. Machinery was brought in in excess, cooperativists were replaced by students from schools and state clerks in weeding and harvesting. Cooperativists did not have the opportunity of feeling that they owned their own cooperative and became mere spectators. All cooperatives which were born under these circumstances ended up going through demobilisation crises. Cooperativists considered their cooperatives as state *machambas* and passively waited for external solutions to their problems, including the achievement of their production plans. This characteristic is common to most of the cooperatives in this Province".⁶⁸

These early developments had important consequences beyond heavily influencing the cooperativist attitude. In Changara, according to its District Administrator, the widespread use of machinery led to the clearance of lands for cultivation irrespective of the number of cooperativists, and to the introduction of types of crops following central guessing and irrespective of the local conditions in terms of soil and climatic suitability.⁶⁹ Table 10.9

⁶⁸In MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):9.

⁶⁹MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):9-10.

reveals the evolution of farming cooperatives existing in Tete communal villages between the agricultural campaigns of 1978-1979 and 1979-1980, in terms of planned areas and cooperativists.⁷⁰

TABLE 10.9:
EVOLUTION OF TETE FARMING COOPERATIVES IN COMMUNAL VILLAGES

PROVINCE	COOPERATIVE	1978-1979		1979-1980	
		AREA (ha)	MEMBERS	AREA (ha)	MEMBERS
Angónia	<i>Josina Machel</i>	18	17	10	6
	<i>III Congresso</i>	18	20	25	9
	<i>Mkanjula Base</i>	40	25	66	77
	<i>Marien Ngouabi</i>	67	33	52	14
	<i>N'Katué</i>	--	--	60	38
Macanga	<i>Gandale</i>	--	--	62	48
Moatize	<i>25 Setembro</i>	424	210	150	170
	<i>Samora Machel</i>	--	--	90	45
Changara	<i>III Congresso</i>	71	54	78	55
	<i>Eduardo Mondlane</i>	93	48	88	55
	<i>Massacre Wiriamu</i>	67	24	71	25
Cabora Bassa	<i>3 Fevereiro</i>	44	62	26	11
Mutarara	<i>Josina Machel</i>	--	--	60	40
	<i>24 Julho</i>	--	--	32	18
	<i>7 Abril</i>	--	--	55	12
AVERAGE		94	55	62	42

Source: MA.GODCA.G/134: GODCA, "Situação das Cooperativas de produção agrícola na campanha 1978/1979 em Tete" s/d (1979); MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "Relatório ao Conselho Consultivo Alargado do GODCA" (2/08/80); Table 10.7.

According to the table, cooperatives created in the early phase were not capable of maintaining either planned areas or members who had joined them from the outset. It is important to note that such decreases were more pronounced in the case of planned areas, resulting in a considerable reduction in the planned area per cooperativist from 1.7 ha to 1.4 ha between 1979 and 1980. If this ratio, at the first sight, is not very different from the one

⁷⁰Cooperatives whose values are not shown for the 1978-1979 agricultural campaign were formed during the following campaign.

of 2 ha commonly ascribable to the household sector, the picture becomes different if the same ratio is estimated on the basis of area effectively cultivated, instead of just planned. Effectively, figures of cooperative cultivated area for the 1979-1980 agricultural campaign would lower the ratio to just 1 ha⁷¹ per cooperativist, or even much less if the criterion was based on the harvested area. As will be discussed below, such distinctions are crucial.

The decreases referred to above were related to the gradual end of the period of grace experienced by the cooperatives during this first stage, which was replaced by their progressive and vital need for presenting tangible economic results if they were to survive. The withdrawal of the subsidies of the early stage (free occasional labour brought from elsewhere and non-accounted forms of support), placed the relationship between the state and the cooperatives on a much different level, a shift which did not occur without many difficulties.

First of all, at the level of the services provided by the state for land clearance and tillage, local initiative in clearing new lands and tilling for cultivation was limited by traditional ways of performing such operations, namely the burning of vegetation and the use of hoes.⁷² While the former was openly combated by the authorities,⁷³ the second depended on instruments which were not imported nor locally produced either, due to the government orientation towards the "modern" sector, as was seen above. Deep transformations in this respect partially depended, therefore, on the services provided by Mecanagro, the state firm which sold services of agricultural machinery in this field. In an apparent paradox, problems which emerged were due both to *excess* and to *lack* of services of the kind. Excess, because particularly in the early stages, tractor operation rendered these agricultural operations easier and more wide-ranging compared with peasant techniques, and this led to the trend to clear and till much wider areas than the ones the cooperativists could effectively cultivate. Paradigmatic in this respect was the case of cooperative *25 de Setembro* in Capirizange,

⁷¹MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "Relatório ao Conselho Consultivo Alargado do GODCA" (2/08/80).

⁷²By 1981, the use of draught power in agriculture, though known in several areas for long time, was apparently restricted to Samôa (MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Anteprojecto do Plano Estatal Central para 1982 de realização na Província de Tete (Confidencial)" (27/05/81):2). As was referred to above, projects CO-1 and CO-2 paid some attention to its re-introduction but their short life (one year approximately before the war destabilised the area) did not allow concrete results.

⁷³On the strong campaign against burning, for instance in Marávia, see MA.CNAC.AC/151: CNAC, "Relatório. Trabalhos efectuados com o Director-Adjunto nacional das Aldeias Comuns durante a sua visita à Província de Tete" (11/10/80):1.

where a huge area of 424 ha was cleared, tilled and seeded with machinery support, and subsequent weeding entirely failed, the campaign resulting in a "complete disaster", in the words of the authorities.⁷⁴ However, soon cases of deficient support by Mecanagro began multiplying, of which an account was already given in Chapter 9, in a bitter evaluation made by GODCA during its Second Consultative Council. On the one hand, problems were caused by the poor state of the roads, an insufficient number of machines or poor Mecanagro internal organisation, causing incomplete services to be delivered (clearance and tillage just of fractions of the area which had been planned or agreed) or late assistance, when the agricultural season was already over. Poor assistance provided by Mecanagro to the cooperatives in general was considered as a major problem throughout the existence of Tete cooperatives and the main cause of the failure of the 1980-1981 agricultural campaign.⁷⁵ On the other hand, control of agricultural machinery was a powerful instrument for local Mecanagro representatives or drivers to earn large illegal profits, and due to long distances and lack of communications these corruption mechanisms often took months before they could be detected and combated. Numerous accounts mention such cases, like the one at Estima, a new communal village which was being created by 1982 for people displaced from the area of the Cahora Bassa dam, for security reasons. Without reporting to the higher levels, Mecanagro drivers supposed to clear the lands of the village *machambas* kept alleging for months that lack of fuel was preventing them from doing their job while using the tractors to provide paid transportation services elsewhere.⁷⁶

Assuming that the cooperative had overcome these problems, it had to face next the one of planting the lands and weeding its crops. Again, procedures of seed selection and storing followed in household agriculture could not satisfy cooperative goals either in quantitative or qualitative terms. Even if this source could fill the needs partially, a long period of selection and quantity adjustment to household agriculture, particularly in the case of crops for self consumption, did not leave many seeds for cooperatives without seriously affecting subsistence. As to cash crops, the long colonial tradition of state intervention in

⁷⁴MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979).

⁷⁵MA.CNAC.AC/190: DPA/Tete, "Relatório a apresentar por ocasião do III Conselho Agrário Nacional" s/d [1978]; MA.GODCA.G/38: GODCA, "Deslocação à Província de Tete. Campanha agrícola de 1980/81" (3/10/80); MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Estado de implementação do PEC/81 e do PPI/81" (7/05/81).

⁷⁶MA.CNAC.AC/151: CNAC, "Relatório da visita de trabalho efectuada pelo Excelentíssimo Senhor Director-Adjunto às Províncias de Sofala e Tete" (22/04/82):7-8.

peasant agriculture has to be recalled here as not having pushed local procedures of improved seed selection. Consequently, cooperative development, in this regard, heavily depended on the state's capacity to provide seeds locally. As a result, in Tete, between 1978 and 1981, absence or late seed supply kept being mentioned as an important reason for the failure of successive cooperative agricultural campaigns.⁷⁷ Finally, these reasons, added to the "spirit of relying on the state", also affected the weeding operations. Table 10.10 reveals how seriously such factors could reduce the initial expectations.

TABLE 10.10:
TETE FARMING COOPERATIVES: AREAS AND AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS
IN THE 1981-1982 CAMPAIGN (Ha)

Culture	Cleared	Tilled	Harrowed	Sown	Weeded	% of Achievement
Cotton	200	180	180	180	100	50
Sunflower	510	222	191	94	9	1.7
Maize	1,000	638	622	586	300	30
Groundnuts	116	29	29	14	-	0
Beans	180	50	50	34	29	16
Potatoes	150	86	86	18	15	10
Horticulture	9	-	-	-	-	0
TOTAL	2,165	1,205	1,158	926	453	15.3

Source: MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82).

Excluded from the table above are losses occurred between crop maturing and harvests, which would render the picture even gloomier. Table 10.11, on the other hand, complements the above, presenting cooperative evolution according to yields in major crops. According to this, total 1980-1981 yields, in tonnes, meant about 10 percent of the level of the 1978-1979 campaign. This picture is yet more striking if yields are related with the number of cooperativists: from the more than 3,000 kilos per cooperativist in the 1978-1979 campaign, production dropped to an average of scarce 150 kilos per cooperativist in the 1980-

⁷⁷See, for instance, MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979); MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Estado de implementação do PEC/81 e do PPI/81" (7/05/81).

1981 campaign.⁷⁸

TABLE 10.11:
YIELDS OF SOME PRODUCTS AS INDICATING THE EVOLUTION
OF TETE FARMING COOPERATIVES (in Ton.)

Crops	1978-1979	1979-1980	1980-1981
Cotton	-	-	18
Sunflower	5	28	18
Maize	1,145	246	120
Groundnuts	10	-	-
Beans	70	13	-
Potatoes	380	57	-
Horticulture	-	20	12
TOTALS	1,610	364	168

Source: MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA de Lançamento da Planificação das Campanhas Agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979); CPAC/Tete, "Estado de Implementação do PEC/81 e do PPP/81" (7/05/81); MA.GODCA.G/38: GODCA, "Deslocação à Província de Tete. Campanha Agrícola 80/81" (3/10/80); MA.GODCA.G/109: GODCA, "Gráficos de Análise do Movimento Cooperativo" [1982];

The argument on seed supply could be also widened to include other inputs to be provided by the state, namely farming tools (basically hoes, *catanas*,⁷⁹ machetes, knives and ploughs), fertilisers, pesticides and so forth. Local availability of such production instruments, as already argued, depended on the rural trade system which was hampered by several factors deriving from the way it had evolved since independence. The liberation struggle had reduced the presence of private shopkeepers to practically irrelevant levels, as was shown in Chapter 8. Where they existed, in spite of having submitted the peasantry to high levels of exploitation, they had historically performed the role both of supplying the rural areas with production factors and consumer goods, and of buying local surpluses. After independence, the state attempted to assume total control of rural trade by restraining the movements of the *cantineiros* and denying them access to bank credits, confident of its own ability of replacing them in the rural scenario. However, as argued in Chapter 9, the state departments supposed

⁷⁸While yields decreased from 1,610 to 168 tons, as see on in the table, the number of cooperativists increased from 493 to 1,175 in the same period.

⁷⁹Small multipurpose sabres.

to ensure rural trade were inefficient, fundamentally as a result of three main reasons: "geographical" (village location, absence of district and local roads), organisational (lack of sufficient number of trading posts to cover a significant percentage of communal villages), and under-capitalisation (thus related to the state option to give priority to the "modern" sector) resulting in the scarcity of trucks to assure product transportation, and particularly in poorly supplied local shops.

The "geographical" reason was perhaps also connected with the priority scale established by the Government: being a backward province based on household agriculture, Tete did not attract great state investments in this period. In 1979, for instance, when lack of communications had been already identified as a major obstacle, works foreseen centrally were general and modest: to start opening a sand road via Tsangano; to start the construction of a bridge at M'cito; and to improve the road to Mágoè.⁸⁰ Considering the low capacity of the Provincial Directorate for Public Works, construction and maintenance of district roads was attached to district authorities commonly deprived of machinery, spare parts and fuel,⁸¹ who had to rely therefore on peasant mobilisation if such works were to be done. Several appeals were made locally by central authorities for the peasants to undertake these works manually,⁸² but major difficulties gave rise to peasant reservations: district roads were still landmined from the struggle for independence, turning the work into a dangerous task; restored sand roads became impassable again after the rainy season, requiring substantial repairs every year, and as many years had passed since independence, road degradation was advanced and widespread; last but not least, behind the villager's unwillingness to undertake such time consuming work was the need not to lose time from household production, in addition to that already being taken by political and village construction activities, cooperative production, etc. The low level of road improvement occurring until 1982 appears therefore as understandable.

The problems with trading posts established by state companies such as Cogropa, Encate and Agricom, were also several, starting with their low numbers, both fixed and

⁸⁰MA.CNAC.AC/1: Presidência da República, "Reunião das Estruturas Centrais e Provinciais do Estado sobre Questões Económicas" (6/07/79):41-42.

⁸¹CNAC 1981a:7.

⁸²See, for instance, MA.CNAC.AC/151: CNAC, "Relatório dos trabalhos efectuados com o Director-Adjunto Nacional das Aldeias Comunitárias durante a sua visita à Província de Tete" (11/10/80):3.

mobile.⁸³ The *Lojas do Povo*, established in some villages to reinforce the presence of the state in this field, were supposed to sell at accessible prices, providing a local alternative to private speculation. However, they also were poorly established.⁸⁴ The CNAC director, when visiting some areas, bitterly complained that in many cases the prices charged by the *Lojas do Povo* were much higher, making the villager pay for their heavy transportation costs and for the incompetence and low productivity of their staff. Above all, the problem with the state run supplying system, deriving from the administrative and bureaucratic costs and the under-capitalization of the sector, resulted in the absence of products: empty shelves were the most common characteristic of the local *Lojas do Povo*.

The consumer cooperatives were supposed to overcome some of these problems, handing over to the villagers the control of both the buying of peasant and cooperative surpluses and selling the products they needed, at reasonable and fair prices, thus assuring that revenues produced locally would be invested to greater extent in village development.⁸⁵ But the problems they experienced were numerous from the start, and this is one of the reasons why the consumer cooperative programme started relatively late and evolved reluctantly (the other being the late Tete communal village programme itself), covering less than 40 percent of the communal villages by 1982.⁸⁶ Transportation, which at least in some of the remaining provinces was apparently subsidised by the state,⁸⁷ had in Tete to be hired by the cooperatives when occasional support was not given by entities such as CO-2 CRED in Angónia, or private traders in Mutarara.⁸⁸ For the rest, cooperative handicap in Tete, if compared with the private rural shops, was the same as elsewhere: dependence on the state supply and transportation systems, and lack of capital to finance acquisitions.⁸⁹ Absence of or poor quality of tools available were a permanent cause for local complaints, and people

⁸³CNAC 1981a:9.

⁸⁴Only 6 in 1978, according to MA.CNAC.AC/119: Comissão Nacional de Abastecimento, "Informação" s/r (4/09/77).

⁸⁵MA.CNAC.AC/119: Comissão Nacional de Abastecimento, "Informação" s/r (4/09/77).

⁸⁶MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82).

⁸⁷According to CEA 1980:38.

⁸⁸MA.CNAC.AC/195: CNAC, "Algumas observações sobre a actuação do Estado em relação ao Sector Cooperativo e das Aldeias Comunais na Província de Tete" (27/12/82):11.

⁸⁹CEA 1980:37-38.

from the border areas commonly went to Zambia and Malawi to acquire their working instruments.⁹⁰

As indicated above, some of the problems characterising cooperative supplies were common to the ones they experienced in marketing their harvested products. The two main sectors of Tete agriculture, household and cooperative, though deeply affected, were affected differently by the poor commercialisation network. Generally, the household sector could react more flexibly. Thus, the neighbouring countries, particularly Malawi, always showed a readiness to buy household produce through establishing well supplied markets along its borders with Mozambique at the end of each campaign.⁹¹ As to the household units in the interior regions, they frequently traded their produce through the parallel market, or *candongas*, undertaken most of the time by itinerant agents working for private *cantineiros*.⁹² But the main reaction to the feebleness of the trade network was the trend of the peasantry to decrease their production levels, starting with cash crop production, and therefore partially withdrawing from the market into subsistence farming or migrating to the cities, to neighbouring countries or to work in state farms in other provinces.⁹³ However, the farming cooperatives could not afford this reaction. Obligated to follow legal procedures, they did not have access to foreign border markets or to the circuits of *candongas*. On the other hand, reducing production as a way of answering the market crisis was contradictory to their very nature, and consequently several cases were reported of harvests rotting in deficient warehouses where the campaign had been successful.⁹⁴

⁹⁰CNAC 1981a:4. In Chapter 9 lack of agricultural tools is related not only with distribution hardships but also with the state strategy which openly neglected the peasant sector. In 1981, I witnessed in Nkalapa, Niassa, agricultural work being done with sharp wooden sticks, which because of the very hard soil would last less than half an hour, new ones having to be prepared to replace them. This gives perhaps the dimension of how serious this problem could become.

⁹¹MA.CNAC.AC/190: DPA/Tete, "Relatório a apresentar por ocasião do III Conselho Agrário Nacional" s/d [1978]: 12; MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979).

⁹²MA.CNAC.AC/195, CNAC, "Algumas observações sobre a actuação do Estado em relação ao Sector Cooperativo e das Aldeias Comunais na Província de Tete" (27/12/82):9-10.

⁹³MA.CNAC.AC/195, CNAC, "Algumas observações sobre a actuação do Estado em relação ao Sector Cooperativo e das Aldeias Comunais na Província de Tete" (27/12/82):9-10.

⁹⁴See, for instance, See, for instance, MA.CNAC.AC/151: CNAC, "Relatório dos trabalhos efectuados com o Director-Adjunto Nacional das Aldeias Comunais durante a sua visita à Província de Tete" (11/10/80):2.

According to the recommendations issued at the First National Meeting on the Communal Villages in March 1980, the BPD was to establish a credit policy which, though safeguarding the repayment, was to finance communal village development in areas such as agriculture and commerce among others, a policy which was to include low interest rates as a response to the fragility of the rural economy.⁹⁵ In Tete, the implementation of such a policy was hampered by two sorts of factors: on the one hand, the doubtful or clearly negative economic results and organisational problems revealed by the cooperatives, which discouraged bank involvement; on the other hand, the poor capacity for extending the bank network through the rural areas for reasons common to the ones affecting state attempts in other fields of activity, namely transportation problems, lack of infrastructures, and so forth. Lack of bank branches remained as a problem mentioned by local authorities throughout the period. By 1981, only three BPD branches could be found in Tete rural areas, namely at Angónia, Moatize and Cahora Bassa.⁹⁶ Moreover, due to the lack of information and of skilled members, cooperatives rarely approached the bank's local branch for credits. On the other hand, cooperative fragility paved the way for their removal from financial decision making in matters which directly concerned them. Usually, cooperatives were represented by district or provincial officials in contacts with BPD, frequently without the cooperativists being notified. Cooperative agricultural campaigns, particularly from 1981, were in many cases planned by sectors such as Mecnagro and BPD. On the other hand Agricom, instead of delivering to the cooperativists the money of the harvests it had bought from them, frequently delivered it directly to BPD for paying their debt.⁹⁷ In the words of the manager of the Moatize branch of BPD, from that date all branches had recommendation to secure the savings (therefore resulting from the sale of their harvests) of cooperatives in debt to the bank in order to prevent the aggravation of their situation.⁹⁸

The training of cooperativists in matters of cooperative organisation as well as in new agricultural techniques appeared therefore as a critical issue. Only with skilled cooperativists

⁹⁵CNAC 1980a:10-11.

⁹⁶CNAC 1981a:11; MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Anteprojecto do Plano Estatal Central para 1982 de realização na Província de Tete (Confidencial)" (27/05/81):5. By that date, two more branches were planned to be established in 1982, in Macanga and Marávia.

⁹⁷CNAC 1981a:6; MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):32.

⁹⁸MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):33.

could the cooperatives assure improved functioning and a growing decision making capacity. Unlike most of the other provinces, Tete did not have a tradition of peasant integration in settler agriculture nor was the state sector significantly implanted. Excluding the eastern areas and labour migration which had sharply decreased from the mid-1960s, Tete had been essentially a province of household agriculture, and this was obviously present when cooperatives required new production attitudes from the peasants. However, state participation in training activities during the period remained very modest. According to a report presented by the cooperative sector to the Second Provincial Seminar on Cooperatives, formal training activities held thus far had only been the following six:

TABLE 10.12:
FORMAL TRAINING OF TETE COOPERATIVISTS (1978-1981)

YEAR	SUBJECT	PARTICIPANTS	
		Total	Approved
1978	Potato cultivation techniques using chemical and organic fertilizers	15	10
1978	Rabbit breeding	10	5
1980	Organisation and planning (held in Bulgaria)	3	3
1981	Use of animal drafted ploughs (held in Maputo)	4	4
1981	Basic accountancy and cooperative management	13	8
1981	Basic Agriculture	3	3

Source: MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82).

Indications such as the one of state sectors "representing" the cooperativists in operations beyond their reach, added to feeble training undertakings aiming at increasing cooperativist's ability to run their own affairs, provide a picture of an apparent lack of interest, on the part of the state, in involving the cooperative sector in the decision making process. These features were exacerbated by increased enforcement of more centralised and demanding yearly plans, from 1980 on, and the establishment of the Prospective Indicative Plan, which apparently had the sole role of pressing for production increases in order to meet the ambitious central plans without discussing the serious problems affecting the sector. Table 10.13 reveals how the 1981-1982 Central Plan for Tete cooperatives neither took account of the yields from the previous campaign nor had any correspondence with reality.

TABLE 10.13:
THE CENTRAL PLAN AND TETE COOPERATIVES
IN 1981/82 (YIELDS IN TON.)

Crops	1980-1981	1981-1982	
	Effective	Estimated	Probable
Cotton	18	150	55
Sunflower	18	180	14
Maize	120	1,260	314
Groundnuts	0	0	0
Beans	0	50	11
Potatoes	0	720	0
Horticulture	12	40	0
TOTALS	168	2,400	394

Source: Table 10.11; MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Estado de implementação do PEC/81 e do PPI/81" (7/05/81).

The reasons presented at the time for the campaign's general failure could only reinforce the arguments above. Crops such as potatoes, beans and groundnuts failed for the only reason that the Province did not receive the seeds it was expecting; maize, sunflower and cotton failures were attributed to poor Mecanagro service in tilling and harrowing, lack of seeds (or partial use of local seeds) and, in the case of cotton and sunflower, poor cooperative organisation and floods at the Zambezi river.⁹⁹

These developments could only have aggravated the organisational problems, resulting in low cooperativist mobilisation and poor cooperative performance, as has been argued above, and in the widening of the gap between state departments and cooperatives. At this stage signs were multiplying of a clear distinction between, on the one side, a stratum of party and state officials, sometimes including cooperative leaders, and on the other the peasants nucleated in villages and trying to make a better life. In 1979, in Zumbo, cooperativists refused to carry on with cooperative works because the money from the 1975-1976 campaign had been kept by the district authorities who claimed to be waiting for good opportunities to invest it,¹⁰⁰ while cooperative *25 de Setembro*, in Moatize, also interrupted its works in

⁹⁹MA.CNAC.AC/155: CPAC/Tete, "Estado de implementação do PEC/81 e do PPI/81" (7/05/81).

¹⁰⁰MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979).

early 1982, after having discovered that some officials from DPA had taken away the money of their last campaign.¹⁰¹ Such contradictions could also be transferred into the villages and the cooperatives themselves, when local political and administrative leaders ceased to be considered by villagers and cooperativists as defending their interests and, on the contrary, "playing on the side of the government". A village leader from Zumbo, for instance, complained to the Province authorities quite candidly that:

"[The cooperativists] keep asking why we, leaders, keep mobilising people for collective production while not participating ourselves in it and even having private *machambas* with hired labourers. Since our responsibilities do not leave us time to participate [in collective production] (...), what shall we do?"¹⁰²

These contradictions could go far without central party or government intervention largely because they relied on local authorities as the true representatives of the people, local authorities whose attitudes therefore had a moral justification. At communal village N'Katué, in Angónia, great conflicts were reported in 1982 because the president of the local Assembly, the deputies and party members living in the village would not join the cooperative.¹⁰³ At cooperative *24 de Julho*, in Mutarara, open conflicts were also reported in 1982 between the Party secretary and the cooperative. Here, local authorities kept the money the cooperative had raised from the sale of their cotton to pay their debts to the bank and the money received from their sunflowers for buying hoes which the cooperativists would not want. As a result, the president of the cooperative, backed by all cooperativists, declined to participate in the Second Provincial Seminar on Cooperatives and refused further collaboration with the Government until this matter was settled. At the same time, other cooperatives reacted against the state by letting their crops waste on the fields, as in Mutarara, or in the warehouses, as in cooperative Samora Machel in Moatize, where the consumption cooperative was also burnt.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):36.

¹⁰²MA.GODCA.G/134: Ministério da Agricultura (Brigada Tete/Niassa), "Relatório da Brigada do MA do lançamento da planificação das campanhas agrícolas 1978/79 e 1979/80" (Abril 1979).

¹⁰³MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):40.

¹⁰⁴MA.GODCA.G/38: GODCA, "Deslocação à Província de Tete. Campanha Agrícola 1980/81" (3/10/80).

MAP 10.2: ALDEIA COMUNAL CAPIRIZANGE (OUA)

121 122 123 124	125 126 127 128	129 130 131 132	133 134 135 136	137 138 139 140	141 142 143 144	145 146 147 148
109 110 111 112	113 114 115 116	117 118 119 120	149 150 151 152	153 154 155 156	157 158 159 160	161 162 163 164
97 98 99 100	101 102 103 104	105 106 107 108	165 166 167 168	169 170 171 172	173 174 175 176	177 178 179 180
85 86 87 88	89 90 91 92	93 94 95 96	181 182 183 184	185 186 187 188	189 190 191 192	193 194 195 196
73 74 75 76	77 78 79 80	81 82 83 84	197 198 199 200	201 202 203 204	205 206 207 208	209 210 211 212
61 62 63 64	65 66 67 68	69 70 71 72	213 214 215 216	217 218 219 220	221 222 223 224	225 226 227 228
49 50 51 52	53 54 55 56	57 58 59 60	SPORT		233 234 235 236	237 238 239 240
37 38 39 40	41 42 43 44	45 46 47 48	SCHOOL		245 246 247 248	249 250 251 252
25 26 27 28	29 30 31 32	33 34 35 36	PARTY		257 258 259 260	261 262 263 264
13 14 15 16	17 18 19 20	21 22 23 24	HEALTH POST		269 270 271 272	273 274 275 276
1 2 3 4	5 6 7 8	9 10 11 12	SHOP		281 282 283 284	285 286 287 288

Source: MA.CNAC.AC/3: MOPH/DNH, "Inquérito" [1973].

However, there were also other reasons behind the increased hardships faced by each family in assuring people's life in the communal villages. Household agriculture was affected both by population nucleation in itself, and more particularly by the extent to which it was subordinated to cooperative production (or to the state farm system in other regions). As to the effects exerted by villagisation in general, problems in the communal villages were not generally very different from the ones the peasants had been submitted to some years before, during the *aldeamento* process, and some of the main characteristics deserve to be recalled here. Firstly, the problem of land availability, perhaps the most serious one, with many causes and certainly many effects as well. If the main characteristic of Tete land, of small scattered pockets of fertile soils not having carrying capacity for considerable numbers of people, is linked with the agricultural practices carried out traditionally, then this was a problem which was difficult if not impossible to solve. Its solution was further hampered by the general lack of studies of farming soil availability preceding villagisation. The result could only have been *less* farming land available per family in the villages. In Tete, land distribution around the villages apparently did not follow a standardised formula: it greatly depended on the local authorities. According to one direct witness, "each one would demarcate his land starting by contacting the people already living there to find out where the good lands which had been left could be found".¹⁰⁵ Though the war situation up to 1992-1993 did not permit extensive field research on this matter, some indications of *régulo* preponderance in Mwanza, some developments which occurred during the *aldeamento* process, and the situation which was going on in other Mozambican provinces¹⁰⁶ suggest that in this context, families already living in the region before the villages were created, and therefore "owning" the land, tended to end up in a superior position by taking hold of the best lands or even by running local land distribution. This was in spite of some indications revealing that the authorities were aware of the problem and tried several ways of minimising it, for instance by adopting new names for the villages not related with the preponderant families.¹⁰⁷ According to Casal¹⁰⁸,

¹⁰⁵Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹⁰⁶See Geffray 1991:20, particularly footnote 13.

¹⁰⁷Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹⁰⁸Casal 1988:176.

"Most of the lands are placed under occupation and utilisation rights by local lineages, which creates very acute conflicts between the incomers and these matrilineal lineages. The verdict of such conflicts - when taken to trial at the village people's court - is in most of the cases in favour of the *traditional proprietors* as the mechanisms for exerting lineage power are still very vivid and easily overcome Frelimo political structures at the village level; sometimes the traditional representatives also take part at the village political and administrative organs and manage to efface the strength and political meaning of the official people courts".

This factor certainly contributed to the beginning of a process of social differentiation which did not have time to mature owing to the short life of Tete communal villages and difficult village conditions. Meanwhile, for the incomers, the immediate result was further hardships in gaining access to the land. But less land available was far from being the only problem. In fact, it produced two important consequences. Firstly, the increased population density provoked much higher pressure on the land, while secondly it lengthened the distances to the *machambas*. As to the former, since the "slash and burn" *machambas* with not very well demarcated boundaries - moved every five years or so, according to the degree of land degradation - were replaced by smaller better defined plots where people cultivated through the same technique, the result could only have been deferred and reduced fallow periods, and increased land degradation without people being able to move their *machambas* elsewhere. This factor was obviously aggravated by the fact that most of the new villages were located at the sites of the former *aldeamentos* and, therefore, surrounded from the start by lands suffering some level of degradation.¹⁰⁹ Besides aspects such as serious land erosion, this process was also accompanied by a fast degradation of the natural resources nearby, particularly of fuelwood, wood for housing,¹¹⁰ and wildlife and fruits which had the important role of traditionally supplementing household economy. Around the communal villages, therefore, *less* land available went in parallel with *worse* land available.

As the number of incomers kept growing and this process reached unbearable levels, people were forced to move to new, more distant lands, which comprised the second of the two serious consequences mentioned above. In the words of Maxwell Mwanza, head of the Provincial Physical Planning Department and who integrated the brigades for settling Tete communal villages,

¹⁰⁹This factor is referred to by Raposo 1988:108 as leading to the abandonment of most of the *aldeamentos* after independence. In Tete, at least, reality showed however that most of the *aldeamentos*, though eroded, remained as nucleations.

¹¹⁰On the direct influence of wood availability in determining house building quality within Tete communal villages see Mwanza and Coutinho 1992:Interview.

"At the beginning, [the village] was understood as people living together. Other aspects as agricultural production, for example, were left behind. (...) The *machambas* nearby were immediately occupied by the first ones arriving in the village. The people who followed had to occupy *machambas* which were apart (...). This is why many people would sometimes leave the village early in the morning and would stay at their *machambas* for an entire week, sometimes for the entire agricultural campaign, only returning after the harvest. This problem emerged because some [authorities] were only interested in gathering people to live together".¹¹¹

The trend for the distance being increased between residence and *machamba* was aggravated, on the one hand because of the process of continuous land degradation, and on the other because of the state efforts to keep and even to increase the nucleation levels. According to Mwanza, the government still would not cease contacting reluctant or stubborn people on the *machambas* and "strongly suggesting" their return into the villages. Consequently, and in spite of several efforts to overcome this problem by staying at the *machambas* as long as possible or by maintaining the village as the formal place of residence while living most of the time near their crops,¹¹² the fact is that the distances to the *machambas* played an increasing role in the economy of the villagised family.

It is widely acknowledged that slash and burn agriculture is characterised by a delicate balance. Much African soil is generally poor and subject to fast erosion and the producer has neither energy nor technology but has to produce what is necessary to assure their own reproduction with the least deployment and as short in time as possible. This is true even if the market incentives, in the case of Tete existing for several decades, create new needs and pull the economy above strict subsistence levels. Seen from another angle, dispersed settlement and the technology based on the hoe enable a balanced and sustainable relationship with the environment. In this context, slight changes can produce serious imbalance. According to Casal,¹¹³

"A negative change in average productivity due, for instance, to natural obstacles, accidents, longer distances, etc., will provoke an impact which will be immediate on the produce - decreased production - and transferred onto the costs - increased costs up to a certain level of the production capacity. In this case, unbalancing factors of the domestic production system easily occur and the risk of dissolution and disruption of the reproduction abilities is most probable".

¹¹¹Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹¹²See on this last argument Geffray 1991:136.

¹¹³Casal 1988:168.

Other induced factors weakening household agriculture, already referred to, were the state's incapacity to replace the *cantineiros* by an effective commercial network in the rural areas, and in general, Frelimo and the new Government's disavowal of cultural values associated with the rural society, since the strategy of villagisation was based on the idealised family unit of man, wife and children, the denial of the *régulo* structure and sometimes of the family scale of values and authority greatly influencing the structure of household production.

Cooperatives were installed in this weak and greatly disrupted economy, and more than just competing with household agriculture, brought into it further negative influences. Firstly, it has to be said that in every possible sense household agriculture became not only debilitated but also treated as "illegitimate" within the communal village process, even if occasionally this trend was fought by some state structures. Under the general strategy of development, cooperatives, in parallel with the state farms, were to lead the rural economy and society in the transition to socialism. Household agriculture, a sector which did not receive any state investments throughout the period, was seen as an existing reality historically condemned to disappear, characterised by negative and backward values, political and economic as well as social and cultural. Consequently, although precise data are not available for each case, cooperatives most probably increased an already acute competition for the village lands, one which was generally described by Araújo:¹¹⁴

"When land distribution is undertaken it is not uncommon for the most fertile soils to be provided to the cooperatives, while the family units have to be limited to the lands remaining, sometimes characterised by a mediocre soil fertility".

However, these early elements of conflict were probably attenuated by the fact of cooperative participation being opened to everyone. Beyond political forms of propaganda, an ordinary peasant would adhere to the cooperative project in the expectation that, backed by the immense strength of the Government, with its machines and money and trucks and consumer goods, cooperatives would be a much more easy way of gaining a living. At this point, it seems crucial to seek the point of view of the local household producer and the possible misunderstanding established early in this process. Dolny and Senna¹¹⁵ wrote that

"It is known that cooperativism is not a mode of production. As a theoretical proposition, it never postulated ways to solve the fundamental issue of the class struggle. As a way of producing, it can be adapted to any political system, capitalist or socialist. Cooperativism is always a private appropriation (though by a group) of the means of production and, consequently, of the wealth produced by the cooperativist group. As such, its tendency is in principle for stimulating private accumulation by the cooperativist group".

¹¹⁴Araújo 1988:350.

¹¹⁵Dolny & Senna 1978:1-2.

While Frelimo and the government looked at the cooperatives from the point of view of their macro-strategy of transition to socialism, the peasants, quite legitimately, seem to have seen it, from the start, as a "short-cut" to improve their lives still under the logic of their traditional way of producing. A well established commercial network for supplying the villages with production factors and consumer goods, as well as for surplus acquisition, would probably have been a factor favouring the attraction of the cooperative movement into the orbit of the government strategy. In practice, on the contrary, the prevailing situation of weak economic integration seems to have pulled the cooperatives into the household orbit. This was probably the reason why cooperativists in Tete pressed in general for their cooperatives to develop foodcrops which would strengthen their own food security, instead of commercial ones. Nor probably could it have been different without great financial and technological investments which the state was not prepared to make in the cooperatives. The prevalence of the same cultures in the cooperatives as on the family plots, implying the same agricultural calendar for both, brought as an important consequence the fact that each agricultural operation required intensive labour participation at the same point in time of the year. This explains perhaps some of the absenteeism experienced by the vast majority of Tete cooperatives, their members choosing to assure their own *machambas* before the one of the cooperative.

Casal summarised the relationship between the cooperative and household sectors by writing that the disadvantage faced by the domestic units was twofold: on the one hand, family production decreased because part of its producers (or their production time) were transferred into cooperative production; on the other hand, it had to keep on assuring the maintenance or reproduction of the cooperative labour force despite the scarce or absent cooperative results.¹¹⁶ With the failure of cooperative production as an alternative to develop the village economy, household production, though severely weakened, remained as the only way of guaranteeing the survival of the villagers. From the early 1980s, hunger began to be commonplace in the Province, hitting first the areas more vulnerable to drought and floods such as Mágoè, Cahora Bassa and Changara, in the south, and Mutarara in the east. Routes heading to Angónia began to emerge, where groups of peasants would go to buy foodstuffs

¹¹⁶Casal 1988:1987.

whenever they could afford it.¹¹⁷

By 1982, the rural world was, in Tete, on the verge of collapse. As to the cooperatives, they either i) merely asked the state for money in advance, as did Moatize's cooperative Samora Machel and others (a request which was strongly refused by the provincial authorities on the grounds that the cooperatives should fight hunger by producing)¹¹⁸, or ii) reverted to the family economy,¹¹⁹ or iii) sought wage labour when and wherever was possible, as was the case with many cooperatives in Mutarara.¹²⁰ The villagers, based on their family *machambas*, reacted probably by looking at the communal villages as a failed experience, not holding any more the prospects of a future life of abundance which had been advertised in the propaganda of the early days.

e) War and Decline of the Tete Communal Village Programme

Renamo, the terrorist movement fighting Mozambique's independent Government, arrived in Tete when the Province was involved in the rural situation discussed above. The first signs of military instability in Tete were observed in early 1982 when reports by truck drivers mentioned the presence of guerrilla forces on the road heading south, to Changara and Zimbabwe. Soon other signs emerged, such as the firing at the house of CO-1 Project's local manager, at Temangau, in 27 July, ascribed to an "unknown author" but probably meaning

¹¹⁷Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview. "This hunger was the first one hitting the Province since independence. (...) For instance, I am a peasant with nothing to eat. I get some money and travel to Fingoé or Macanga, Furancungo, where I manage to buy three or four sacks of maize, potatoes and beans, which I bring back here, into my place. It was like this: people would head to the extreme north of the Province to save their lives".

¹¹⁸MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):19-21.

¹¹⁹The district responsible for communal villages in Mutarara asked in desperation: "Why are the cooperative areas already tilled never entirely seeded? Because we are not capable of mobilising the people. They just work for a few hours at their cooperative but still find strength to work at their family plots. Why can't they transport the cooperative onions if they are able to transport the produce from their *machambas* for long distances?" MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):13.

¹²⁰MA.GODCA.G/134: DPA/Tete, "2o Seminário Provincial das Cooperativas Agrárias" (16/05/82):11-12.

that, in addition to road ambushes more selected targets were being hit.¹²¹ From August on, and for the next three months, a series of powerful attacks was to be launched, following a consistent pattern which permits some indication of their nature and objectives.

As seen in Table 10.14 below, these 1982 operations, soon attributed to the MNR (the English acronym for Mozambican National Resistance),¹²² were limited to eastern Tete, particularly to Changara, which witnessed the first attacks by guerrilla forces coming from southern Manica Province, where a Renamo presence had been felt for some time.¹²³ Though this is not the place to discuss the origin and history of Renamo,¹²⁴ some elements are required here in order to enable a better understanding of the conjuncture prevailing at the time when Renamo arrived in Tete and which determined its first activities in particular areas. By this time the main support given to the movement had been transferred from former Rhodesia, which in the meantime had turned into independent Zimbabwe, to South Africa.¹²⁵ From its northwestern territory, particularly a base at Phalaborwa and through

¹²¹Investigations on the presumable authors were made by police brigades, not the military. MA.GODCA.G/112: Centro de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo [hereafter CADECO] (Projecto CO-1), "no.61/CADECO/82" (17/08/82).

¹²²In fact, this movement have been labelled by several designations which somewhat correspond to its complex nature. Later on, it would designate itself as Renamo (after *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*) apparently in an attempt to dissociate itself from the English abbreviation of MNR, embarrassingly connecting it with their Rhodesian and South African mentors and supporters. Mozambican authorities, denying the movement any political status until much later, referred to their members as *bandidos armados*, or "armed bandits". Commonly, particularly in the rural areas, they were also known as *Matsangas*, after the surname of André Matsangaiza, their first leader, whose early death in October 1979, in the course of an attack at the small town of Gorongosa, lent him a mythical fame. The movement will henceforth be referred to as Renamo, the term which prevailed until the present day.

¹²³MA.CNAC.AC/131: CPAC/Tete, "no.287/CPAC/82(Confidencial)" (30/11/82); Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹²⁴Literature on Renamo origins and history in general is already vast though somewhat repetitive. There is a particularly focus on this issue, amongst others, in Martin & Johnson (eds.) 1986; Metz 1986; Vines 1991; Young 1990; Tajú 1988.

¹²⁵The MNR had been created by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), headed by Ken Flower, in order to gather intelligence on Zimbabwean nationalist movements operating from Mozambique, and to undertake sabotage operations within this country. The rapid increase which initially occurred in the number of its troops had been due to the fact that on the eve of independence joint Portuguese/Rhodesian military operations already included the use of pseudo-terrorist groups who could be easily adapted to their new role, in a process described by Nilsson 1991 as "the pseudo-terrorist concept developed into a pseudo-guerrilla concept"). After the victory of ZANU-PF on the 1980 Zimbabwean elections the MNR had to leave the country to South Africa, which had been involved in the operation since early 1979 (see Flower 1987:262, 300-302; Johnson & Martin (eds.) 1986:11-15; Darch 1989:39). According to Vines 1991:18, "the transfer to South Africa from Rhodesia was done mostly by air, using a shuttle of South African C130s. These carried the equipment and staff of *Voz da África Livre* [radio services broadcasting into Mozambique], Renamo personnel, their armaments and several instructors. The remaining rebels were ordered to regroup

the Mozambican Province of Gaza and air support, that country was able to directly support Renamo action in Manica.¹²⁶ On the other hand, Malawi also represented an important source of support to Renamo. Malawi's reasons, not to be discussed here at length either, were several. They were partly historical, related both to Banda's ambitions to build a "Great Malawi" based on the ancient Maravi empire, and to events which developed during Frelimo's struggle for independence, which included a close association of Banda with the southern white states, particularly his collaboration with the Portuguese counter-insurgency forces.¹²⁷ But Malawi was also "trapped" by South Africa, which granted vital support to its economy and communications, and in this sense was in a position to pull Malawi into its orbit and strategy for destabilising the region in spite of the fact that the latter had joined SADCC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (a development association of independent Southern African states opposed to South Africa's attempts at regional hegemony). If the above is taken into account, Renamo's penetration into eastern Tete became possible both from Manica in the south, and from Malawi in the north.

On the other hand, and probably resulting from such connections, Renamo experienced an increased operational ability from the second half of 1982,¹²⁸ through factors which included the union of its forces with those of *África Livre*, aiming at opening a joint northern military front.¹²⁹ *África Livre*, which operated approximately between 1979 and

at a base already set up on Sitatonga mountain (...)". South Africa's hostility towards Mozambique was motivated by the view of its leaders of the strategic need to fight the regional installation of communism in Southern Africa and was allegedly based on the need to counteract Mozambique support to the guerrilla activities of South Africa's African National Congress, ANC. Documents found when Renamo's Garágua base was captured confirmed South Africa's objectives "to turn Mozambique into a destabilised buffer zone and to curb ANC infiltration into South Africa" (Vines 1991:20). Of course, the South African destabilisation effort was also motivated by what was considered as the threat which the Mozambican ports and railways, in providing the Southern African hinterland with an alternative way out to the sea, represented to South African economic hegemony in the region (see, amongst extensive literature, Adam *et al.* 1981; Metz 1986:491-507; Olson 1990:17-62).

¹²⁶A major Renamo base was established at Garágua, in Manica, from where the communication lines between the coastal town of Beira and Zimbabwe (including the railway and the Beira-Feruka pipeline) could be sabotaged. Garágua was captured by the Government forces in December 1981.

¹²⁷Generally on Malawi political developments after its independence, McMaster 1974 and Short 1974. Literature on the relationship between Malawi, the Portuguese and Frelimo is also vast, including Henderson 1977, Borges Coelho 1984 and 1989, Hedges 1987 and 1989.

¹²⁸By late 1982 Renamo had reached all Mozambican provinces with the exception of Cabo Delgado, on the extreme northeast, its forces being estimated as around 8,000 men (Young 1990:498).

¹²⁹See on this respect Vines 1991:54-55.

1982, probably had its roots on UNAR, a proxy liberation movement created with the support of Jorge Jardim and Banda to claim the "liberation" of northern Mozambique, between rivers Rovuma and Zambezi.¹³⁰ Since *África Livre* had its base and operations focused on western Zambézia, near the Malawian eastern border, military operations were increased at that time, simultaneously with the first attacks on Tete, which cannot have been coincidental.¹³¹

Finally, a third element determining the location of Renamo's first operations in eastern Tete was that the Gorongosa region, in central Mozambique, was selected as a privileged base for Renamo's operations in the country for two main reasons. Firstly, it was close to the home area of the Ndaou, an ethnic group who supported and supplied the movement with men from the outset.¹³² Secondly, because this was a strategic area easily accessible from Malawi, through a strip following the Chire river across Mutarara district, from where immense areas in central Mozambique could be controlled.¹³³

All the above elements combined determined Renamo penetration from Manica's districts of Tambara and Guro, and from southern Malawi (and probably Morrumbala district, in western Zambezia), into Tete's areas of Changara and Mutarara, respectively, also affecting Moatize and Macanga, districts bordering the former. From these original areas the

¹³⁰UNAR was the acronym for *União Africana da Rumbézia*, or African Union for Rumbézia. While Banda had in mind Malawi's access to the Indian Ocean, Jardim had probably sought the creation of a tampon between Mozambique and Tanzania (the main Frelimo rear base), even if at the cost of losing the northern part of Mozambique's territory (Jardim's personal interests were mainly located at the central territory). On UNAR see Borges Coelho 1984 and Tajú 1988.

¹³¹Wilson 1992:1, documented the arrival of "a strong Renamo force (...) in Morrumbala district in August 1982, as part of its first and highly co-ordinate assault on western and central Zambezia (...) probably involving troop movements in directly from the established war zone of Sofala [and] from across the border of a neighbouring country [Malawi] (...). The two administrative posts (*postos*) of Morrumbala district, Chire and Derre, both fell on the 3rd September 1982; and two of the other four important centres in the district, Megaza and Pinda, also fell in late 1982".

¹³²Though Renamo had its recruiting base widened as to include people from all regions, sometimes adhering but mostly abducted, Shona and particularly Ndaou remained as the ethnic "core" of the movement, probably due to historical and geo-strategic reasons in the first place (the provinces of Sofala and Manica, of Shona extraction, were the first ones to endure the Rhodesian backed action of Renamo and, as was already referred to, Zimbabwe's communication with the sea was selected by South Africa as a prime target for Renamo operations). This issue, very complex, requires further research (see references in, for instance, Cahen 1988:12; Roesch 1992a:469-473 and *passim*; Roesch 1992b).

¹³³This penetration route is historical and was used by Frelimo during the independence struggle in the 1970s. It was the shortest and more direct way leading from Malawi to the area of Gorongosa Mountains. These were strategic for controlling Mozambique's central area since the old times of *prazeiro* Gouveia, in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, this was an area relatively near "Renamo's areas" in Manica.

military action spread into the western districts: Marávia in late 1983, Zumbo in 1985 and Cahora Bassa and Mágoè in late 1986 or 1987.¹³⁴ Of course, the concentration of the state's agricultural initiative on Tete's eastern areas, including more communal villages and cooperatives, and its subsequent lesser presence in western areas as Zumbo, also played a role in Renamo's focus on eastern Tete.¹³⁵ Moreover, due to difficult airborne communications, ambushing and landmining of the few roads heading west soon isolated the western districts without the need, on the part of Renamo, for local operations. In fact, by November 1982 CPAC/Tete was already reporting that

"Access roads, which are strategic targets for the *armed bandits*, became practically impassable to almost every district or communal village north of the Zambezi, such as: Angónia, Mutarara, Marávia, Zumbo, Moatize, Macanga and Chiúta. Due to its proximity to the provincial capital, it is still possible to reach safely Moatize's central area. Access to the remaining districts now requires military escorts".¹³⁶

To the conjunctural data later made available and on which the argument above is based, was added the evidence of powerful and widespread simultaneous military operations (requiring a considerable level of coordination), causing a sudden shift in the security condition of the Province and pointing at an external origin of the conflict. Besides their geographical scope and timing, Table 10.14 also reveals a clear pattern in Renamo's first military operations in Tete, composed on the one hand by a focus on communal villages and cooperatives as privileged targets, and on the other by a continued characteristic of these attacks of destroying infrastructures and houses and pilfering the village goods and villagers' belongings. Almost 70% of the targets were communal villages, mostly former *aldeamentos* being "transformed"¹³⁷ or villages newly created, while the rest were cooperatives. The particular focus of Renamo operations on cooperatives was further confirmed by evidence such as that of the first reported attack, on cooperative *Massacre de Wiriamu*:

¹³⁴Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹³⁵According to Coutinho, Renamo operations on the south of the city of Tete were kept strictly confined to Changara for a long time, limited, to the west, by the Mazoe river. Military convoys protecting the road to Songo, Cahora Bassa, only became necessary from 1988. Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹³⁶MA.CNAC.AC/131: CPAC/Tete, "no.287/CPAC/82 (Confidencial)" (30/11/82).

¹³⁷N'cungas, for example, which was attacked and destroyed on 14 November, had been an *aldeamento* which deserved our more detailed approach in Chapter 9. After independence some of its inhabitants left to re-gain dispersed living while others remained at the "informal" village. At the time of the attack, the authorities were trying to create a communal village there, again "mobilising" the people living nearby to be resettled there. This was never achieved since two further attempts were countered by devastating Renamo attacks. See Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

"(...) on the 5th of August of the present year a group of *bandos* was infiltrated. Once they had arrived at the centre of the pilot-cooperative *Massacre de Wiriamu* they entered the residence of the priest,¹³⁸ woke him up and forced him to reveal where the cooperative vault was. They asked him to whom belonged the production means existing at the cooperative, including the car, to which the priest answered that they were his. They said that in case they belonged to the cooperative they would burn it all. After stealing all the cooperative belongings they headed to the neighbouring communal village Carate, where some cooperativists live, together with common population. There they set some houses on fire and stole food and money from some cooperativists (...)"¹³⁹

TABLE 10.14:
MAIN RENAMO MILITARY OPERATIONS IN TETE (AUG-OCT 1982)


Date	District	Place	Target	Damage
5 Aug	Changara	M.Wiriamu	Coop.	Ransacking of food and clothing
5 Aug	Changara	Múduð/Cancunç	Village	Assault, house burning, ransacking of food and clothing
5 Aug	Changara	Carate ^a	Village	Assault, ransacking of food and clothing
5 Aug	Changara	Nhaphonzoa ^b	Village	Assault, ransacking of food and clothing
14 Sep	Moatize	N'cungas ^a	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
24 Sep	Moatize	Djenje ^b	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
26 Sep	Moatize	Catme ^a	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
Oct	Mutarara	Doa ^a	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
Oct	Mutarara	Bauó/Mbinhe	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
Oct	Mutarara	Muanga	Coop.	Cooperative was demolished, ransacking of food
7 Oct	Changara	Capimbi	Village	Assault
7 Oct	Changara	Temangau	CO-1 Centre	Assault and destruction of project facilities
10 Oct	Macanga	25 de Setembro	Coop.	Assault, ransacking of food and clothing
10 Oct	Moatize	Canchira ^a	Village	Village was assaulted and burnt, ransacking of food
10 Oct	Moatize	Catipo ^a	Village	Village was assaulted and burnt, ransacking of food
13 Oct	Macanga	Central Area	CPAC truck	Truck was burnt
13 Oct	Macanga	Eduardo Mondlane	Coop.	Installations were burnt, ransacking of food
15 Oct	Moatize	N'thudz ^a	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing
31 Oct	Moatize	Samôa	Village	Village was burnt, ransacking of food and clothing

^aFormer *aldeamentos* being transformed in communal villages; ^bNew communal villages being created.
Source: MA.CNAC.AC/131: CPAC/Tete, "no.287/CPAC/82 (Confidencial)" (30/11/82).

¹³⁸Cooperative *Massacre de Wiriamu* had formerly belonged to catholic priests. The priest referred to here had been its executive manager and was now a cooperativist. MA.GODCA.G/249: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Relatório síntese sobre os trabalhos realizados com cooperativistas e aldeãos de Changara" (25/10/83).

¹³⁹MA.GODCA.G/112: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "no.65/CADECO/82" (6/09/82).

MAP 10.3: RENAMO ATTACKS IN TETE (Aug-Oct 1982)



There were many reasons determining the focus of early Renamo operations on road ambushing and attacks on communal villages and cooperatives. The former, besides being easy targets (commonly poorly escorted or unescorted truck drivers) hampered movement and communications in general. As to the latter, two reasons seem applicable: firstly, these nucleations were frequently the only "marks of state presence" in the rural areas; secondly, it was within these villages that the scarce shops and food stocks were concentrated, as well as the human stock for potentially recruiting to the guerrilla forces. Normally, great numbers of villagers forced to carry food and goods stolen from the villages to Renamo hiding areas were abducted and integrated, frequently through violent means, into Renamo gangs.

The general description of how these first operations were run also follow invariably the same pattern, namely burning of village houses and ransacking of shops and people's belongings, particularly food and clothes. While not relating to Tete specifically (though including great numbers of people from several parts of Tete in its interviewing programme), Robert Gersony's report to the US Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs provides a general description of Renamo's attacks matching with this pattern:

"The attack stage was sometimes reported to begin with what appeared to the inhabitants to be the indiscriminate firing of automatic weapons by a substantial force of attacking Renamo combatants. This force usually has the element of surprise, as the attack begins during the very early morning hours. In some villages, the firing is sometimes reported to be directed into the houses of the civilian population, at inhabitants who attempt to flee and at the handful of Government soldiers or militia, if any, who return the fire. Reportedly the Government soldiers aim their defensive fire at the attackers, while the Renamo forces shoot indiscriminately into the village. In some cases refugees perceived that the attacking force had divided into three detachments: one conducts the military attack; another enters houses and removes valuables, mainly clothing, radios, food, pots and other possessions; a third moves through the looted houses with pieces of burning thatch setting fire to the houses in the village. There were several reports that schools and health clinics are typical targets for destruction. The destruction of the village as a viable entity appears to be the main objective of such attacks".¹⁴⁰

A detailed description was provided by a report on the attack to the CO-1 headquarters at Temangau, a relatively important agglomeration with 13 residences, a mess hall, general store, house carpentry, workshop, film laboratory, central power generator, health post, maternity ward, school and private shop, all surrounded by a small village.¹⁴¹ After having partially destroyed the village of Nhoponzo, which was being "created" as a communal village, 50 to 60 men entered the Temangau Centre after breaking the resistance

¹⁴⁰Gersony 1988:19.

¹⁴¹MA.GODCA.G/112: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "Relatório do ataque ao CADECO-3 pelos Bandos Armados" s/d [1982].

of a small military unit. There they set fire to every building, including furniture (piled inside in order to "feed" the fire) and goods such as medical and school equipment, trucks, tools and so forth, after which they left the place before the arrival of government troops, promising to come back to take the cattle and punish the people who might help in re-building the Centre. From then on, Renamo attacks would follow the same pattern: attack on villages including burning of houses and pillage of foodstuffs and clothes.

But the communal villages only included a minority of the population. In Tete they represented around 13 percent of the total population of the Province, or even 2 percent in Changara.¹⁴² This means that the vast majority of the people lived in the former *aldeamentos* which were now "eroded", and particularly in the small household scattered settlements. These also endured Renamo food requisitions and brutality as well as severe drought which rendered their crops unviable.

In his general approach, Gersony distinguished within the general areas under Renamo influence the following: *tax areas*, "in which the population resides in extremely dispersed patterns" and is obliged to make regular or irregular contributions of food, clothes and other possessions, as well as to do porter work, and where Renamo guerrillas abducted women for sex and men to be integrated into their ranks; *control areas* more strictly and permanently controlled, where both people from the area or brought from other areas lived, a subdivision being suggested within these areas as *combatant bases* (for resident guerrillas), *field areas* (with Renamo *machambas* cultivated by captives), and *dependent areas* (peopled by "the elderly, who cannot serve in other more taxing functions, and young children"); and finally, *destruction areas* which included villages and areas generally under Government control, targeted for destruction.¹⁴³

Of course, such a pattern of territorial organisation varied in space and time. Tete, particularly Changara and Mutarara during this early stage, must have been an immense destruction area (if Gersony's typology is to be adopted) before Renamo presence became permanent, where pockets of tax areas and combatant bases tended to emerge. Within such areas the level of violence exerted by Renamo remained high, including abduction as a means

¹⁴²See estimates in Table 10.1.

¹⁴³Gersony 1988:10-20. Geffrey 1991 described Renamo territorial organisation at Erati, in Nampula province.

to recruiting, pilferage, sexual abuse, forced transport of booty and aimless destruction and manslaughter - terror remained certainly as the most constant characteristic of Renamo's action irrespectively of the specific area.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, a more settled Renamo presence would not necessarily mean a decrease in the level of terror exerted, which, on the contrary, grew as the local commanders got more familiar with their areas of operation and were given a certain liberty of action.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, this became a decisive argument used by some analysts to question the possibility of a popular base for Renamo, vaguely advanced by some on the grounds of local unpopularity of the Government's rural policies.¹⁴⁶ Minter wrote that "both logically and empirically, lack of support for Frelimo in rural Mozambique does not imply

¹⁴⁴Widely documented, including by Renamo's foreign sympathetic or propaganda agents as Jack Wheeler 1985:31-32.

¹⁴⁵Geffray considered that terror, more than a *tactics* for local supremacy was becoming an internal *logic*: "Renamo is a kind of a wild uncontrolled army: not submitted to any superior civil authority which would command it and determine its combat objectives. Its officers nurture a social war *project* which is their sole true motivation: they enjoy the war way of life, a source of enthusiasm and social promotion. Renamo's men are not familiarised with any values besides the martial ones, the sole way of mutual identity within the military institution. The unsubmitiveness of such values to a project of a civil society beyond the army is a plausible explanation for the cruelty they are capable of during their collective operations, particularly when attacking convoys on the roads" (Geffray 1991:155). Though the "warrior spirit" seems to have been developed and even inculcated to the ranks to increase their "effectiveness", the level of "uncontrolled autonomy" seems to have been manifestly exaggerated by Geffray, as became evident, for instance, in the events following the October 1992 peace agreement. Renamo units generally patented close radio contacts with their headquarters and the ceasefire could be effectively established almost overnight, even if arguments such as "war fatigue" could also be alleged. For a critique of Geffrey and stress of the need of a structural articulation of the "external factor" ("the war of the secret services"), meaning the continued level of "remote control" exerted by the South African mentors, see O'Laughlin 1992b:107-142.

¹⁴⁶Some texts, as Clarence-Smith's 1989, sometimes hardly resisted the temptation to hastily infer Renamo's popular support directly from the people's reaction to Frelimo's rural policies. This and other related questions have been behind a sometimes bitter debate, at least in its initial stage provoking a cleavage between those who tended to explain Renamo's growth on the base of its Rhodesian/South African origins and continued obedience, and those apparently considering Mozambique's rural policies as a major cause for the rapid spreading of Renamo's influence over the territory. Having started over the issue of "the roots of Mozambican counter-revolution" the debate meaningfully evolved around the question "Is Renamo a popular movement in Mozambique?" Not being this footnote the appropriate place to discuss this issue (which only in part fits in the period under study) we will just argue that as probably happens in all debates of this nature, both parties had partial reasons for their focus since the causes of "Renamo's success" are complex and several: on the one hand, the emergence of Renamo as a direct instrument of Rhodesian/South African policies for destabilising Mozambique, as well as the continuous direct support of South Africa throughout the war kept being profusely documented and became an unquestionable issue to understand this process; on the other hand, it also is now unquestionable that internal conflicts (which took time to be raised and studied), deriving in part from rural contradictions, played an important role in the growth of Renamo "beyond South Africa's wildest dreams", as Clarence-Smith puts it. On the mentioned debate see Clarence-Smith 1989:7-10; Minter 1989b:22-23; Fauvet 1989:26-27; Fauvet 1990:21; Cahen 1989:26-27; Cahen 1989-1990:20-21; Cahen 1990:26; Roesch 1990a:20-22; Roesch 1990b:28-29; and, in some way, O'Laughlin 1992a and 1992b. The issue of Renamo nature as viewed by academics is discussed in a forthcoming doctoral thesis by Yussuf Adam.

support for Renamo".¹⁴⁷ As parallel unarticulated evidence on local disavowal of the Government's rural policies, at least as they were developing until 1983, on the one hand, and of terror exerted by Renamo locally, could probably be gathered ad infinitum, Minter's assertion could well suggest a "third stand" for the majority of the local population,¹⁴⁸ even if nuanced by some level of internal social differentiation which obviously gave rise to unequal means to cope with the situation.

Of course, the pattern of Renamo action described above does not match with an eventual picture of widespread popular support to the terrorist movement. However, on the other hand, generalised as it was, recurrent mentioning of stealing of food and clothing, besides being explained as meeting the needs of the guerrilla units also suggest some sort of autonomous or integrated popular participation, an issue which brings serious inputs to the analysis of Renamo's nature. This aspect is certainly better understood if the social context of great instability provoked by the joint effects of drought and the war brought by Renamo, as well as the diversified local strategies to cope with the situation, are taken into account.

Renamo's arrival in Changara coincided with a drought of serious proportions, which is common in the area.¹⁴⁹ Deprived of food stocks, people from the entire territory of Tete south of the Zambezi were already in search of food, sometimes collecting plants and hunting in the environs,¹⁵⁰ but mostly undertaking longer trips particularly to the northern areas and also to Zimbabwe,¹⁵¹ irrespective of their settlement organisation. Before some stable territorial war pattern could be established, late 1982 and early 1983 became times of great movement of villagised and dispersed populations heading north or south in search of food,

¹⁴⁷Minter 1989b:22.

¹⁴⁸Also in the same line, Roesch 1990b:28, when writing, referring to Nampula province, that "peasant alienation from Frelimo has not entailed large-scale active political support for Renamo, but at best passive neutrality towards both sides". See also, in this regard, Roesch 1992b and the population's "retreat to tradition".

¹⁴⁹After independence, droughts were reported almost every year south of the Zambesi, particularly in 1981-1982, and a major flood in 1978.

¹⁵⁰MA.GODCA.G/249: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Relatório síntese sobre os trabalhos realizados com cooperativistas e aldeãos de Changara" (25/10/83).

¹⁵¹Mention of widespread exchange of goats for food in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s can be found, for instance, in Adam 1991:188. "Food routes" linking Changara to certain areas north of the Zambezi as Angónia, Macanga and Marávia in Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

escaping from the war zones or simply hiding from Renamo's roaming gangs.¹⁵² Family capacity to cope with such adversities eventually depended to a great extent on their own wealth. Families with stronger alliances (kinship or other), better access to irrigated lands, or owning cattle herds or cereal stocks, could resist longer and even had more cash available to organise "expeditions" for food acquisition. However, they probably became also more privileged targets for Renamo's operations within a society which, as a whole, increasingly tended to be levelled to the bottom.

Sometimes the decision to send a group for food elsewhere was taken at a communal village general meeting, as was the case at village Cancune. But this probably was more and more an exception since the level of village political and social organisation permitting the design of collective strategies to cope with these problems was sharply decreased because of the withdrawal of the already weak party and state local presence as well as any form of locally fostered administration. As have been profusely documented, village political and administrative leaders, or "state representatives" as teachers and nurses, became privileged targets of Renamo's violent action from the outset of the war. Moreover, these villages and cooperatives were, in most of the cases, protected by feeble security detachments which made them tempting military targets from a guerrilla point of view.¹⁵³ Villagers from Cancune made impressive appeals for an APE to be appointed for the local health clinic and particularly for government support in improving their self-defence capacity, apparently with no answer.¹⁵⁴ According to Mwanza's account,

¹⁵²Little is known about local strategies on this respect, not only for Tete but also for the entire country. Wilson 1992:8-9, did some useful descriptions on this regard for the case of Derre, in western Zambezia, where "people had to develop increasingly sophisticated systems. (...) each nuclear family possessed around five *camblinha* [camouflaged pits in which people can hide without detection by Renamo soldiers] each located in a different area of dense lowland vegetation. On each occasion that the family met they would agree which *camblinha* they would meet next time and at what time. Each family member would take a different route, and when using paths all kinds of tricks would be used to confuse anyone trying to interpret the footprints (such as walking backwards). Fields could be farmed by moonlight, and people also fed off the fruits in abandoned orchards and in the bush, and fished and hunted (including in teams using nets)".

¹⁵³The characteristic of Renamo as a guerrilla movement has been denied on the grounds that it did not develop means of "winning the hearts and minds" of the people. Guerrilla, as considered here, is rather a military tactics which includes, for example, avoiding direct confrontation with a more powerful enemy, "hit and run" operations, ambushes as a means to avoiding easy movement and communications of the contrary forces.

¹⁵⁴MA.GODCA.G/249: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Relatório síntese sobre os trabalhos realizados com cooperativistas e aldeãos de Changara" (25/10/83): "(...) they say that district authorities went there to register the names of volunteers but nothing was done since then".

"Renamo was first noticed in the area by attacking the villages (...). There were no military forces there to assure defence, contrary to what had happened in the *aldeamentos*. The only forces available were some militia units formed out of people from the villages, village sons which tried to maintain some level of security. They [Renamo] would burn and steal. So villagers began dispersing. (...) They could even have given them food but Renamo would come back on the following day to attack the very ones who had fed them".¹⁵⁵

On the other hand, as suggested above, the Government revealed its incapacity to counter Renamo's operations, both militarily and through the strengthening of local security forces.¹⁵⁶ These factors, added to the problems clearly emerging and discussed in the previous section, provoked a situation of a rapidly disintegrating society in which the strategies to cope with generalised famine and war were increasingly drawn out of the contexts locally assumed as created and controlled by the state, and inserted in a household framework which frequently opposed the former. This was clearly illuminated by the President of the Tete union of cooperatives (which was being created) when saying, at a meeting of the CO-1 Project:

"The bandits threaten us that they don't want cooperatives but we still do cooperatives! They come to steal and destroy our *machambas* and consumption cooperatives, and to take our cattle. People not integrated in cooperatives laugh at us! People not integrated in cooperatives take the road, hitching a ride, going on foot or bicycle in search for food, which they bring back home. We, the ones working at the cooperative *machamba*, cannot leave the place for a whole week in search for food. And then the people laugh at us again and ask - if Frelimo supports the cooperatives how come that you starve?"¹⁵⁷

In the cooperatives the weak money reserves still left rapidly began being plundered by cooperativists, including cooperative presidents, not necessarily through theft but particularly as attempts to buy food elsewhere. "Informal distribution" of cooperative money amongst cooperativists became a strategy for food acquisition and to safeguard it from Renamo's actions. At village Capimbi, for instance, when Renamo gangs approached its environs, cooperatives *III Congresso* and *Eduardo Mondlane* distributed their money among

¹⁵⁵Mwanza & Coutinho 1992: Interview.

¹⁵⁶As O'Laughlin 1992b:121 wrote: "Though local defence forces can be found in parts of the country capable of assuring village defence, I think it is fair to acknowledge that generally militia units have not been able to defend the areas submitted to Renamo attacks". Curiously, besides some hasty references, no relevant analyses, both within and outside the country seem to have been attempted since independence on the Mozambican army, ones which would include the transformation of Frelimo guerrilla units in a regular army as well as the role played on this war. On the other hand, here resides perhaps the most striking difference from the colonial *aldeamentos*, where in spite of everything a considerable level of local defence had been assured by militia units.

¹⁵⁷MA.GODCA.G/199: "Acta sintetizada do VII Colectivo de Direcção Alargado do Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo Agrário (Projecto CO-1)" (13/04/83).

their members who would keep their share at home so that in case of attack they could run away with it.¹⁵⁸ Given the lack of proper registration of these operations, this suggests a "final distribution" and, symbolically, the dissolution of the cooperative. At the same time, cooperative production was definitely coming to a halt. Cooperative *Massacre de Wiriamu* followed the tilling and harrowing plan but only sowed 3.5 ha, with no results. Cooperative *III Congresso* planted 5 ha but the seeds did not germinate, the same happening with the 14 ha of cooperative *Eduardo Mondlane*. The remaining Changara cooperatives, *Unidade* and *Maputo*, simply did not sow.¹⁵⁹ The situation in Moatize was the same. There, CADECO had also withdrawn its support from September on, on the grounds of lack of security conditions for its technicians. Pilot-cooperative *Samora Machel*, for instance, suffered major devastating Renamo attacks in 31 October and 6 December, after which it practically ceased to exist.¹⁶⁰ In practical terms cooperatives had temporarily ceased existing as such by late 1982.¹⁶¹ A still clearer indicator of the people's "third stand" in the context of the war is perhaps the astonishment revealed by the CO-1 project technicians who reported, after Renamo's attack to the Temangau Centre,

"(...) the odd role played by the [surrounding] populations, whose attitudes clearly discouraged the permanence of the few technicians who had decided to return to the Centre after the armed bandits had left. This was the reason why they felt obliged to abandon the Centre immediately, to the city of Tete where they remain at present. (...) the odd behaviour of the neighbouring population, surrounding the Centre, who did not panic with the events of that day, with the exception of the Centre wage workers and a few people from the party and mass organisations, whose houses were set on fire. Also to be mentioned is the fact that the enemy attacked in broad daylight (9.45 a.m.), penetrating through the residential area of the population, who did not panic nor immediately warn the Centre. [The Centre] was [therefore] unexpectedly attacked and

¹⁵⁸MA.GODCA.G/249: Governo Provincial de Tete, "Relatório síntese sobre os trabalhos realizados com cooperativistas e aldeãos de Changara" (25/10/83).

¹⁵⁹MA.GODCA.G/249: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "Relatório" (6/01/83). Cooperatives *Unidade* and *Maputo* were reported in Governo Provincial de Tete 1983 as suffering from almost total cooperativist absenteeism. "Their presidents are the first ones to miss the work".

¹⁶⁰MA.GODCA.G/199: "Acta sintetizada do VII Colectivo de Direcção Alargado do Programa de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo Agrário (Projecto CO-1)" (13/04/83); MA.GODCA.G/249: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "Relatório" (6/01/83). During the first half of 1983 the project attempted the reconstruction of the Temangau Centre and initiated the pre-feasibility study for supporting cooperatives at the Nhartanda valley, on the environs of the city of Tete. See MA.GODCA.G/112: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "no.08/CADECO/83" (16/02/83).

¹⁶¹The situation would partially improve in the second half of 1983 with the reorganisation of the Temangau Centre, which included the creation of the CDR (*Centro de Desenvolvimento Rural* or Centre for Rural Development) with a more supportive role towards Changara cooperatives, and the collaboration of UNICEF. However, a major Renamo comeback in 1985 (which included an assault to the Centre and killing of its director in 5 April) brought all external support practically to a halt. For many years from then the area, as well as most of Tete, became a 100 percent war zone.

occupied".¹⁶²

Strategies for survival became atomised, centred on the family or group, and certainly included local hiding or fleeing to district capitals, before these also became a war zone, and to neighbouring countries through paths which a great part of the older people had crossed some years before. Of course robbery must have also been included in the range of local strategies for survival, either in independent gangs or through occasional participation in Renamo raids,¹⁶³ even if, at least in this first phase, apparently not so structured as suggested for other provinces.¹⁶⁴ This seems to have been the case in southern Changara district, where according to Derluguian "hunger gangs were regularly called upon to participate in ambushes on international aid convoys and Malawi-Zimbabwean transports by a local Renamo commander".¹⁶⁵

Evidence from the discussion above does not point at a *direct* connection between the process of villagisation to which the Tete population was submitted after independence, and the war waged by Renamo. Such a development would have required a relationship between the rural population and Renamo other than the one which prevailed. In fact, Renamo emerged in these early days of the war as a direct instrument of aggression run from the exterior, which determined its evolution as a war machine, nurturing a war culture which was blind to people's aspirations. The communal villages, as the most evident and vulnerable symbols of the presence of Frelimo's state in remote rural areas, were attacked and ravaged precisely as such and not because their disappearance was supported by a deep popular aspiration. People were ruthlessly ordered out of the communal villages precisely because the Government authorities wanted them to remain in them: while the Government was seeking

¹⁶²MA.GODCA.G/112: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "Síntese da reunião com os técnicos" (19/10/82). Further on the attempts to re-establish the Centre after the attack in MA.GODCA.G/112: CADECO (Projecto CO-1), "Relatório do ataque ao CADECO-3 pelos Bandos Armados" s/d [1982].

¹⁶³Wilson 1992:1, referring to Zambezia, mentioned Renamo's expansion in this period as "greatly facilitated by its collaboration with pre-existing or emergent bandit and guerrilla forces who ranged from small groups of armed robbers to populist militia opposed to state rural development programmes".

¹⁶⁴Geffray 1991, referring to Nampula in a later period, shows a mutual utilisation, of traditional authorities by Renamo in order for the latter to assure control of local societies through a sort of indirect rule, and of Renamo by traditional authorities in order for the latter to restore at least part of the role played before the arrival of Frelimo. In general, as the war developed and the war areas became more "stable", this phenomena of the kind became probably more common. See, in this regard, Roesch 1992b.

¹⁶⁵Derluguian 1990:157.

to maintain the nucleations for administration and control purposes, Renamo needed them settled in a dispersed manner so that it could keep on nurturing itself from the violent extraction of the meagre peasant surpluses and of the abduction of men for its military activities. Had it been a movement of a different *nature*, the conflict might perhaps have evolved into a civil war. However, the violence and brutality permanently enveloping the relationship between Renamo and the people condemned, from the outset, any form of evolution towards a popular base for the movement.

In the sense of the reasoning above, villagisation cannot be considered as a cause of the war. However, from this cannot be inferred the mere denial of any relationship between villagisation and this war as was done by Fauvet on the unconvincing grounds of a fragile statistical base.¹⁶⁶ On the contrary, not just broad problems affecting the entire rural people, as the lack of marketing and supplying systems, but also villagisation were connected with the war in the sense that the war caught a rural people weakened by several factors, one of which was certainly this process, according to the arguing of this and the previous chapter. And from then on what the people did was to nurture an ambiguous relationship with the Government which included the lack of special efforts to defend the villages, not considered by them, in general and according to our view, as an asset of theirs. By December 1982 CNAC reported to Frelimo's Central Committee that Renamo had assaulted and destroyed 17 communal villages in Tete,¹⁶⁷ which corresponded to the high percentage of almost 50 percent of the communal villages of the Province in the short period of 5 months. On the other hand, popular reservations towards Renamo are clearly shown by the fact that Mutarara, for instance, was in 1992 reduced to less than 4 percent of its population in 1975.

¹⁶⁶Fauvet 1989:26-27, concluded that since the most villagised areas do not correspond to the areas the most affected by the war there cannot be found any correspondence between villagisation and war in the present Mozambican context, thus neglecting other causes for the territorial localisation of the war conflicts, which are always several and complex. An example he used for strengthening his argument was drawn from the province of Cabo Delgado - usually appointed as Frelimo's stronghold in Mozambique - the most villagised area and simultaneously the less affected by the war. However it is not mentioned that Cabo Delgado was the furthest province from former Rhodesia, Malawi and South Africa, which traditionally provided Renamo's rear base. Neither is taken it into account, for example, the consideration of colonial decision makers according to whom the *aldeamentos* were, in Cabo Delgado, an issue less problematic than in other areas because the people, for several reasons, were used to larger and more stable villages than the average, which eased the transition from the *aldeamentos* to the communal villages (in Cabo Delgado around 70 percent of the communal villages, and not just *some* as Fauvet claims, had their origins in former *aldeamentos*). Darch 1989:44-47, in a section entitled "The Villagisation Problem" follows a reasoning not far from Fauvet's).

¹⁶⁷MA.CNAC.AC/153: CNAC, "Relatório de balanço e prestação de contas ao Comité Central do Partido Frelimo (Confidencial)" (14/12/82):15-16.

Chapter 11:

ALDEAMENTOS AND ALDEIAS COMUNAIS AS STATE-RUN RESETTLEMENT POLICIES IN TETE: COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS

In the short period of fourteen years Tete rural communities endured two major resettlement programmes. These were undertaken by two distinct states, both claiming to be pursuing the general goal of socio-economic development of these communities. In fact, both argued that clustering people in larger villages was a fundamental step in order to provide local communities with services such as health clinics, schools, water supply systems and also commercialisation structures, technical support to agricultural production, and so on.

As to the colonial state, the true nature of its villagisation scheme was soon revealed behind the proclaimed goals. As the war approached, in the early 1960s, the minority of state officials who defended community decision-making (though *relative* and *gradual*) as the only way to perpetuate the Portuguese presence in its colonies were marginalised. The colonial state's developmental argument was then shaped as a mechanism aiming both at international propaganda and at supporting the "Psychological Action" to be exerted on the rural communities submitted to villagisation. Besides the profuse evidence available, such an evolution is corroborated by the fact that the authorities leading the villagisation process were well aware that the *aldeamento* programme, as it was set up, had no chance of producing tangible results in terms of community self-reliance and socio-economic development. In the words of Vasconcelos, who was the director of the Tete *aldeamento* programme between 1972 and 1974:

"The *aldeamentos* had no chance. As I said, they were located in areas deprived of conditions (...). [In so far as foodstuffs are concerned] they always needed help. I do not know of any *aldeamento*, either from the GPZ, the CFM or the Government [which was self-sustained]. Not to mention the *aldeamentos* built by the military, which were true concentration camps where we [administrative officials] would go to try to improve the situation. But all of them needed to be fed, always. (...) They worked badly. But of course it could not have been otherwise. Usually the people were unhappy. They had left their homes, their lands, and were humiliated. Generally they were humiliated. They were under great pressure, submitted to great psychic violence, to say the least... They were humiliated".¹

¹Vasconcelos 1992:Interview.

As we sought to show in Chapters 5 to 8, in the context of the colonial resettlement scheme, development was subordinated to what became the most important and practically exclusive goal of this effort: villagisation as part of a wider counter-insurgency strategy in which it was to perform the role of preventing contacts between a confined population and the guerrilla forces, thus denying the latter any local support. In this context, the room left for *development* was that of achieving a self-sustained level of village activity, to the degree possible, in order to alleviate the *burden* of the colonial state.

The colonial state invested remarkable effort in its counter-insurgency strategy: in the short period of six years the vast majority of the Tete population (70%, according to an estimate discussed in Chapter 6) were clustered together in around 250 *aldeamentos*, and a system of *self-defence* was developed in them through the creation of local militia corps, which prevented Frelimo from occupying any *aldeamento* before April 1974. However, the colonial strategy was only achieved in part since it did not prevent the guerrilla forces from contacting and benefiting from the support of those in the *aldeamentos* nor it was capable of maintaining a *war of fronts*. The initial purpose of the Portuguese army, of placing the *aldeamentos* in lines along the main roads and rivers, creating empty corridors between these lines, was hampered by several factors, related both to the difficulties of the state in implementing the scheme and to the unfolding of the war, as was analysed in Chapters 6 and 8, and in Chapter 7, respectively. Consequently, by 1974 the *aldeamentos* had become "colonial islands in a sea of insurgency", and the guerrilla movement managed to pass through Tete, penetrating deeply into the central districts of Vila Pery and Beira, extending the theatre of war to the central parts of the country.

Finally, if in military terms the results of the *aldeamento* scheme were disputable, in the social and economic ones they undoubtedly *destroyed* community organisation and life. A critical lack of farming land occurred for the first time, a major factor which, associated with the break down of the rural commercialisation network and with the outbreak of diseases the health services could not cope with, promoted generalised famine and instability. The last section of Chapter 8 sought to reveal the degeneration of *aldeamento* N'cungas to a point in which it could not survive without permanent aid from the outside.

As to the resettlement effort deployed by the Mozambican state after independence, it was obviously motivated by radically distinct goals: to end the "exploitation of man by man" through the creation of new production relations in the countryside; to improve the living standards of the people, which allegedly could not be achieved unless the people were clustered in villages where social services as schools and health clinics could be made available. In parallel, the effort of the new regime in nucleating the country's rural population certainly aimed at better access to local communities, trying to extend a relatively firm political and administrative control achieved in the *liberated areas* to the whole country.

But despite the fact that some of these objectives were apparently capable of raising popular support, and of the high reserve of Frelimo popularity in the aftermath of the nationalist war, over the years of its implementation post-independence resettlement achieved modest results both in terms of clustered population (if compared with the colonial *aldeamentos* and with the targets defined by itself) and as a means of improving local socio-economic conditions. The reasons for this are complex and were for some time found exclusively in the action of the proxy guerrilla movement, backed by South Africa, which picked the communal villages and their cooperatives as prime targets for destruction. In Tete, as revealed in Chapter 10, half of the communal villages were destroyed by Renamo in just a couple of months.

However, it is indisputable that before the emergence of Renamo the communal village programme was already revealing clear signs of decline. One first reason must be found in connection with the immoderate trust of the nationalists in the capacity of their state to replace the colonial structures completely and without delay.² One important consequence was the break down of the rural commercialisation network. But the most general cause for the decline was perhaps the centralised and *dualist* perspective developed by the independent state, implemented particularly after the 1977 Third Frelimo Congress, according to which the state effort towards developing the country's economy within the strategy of transition to socialism was focused on the modern sector of the state farms (allegedly the one which could bring quick tangible results). Accordingly, little attention or investment was allotted to the cooperatives and practically none to the family sector. In the view of the state these two last

²The "official discourse" claims that the settlers' retreat left the independent state with no alternative but to take hold of the process decisively, which in part seems true. However, as we sought to show in Chapter 9, it is also a fact that the radical measures taken at the time, in *helping* to increase that retreat, revealed a new regime self-confident to the point of dispensing with a gradual transition.

sectors were to assure most of their self-sustenance while the state would run the transition. The *motto* "to rely on one's own forces", which during the struggle for independence had stressed the political importance of local initiative, progressively acquired an unspoken content in which the peasantry would have to count mostly on themselves to improve their living conditions, in the development strategy.

But further reasons for the failure of the programme (and for co-related peasant resistance) are to be found in villagisation itself, in the cases both of the *aldeamentos* and the *aldeias comunais*. The colonial *aldeamentos*, immediately before independence, had deeply transformed the settlement pattern without transforming the level of productive forces. This meant that slash and burn agriculture based on the hoe remained the practically exclusive way of assuring community production and social reproduction. In this context, nucleation of people could only have meant increased difficulties in access to land, and growing environmental problems, including particularly severe deforestation and scarcity of water. The way to overcome peasant resistance to the *aldeamentos* had been to enforce them by violent means.

After independence few changes occurred in villagisation. On the one hand, the new regime countered peoples' expectations by trying to resume a policy of nucleation (including preventing people from leaving the colonial *aldeamentos*). But on the other, the new state was incapable of assuring the conditions needed to improve the process in the new settlement environment. Furthermore, these must have been times of great confusion for a peasantry who considered the *liberation* as the possibility of leaving the *aldeamentos*, the very same ones which Frelimo had considered as concentration camps during the war for independence. In this context, peasant initial resistance could only have been diminished by the great reserve of popularity which Frelimo had brought from the armed struggle, and by the promises of state support to the new *aldeias comunais*, where life would allegedly be much easier.

This is not to deny a genuine effort on the part of the new regime to improve village conditions and imprint a higher level of local democracy and participation to the process. According to the strategy, cooperatives were to emerge in all communal villages, tending to be the exclusive foundation of their economy in order to end the exploitation inherited from the colonial period. However, several factors contributed to the failure of this project, ironically bringing an extra burden to the villagised family sector. The weak support provided

by the state in terms of agricultural inputs, commercialisation and training of cooperativists, transformed the cooperatives into little more than a symbolic alternative, a reality which the state took too long to recognise and, therefore, to try to alter. Meanwhile, the political stress put on cooperative development transformed the family economy in a *quasi-clandestine* activity, one the peasants were supposed to take care of only after fulfilling their cooperative obligations.

On the other hand, important differences are found between the two resettlement schemes in the way they approached the issue of the so-called traditional forms of local power. The importance of it for the success of the scheme lay on its role, discussed in Chapter 1, in organising the productive and reproductive activities in general. Consequently, social and economic stability depended, to a great extent, upon the preservation of social and cultural values. The decision makers of the *aldeamento* scheme seem to have understood it very well. They followed a colonial tradition developed in the days of Salazar's *New State* and concluded in 1961,³ of integrating, through *manipulation*, the local political and administrative structures as the bottom level of the colonial state apparatus. The *régulo* structure, legitimate by definition, undertook labour conscription and tax collection on behalf of the weak colonial state in a *cost-effective* way. Chapter 6 discussed how this policy was pursued, mentioning the colonial debate, particularly from 1972 and 1973, to place traditional authorities on leading roles in the *aldeamentos*.

The Mozambican authorities after independence, on the contrary, took their view of the traditional authorities as basically undemocratic structures to its last consequences. Traditional authorities were overtly disbarred, and in spite of some attempts of formal cultural integration through national and provincial music and dance festivals, traditional culture was *illegitimised* by the new view which promoted the confrontation of it with the new revolutionary values. Apparently, however, the new Mozambican state's presence at the local level was much weaker than initially expected by the revolutionary authorities and thus a situation was created of a *duality* of powers at the local level, between the new revolutionary authorities and shadow traditional ones. This is not to conclude that local communities reacted as a block against the new values which, in fact, obtained wide support since the days of the armed struggle for independence. However, it is also certain that the attitude of the new

³Discussed particularly in Chapters 3 and 4.

regime played a part precisely in undermining that popularity and in creating local instability. In general, the local communities faced growing difficulties in producing through the only way they knew: lands became scarce, production was disorganised and had to face the competition of the cooperatives, which took time which was necessary for family production, production inputs and consumer goods became rare.

In the socio-economic context described above, differentiated access to the scarce inputs and consumer goods made available by the state to the communal villages led to signs of emergence of a privileged stratum composed of local party and administrative staff. The traditional authorities, who even inside the *aldeamentos* had managed to keep some privileges, more than having to face the competition of a new group were relegated to a *non-existing* status, which must have strengthened their reservations towards the new regime. However, as was argued, cleavages were yet to be neatly defined since this period also witnessed the first signs not simply of decreasing peasant mobilisation towards the goals defined by the party and the state for the countryside, but also of reactions against this scenario, which were frequently led by party and cooperative leaders and developed from ambiguous forms to open challenge. Three sorts of factors were behind these reactions: the increasingly difficult living conditions; the fact that the communities were perhaps not prepared to act so radically against their former authorities; and last but not least, the fact that some aspects of the new reality were in open contradiction with the revolutionary principles and values, particularly when some new authorities openly took advantage of the situation by misappropriating goods and money, or when the state officials and the bureaucratic apparatus revealed a high degree of indifference or insensibility towards the everyday hardships these communities had to confront.

During the late colonial period the population had had to endure the difficulties in a submissive manner, if individual flights to the *liberated areas* are excluded, due to the high degree of militarisation and control in the *aldeamentos*, and to the brutality of the colonial authorities directly in charge of them. However, after independence enforced resettlement almost disappeared,⁴ current villagisation acquired a new *meaning* and people achieved more control of their lives. As the communal village project was entering an impasse or revealing clear signs of failure, people, in face of Renamo brutality, sought generally what was

⁴There are signs of the emergence of strategic (communal) villages formed on the basis of some degree of violence when the new conflict escalated, after the period covered by our study.

considered in Chapter 10 as a *third alternative*, resettling themselves in scattered refuges or seeking safer conditions in neighbouring countries. This tended to depopulate the area,⁵ which is the absolute *negation* of people settlement. Districts such as Mágòè, Mutarara and Angónia became practically depopulated by 1990.


With respect to the settlement pattern, the two resettlement schemes discussed in this study created a new situation in the region, a break with the former historical evolution. Part I of the study revealed that despite the change of actors during the historical process, the settlement pattern had remained *consistent* with the socio-economic reality. Figure 11.1 seeks to simplify this issue, revealing a pattern of community village with a physical configuration which remained unmodified throughout the times, at least until the 1950s, even if suffering profound transformations within.⁶ The *Mwini Dziko* in the 1600s, the *prazo*-holder in the 1800s, the sub-lessee of the Zambezia Company in the first decades of the 1900s, and even the *New State's* Local Administrator (in *association* with the *cantineiro*) in the 1950s, to a certain degree, all attempted to exploit the community village basically without transforming it in physical terms.

Certainly, vital transformations occurred throughout this long historical period (which changed the *content* of the village), particularly the enforcement of tax collection, the deepening of the connection of the village with the external market and the dependence of the former upon the latter, or the withdrawal of men from the village productive sector (not necessarily from the village economy). This process was started with the formation of the *prazo* armies, increased with the slave trade and pursued to the late colonial period with migrant labour. But the fact is that the village was preserved because it assured peasant survival and all the elements of transformation could be integrated in its economy.

⁵After the period under study, particularly from the late 1980s, Renamo would alter its way of acting, trying to assure some degree of territorial and population control, mainly through disgruntled traditional authorities marginalised by the Government.


⁶Chapters 3 to 5 sought to analyse these transformations caused by colonial installation.

MAP 11.1: EVOLUTION OF THE SETTLEMENT PATTERNS IN TETE




ca. 1600

- ⊗ Mambo
- Community villages




ca. 1800

- ⊗ Prazo-holder
- Community villages
- + Achikunda villages




ca. 1910

- ⊗ Zambezia Co. Sub-lessee
- Community villages
- Regulo village




ca. 1950

- ⊗ Local Administrator
- Community villages
- Regulo village



ca. 1970

- ⊗ Local Administrator
- Aldeamentos
- + Military garrisons
- ☆ Guerrilla (people) bases



ca. 1980

- ⊗ Local Administrator
- ◻ Communal Villages
- Former Aldeamentos
- Community villages

Under the assumption above, the *aldeamentos* represent the first break with the historical evolution.⁷ From then on the changes occurred ceased to be *assimilated* by the community economy and became guided by a logic of pure military strategy, even if the propaganda kept trying to present the colonial effort differently. The alterations brought by the new model for settlement pattern, in order to be assimilated, would have to be accompanied by the transformation of slash and burn agriculture, which was not the case. The result was a reality in which the local economy was entirely blocked and the rural population became almost entirely dependent upon external aid.

The development of the rural process in Mozambique after independence, instead of *reconciling* settlement with economy, deepened this gap. Local development, which was in part a matter of recovery, particularly from the harsh conditions of the years preceding independence, was subordinated to a central strategy of development⁸ based on the transition to socialism through growth and accumulation. Local participation, besides being marginalised by the dualist perspective referred to above, far from seeking a balance between community and environment, became a matter of accomplishing targets. Consequently, as the local community was facing increasing difficulties in surviving under these policies, and in the context of natural disasters and emergent war, the national strategy kept to its demanding targets, *divorcing* itself from the real situation of the countryside in Tete.

On the other hand, one last comparison shows that the *aldeamento* scheme had managed to be sufficiently radical as to transform the previous settlement pattern into a new one, in the sense that in the areas under colonial control (the guerrilla areas naturally excluded) all the community villages had practically ceased to exist, replaced by the strategic villages. As to the communal villages, this was a model for settlement pattern the Mozambican Government was incapable of implementing. Despite the initial expectations of clustering together the entire Tete population by 1990, the result was a *composite* settlement pattern formed out of communal villages, former *aldeamentos* and scattered households, all

⁷Certainly, there had been previous colonial attempts to alter the village. However, as was argued in Chapter 4 and deriving from the experience of the colonial administration and also from its relatively low capacity, the transformations had been slow and careful. The authorities used every mean to increase the levels of exploitation of the local community but showed reluctance in *destroying* the village to create a new agglomerate through a process whose outcome they could not foresee. On the other hand, had the nationalist war not come and the *aldeamentos* would take longer to be settled or perhaps would not be settled at all.

⁸In this sense, the military strategy of the Portuguese was replaced by the developmental strategy of the new regime.

entering a profound socio-economic crisis. As the war developed (along with the major drought which hit particularly the southern Tete areas in 1982), this pattern was *destroyed* rather than witnessing the ascendancy of one of its elements.

This process shows that historical evolution is not straight forward. The peasantry of Tete, in the short period of one century were integrated into the international market, semi-proletarianised, then blocked in terms of their development, and prevented from gaining access to the market in a process of slow reversion towards subsistence levels. Finally their own survival was at stake. After the October 1992 Frelimo-Renamo agreement opened up some prospects of peace, large numbers of refugees and displaced people are returning to the area to resume their lives, and a new social fabric will have to be established. This will obviously depend, to a great extent, upon the role of the state. In our view, more than ever the profound implications of the past process of villagisation will have to be taken into account. Equally important will be the strategic role played by dispersed settlement in the struggle against famine, one which is harmonised with the prevailing level of productive forces and which only gradually and carefully can evolve, through comprehensive means of attraction and tangible *stimuli*, and above all through a process controlled, to a great extent, by local communities of peasants, whose prime concern it is.

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5. Personal Communications

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Sarmiento, Luís A.F., November 1991: Former *commando* captain of the Portuguese army (1973-1974).

Segurado, Joaquim Bivar, 16 March 1991: Anthropologist. Extensive field research in Macanga, in 1982.

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